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Apogee Consulting Inc

Re: DFARS Case 2011-D042 Proposal Adequacy Checklist

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Dear Mr. Pitsch,

This letter provides comments in response to the proposed rule that would create a new solicitation clause, the aim of which would be to require offerors to “self validate the adequacy of their proposals” when certified cost or pricing data are required to be submitted.

Apogee Consulting, Inc. is a small business that provides advisory, training, and other services to government contractors in all industries. I provide these comments as an individual and any opinions I express are my own.

  1. The proposed rule is unnecessary. Proposal adequacy is a matter of compliance with solicitation direction. A proposal may be properly excluded from consideration when it fails to comply with solicitation requirements. (See, e.g., Orion Technology, Inc. B-405077, August 12, 2011: “It is an offeror's responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, with adequately detailed information which clearly demonstrates compliance with the solicitation and allows a meaningful review by the procuring agency. Any proposal that fails to conform to material terms of the solicitation may be considered unacceptable and not form the basis for an award.” (Citations omitted.))

Accordingly, there is no need for the proposed checklist. Offerors that cannot comply with the solicitation requirements are also likely to be noncompliant with contract requirements after award—and the Defense Department should not be contracting with them, risking taxpayer funds on contractors that have proven they cannot follow directions.

It strikes me that DCMA contracting officers should not need a proposal adequacy checklist to determine whether or not an offeror complied with solicitation requirements. Shouldn’t that ability be confirmed before a warrant is awarded? If contracting officers are unable to determine a proposal’s compliance without an offeror “walking” them through it, item by item, doesn’t that indicate an urgent need for more and/or better training?

Finally, there is no reason that a contracting officer should rely on an offeror’s “self validation” any more than he or she should rely on an offeror’s ability to follow solicitation instructions. An offeror who cannot follow the solicitation’s directions is in no position to accurately confirm (or validate) that it followed the instructions of Table 15-2. In fact, contracting officer reliance on the offeror’s self validation is more likely to waste time and resources, because the contracting officer likely will focus on the checklist rather than the substance of the offeror’s proposal.

  1. The proposed rule is duplicative. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) already has a similar checklist, called “forward pricing adequacy checklist,” and the proposed DFARS checklist is largely duplicative of DCAA’s checklist. The problem is more than duplication. The items that DCAA considers in determining whether a proposal is adequate for audit are necessarily different from those items that a contracting officer would consider in determining whether a proposal is adequate for analysis. Thus, not only is the proposed checklist duplicative, it is also largely misleading in substance.

Moreover, the proposed checklist is also duplicative with the instructions found in FAR Table 15-2 (found at FAR 15.408). Roughly 30 of the 47 proposed “points of adequacy” merely ask the offer to confirm it is compliant with specific requirements of Table 15-2. That is superfluous. If such a confirmation is really needed, simply replace the 30 individual confirmations with one single point that requires the offeror to confirm that it complied with all applicable requirements of Table 15-2.

  1. The proposed rule doesn’t address the real problem. FAR 15.404-2(a)(1) requires a contracting officer to first determine whether “the information available at the buying activity” is adequate for negotiating a fair and reasonable price before requesting field pricing assistance. If the information on hand is found to be adequate, then the contracting officer need not request field pricing assistance, and may proceed to proposal analysis. In my experience, much time and effort is wasted in obtaining field pricing information that was never needed by the contracting officer in the first place. So the real need is to assist contracting officers in determining whether or not field pricing assistance is necessary for proposal analysis. The real opportunity is to be found in the efficiencies created by eliminating unnecessary requests for field pricing assistance. The proposed rule does not help a contracting officer make that initial field pricing assistance determination, and thus it does not address the real problem.

  1. The proposed rule should not be a regulation; it should be part of the PGI. DOD maintains its Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) to streamline the regulations, and to distinguish between internal direction/guidance and regulatory requirements. Assisting contracting officers in determining whether offerors’ proposals are adequate should be a matter of internal direction/guidance, and not a regulatory requirement. The proposal rule is fundamentally misguided because it does not belong in DFARS in the first place.

  1. The proposed rule does not support the Better Buying Power Initiative. The proposed rule allegedly “supports one of DoD’s Better Buying Power Initiatives by … ensuring offerors take responsibility for submitting thorough, accurate, and complete proposals.” As noted herein, offerors do not need that assistance, nor should DoD offer it. Instead of assisting offerors in generating better proposals, the proposed rule (as drafted) requires little of substance and will result in nothing that can (or should) be relied on by contracting officers. Instead, the proposed rule creates another bureaucratic, non value-added requirement—a requirement which is actually contrary to the Better Buying Power Initiative.

