DCAA, SAQs, and IRRs
As many of us have learned (to our continued frustration and chagrin) over the past couple of years, DCAA has continued to struggle to get its act together. It has, as America’s premier contract audit agency, fallen far short of the goals of providing high, quality, timely and useful audit reports. Unwilling or unable to rely on the audit reports produced by its auditors—the very auditors it is responsible for training—it has implemented multiple layers of management review in what perhaps has been a vain attempt to force audit quality downwards. In our view the agency’s efforts have resulted in little measurable progress towards its goals. Instead, the reviews have delayed issuance of critical audit reports (frequently for indefinite periods), and led to the publicly reported phenomenon of “papering” working paper files to as to avoid any review “gigs,” while in reality such “papering” adds nothing of substance. See, for example, this article in which we discussed a DOD Inspector General independent assessment of the quality of DCAA’s audit of The Aerospace Corporation. We told readers of the many DOD IG findings, including this one—
DCAA did not adequately document the internal controls tested for the cash management and special tests and provisions requirements, the criteria used for activities allowed or unallowed and allowable costs/cost principles compliance testing, and the coordination of the scope of audit work performed by the DCAA Field Detachment office. In addition, the audit file contained a voluminous amount of work papers, many of which simply duplicated the same information. Although we acknowledge that the auditors believed that they were providing a good audit trail, we found the format and content of the working papers lacked clarity and contributed to instances of inconsistencies between working papers and the lack of required information in other working papers.
The result of DCAA’s new management philosophy, as we all now know far too well, is a dramatic (some might say precipitous) drop in agency productivity. (We told you about that unfortunate trend here.) Following our article, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) told a Senate Subcommittee that, in GFY 2010, DCAA had actually cancelled more audits that it had completed. It’s become apparent to most of us that the more DCAA tries to dig itself out of the hole created by its past and current leadership, the deeper that hole becomes …. Now we have two new DCAA management initiatives to report. These are two new efforts to force audit quality downwards in lieu of alternate approaches, such as (a) training auditors and providing them with adequate guidance and supervision, and/or (b) creating a workforce where quality is actually embedded into the agency culture. (Just to name two….) The first initiative is that each FAO (Field Audit Office) will now have a new position, the Special Assistant for Quality (SAQ), who reports directly to the FAO Manager. DCAA has always had a SAQ at the Headquarters level; what’s new here is deploying SAQs at the FAO level. Now, to our knowledge DCAA has not yet publicly released a MRD (Memorandum for Regional Directors) discussing the qualifications and role/responsibilities of the FAO SAQ. But from what we’ve experienced first-hand, the SAQ must review and sign-off on all FAO audit reports, to provide assurance that the working papers meet quality standards. The thing is, the SAQ position is a full-time role. Consequently, DCAA (once again) is moving an experienced senior auditor from a Supervisory Auditor or Technical Specialist role and into a management position that does not directly affect the performance of audit procedures. We’ve commented on this unfortunate trend before, and this latest news does nothing to change our mind. We continue to maintain that DCAA’s recent reorganizational efforts have created a vacuum that has sucked senior auditors upwards, leaving a void where experienced Supervisory Auditors and Tech Specialists used to be. This trend, of course, has exacerbated the agency’s audit quality problems. Moreover, we would assert that the last thing DCAA needs right now is yet another layer of management review. The agency is already experiencing prolonged delays is issuing audit reports. (We’ve personally experienced durations in excess of one year as audit reports sit on Branch Managers’ and/or Regional Audit Managers’ desks awaiting review and sign-off.) Does DCAA really need another “review/question/follow-up/resubmit” loop? We would assert the answer to that question is a clear “no.” The second new initiative is discussed in a Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD) dated July 26, 2011. This MRD ( 11-PPS-012(R)) is entitled “Audit Guidance on Independent Reference Reviews.” These new Independent Reference Reviews (IRRs) have a rather unique meaning to the audit agency. As the MRD states—
Referencing is a process in which an experienced auditor, who is independent of the audit, verifies all significant facts, figures, and dates are correctly reported; that the findings are adequately supported by evidence in the audit documentation; and that the conclusions and recommendations flow logically from the evidence.
