Navy Tells Huntington Ingalls Its Ships Cost Too Much
The leadership team at Northrop Grumman looks like geniuses, since they decided to spin-off the company’s ship-building business last year into an entirely separate company called Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc.
We’ve reported on this new defense contractor before. In this story, we reported that DCAA was having trouble auditing the project cost savings claimed by Northrop with respect to consolidation and spin-off of its shipbuilding business. And more recently, we reported on the imposition of payment withholds by the Navy because of multiple deficiencies in Huntington Ingalls’ EVMS.
To sum up, Huntington Ingalls is no stranger to this site. So there should be no surprise that the rough waters continue for the shipbuilder, and it finds itself, once again, the subject of another article.
This time, the company hit the newswires again, when Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley told the audience at the annual conference of the Surface Navy Association that Navy ships under construction at the Huntington Ingalls shipyards cost too much. This Reuters story reported the comments thusly—
… Stackley said the company was over the government's target price for a number of LPD ships under construction, and had hit the cost ceiling established in a fixed price contract for LPD-22, the second ship delivered at the Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. … He said the Navy was working closely with Huntington Ingalls to drive cost out of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) aircraft carrier, but was trying to ‘hammer home’ the need for additional efforts.
Huntington Ingalls Chief Executive Mike Petters said the company had already taken charges for the cost overruns on the LPD ships 22 through 25, but said the company was doing better with LPD 26, which is in the early stages of production.
Huntington Ingalls last week responded to reports that the carrier would likely be $884 million over budget by saying it was continuing to see improvements in its performance on the aircraft carrier.
Petters said both the company and the Navy knew at the outset that building a first-in-class ship as complex as an aircraft carrier involved risk, and they had agreed on a formula for sharing that risk.
If industry had to shoulder the risk of new development programs completely on its own, he said, the cost of new warships and other weapons would skyrocket because defense companies would raise prices to cover the added risk.
We have asserted that “should-cost” will be the DoD’s buzzword in 2012. We think the stories about the Huntington Ingalls shipyards are but the start of what will turn out to be a continuing series of common-theme stories in the coming year.
If you are a long-time readers of our articles, you already know that we are on record as asserting that program execution—on-time and on-budget performance—is the single key to staying in the Pentagon’s good graces. We think Huntington Ingalls is pushing the performance envelope … in the wrong direction. We hope the situation turns around for the shipbuilder, we really do.
But we are not very optimistic that it will.
Air Force Suspends Three Contractors
In early November 2011, Washington Technology reported that the US Air Force had suspended three IT contractors “after they left their work unfinished on two buildings at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland and have been unwilling to provide information on source-code data so officials can fix their work.” The Air Force was considering debarring the three contractors from any future government work.
Who are this miscreant contractors? Washington Technology reported—
The suspended companies are Advanced C4 Solutions, Inc., a Florida-based company, which was the prime contractor, and two subcontractors, Superior Communications Solutions Inc., [SCSI] based on Georgia, and Iron Bow Technologies, based in Virginia.
Reportedly, a review of the three companies’ work “discovered 14 critical findings, 19 major findings and seven minor findings that affected the overall security and the access to the technology systems.” In addition, WT quoted the Air Force as stating, “There were also more than 145 customer-generated trouble tickets, identifying incorrectly configured network equipment, bad installation work, and a disregard for regulations on critical network security and information protection.”
Yeah, that’s not too good. But that’s not the end of the story.
WT reported that, “There was also a conflict of interest among the companies. Executives from the three companies assisted in developing requirements and cost estimates for the project. They participated in conducting market research.”
Despite all of that, the companies stopped their work and left the job site without finishing the job. Since then, they have been unwilling to provide operational manuals or source-code data, so Air Force officials can begin to fix the work. For example, the audio-visual and teleconference systems are not working because of the IT installation work isn’t done … “
The Air Force summed the situation up thusly: ““Even though [the companies] improperly developed their own contract requirements, the subjects failed to meet their own requirements.”
Our “frenemies” at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reported other issues with the situation. They reported—
There’s also the possibility that John Wilkerson’s dual role as majority owner of SCSI and employee of Iron Bow posed another kind of conflict of interest. According to the memo, Iron Bow, which was a subcontractor to Advanced C4 Solutions, also received multiple orders to provide audio-visual equipment and furnishings and then subcontracted with SCSI to provide material and furnishings. Did this arrangement allow Wilkerson to double-dip or, at the very least, flout regulations designed to cut down on the excessive use of subcontractors?