First, there is nothing in the 23 principal actions of the Better Buying Power Initiative that even addresses proposal adequacy. So it is unclear why the DAR Council believes that the proposed rule supports it.

The Better Buying Power Initiative calls for reductions in “non-productive processes and bureaucracy.” Within that general heading, one finds this objective

Reduce non-value-added overhead imposed on industry. Industry has its own internal unproductive processes which add to project costs, but these are in some part a reflection of the requirements which the government imposes. A great number of the inputs I received from industry were directed at what was viewed as excessive overhead expenses based solely on non-value-added mandates and reporting requirements which may have been relevant at some point in time, but have little relevance in the world in which we now find ourselves. In order to identify and reduce these costly requirements, I am directing the Director of Industrial Policy, with support from DPAP, to more fully survey our industrial base to identify, prioritize, and recommend a path forward to unwind duplicative and overly rigorous requirements that add to costs, but do not add to quality of product or timeliness of delivery. As we remove these requirements, I will expect a decline in the overhead charged to the Department by our industrial base that reflects these reduced costs.

(Italics in original.)

I believe that this proposed rule (as drafted) is a good example of a “non-value added” mandate and reporting requirement that tends to increase contractor overhead. Accordingly, I urge the DAR Council to withdraw it in favor of a PGI entry that assists contracting officers to determine whether or not field pricing assistance is necessary.


Thank you for considering these comments to the proposed rule.

Sincerely,


Nicholas Sanders
President and Principal Consultant
Apogee Consulting, Inc.

 

2012’s Buzz-word of Choice: “Should-Cost”

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Our long-time readers know that we’ve been watching developments over at Shay Assad’s new DOD Pricing Directorate since he departed DPAP. We’ve even ventured an opinion or two about what his new focus area might mean to defense contractors.

The latest scoop (well, it’s a scoop if you ignore the reports from other sources) is the should-cost template.

The should-cost template is a PowerPoint slide deck for use by Program Managers of ACAT I programs when preparing presentations to the Pentagon Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). It’s mandatory for ACAT I use, but “recommended” for use by ACAT II and III programs.

Some of you may be asking what an ACAT is. Google it.

Some other readers may be asking about this whole “should cost” thingee that appears to be the DOD buzz-word of 2012. According to the template—

The Program’s “should cost” is the set of program’s initiatives or opportunities to reduce costs below the Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) level. It is primarily the basis for a negotiating position and result for pending contracts that will be below the ICE, but it also includes measures taken to reduce cost beyond near term contract actions.


We have heard little if any feedback from contractors regarding their experience with “should cost.” But if you’re a Boeing person and you work on the Poseidon P-8A program, we encourage you to take a look at Slide 5 and see if the Navy isn’t getting ready to stick it to your program, hard. Wonder how that one slipped in?

 

Court of Federal Claims Clarifies CAS 418

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If you’ve been in this government contract cost accounting and compliance business long enough, you have come to realize that the regulations and the agency guidance aren’t the end of the matter.  Usually, it takes litigation to clarify what the regulations mean, and to determine if the agency guidance is (or is not) correct.  Which is why we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. spend a lot of time on the internet, looking at Court and Board decisions to see the judicial interpretations of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  We routinely check out decisions at the Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit), the Court of Federal Claims, and the Boards of Contract Appeal, to see how they might impact our clients.  And we post our (layperson’s) thoughts about those decisions here in our blog.

This is one of those times.

Motions for summary judgment that are dismissed are not the final decisions of the judicial body.  Normally that means there are issues of fact that need to be tried, and thus a final decision will be forthcoming in the future.  But recently, the Judge Lettow of the Court of Federal Claims (CoFC) dismissed governmental motions for summary judgment and, in doing so, gave us a thorough discussion of the application of CAS 418.

Let’s look at that decision, shall we?

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, long-time maker of helicopters, filed an appeal of an Administrative Contracting Officer’s final decision alleging the company was in noncompliance with CAS 418.  According to the DCAA and the ACO, Sikorsky owed about $80 million because it had improperly allocated the indirect costs of its “materiel overhead” pool in violation of the requirements of that Standard.  The government filed several motions for summary judgment and, in the Court’s words—

In essence, by the pending motions, the parties have asked the court to provide a general interpretative framework for the most relevant Cost Accounting Standard, 48 C.F.R. § 9904.418, and in particular Section 9904.418-50, to guide their preparation of the consolidated cases for trial and final disposition.

