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Apogee Consulting Inc

CAS Board Moves Forward on Applicability Threshold and PPA Harmonization

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We have a couple of updates for our readers regarding Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  Perhaps somebody at OFPP read our gentle chiding of the CAS Board for leaving so much business unfinished.  (As we write this entry, that article has recorded nearly 700 hits, so perhaps we may be forgiven for thinking it’s been passed around.)  In any case, Christmas brought us all some CAS presents.

The first item under the Christmas tree was the issuance, on December 22, 2011, of a final rule implementing a new CAS applicability threshold.  In July, 2011, the CAS Board issued an interim rule on this topic, and the final rule was adopted without change.  The simple description of the revision is that it raised the CAS applicability threshold from $650,000 to $700,000, to make it consistent with the current Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) applicability threshold.  Essentially, this rule change means that contracts valued at less than $700,000 are exempt from CAS.  But there’s more to be said.

The rule change not only raises the CAS applicability threshold, it also changes it from a fixed dollar amount to being whatever the TINA applicability threshold is on a go-forward basis.  In the words of the CAS Board—

This wording change … will cause future changes to the CAS applicability threshold to self-execute upon any changes to the TINA threshold as they are implemented in the FAR. … By revising the CAS applicability threshold so that it directly referenced the FAR TINA threshold for the submission of cost or pricing data (rather than referencing a stated dollar amount), any future changes to the FAR TINA threshold will automatically apply to the CAS applicability threshold (thereby eliminating the need to revise this regulation to specify a different dollar amount).

One issue with this rule change is how to apply it to subcontracts under existing prime contracts.  Although the CAS regulations have been revised, no similar revision has been made (yet) to the CAS Administration rules in FAR Part 30, nor have any revisions been made to the 52.230 series of CAS-related contact clauses.  At the moment, the FAR language continues to use the now outdated $650,000 CAS applicability threshold.

It is well settled that the regulations in effect on the effective date of the contract control.  So it would seem that subcontracts issued under prime contracts awarded prior to December 22, 2011 would be evaluated for CAS applicability under the old threshold.  That would be the safe, conservative, course of action.

But it’s also well settled that in any conflict between CAS and FAR, CAS trumps FAR.  So we think that the CAS applicability threshold found 48 CFR 9903.201-1(2) supersedes any CAS applicability thresholds found in the FAR.  Accordingly, we would be prepared to argue that any subcontract administrator who used the current $700,000 CAS applicability threshold (and who continuously updated that threshold based on published changes to the TINA applicability threshold) is on solid ground and was absolutely correct.

In fact, one commenter brought this potential quandary up to the CAS Board.  Their response?

The changes to the FAR to reflect the CAS Board's interim and final rules are beyond the authority of the CAS Board as acknowledged by the respondent. The comments have been sent to the OFPP Administrator, the Chair of the FAR Council, for implementation in the FAR.

No further comment.

The second issue concerns CAS harmonization with the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006.  We wrote about this issue right here.  Well, on December 27, 2011, the CAS Board issued its long-awaited final rule, revising Standards 412 and 413 to conform CAS to the PPA.  As the CAS Board reported—

This revision will harmonize the measurement and period assignment of the pension cost allocable to Government contracts, and the minimum required contribution under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, as required by the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006. The PPA amended the minimum funding requirements for qualified defined benefit pension plans.

Our intent here is not to delve into the intricacies of defined-benefit pension plan accounting.  We’ll spare you that headache.  You’re welcome.

But we will note some “highlights” of the final rule.

  • One of the big concerns with the prior Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) concerned the “triggers” that implemented the CAS accounting.  The three proposed triggers have been reduced to one in the final rule.
  • We reported the universal concern with the cost impact of these revisions on existing CAS-covered contracts.  The CAS Board addressed that concern by mandating a five-year transition period.
  • The NPRM contained controversial revisions to the segment closing pension plan adjustment calculations at 413-50(c)(12), and many commenters objected to the NPRM in that area.  In the final rule, the CAS Board eliminated proposed revisions to 413-50(c)(12), and stated, “The Board believes that the issues and problems with the current segment closing and benefit curtailment provisions are beyond the scope of pension harmonization required under section 106, and should be addressed in a separate case, which the Board is considering.”
  • Another controversial aspect was the effectivity date of the new rules.  As the CAS Board stated—

The Board decided to delay the effective date for 60 days after publication to permit time for contractors to make the necessary changes to the actuarial valuation and cost projection systems. Furthermore, to ensure that no contractor becomes immediately applicable to the final rule, the implementation date is the first cost accounting period after June 30, 2012. The Board agrees that such a delay will eliminate a portion of the equitable adjustment claims for contractors that report on a calendar year basis.