We rather doubt that the incestuous contracting relationship between SCSI and Iron Bow, described by POGO above, violated the Excessive Pass-Through Charge rules. But we do agree with POGO that the relationship, which appears to be other than arms-length, should be investigated further. In particular, we wonder whether the prime (Advanced C4 Solutions) knew and understood the relationship between its two subcontractors.
Regardless of POGO’s concerns, the suspension was lifted on November 28, 2011, according to this report. Details regarding the Air Force’s change of heart were not reported. Nonetheless, we wouldn’t want to see the past performance ratings of the three contractors in question.
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Was This Man a Brazen Idiot or Just an Idiot?
What’s it like to work at the Aerospace Corporation, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), where most of the work is performed for Federal entities such as NASA, the US Air Force, or for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)—and is deeply classified? We don’t know for sure, but we’ve heard stories from folks who’ve worked there—and we’ve also heard stories from folks who’ve audited there. We’ve also read some stories, as well.
One story that we’ve previously brought to your attention concerned a fraud perpetrated against the FFRDC by one of its employees. The fraud was discussed in the context of a DOD Inspector General “quality control review” of the “single audit” jointly performed by a Big 4 accounting firm and DCAA under the auspices of OMB Circular A-133. While the DOD IG was okay with the work performed by the Big 4 firm, it was less satisfied with DCAA’s work.
One of the areas which was singled-out for criticism by the DOD IG was DCAA’s failure to properly assess the risk of timekeeping fraud. The Aerospace Corporation discovered one instance of fraudulent employee labor charges and reported that finding to DCAA—yet DCAA did not modify its internal control risk assessment. We quoted from the DOD IG audit report as follows—
DCAA was informed by the Director of Internal Audit of a disclosed fraud involving a full-time employee who worked for another government contractor while employed by Aerospace for a period of several years. There was no indication in the audit documentation that DCAA considered designing and performing procedures in response to this identified risk of labor mischarging as required under auditing standards. We discussed this issue with the audit supervisor and were advised that the auditors determined the identified fraud to be an isolated incident not indicative of a systemic internal control risk and therefore, they did not believe that additional effort was warranted. However, there was no documented evidence to support the DCAA conclusion.
That story surfaced in November 2010. A year later, in December 2011, the story came to conclusion. On December 6, 2011, the Department of Justice announced—
The Aerospace Corporation has paid the United States $2.5 million to settle allegations that for more than seven years it billed the Air Force for the services of an employee who rarely came to work and was not qualified to perform the technical tasks assigned to him.
The Aerospace Corporation issued its own press release, which said---
Today the Department of Justice announced a settlement with The Aerospace Corporation pertaining to the case of a former employee who defrauded the government by falsely claiming dual employment with Aerospace and another company. This illegal act also violates Aerospace's corporate values and policies, and is not condoned by the corporation.
In 2008, Aerospace discovered that a former Aerospace employee, now deceased, had been working another full-time job in addition to his position with Aerospace. Aerospace learned of the employee's misdeeds when the other company contacted Aerospace to have the employee's security clearance transferred.
The Los Angeles Times reported the story with more color. For example, its headline for the story read: Engineer Spent Days at Movies, Bars, and Air Force Paid for It. That’s why those writers get paid the big bucks! The LA Times also added more details to the story. It reported—
Few aerospace employees had it as good as William Grayson Hunter.
He was paid simultaneously to work full time at two aerospace firms but rarely went to work, instead spending his days at bars, amusement parks and movie theaters …
Hunter would occasionally show up at Aerospace in the morning and work for an hour before heading to his second job at Analytical Services & Materials Inc. — or out to have some fun, Assistant U.S. Atty. Howard Daniels said.
One of his favorite stops was Liquid Zoo, a windowless hole in the wall on Sepulveda Boulevard in Van Nuys, Daniels said.
In some instances, Hunter billed his two employers for more than 24 hours of work in a single day, Daniels said. He allegedly ran the scheme from 2003 until 2008. …
In addition to submitting fraudulent time cards, Hunter falsely claimed to hold a doctorate from Oxford University in England when he had only a high school education …
The fraud was discovered by a third employer, Tybrin Corp., which reported it to NASA's inspector general, Daniels said. Tybrin had planned to employ Hunter under a contract with NASA when it uncovered problems in his background. …
Federal investigators reviewed Hunter's credit card bills, which revealed that he had been spending his time at the Van Nuys bar, enjoying trips to Disneyland and watching new releases at movie theaters such as Laemmle Fallbrook 7 in West Hills, Daniels said.