In crafting his decision, Judge Lettow needed to be mindful of several Federal Circuit Appellate Court decisions.  The first decision was the infamous travesty of a judicial ruling (in our opinion, naturally) found in Rumsfeld v. United Techs. Corp., 315 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The second decision was a more recent Federal Circuit decision in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  As we’ll point out, Judge Lettow took great pains to address those issues and to position his decision to survive appeal at that level of the judiciary.

The Judge’s decision started with a review of the CAS Board history and put CAS 418 in that historical context.  As Judge Lettow wrote—

Of particular interest to the pending motions in this case is CAS 418, which sets out how contractors may distribute indirect costs, such as overhead, among their contracts. Specifically, CAS 418 specifies accounting practices for ‘the consistent determination of direct and indirect costs,’ ‘the accumulation of indirect costs . . . in indirect cost pools,’ and ‘the selection of allocation measures based on the beneficial or causal relationship between an indirect cost pool and cost objectives.’

Next, the Judge listed several “basic accounting concepts.”  These included the definitions of direct and indirect costs, as well as the definition of “cost allocation”.  For example, he wrote—

Indirect costs are apportioned according to an allocation method (also termed an allocation base, allocation basis, or cost driver), the selection of which is subject to detailed criteria. See id. § 9904.418-50. An allocation method, essentially, guides how an indirect cost is to be distributed among multiple cost objectives. For an indirect cost, an allocation method should be chosen based on the “causal or beneficial relationship,” id. § 9904.418-40(c), between the indirect cost pool and the final cost objectives, i.e., the allocation base should distribute the indirect cost to final cost objectives in a manner accurately reflecting each cost objective’s fair share of the indirect cost.

It what seems to us to be the Judge’s great pains to give the Federal Circuit some clue as to the concept of cost allocation, the paragraph quoted above included a footnote, which read as follows—

A relatively straightforward example would arise if two families, one of two adults and a child, the other of just two adults, shared a $60 meal. The $60 could be allocated between the families by several allocation measures. If the child eats little, it would be sensible to select the number of adults as the allocation measure: $60 divided among four adults is $15 per adult, and there are two adults per family, so each family would bear $30 of the cost. If the child eats as much as the adults, then a suitable allocation measure would be the number of persons: $60 divided among five persons is $12 per person, so the three-person family would bear $36 and the two-person family $24. See Ramji Balakrishnan et al., Managerial Accounting 88-90 (2009). If the child is a teenager who eats an extraordinary amount, a pounds-eaten allocation measure would be more appropriate. Assuming six pounds of food is eaten at the dinner, the food cost of $60 would be allocated at a rate of $10 per pound. If the four adults eat one pound each, and the child eats two pounds, the two-adult family, together eating 2 pounds, would bear $20 in costs, while the family with the child, together eating 4 pounds, would bear $40 in costs. For a more sophisticated example, see 48 C.F.R. § 9904.418-60(e).

Now that a context had been established, Judge Lettow turned to the merits of the case.  The dispute concerned the proper cost allocation base to be used for Sikorsky’s materiel overhead.  The materiel overhead pool collected “costs of the purchasing department, of receiving and inspecting the materi[e]l, and of its storage and transportation.”  The Judge continued—

Prior to 1999, Sikorsky allocated its materiel overhead cost pool to contracts by a materiel cost base. ‘In other words, Sikorsky allocated a portion of the materi[e]l overhead costs to each [g]overnment and commercial contract based on the cost of materi[el] associated with the contract.’ ...  According to Sikorsky, however, a materiel cost base distorted the relative costs of Sikorsky’s contracts because it did not account for the indirect costs of government-furnished materiel (‘GFM’) — items like engines that the government purchases elsewhere and provides to Sikorsky at no cost for further assembly. ...  ‘As a result, under Sikorsky’s pre-1999 accounting practice the value of GFM was not included in the materi[e]l cost base used to allocate the cost of materi[e]l overhead. Because GFM was excluded from the materi[e]l cost base, costs Sikorsky incurred when it received, handled, or inspected . . . GFM were under-allocated to [g]overnment contracts for which that work was performed.’  Consequently, on January 1, 1999, Sikorsky began allocating its materiel overhead cost pool on a direct-labor-cost basis.