To sum up, if you are a fully CAS-covered contractor with defined-benefit pension plans, then this final rule is a big deal.  The first thing you would want to do is to update your Forward Pricing Rates to reflect the increased/accelerated pension costs under the revised rule.  You would want to do that in order to price the pension costs into your proposals for new work.

The second thing you would want to do is to figure out which existing CAS-covered contract is going to be impacted by these revisions, given the effectivity date and five-year transition period.  Once you’ve figure out the cost impact, then it’s time to submit your requests for equitable adjustment on all affected CAS-covered contracts (of all types, including FFP types).

For most government contractors, the revisions to CAS 412 and 413 won’t matter much.  But for those few big contractors for whom this is a big deal … it’s going to be a time-consuming and potentially expensive deal as well.

 

Improper Exclusion of Bidders on Light Air Support Award?

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a29_super_tucano

On December 30, 2011, the U.S. Air Force announced that it had awarded a $355 Million delivery order (and a simultaneous ID/IQ contract) to Sierra Nevada Corporation for “Light Air Support” (LAS) aircraft and associated support. Reportedly, the ID/IQ contract may end up being worth as much as $1.5 Billion. The Air Force contract award announced that—

This is a non-developmental aircraft procured for conducting advanced flight training, surveillance, air interdiction, and close air support. The LAS aircraft is a single-engine turboprop fixed-wing aircraft with tricycle, retractable landing gear, and tandem two-place pressurized cockpit with ejection seats, capable of operating from semi-prepared air fields.

The award announcement was made about one week after the GAO had dismissed a protest by a disappointed bidder—Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC (HBDC).as being “untimely”. According to the decision, HBDC had protested its exclusion from the competitive range because “multiple deficiencies and significant weaknesses found in HBDC’s proposal make it technically unacceptable and results in unacceptable mission capability risk.”

Because HBDC had been excluded from the competitive range, that left its only competitor, Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) as the winner by default. The SNC proposal was based on use of the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano—a plane allegedly manufactured in Brazil.

The Air Force notified HBDC that it had been excluded from consideration on November 1, 2011 and the GAO found that HBDC had received that notification on November 4. Bid protest rules require a pre-award debriefing request must be made within 3 days after receipt (see FAR 15.505(a)). Yet HBDC inexplicably waited until November 15 to request a debrief.

The contracting officer refused to provide any debriefing, because HBDC had made its request too late, and thus HBDC found itself before the GAO—where it received little sympathy and a succinct dismissal.  The GAO protest decision said—

Accordingly, HBDC was required to request a debriefing within three days of its receipt of the Air Force notice on November 4, or, absent a debriefing, was required to file its protest no later than 10 days after that date. Where HBDC did not timely request a debriefing, and failed to file its protest until 17 (sic) days after it was notified that its proposal had been excluded from the competitive range, the protest is untimely and must be dismissed.

The GAO was seemingly mystified as to why it would take HBDC so long to file its protest. (And frankly so are we.)  Apparently, it took the HBDC contracts manager more than two weeks (until November 15) to review the Air Force’s notification that the company had been excluded from the competitive range, and do something about it.  Was the HBDC contracts manager sick or on vacation? Was he or she busy with other pressing matters? The GAO didn’t say and we may never know. But still, it says something (to us, anyway) that correspondence from a customer regarding a competition for what was potentially more than a billion dollars’ worth of business just sat in an in-box for two weeks.

In a footnote, GAO offered a subtle suggestion that might lead to a resolution of the issue. It said—

Although the Air Force is not required to provide HBDC with a preaward debriefing due to HBDC’s untimely debriefing request, we note that the Air Force is not prohibited from providing HBDC with such a debriefing, so that HBDC can have a full understanding of the basis for its exclusion from the competition.

As far as we can tell, the Air Force declined to provide HBDC with a “full understanding” of its proposal deficiencies.

Normally, that would be the end of the story. Protest filed; protest dismissed. Better luck next time. But that was not the end of this story.

HBDC then did two things.  First, it issued a press release that said—

‘We are disappointed in the GAO’s decision as we were relying on their investigation to provide transparency into what has been a bidding process of inconsistent, irregular and constantly changing requirements,’ said Bill Boisture, Hawker Beechcraft chairman and CEO. ‘We find ourselves still without answers, which is unacceptable, and continue to believe that our exclusion from this important contract was made without basis in process or fact.’