Effective with the issuance of the MRD, audit reports associated with certain assignments (as delineated in the MRD) must undergo an IRR prior to issuance of the report. Actually, the MRD states that the IRR will take place between the supervisory review and the issuance of the audit report. How the independent reviewer performs the IRR is documented in DCAA Instruction 7642.1, which is included as an attachment to the MRD. IRRs can only be performed by audit staff ranked GS-13 or higher. As the MRD states—
The IRR auditor must possess the knowledge and experience necessary to complete an effective review. The selection of the IRR auditor should be based on the potential reviewer’s independence, objectivity, experience, and analytical ability. The IRR auditor must be someone not directly associated with the work on which the working papers and report are based, and must not be under the direct supervision of the cognizant supervisory auditor.
We looked, and assignments subject to IRR include—
- Incurred cost audits where auditable dollar value is $100 million or more.
- Internal control audits.
- Earned Value Management System reviews.
- All CAS-related audits (except perhaps for Disclosure Statement adequacy reviews).
- Forward pricing assignments, including audits of Forward Pricing Rate Proposals.
- Post-award (“defective pricing”) audits.
As one might expect, there’s a process related to the IRR that includes resolution of issues raised by the review, and even a process for documenting “unresolved deficiencies” and forwarding them to the FAO Manager for resolution. But there’s more—
If the issues cannot be resolved at the FAO manager level, then the FAO manager will forward the workpapers, audit report, and the Independent Reference Review Checklist and Certification to the Regional or Detachment Audit Manager (RAM/DAM) for resolution. Discussions of issues should include all parties. If the issues cannot be resolved at the RAM/DAM level, then the Regional or Detachment Audit Manager (RAM/DAM) will forward the workpapers, audit report, and the Independent Reference Review Checklist and Certification to the Deputy Regional Director for resolution. The resolution should be clearly documented on the Independent Reference Review Unresolved Deficiency List.
Appendix 1 to Enclosure 3 of the MRD contains a “Independent Reference Review Checklist.” Appendix 4 to Enclosure 3 of the MRD contains an “Independent Reference Review Certification” that is to be executed by the IR Reviewer. We trust you are getting the picture …. We have discussed these changes with current DCAA auditors, and we’ve learned that, originally, these two initiatives were separate. By that we mean that the FAO SAQ performed quality reviews and another, independent, GS-13 performed the IRRs. But such duplicative quality reviews were seen as being overly, well, duplicative, and thus the two initiatives were merged such that the FAO SAQ performs all necessary IRRs for the Branch. Thus, instead of two new quality reviews, there is really only one new quality review. That last bit might be seen as a silver lining in the dark cloud of DCAA audit reviews. To wrap this up, we continue to wail and moan and gnash teeth at the long-delayed reports that continue (in our view) to miss the quality mark. But we don’t think these new initiatives—which continue an unfortunate trend of imposing quality downwards instead of fostering it at the lower levels of the organization—are the right approach. It is quite certain that they won’t do anything to speed up issuance of audit reports.
Northrop Grumman Gets Schooled on Anti-Assignments Act
Northrop Grumman Computing Systems, a subsidiary of aerospace/defense giant Northrop Grumman, brought suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, arguing that the Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) breached its contract when it failed to exercise priced options under an ID/IQ contract’s Delivery Order.
According to Judge Allegra’s decision, the Delivery Order required Northrop to “lease the Oakley software to ICE and perform specific support services for a one-year base period in return for payment of $900,000, with three one-year options at $800,186 per option year—for a total contract price of $3,597,558.” Northrop delivered the software to ICE in October, 2004, and received payment of $900,000. A year later, on September 30, 2005, ICE told Northrop that it would not be exercising the first option year because it lacked sufficient funds.
Northrop filed suit under the Contract Disputes Act, alleging various actions or inactions on behalf of the Government, including failure to use its best efforts to obtain funding, failure to reserve appropriate funding, and replacing the software with another piece of software performing the same function—all of which (Northrop alleged) violated its contract with ICE.