At the time Sikorsky made its allocation base change, the DCMA Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO) found that it created no material cost impact to CAS-covered contracts.  However, “more than five years later,” DCAA issued an audit report finding that Sikorsky’s allocation base was in “potential noncompliance with CAS 418,” which required Sikorsky to negotiate with a new CACO.  According to Sikorsky, the matter was resolved by agreeing to a prospective change in allocation base.  (The new allocation base was not specified in the decision.)  But according to the government, that did not end the matter.  As the Judge wrote—

Two years later, on April 5, 2007, Sikorsky’s new CACO, Frank J. Colandro, relied on the same DCAA audit report issued in 2004 to submit a fresh notice to Sikorsky stating that its pre-2006 accounting practice potentially violated CAS 418. … Sikorsky protested that CACO Sherwood had approved its earlier practice and CACO Weisman had resolved the issues arising from the 2004 audit report. … Nevertheless, Mr. Colandro, on behalf of the Defense Contract Management Agency (‘DCMA’), issued a contracting officer’s final decision against Sikorsky. … The decision found that Sikorsky’s pre-2006 accounting practice violated CAS 418, that the practice became material in 2003, and as a result Sikorsky had overcharged the government respecting its contracts. Id. The decision ordered Sikorsky to pay the government $64 million in principal and $15 million in interest.

But before the Court could rule on the CAS matters before it, it first had to rule on the government’s motion to dismiss Sikorsky’s “protective, defensive claim” it had filed under a reasonable fear that its defenses wouldn’t be allowed under the Maropakis Doctrine.  The Maropakis Doctrine is another one of those WTF? decisions out of the Federal Circuit. Here’s a good summary from McKenna Long & Aldridge.

In its Maropakis decision, as the attorneys at McKenna Long wrote, “the Federal Circuit held that a contractor’s failure to present a certified claim for time extensions under its contract barred it from presenting any factual defenses to the government’s liquidated damages claim.”  In other words, the contractor was prevented from asserting factual defenses against the government’s claim, because it had failed to first submit a certified claim in accordance with the Contracts Disputes Act.  Though Judge Newman emphatically dissented from the opinion, writing that it was “contrary to the purposes of the CDA, contrary to precedent, and an affront to the principles upon which these courts were founded,” it stands as current precedent.  The MLA attorneys summed-up the situation thusly—

Now, when challenging a Contracting Officer’s final decision assessing liquidated damages, contractors must consider submitting a formal claim for recovery per the CDA prior to appealing the liquidated damages assessment, especially where the government sets-off the assessment against contract balance. Based upon the Federal Circuit’s far-reaching decision, a contractor could be held to have waived its ability to present a factual defense to a liquidated damages assessment if, prior to its appeal, it fails to embed such a defense in a corresponding claim to modify/adjust the contract and/or recover the assessed amounts.

Consequently, Sikorsky filed a claim with the ACO that presented its affirmative defenses in its CAS 418 dispute, in order to preserve its right to raise them at trial.  The ACO declined to issue any decision, because the matter was in litigation.  Sikorsky appealed that deemed denial of its claim.  So now the Court had two, related, appeals to adjudicate.  Naturally, the government moved to dismiss Sikorsky’s claim.

The whole course of action was ridiculous, but it was also the logical outcome of the Federal Circuit’s Maropakis decision.  Nice job there, Feds.  Way to promote judicial economy.In any case, Judge Lettow was able to deal with the matter succinctly.  First, he was able to distinguish between the current CAS 418 case and the Maropakis case.  Second, he dismissed the matter based on simple logic.  The Judge wrote—

Sikorsky need not be put to the Hobson’s choice of preserving its affirmative defenses only through its original complaint or not at all. … On the assumption that Maropakis does not apply to Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses, the court would continue to entertain Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses as pled in Sikorsky’s first complaint. Alternatively, if Maropakis’ filing requirement does apply to Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses, then this court manifestly has jurisdiction over Sikorsky’s second complaint (and, again, also over Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses). … If Maropakis applies to Sikorsky’s affirmative defenses, the contracting officer’s choice to decline issuing a final decision on Sikorsky’s second set of claims would be incorrect: the claims would not have been already in litigation, so the contracting officer should have issued a final decision within 60 days or a reasonable time. … The officer’s inaction thus would be deemed a denial, and appeal of that denial via the complaint in No. 10-741C would be jurisdictionally proper. … If Maropakis does not apply, then Sikorsky’s second complaint would be merely redundant.  Consequently, on these grounds, the court denies the government’s motion to dismiss Sikorsky’s complaint in No. 10-741C.