‘As a U.S. company, we believe we deserve a fair chance at this contract,’ Boisture said. ‘Hawker Beechcraft has been delivering U.S. Department of Defense aircraft certified to military specifications for more than 50 years. We are qualified and prepared to continue doing so for the Air Force’s LAS operations with our capable, affordable and sustainable AT-6 aircraft.’

‘We are asking concerned Americans, members of the flying military and anyone else dedicated to the success of U.S. manufacturing, preservation of the aerospace industrial base and U.S. tactical air power to take action to ensure the AT-6 gets proper consideration for this Air Force contract. Visit the AT-6 website at www.missionreadyat-6.com to send a letter to your congressional leaders.’

Second, the company filed a suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.  As part of that suit, it asked the Court to issue a temporary restraining order that would prevent the Air Force from executing the LAS contract with SNC.

That second step resulted in the Air Force sending SNC a Stop Work Notice pending resolution of the matter.  According to this Washington Post story, the Air Force “decided put its own stop work order in place before the court ruled on the temporary restraining order.”

The same Washington Post story also reported that—

Hawker Beechcraft CEO Bill Boisture and U.S. Rep. Mike Pompeo planned a news conference Friday [January 6, 2012] to talk about the developments. U.S. Sen. Pat Roberts said Hawker Beechcraft deserves more answers as to why it was excluded from the competition. ‘On every turn, the Air Force has denied the company and the congressional delegation the opportunity to understand why it made the decision,’ Roberts said in a statement.

Okay, stay tuned for further developments on this interesting story.

But before we leave it, readers should note that HBDC is pulling out all the stops on this one. We’re guessing that the potential revenue from this contract made it a “must-win” for the company, and that everybody is scrambling to address the issues involved in the fiasco.

And fiasco it was, make no mistake.

The Air Force could have resolved this with some open communication as to why HBDC was excluded from the competitive range. Sure, they didn’t have to but, as GAO pointed out, there was nothing preventing them from doing so. And so now we have Congress involved. Not to mention a very important warfighter support contract on hold. Remember, the Commander-in-Chief has promised taxpayers more transparency, and his folks clearly are not living up to his pledge.

HBDC still has to explain (to its Board of Directors and shareholders, if to nobody else) why a critically important piece of correspondence lay unopened for two weeks, letting regulatory deadlines lapse in the meantime.  (We would not want to be in that contracts manager’s seat right now….)

Not to mention, of course, why its proposal for such a “must-win” competition was so flawed that the Air Force threw it out as being (essentially) uncorrectable. Did HBDC have the right skill sets? Did they put the company’s varsity team on the proposal? What went wrong?

It is incorrect to posture this story in terms of “USA versus Brazil”. That’s not what this is about. What it is about, quite clearly, is having the Air Force act like stewards of taxpayer funds, and explain their decision-making. The Air Force is hunkered-down and lawyered-up, and acting like this is an adversarial relationship. Instead, they need to come clean and make this all go away.

HBDC needs to understand why it screwed-up, so we can get the warfighters the light air support (and reconnaissance) necessary to minimize the loss of life in the war zone.

That’s our take, anyway.

 

2012’s Buzz-word of Choice: “Should-Cost”

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Our long-time readers know that we’ve been watching developments over at Shay Assad’s new DOD Pricing Directorate since he departed DPAP. We’ve even ventured an opinion or two about what his new focus area might mean to defense contractors.

The latest scoop (well, it’s a scoop if you ignore the reports from other sources) is the should-cost template.

The should-cost template is a PowerPoint slide deck for use by Program Managers of ACAT I programs when preparing presentations to the Pentagon Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). It’s mandatory for ACAT I use, but “recommended” for use by ACAT II and III programs.

Some of you may be asking what an ACAT is. Google it.

Some other readers may be asking about this whole “should cost” thingee that appears to be the DOD buzz-word of 2012. According to the template—

The Program’s “should cost” is the set of program’s initiatives or opportunities to reduce costs below the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) level. It is primarily the basis for a negotiating position and result for pending contracts that will be below the ICE, but it also includes measures taken to reduce cost beyond near term contract actions.


We have heard little if any feedback from contractors regarding their experience with “should cost.” But if you’re a Boeing person and you work on the Poseidon P-8A program, we encourage you to take a look at Slide 5 and see if the Navy isn’t getting ready to stick it to your program, hard. Wonder how that one slipped in?