‘I've been doing this a long time and this is the first time I've seen this kind of fraud,’ Daniels said. ‘He was pretty unique.’
Readers should understand that, even though the Aerospace Corporation was a victim of Hunter’s fraud, and fully cooperated with the Federal investigation, it was held culpable and had to make restitution. The LA Times reported—
Aerospace was culpable because it knew that Hunter was not working the hours he submitted on his time card, Daniels said. The company profited from its employment of Hunter because it billed the government a higher hourly rate than it paid him, Daniels said.
‘They were well aware of his time card fraud,’ Daniels said. ‘The reason we're recovering money from them is they didn't do anything about it.’
We keep harping on the subject of internal controls, and we’re doing it again here in this article. Let’s put it this way: The Aerospace Corporation paid a $2.5 million settlement because (a) it didn’t perform a rigorous background check on its employment candidates, and (b) it didn’t make sure its supervisors and managers knew what their employees were working on (or whether they were even working!) before approving time sheets. Wouldn’t it make a lot more sense to invest $2.5 million in additional internal controls and employee training, rather than pay it out in fines/penalties? Certainly, it would reduce the probability of seeing unflattering stories about the FFRDC in the LA Times.
Now, we understand that The Aerospace Corporation is a fairly unique place to work. Most of the work it does is deeply classified and thus compartmented. So there’s not a lot of opportunity to have visibility into the work of any individual employee. We get that. But still—and obviously—there is much room for improvement.
We suggest readers think about how they might spend $2.5 million on their internal controls and employee training programs.
Oshkosh’s FMTV Problems Increase Along with Sales Volume
Apogee Consulting, Inc. has worked with government contractors in all industries, from the largest defense conglomerates to small not-for-profits, and pretty much everything in between. At one point a few years ago we visited a small-to-middlin’ subsidiary of a large defense contractor, located somewhere in the Midwest. We were tasked with evaluating the management team’s effectiveness and identifying opportunities for improving program performance.
(Yes, we do more than harp on FAR and CAS and DCAA audit issues. Sometimes we even get out of the back office!)
We identified a number of fairly minor issues, but we also noted that the subsidiary had only two experienced system engineers, both of whom were retirement eligible. The program management team was similarly small in number and senior in age. And there were no plans in place to deal with the impact of the inevitable retirements that were going to take place in the near future. Programs were (in the main) currently executing well; but tomorrow (metaphorically speaking) program execution was going to be a completely different story. The management team was simply oblivious to upcoming challenge of executing programs without seasoned program managers and experienced system engineers.
I’ll never forget what that General Manager said when we brought these issues to his attention: He said, “Well, in my 30 years of doing this, I have never seen any problems couldn’t be fixed by enough new orders.”
Meaning, of course, that business development and booking new orders were his priorities, and that anything that distracted him from that mission was a waste of his time. And to be fair, it’s very possible that his management metrics and incentive comp plan were focused on the winning of new business to the exclusion of other matters. It may well be that he was following his management’s wishes. But we came away convinced that his operation had a huge downstream risk that, if not addressed right then and now, was going to severely impact the execution of all those new orders he was focused on winning.
I was reminded of that story by a recent story about Oshkosh’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) program, reported in Defense Industry Daily.
In 2010, Oshkosh was awarded the follow-on FMTV production contract, reportedly worth up to $3 Billion. As we reported at the time, Oshkosh was the surprise winner, beating-out incumbent Stewart & Stevenson (now a subsidiary of BAE Systems). We also reported the views of Dr. Loren Thompson, who pointed to the Army’s FMTV award as being a poster child for the notion that a low bid price (however unrealistic) gets a better rating by the source selection authority than a more realistic, higher price. At the time, Dr. Thompson asserted that Oshkosh’s bid was “30% below what the incumbent is currently charging for identical trucks,” and that Oshkosh’s profit projection was based on receipt of “financial aid from state and local governments.”
The DID story that got us thinking about business development versus program execution stated—
… reports indicate that for this re-buy program, BAE Systems submitted a bid 20% lower than the current FMTV price, despite a supply chain for FMTV that is 60% directed source (i.e. sub-contractors and parts specified by the government). Oshkosh’s bid was reportedly 33% below the current FMTV price
The DID story also noted that Oshkosh faces challenges in executing its FMTV program. The BAE Systems team in Sealy, Texas, saw FMTV production more than triple in 2009, from 2,400 vehicles per year to more than 8,000 per year. Oshkosh faces a similar high-volume production environment. But that’s not their only challenge.