Having disposed of the pesky Maropakis decision, the Court next turned to the heart of the matter: compliance with CAS 418.

Judge Lettow wrote that “the central issue in this case is whether Sikorsky’s allocation of its materiel overhead pool contravened the requirements of” CAS 418-50.  The Judge wrote that there were two “mutually exclusive sets of requirements” in that section of the Standard.  One set of requirements, found at 418-50(d), pertains to “indirect cost pools containing ‘a material amount of the costs of management or supervision,’” whereas the second set of requirements (found at 418-50(e)) pertains to “such pools that ‘do not include material amounts of the costs of management or supervision.’”  (Emphasis added by the Judge.)  Sikorsky and the government disagreed about which set of requirements should be applied to the evaluation of Sikorsky’s materiel overhead pool.  Resolution of that disagreement would go a long way towards resolving the appeal.

The Judge summarized the parties’ positions thusly—

Sikorsky contends that the key to whether Subsection 418-50(d) or 418-50(e) applies to a pool is whether that pool includes ‘a material amount of the costs of management or supervision.’ … Thus, in Sikorsky’s view, pools containing significant management or supervision costs, as a quantitative measure, are governed by Subsection 418-50(d), and those that do not are governed by Subsection 418-50(e). … In contrast, the government argues that the key to determining whether Subsection 418-50(d) or 418-50(e) applies to a pool turns on the phrase that follows ‘material amounts of the costs of management or supervision,’ i.e., ‘activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs.’ … (emphasis added)…. The government avers that the CASB was not concerned with whether indirect pools contained management costs, but whether they collected costs of activities ‘hav[ing] a direct and definitive relationship . . . [to] benefiting cost objectives.’

[The government’s] interpretation of Subsections 418-50(d) and (e) serves as the textual touchstone for the government’s chief argument: the government posits that Subsection 418-50(d) sets out the allocation rules for indirect cost pools collecting overhead costs, which costs have a tenuous relationship to cost objectives, while Subsection 418-50(e) sets out the allocation rules for indirect cost pools collecting costs of service centers, which are more directly attributable to cost objectives. … As the government would have it, pools containing management costs are entirely governed by another Cost Accounting Standard, viz., 48 C.F.R. § 9904.410 (‘CAS 410’). … Therefore, reasons the government, because overhead pools fall strictly under Subsection 418-50(d), and because Sikorsky’s materiel overhead pool is an overhead pool, the factual inquiries at trial should be limited to whether Sikorsky’s pool complied with Subsection 418-50(d).

The Judge’s reasoning, which we will quote extensively below, is clearly written to address concerns raised by the Federal Circuit in reversals of prior CAS decisions of the lower Court.  For example, much is made of the “plain meaning” and use of “standard dictionary definitions” and significant effort is made to point out that no special accounting definitions are being applied. Keep in mind that the Federal Circuit has expressed suspicion regarding use of complex accounting terms and has clearly shown favor for such “Joe the Plumber” dictionary definitions.  It seems to us that Judge Lettow was trying very hard to forestall those potential Appellate-level objections to his CAS analysis while he was setting-forth his interpretation of how CAS 418-50 operates.  He wrote—

The plain language of Subsections 418-50(d) and 418-50(e) demarcates indirect cost pools based on two criteria: first, whether the pools contain significant management or supervision costs, and second, whether the activity being managed or supervised involves direct labor or direct materiel costs. Thus, Subsection 418-50(d) applies only to ‘an indirect cost pool which includes [1] a material amount of the costs of management or supervision [2] of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs.’ … (bracketed numbers added). Conversely, Subsection 418-50(e) applies to ‘indirect cost pools [1] that do not include material amounts of the costs of management or supervision [2] of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs.’ … (bracketed numbers added) (emphasis added). In short, both types of indirect cost pools use the words ‘activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs.’ … Nonetheless, not all of the costs in an indirect cost pool may involve direct labor or direct materiel costs, and this circumstance may vary somewhat depending upon which Subsection is involved. Rather, the Subsections are primarily differentiated based upon whether the indirect cost pools involved contain significant amounts of management and supervision costs.