 

Re: DFARS Case 2011-D042 Proposal Adequacy Checklist

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Dear Mr. Pitsch,

This letter provides comments in response to the proposed rule that would create a new solicitation clause, the aim of which would be to require offerors to “self validate the adequacy of their proposals” when certified cost or pricing data are required to be submitted.

Apogee Consulting, Inc. is a small business that provides advisory, training, and other services to government contractors in all industries. I provide these comments as an individual and any opinions I express are my own.

  1. The proposed rule is unnecessary. Proposal adequacy is a matter of compliance with solicitation direction. A proposal may be properly excluded from consideration when it fails to comply with solicitation requirements. (See, e.g., Orion Technology, Inc. B-405077, August 12, 2011: “It is an offeror's responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, with adequately detailed information which clearly demonstrates compliance with the solicitation and allows a meaningful review by the procuring agency. Any proposal that fails to conform to material terms of the solicitation may be considered unacceptable and not form the basis for an award.” (Citations omitted.))

Accordingly, there is no need for the proposed checklist. Offerors that cannot comply with the solicitation requirements are also likely to be noncompliant with contract requirements after award—and the Defense Department should not be contracting with them, risking taxpayer funds on contractors that have proven they cannot follow directions.

It strikes me that DCMA contracting officers should not need a proposal adequacy checklist to determine whether or not an offeror complied with solicitation requirements. Shouldn’t that ability be confirmed before a warrant is awarded? If contracting officers are unable to determine a proposal’s compliance without an offeror “walking” them through it, item by item, doesn’t that indicate an urgent need for more and/or better training?

Finally, there is no reason that a contracting officer should rely on an offeror’s “self validation” any more than he or she should rely on an offeror’s ability to follow solicitation instructions. An offeror who cannot follow the solicitation’s directions is in no position to accurately confirm (or validate) that it followed the instructions of Table 15-2. In fact, contracting officer reliance on the offeror’s self validation is more likely to waste time and resources, because the contracting officer likely will focus on the checklist rather than the substance of the offeror’s proposal.

  1. The proposed rule is duplicative. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) already has a similar checklist, called “forward pricing adequacy checklist,” and the proposed DFARS checklist is largely duplicative of DCAA’s checklist. The problem is more than duplication. The items that DCAA considers in determining whether a proposal is adequate for audit are necessarily different from those items that a contracting officer would consider in determining whether a proposal is adequate for analysis. Thus, not only is the proposed checklist duplicative, it is also largely misleading in substance.

Moreover, the proposed checklist is also duplicative with the instructions found in FAR Table 15-2 (found at FAR 15.408). Roughly 30 of the 47 proposed “points of adequacy” merely ask the offer to confirm it is compliant with specific requirements of Table 15-2. That is superfluous. If such a confirmation is really needed, simply replace the 30 individual confirmations with one single point that requires the offeror to confirm that it complied with all applicable requirements of Table 15-2.

  1. The proposed rule doesn’t address the real problem. FAR 15.404-2(a)(1) requires a contracting officer to first determine whether “the information available at the buying activity” is adequate for negotiating a fair and reasonable price before requesting field pricing assistance. If the information on hand is found to be adequate, then the contracting officer need not request field pricing assistance, and may proceed to proposal analysis. In my experience, much time and effort is wasted in obtaining field pricing information that was never needed by the contracting officer in the first place. So the real need is to assist contracting officers in determining whether or not field pricing assistance is necessary for proposal analysis. The real opportunity is to be found in the efficiencies created by eliminating unnecessary requests for field pricing assistance. The proposed rule does not help a contracting officer make that initial field pricing assistance determination, and thus it does not address the real problem.

  1. The proposed rule should not be a regulation; it should be part of the PGI. DOD maintains its Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) to streamline the regulations, and to distinguish between internal direction/guidance and regulatory requirements. Assisting contracting officers in determining whether offerors’ proposals are adequate should be a matter of internal direction/guidance, and not a regulatory requirement. The proposal rule is fundamentally misguided because it does not belong in DFARS in the first place.

  1. The proposed rule does not support the Better Buying Power Initiative. The proposed rule allegedly “supports one of DoD’s Better Buying Power Initiatives by … ensuring offerors take responsibility for submitting thorough, accurate, and complete proposals.” As noted herein, offerors do not need that assistance, nor should DoD offer it. Instead of assisting offerors in generating better proposals, the proposed rule (as drafted) requires little of substance and will result in nothing that can (or should) be relied on by contracting officers. Instead, the proposed rule creates another bureaucratic, non value-added requirement—a requirement which is actually contrary to the Better Buying Power Initiative.