What makes this case a bit more interesting than your run-of-the-mill contract dispute is that Northrop assigned its receivable to a third party—ESCgov. ESCgov paid Northrop $3,296,093 in return for “any payments [Northrop Grumman] received under the Delivery Order.” And then ESCgov turned around and assigned its receivable to “Citizens Leasing Corporation, n/k/a RBS Citizens, N.A. (Citizens), in exchange for $3,325,252.16.” As Judge Allegra noted, “neither plaintiff, ESCgov, nor Citizens ever notified ICE of these assignments.”
The Government had a problem with this.
The Government moved “to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), asserting that Northrop had submitted a claim to the contracting officer that failed to provide adequate notice of the nature of the claim and to reveal that the claim was for the losses of a third party.”
As Judge Allegra stated—
[The Government] argues that this claim was deficient because it failed to reveal that Northrop had assigned its rights under the contract to ESCgov, which, in turn, had assigned those rights to Citizens. Defendant asseverates that Northrop should have revealed that it was seeking damages on behalf of a second-level assignee. Indeed, defendant questions whether, after the assignments, Northrop remained the proper party to file such a claim under the contract.
(Before we go on, how cool is that word “asseverate”? We had to look it up to understand it mean “earnestly assert”.)
The Judge determined that Northrop was, indeed, the proper party to file the claim. However, he was less kind to Northrop with regards to its assignment. He wrote—
There is little doubt that, as in Beaconwear, Northrop’s assignment here ran afoul of 31 U.S.C. § 3727. While that section allows for assignments to a ‘financing institution of money due or to become due under a contract,’ 31 U.S.C. § 3727(c), and ESCgov arguably qualifies as such an institution, Northrop admits that it did not notify defendant [the Government] of its assignment, as is required by the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(c)(3); Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.2d 1394, 1396 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Accordingly, the assignment of Northrop’s claims under the ICE contract was null and void, as against the United States.
[Emphasis added.] So because Northrop never notified ICE that it was assigning its contract interests to ESCgov, that assignment was voided—as was ESCgov’s subsequent assignment to Citizens. But that outcome did not necessarily invalidate Northrop’s claim against ICE under the CDA. But then the Judge asked whether Northrop’s concealment of the information violated the claim requirements of the CDA. He concluded that Northrop’s failure to notify the Contracting Officer of the assignment(s) did violate a required claim element and thus Northrop’s claim failed. He wrote, “allowing Northrop – or any other contractor, for that matter – to withhold the fact that it has assigned its claim against defendant not only prevents the contracting officer from analyzing whether the claimant has truly suffered damages, but might prejudice defendant’s ability to mount a defense to the claim.”
Judge Allegra dismissed Northrop’s claim, and concluded by writing—
In sum, the court finds that Northrop’s putative claim did not ‘contain ‘a clear and unequivocal statement that [gave] the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis’’ of its claim. … At the least, Northrop needed to reveal that it had assigned its claim to a third party and was pursuing this matter as a sponsor. Revealing these facts was important, not only to alert the contracting officer to the potential application of the Anti-Assignment Act and Severin doctrine, but also to put him on notice as to the possible relevancy of a host of other issues that have been associated with sponsored or ‘pass-through’ claims. Northrop did not have the right to keep these facts in pectore. For the court to rule otherwise risks converting the CDA claims process into a high-stakes game of cat and mouse, in which some contractors might hope to catch the contracting officer unawares. Those inclined to forgive such gamesmanship in conferring more latitude upon CDA claimants would be well advised to remember that the filing of a claim is not merely a prerequisite to suit – a way-station along the path to the courthouse – but, rather, a current demand ‘for the payment of money in a sum certain.’ 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. In fact, Congress created the CDA claims process with the expectation that the wide majority of claims would be resolved by the contracting officer and go no further. Consistent with that intent, a CDA claim ought to put the contracting officer on notice of all critical operative facts, lest a claim that should be denied be granted (or vice-versa). And that means that such a claim ought to reveal that it is only being sponsored by the original contractor.