The regulation defines neither ‘management’ nor ‘supervision.’ Consequently, they ‘will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’ Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) …; see Rumsfeld, 315 F.3d at 1370 (applying ‘standard dictionary definitions and other pertinent regulations’ to determine the meaning of undefined CAS terms); ATK Thiokol, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 612, 630-31 (2005). The word ‘management’ is a nominal of the verb ‘manage,’ which means ‘[t]o direct or control the use of; . . . [t]o exert control over; . . . [t]o direct or administer (the affairs of an organization, estate, household, or business).’ American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 792 (New Coll. ed. 1976). Correlatively, the noun ‘supervision’ stems from the verb ‘supervise,’ which means ‘[t]o direct and inspect the performance of (workers or work); oversee; superintend.’ Id. at 1292; see also Random House College Dictionary 811, 1320 (rev. 1st ed. 1975); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1372, 2296 (16th ed. 1971). The words have no special meaning for accountants or auditors. See Erik Banks, Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Finance, Investment and Banking 317-19 (2010) (no entry for ‘management’); id. at 496-97 (no entry for ‘supervision’); David O’Regan, Auditor’s Dictionary 176-78, 250 (2004) (‘management’ defined as ‘[t]he process of directing, controlling, and planning in an organization’ and ‘supervision’ defined as ‘[t]he oversight, review, and correction of a matter,’ id. at 250); Oxford Dictionary of Accounting 272-73, 404 (4th ed. 2010) (no entry for ‘management’ or ‘supervision’); Joel G. Siegel & Jae K. Shim, Dictionary of Accounting Terms 269-72, 429 (3d ed. 2000) (same). …

This plain language refutes the government’s contention that the phrase ‘management or supervision of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs’ denotes the concept of an overhead cost pool for Subsection 418-50(d) and the same language refers specifically to service-center pools for Subsection 418-50(e). Had the CASB ‘intended for [these subsections] to carry a specialized — and indeed, unusual — meaning . . . , [the CASB] would have said so expressly.’ … (‘Reluctance to working with the basic meaning of words in a normal manner undermines the legal process.’); cf. Perry, 47 F.3d at 1138 (There is ‘no reason to believe the CASB would publish incomplete, and possibly misleading, illustrations.’). Section 418-50 does not mention overhead, service center, or other particular kinds of indirect cost pools. Instead, the language only refers to indirect cost pools generally, differentiating them insofar as they encompass ‘management or supervision of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs.’

[Emphasis added by us.]But the Judge wasn’t finished (and so neither are we).  

He continued—

The plain language of the triggering portions of Subsections 418-50(d) and (e) admit only one interpretation. Even so, the court must ensure that the interpretation is not manifestly mistaken in light of the regulatory context. See … (dismissing plain language arguments that ‘would frustrate the undeniable purpose of [a CAS] provision,’ id. at 1374). The stated purpose of this portion of the CAS is ‘to provide for consistent determination of direct and indirect costs; to provide criteria for the accumulation of indirect costs, including service center and overhead costs, in indirect cost pools; and, to provide guidance relating to the selection of allocation measures based on the beneficial or causal relationship between an indirect cost pool and cost objectives.’ … (emphasis added). The second clause of the statement refers to both service center and overhead costs, but it does so in a way that suggests they should be grouped together, not separately. In this respect, the third clause states that all indirect cost pools should be allocated ‘based on [their] beneficial or causal relationship [to] . . . cost objectives.’

Other portions of CAS 418 elaborate on these relationships. Section 418-40 explains that pools with significant management costs have a more attenuated causal relationship to cost objectives than do pools without significant management costs. ‘If a material amount of the costs included in a cost pool are costs of management or supervision of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs, resource consumption cannot be specifically identified with cost objectives.’ … This is because, as Sikorsky observes, ‘[t]he costs of managing or supervising activities of employees whose own work involves various contracts are further removed from the benefiting contracts. As a result, indirect cost pools that include significant management or supervision costs ‘cannot be allocated on measures of a specific beneficial or causal relationship.’’ … Therefore, ‘in that circumstance, a base [is] used which is representative of the activity being managed or supervised,” i.e., a base among the alternatives provided by Subsection 418-50(d).