First, there is nothing in the 23 principal actions of the Better Buying Power Initiative that even addresses proposal adequacy. So it is unclear why the DAR Council believes that the proposed rule supports it.

The Better Buying Power Initiative calls for reductions in “non-productive processes and bureaucracy.” Within that general heading, one finds this objective

Reduce non-value-added overhead imposed on industry. Industry has its own internal unproductive processes which add to project costs, but these are in some part a reflection of the requirements which the government imposes. A great number of the inputs I received from industry were directed at what was viewed as excessive overhead expenses based solely on non-value-added mandates and reporting requirements which may have been relevant at some point in time, but have little relevance in the world in which we now find ourselves. In order to identify and reduce these costly requirements, I am directing the Director of Industrial Policy, with support from DPAP, to more fully survey our industrial base to identify, prioritize, and recommend a path forward to unwind duplicative and overly rigorous requirements that add to costs, but do not add to quality of product or timeliness of delivery. As we remove these requirements, I will expect a decline in the overhead charged to the Department by our industrial base that reflects these reduced costs.

(Italics in original.)

I believe that this proposed rule (as drafted) is a good example of a “non-value added” mandate and reporting requirement that tends to increase contractor overhead. Accordingly, I urge the DAR Council to withdraw it in favor of a PGI entry that assists contracting officers to determine whether or not field pricing assistance is necessary.


Thank you for considering these comments to the proposed rule.

Sincerely,


Nicholas Sanders
President and Principal Consultant
Apogee Consulting, Inc.

 

GAO Tells DCAA to Request Contractors’ Internal Audit Reports

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Bemusement. Yes, that’s the right word to describe how this GAO audit report makes us feel. Bemusement is the feeling of “wry or tolerant amusement” and that’s how we feel when reading GAO’s latest effort (GAO-12-88), entitled “DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDITS: Actions Needed to Improve DCAA's Access to and Use of Defense Company Internal Audit Reports.” Issued on December 8, 2011, GAO told Senators Levin and McCain that “DCAA auditors are hindered in their ability to effectively plan work and meet auditing standards for evaluating internal controls.” As a result of this sad state of affairs, “GAO recommends that DCAA take steps to facilitate access to internal audits and assess periodically whether other actions are needed.”

Access to contractor internal audit reports has been a bogey-man for quite some time. Somehow the failure to provide DCAA auditors with internal audit reports means that the contractors are hiding something. Sometimes it’s true. But more often, there’s very little in the report that would be of interest to a DCAA auditor. And sometimes, disclosing internal audit reports that were prepared under attorney-client privilege results in a broad waiver of that privilege.

Regardless of our feelings about the matter, GAO told the Senators that they reviewed 1,125 internal audit reports prepared by seven DOD contractors. They identified 520 internal audit reports that “were related to contracting with the Federal government” and, of those, they reviewed 470. They also reviewed detailed working papers associated with five internal audit reports from each contractor.

GAO was, in general, complimentary about the contractors’ internal audit function. GAO wrote—

Our analysis found that five of the companies met the standards for individual audits … including engagement planning, conducting fieldwork and testing, reporting findings, and tracking corrective actions. We were unable to completely assess two companies’ compliance with the standards because the companies did not provide the information needed to do so. Specifically, we found that the 470 audit reports provided by six companies and 25 sets of supporting workpapers provided by five companies followed the Institute [for Internal Audit]’s standards.

Of the 520 internal audit reports it found relevant to Federal contracting, GAO reported that—

  • 338 audits related to one or more of the six business systems that DOD audits.

  • 97 audits pertained to a specific DOD program and could include reviews of an entire business system, such as the earned value management system, or one component of a business system, such as purchasing.

  • 96 audits were associated with a company’s compliance with federal laws and regulations, or company policies related to its management and oversight of its defense contracts.

After concluding that roughly 50% of a contractor’s internal audit reports would be of use by DCAA auditors, GAO then looked at whether the contractors provided DCAA with those reports, and/or whether DCAA was requested access to them. GAO found that—

  • Six companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to at least some internal audits reports upon request. Four of the six, however, provide that access on a ‘view-only’ or ‘read-only’ basis, meaning that DCAA auditors may not have physical or electronic copies of the reports but may view them and take notes in the presence of company staff. Company officials explained to us that they adopted this policy because the reports are sensitive and proprietary. One company provides copies only of the sections of the reports and workpapers that company officials consider relevant to DCAA’s work.