Before we leave this topic, we wanted to direct interested readers to a discussion of the Anti-Assignments Act over in this Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) decision. In the matter of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. England, the Court wrote in 2002—
What is commonly called the Anti-Assignment Act consists of two statutory provisions. Title 41 of the United States Code, Section 15(a) (2000) (which deals with ‘Public Contracts’) provides that ‘[n]o contract ․ or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the party to whom such contract ․ is given to any other party, and any such transfer shall cause the annulment of the contract or order transferred, so far as the United States is concerned.’ Subsection (b) of that provision states that ‘[t]he provisions of subsection (a) ․ shall not apply in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United States or from any agency or department thereof ․ are assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing institution, including any Federal lending agency.’
Title 31 of the United States Code, Section 3727(a)(1), (b) (2000) (which deals with ‘Money and Finance’) provides that an ‘assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Government or of an interest in the claim ․ may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued.’ Subsection (c) makes subsection (b) inapplicable ‘to an assignment to a financing institution of money due or to become due under a contract’ provided certain conditions (not here involved) are met.
These two provisions together broadly prohibit (with narrow exceptions discussed below) transfers of contracts involving the United States or interests therein, and assignment of claims against the United States. Such contracts (or interest therein) may not be transferred and such claims may be assigned ‘only after’ they have been allowed in a specific amount and provisions made for their payment.
Northrop Grumman got schooled in the foregoing statutory requirements. And we hope you learned a lesson as well.
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The “Unpleasant Truth” Is that the U.S. Air Force Cannot Manage its Programs
Perhaps you’re getting a bit tired of reading yet another article about schedule delays, cost overruns, and technical glitches on USAF programs? We understand. After all, in the past month we’ve written about cost problems on the next generation aerial tanker. And our website is rife with stories about problems with the F-35 Lightning II program. Everybody, it seems, is piling-on and the constant barrage of criticism about programmatic problems can get a little tiresome. So we get it. If you’re sick of reading about aircraft program management failures, you may as well click away now, because this is another one of ‘em. Today we’re going to discuss the absolute, inarguable, failures of the U.S. Air Force to manage its programs. We’re going to start with this editorial over at the Aviation Week’s Ares Defense Technology blog, penned by Bill Sweetman. Mr. Sweetman wrote—
… the Pentagon, industry, lobbyists and friendly politicians are going to have to come to grips with an unpleasant truth: the White House and Congress are largely not to blame, aside from a failure to provide oversight and leadership. Procurement spending was abundant in the past decade. In all too many cases, it just has not delivered capability to the front lines. …
… a lot of R&D was funded in the 1990s (including F-22 and the first stages of JSF) on the grounds that production would restart after 2000. Both the Navy and the USAF had similar combat aircraft plans, with one fighter in full-scale development in the 1990s, to be followed by JSF.
But while the Navy's Super Hornet has gone reasonably well, both the USAF's programs have failed to deliver what they promised on time. The JSF's struggles are well documented - less so, the delays in adding capability to the F-22.
Mr. Sweetman then discussed a 2004 Lockheed Martin presentation that showed the F-22 program roadmap. After looking at LockMart’s promised roadmap to success, he commented—
… had all gone to plan, the USAF would be taking delivery today of F-22s with air-to-ground radar modes ready to go and full Small Diameter Bomb capability, plus the ability to use Link 16 to communicate with all other assets on the battlefield. The next step -- to be delivered in 2014 -- would be the Block 40 Global Strike Enhanced variant, with two-way satcoms and wide-aspect radar coverage, including side arrays.
These plans have been downscaled and delayed. Air-to-ground radar and SDB may be operational next year -- depending on how the record-duration grounding affects testing -- but anything like what the 2004 plans called Block 40 is well beyond 2016, and satcoms and side arrays are little more than a dream.
In that last bit, Sweetman was alluding to the indefinite grounding of the F-22. The Air Force has been remarkably closed-mouth regarding the cause(s) for the grounding of the entire fleet—which has lasted more than 14 weeks as this article is written—but reports continue to surface that the aircraft’s oxygen system has problems. As one article (link above) reported—
The … jets have been grounded because they appear to be poisoning their pilots. Tests have found multiple toxins in the blood of Raptor pilots affected by symptoms similar to hypoxia while flying the jets. And the Air Force hasn't been able to source the problem, leading to a cascade of complications.