The DID story tipped us to the machinations of Carl Icahn, billionaire investor. Some of you may remember Mr. Icahn from his role in the attempted hostile takeover of the Phillips 66 oil company in the mid-1980’s, financed by the firm Drexel Burnham Lambert and its “junk bond king,” Michael Miliken. DID reported that, by December 2011, Mr. Icahn had amassed a 9.51% ownership stake in Oshkosh. What’s perhaps more interesting is that Mr. Icahn had also accumulated a 10% ownership stake in Navistar—maker of MRAPs (Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles) such as the MaxxPro. In fact, Navistar may the single largest provider of MRAP vehicles to the US Army.
So when Mr. Icahn opined that the two companies should be merged, that got everybody’s attention. The two companies’ Boards of Directors were—shall we say?—alarmed at the prospect of a shotgun marriage, and reportedly took defensive measures in order to try to abort the plan.
Mr. Icahn listed several reasons for his proposed merger of the two companies. Reportedly, he was critical of Oshkosh management and “expressed concern” about the upcoming FMTV rebid. According to Mr. Icahn, Oshkosh management has been distracted by the rebid strategy, as well as by a recent acquisition.
When the BODs proved reluctant to move forward with his plan, Mr. Icahn launched a proxy battle in January 2012, writing in an SEC filing, he said—
We believe that the FMTV represents the single largest problem with the future of this company…. We believe this unprofitable contract represents management’s unrealistic attitude and poor planning, as well as the board’s lack of oversight on a product that represents over half of segment revenue.
Regardless of the merits of Mr. Icahn’s hostile maneuvering, it did surface financial problems with Oshkosh’s FMTV program. DID reported—
The facts of the matter do make it appear that the Army played its FMTV hand well, and Oshkosh chose a strategy that failed at every point. As BAE surmised at the time, given the value of Army-specified sub-contracts, Oshkosh’s bid could not be profitable, and has not been. Worse, the Army chose not to be interested in enhancements, which would have restored some profit for Oshkosh; they also front-loaded FMTV purchases, before price-escalation clauses in the contract could kick in.
Dr. Thompson, of The Lexington Institute, also opined on Oshkosh’s current predicament. He wrote—
The company finds itself in this predicament because it made some ill-timed acquisitions at the top of the sub-prime real estate boom (most notable lift-maker JLG), and then sought to compensate for its error by bidding very aggressively on Army truck contracts. It won the contracts and by most accounts is performing well, but profitability has been hard to sustain. Oshkosh executives apparently thought they could win more favorable terms on the Army work by proposing design enhancements, but the customer insisted on sticking with the original contract terms.
Dr. Thompson also sounded a cautionary note for the US Army. Assume Mr. Icahn gets his way and Navistar and Oshkosh merge into “a $20 billion behemoth that can dominate the domestic truck-building industry.” What does that mean for future acquisitions of Army vehicles?
Dr. Thompson cautioned—
When you are by far the biggest source of demand for a company's products, then you can pretty much dictate the terms of the relationship. When you are only one of many customers, you have less influence over how managers and investors choose to deploy their capital. In the case of Mr. Icahn, he doesn't much care what the long-term consequences of combining Oshkosh and Navistar might be for the price and performance of Army vehicles, because he is motivated by near-term financial results. The fact that submerging Oshkosh into the Navistar culture will give the Army fewer competitive options in the future is fine with him; that's how you get pricing power. So even before the Army's strategy of relying more on commercial sources for its vehicles has fully coalesced, the marketplace is sending a signal that there may be consequences service officials hadn't considered.
DID also noted a related issue. BAE Systems is no longer in the FMTV production business, with predictable results for its staff. If Navistar and Oshkosh merge, and BAE Systems is no longer a serious player—then where’s the competition. DID wrote—
Though [the Army’s] acquisition approach drove down short-term costs, in the long term, it could actually backfire on the Army by destroying 2 key suppliers. With BAE’s Sealy, TX truck plant largely emptied of work and staff … [and the Lexington Institute’s prediction of problems from the proposed merger] [one] wonders if [the Army’s] procurement victory will prove as pyrrhic as Oshkosh’s.
So you see, sometimes all the new orders in the world won’t solve your management problems. Sometimes those new orders are just the beginning of a whole new host of management problems that you never even considered. Sometimes, you can be the victim of your success, as Oshkosh appears to have been.
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