  • Of those six, four companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to the supporting workpapers for their internal audits upon request. Again, one company’s policy is to provide only workpapers for the sections of internal audit reports the company deems relevant to DCAA’s work. The other two companies have policies to not provide DCAA with access to supporting workpapers.

  • One company adopted a policy of not providing DCAA with access to its internal audits or workpapers.

  • … one company denied DCAA access to two requested audits because company officials determined that the audits were related to commercial or other activities the company believed were not subject to DCAA’s review. Another company official said that the company would not provide DCAA with access to internal audits related to internal controls for information technology due to the potential threat of unauthorized individuals getting access to networks, critical applications, and confidential company or client data.

GAO reported that DCAA did not take kindly to being denied access to company internal audit reports (in the few instances when they were requested).  It reported—

For the company with the policy of not providing DCAA with access to internal audit reports, DCAA has cited the lack of access as preventing it from obtaining an understanding of the company’s internal controls and reported this as a deficiency in the audit of the company’s overall accounting system. DCAA concluded that without access to the company’s internal audit reports, DCAA could not determine if the company’s monitoring function was operating effectively and whether deficiencies were corrected. …

In another instance, DCAA reported a deficiency in another company’s control environment, citing the company’s policy of limiting access to sections of internal audit reports the company deemed relevant to contract oversight and not providing adequate and timely disclosure of audit reports that identified unallowable costs. The company changed its policy and agreed to provide DCAA with access to all audit reports the company determines to include findings related to government costs. However, auditors at one DCAA office who have requested internal audit reports from the company said that the company has not adhered to the revised policy and has continued to deny DCAA access to reports.

DCAA auditors provide various rationales for not requesting contractor internal audit reports.  We were interested by this paragraph in the GAO report—

Auditors from three DCAA audit teams stated that they did not believe that access to contractor internal audit information is critical to their own audit work and that the internal audit reports do not have enough detail to be helpful. They also stated that they are restricted by auditing standards in relying on the work of others. However, auditing standards do not restrict auditors from relying on the work of other auditors, including internal audit functions. While not reducing the level of work to be performed by DCAA auditors, consideration of relevant internal audit reports in planning related DCAA audits and performing risk assessments can provide useful information for planning DCAA’s scope of work and audit procedures.

We were also interested in this item:

DCAA has issued significantly fewer audit reports since 2008. The annual number of DCAA audits of the seven companies selected for this review decreased by almost 50 percent from 2008 to 2010. The number of internal control audits DCAA performed on the companies decreased from 128 to 62 in the same period. A DCAA policy official noted that DCAA decreased its number of control environment audits because it was waiting for a regulatory change that would redefine critical business systems for contractors.  As a result of this decrease, the number of internal audits necessary to supplement DCAA’s audit work also decreased during this time period.

That item, above, confirms (yet again) what we’ve been reporting on this site about DCAA productivity stats, as measured by audit reports completed. (Enough said about that.)

As we noted at the beginning of this article, GAO recommended that DCAA take a more organized and systematic approach to obtaining contractor internal audit reports. GAO opined—

The work of the internal auditors by no means replaces the work of DCAA auditors, but it could provide DCAA auditors with a basis for making a judgment about a company’s internal controls and help inform their audit planning, thereby making more effective and efficient use of DCAA audits

While we are a bit skeptical about how the average DCAA auditor would (or could) make use of a company’s internal audit reports, we have to agree that some of them might indeed be relevant. This is especially true since the new DFARS rule on contractor business systems mandates internal compliance reviews. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove compliance with the self-governance requirements without providing DCAA with the output of those reviews.

However, since not all internal audit reports are going to be relevant to DCAA, it seems prudent for contractors to categorize them, and to provide access to DCAA based on the category into which an internal audit report falls.  We think some of those categories might be:

  • Sarbanes-Oxley compliance-related.
  • General control or control environment-related.
  • Business-systems related.
  • Internal investigations performed under privileged.

No doubt many companies will have their own ideas regarding the appropriate categories, and how they will provide access to DCAA.  The point is, one should be proactive about the situation.  A written policy establishing company categories of internal audit reports, and stating how (or if) DCAA will be provided with access to those reports, would seem to be a relatively easy thing to do.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.