The blood tests turned up chemicals from oil fumes, burned antifreeze and propane, according to the Air Force Times. … Deliveries have been effectively halted because government test pilots can't fly the jets under the grounding order. … What was first thought to be an oxygen delivery problem leading to hypoxia -- and the possible cause of a fatal crash last November -- is apparently more complicated.
But it may not just be the Honeywell-designed on-board oxygen-generating system that’s the problem. As the article quoted above notes, the USAF investigation has grown to encompass “all aspects” of the aircraft. Getting back to Mr. Sweetman’s editorial, he next discussed the original program roadmap for the F-35. He commented that, if the program had held to its plan—
Today, the Air Force would be declaring IOC with a combat-capable Block 2, capable of interdiction, ‘enhanced air-to-air’ (Block 1 was to introduce AMRAAM), close air support and destruction of enemy air defenses.
Block 3 operational test and evaluation would be under way, to be completed in 2012. More than 180 F-35As would have been ordered for the Air Force and more than 90 of those would have been delivered. The next contract would be the first multiyear deal.
Those F-35s would already be replacing older aircraft, so the Air Force would not be looking at expensive service-life extension programs and upgrades.
Mr. Sweetman also made an important point about cost control—
… had the F-35 program stayed within its cost bounds, the F-22 would not have been cut to a silver-bullet force and would still be in production. And with fighter recap in hand, the Air Force would be in better shape to start building a new bomber -- a task that was, in 2006, considered do-able by 2018 if the money was available.
So quite obviously, both of the Air Force’s flagship aircraft development programs are in trouble. But that’s not the end of our article. If we didn’t have a point of view about this sad situation, we wouldn’t bother to write this article. If we didn’t have something to add, it wouldn’t be worth our time (or your time to read it). So here goes: we don’t believe the root cause of this situation is ineffective contractor management. Instead, we believe the root cause is ineffective management of contractors. We think it’s a military problem, a Pentagon problem. And we don’t expect any significant changes to the status quo until and unless the Pentagon’s acquisition and program management culture changes. We respect our military and we sincerely thank them for the service and their sacrifices, and for often risking their lives so that we can live in freedom and security. But that respect should not blind us to the problems endemic to the massive bureaucracy that seems to exist primarily to prevent weapons programs from progressing efficiently. This is not a new theme for us—we’ve written about DCMA and DCAA in less than flattering terms, and we’ve posted links to a Defense Science Board report alerting the Secretary of Defense to pretty much this same issue. Yet nothing changes. And we’re not alone in our concerns. In the August 2011 edition of National Defense magazine, General Lawrence Skantze (USAF, Retired) wrote that “the issue of accountability … is nonexistent in the acquisition process.” He added—
Program managers, even the best, have no real control over their programs. … [The Pentagon] has and will survive any attempt to restructure it. No one is accountable. If they were, a significant number would have been let go in the past few years. The entrenched structure will resist and survive any defense secretary. … The only real solution, indicated by the Defense Business Board, is to create a Defense Department acquisition corps, independent of the Pentagon bureaucracy, with adequate resources, facilities and people, and no linkage to the Pentagon except in reporting to the secretary of defense. The head of the acquisition corps will be accountable.
Now we don’t’ wholeheartedly endorse General Skantze’s position. As a threshold matter, we think it’s absolutely critical to disconnect acquisition problems from program management problems. (Naturally, we think the Pentagon should be focusing on both.) But we do completely agree that if the Pentagon cannot cut back and streamline its own bureaucracy (DCMA we’re looking at you), then it’s time to start over. And as much as we’ve resisted the notion in the past, it’s time to thoughtfully consider a new DOD contract audit agency—one that is better managed and less concerned about tooting its own horn by fabricating findings, and more dedicated to supporting the needs of both acquisition professionals and buying commands. Both DCAA and DCMA have failed the taxpayers, and the Pentagon bureaucracy has failed to implement effective course-corrections. Accountability is lacking and perhaps it is time to start over. And we think the U.S. Air Force may be a great place to start implementing the new regime. Because it’s inarguable that the current approach to contractor and program management isn’t getting it done.
Industry Associations Battle on Your Behalf for Regulation Roll-Backs
Is your company a member of an industry association? If not, why not?
Generally, the associations benefit like-positioned companies through advocacy and lobbying. The associations also provide a forum where member companies can meet to discuss cross-cutting issues. The associations can meet with Senior Executive Service policy-makers, Congressional staffers, and others without creating any perceived conflicts of interest, since they are independent of the companies that comprise their memberships. In other words, plausible deniability.
There are many associations serving diverse constituencies. Ones that come immediately to mind include—
- The Professional Services Council, representing “the federal government’s professional and technical services industry”.
- The National Defense Industrial Association, representing companies that provide national defense and homeland security products to the Federal government (primarily NASA, DOD, and DHS).
- The Aerospace Industries Association, representing “more than 300 major aerospace and defense companies and their suppliers … embodying every high-technology manufacturing segment of the U.S. aerospace and defense industry from commercial aviation and avionics, to manned and unmanned defense systems, to space technologies and satellite communications.
There are also the more prosaic organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who represent any business that wants to be a member—and benefits many businesses that are not members.
Finally, there are what may termed “meta-associations” which are groups of like-minded associations that band together for the (hoped-for) purpose of influencing policy-makers through the sheer weight of numbers. A good example of a meta-association is the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA). According to CODSIA’s sporadically updated website, it has seven member associations, including all those listed above.
Recently, CODSIA met with a high-level leader in the General Services Administration (GSA) for a routine “government-industry cross-talk”. As usual, the topics were carefully vetted beforehand and the Government representatives were careful not to speak beyond their authority. Despite all the caveats and controls, however, some communication took place. We were on distribution for the meeting notes, and we thought the CODSIA representatives did a good job of advocating for their members.
The topic of conversation was the “retrospective regulatory review” required by President Obama’s Executive Order 13653, issued January 18, 2011. That Executive Order states—
… each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity); (4) to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and (5) identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.
The Executive Order also states—
To facilitate the periodic review of existing significant regulations, agencies shall consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned. Such retrospective analyses, including supporting data, should be released online whenever possible.
So that is what CODSIA was asking the GSA folks about.
Specifically, CODSIA asked whether GSA had looked at FAR Case 2005-036, Definitions of Cost and Pricing Data, in implementing the President’s Executive Order. We wrote about the rules stemming from that FAR Case here. We said at the time—
We notice that the prohibition on obtaining cost or pricing data when certain conditions (e.g., adequate competition) are found has been de-emphasized in favor of a more detailed discussion of the types of data the contracting officer should obtain. This appears to represent a return to a pre-Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) pricing environment, which may add to contractors’ proposal costs— meaning that, ultimately, the Government may end up paying more for the goods and services it, acquires.
CODSIA inquired as to whether the FAR Councils were measuring the efficacy of the new rules, whether they were looking—as the President directed—at costs versus benefits. The response was telling. The CODSIA notes state—
GSA representatives said that no attempts were made to measure compliance costs, to monitor if an increase in the number of adequate price reasonableness determinations had taken place, or if an increase in requests for Certificates of Current Cost or Pricing Data has occurred. Most importantly, the question asked if any noticeable reduction of prices paid by the government had been noted and GSA replied that a review of the operational ‘success’ of the rule has not been conducted.
We were not in attendance at the meeting. But it looks to us like a case could be made for asserting that the FAR Councils were ignoring the Presidential Executive Order.
But CODSIA wasn’t yet done with the topic. More discussion ensued. Here’s another quote from the meeting notes—
GSA recognizes that the rules imposed by the acquisition regulatory systems drive overhead costs and hence, price. The government’s estimate of compliance with the Truth in Negotiations Act was cited as one example and that estimate is over ten million hours per year. Cost benefit analyses can help to identify those regulations whose benefits to the government exceed their costs. The regulated population, however, has little insight into those analyses and is unable to compare the burden estimates with actual time and dollars spent. Industry suspects the burden hours are larger than the government believes. GSA reported that they are updating their guide to existing burden estimates and it will be available on the DPAP website. The aggregate cost of compliance is impressive. The CODSIA reps asked that the government investigate whether the benefits justify that cost.
See? You’re not alone. There are people inside the Beltway who understand your plight and are challenging The Powers That Be on your behalf. They’re called industry associations and you should support them through membership.
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