Conversely, if a ‘cost pool does not contain a material amount of the costs of management or supervision of activities involving direct labor or direct materi[e]l costs, resource consumption can be specifically identified with cost objectives.’ … This is because the pool’s activities are more directly associated with cost objectives. Consequently, the pool’s costs can be allocated more precisely, i.e., ‘[t]he pooled cost [can] be allocated based on the specific identifiability of resource consumption with cost objectives . . . in accordance with the criteria set out in 9904.418-50(e).’ Id. The regulation’s illustrations bear out this analysis. See id. § 9904.418-60(e) (commenting that a weighted-square-foot basis for allocating occupancy costs ‘adequately reflect[s] the proportional consumption of resources,’ as required by Subsection 418-50(e)); id. § 9904.418-60(f) (noting that a dollars-of-materiel-issued basis for allocating the costs of a materiel-related overhead pool ‘varies in proportion to the services rendered,’ as required by Subsection 418-50(e)).

The Judge continued, reciting the history of the Standard’s development and discussing both published and unpublished comments.  We’ll spare you that recital, though it’s an excellent resource for those who may want to read it.  The Judge summed-up as follows—

The plain language of 48 C.F.R. §§ 9904.418-50(d) and (e) divides indirect cost pools by inclusion, or not, of significant costs of management or supervision of activities related to direct labor or materiel costs. Pools containing such significant costs are governed by Subsection 418-50(d); pools without such costs are governed by Subsection 418-50(e). This interpretation is supported by the regulation’s overall operation and purpose, and by the relevant regulatory history. Consequently, whether Sikorsky’s materiel overhead pool falls under Subsection 418-50(d) or under Subsection 418-50(e) turns on whether the pool contained significant costs of management or supervision of direct-cost activities.

The government’s motions were denied and the case will proceed to trial, where it will be determined whether or not Sikorsky’s materiel overhead pool contained a “material” amount of the costs of management or supervision of the activities related to direct labor or materiel costs.  Meanwhile, we practitioners of CAS and other related matters of government contract cost accounting compliance have an important resource to use, in order to better understand the operation of CAS 418.
 

GAO Tells DCAA to Request Contractors’ Internal Audit Reports

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Bemusement. Yes, that’s the right word to describe how this GAO audit report makes us feel. Bemusement is the feeling of “wry or tolerant amusement” and that’s how we feel when reading GAO’s latest effort (GAO-12-88), entitled “DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDITS: Actions Needed to Improve DCAA's Access to and Use of Defense Company Internal Audit Reports.” Issued on December 8, 2011, GAO told Senators Levin and McCain that “DCAA auditors are hindered in their ability to effectively plan work and meet auditing standards for evaluating internal controls.” As a result of this sad state of affairs, “GAO recommends that DCAA take steps to facilitate access to internal audits and assess periodically whether other actions are needed.”

Access to contractor internal audit reports has been a bogey-man for quite some time. Somehow the failure to provide DCAA auditors with internal audit reports means that the contractors are hiding something. Sometimes it’s true. But more often, there’s very little in the report that would be of interest to a DCAA auditor. And sometimes, disclosing internal audit reports that were prepared under attorney-client privilege results in a broad waiver of that privilege.

Regardless of our feelings about the matter, GAO told the Senators that they reviewed 1,125 internal audit reports prepared by seven DOD contractors. They identified 520 internal audit reports that “were related to contracting with the Federal government” and, of those, they reviewed 470. They also reviewed detailed working papers associated with five internal audit reports from each contractor.

GAO was, in general, complimentary about the contractors’ internal audit function. GAO wrote—

Our analysis found that five of the companies met the standards for individual audits … including engagement planning, conducting fieldwork and testing, reporting findings, and tracking corrective actions. We were unable to completely assess two companies’ compliance with the standards because the companies did not provide the information needed to do so. Specifically, we found that the 470 audit reports provided by six companies and 25 sets of supporting workpapers provided by five companies followed the Institute [for Internal Audit]’s standards.

Of the 520 internal audit reports it found relevant to Federal contracting, GAO reported that—

  • 338 audits related to one or more of the six business systems that DOD audits.

  • 97 audits pertained to a specific DOD program and could include reviews of an entire business system, such as the earned value management system, or one component of a business system, such as purchasing.

  • 96 audits were associated with a company’s compliance with federal laws and regulations, or company policies related to its management and oversight of its defense contracts.

After concluding that roughly 50% of a contractor’s internal audit reports would be of use by DCAA auditors, GAO then looked at whether the contractors provided DCAA with those reports, and/or whether DCAA was requested access to them. GAO found that—

  • Six companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to at least some internal audits reports upon request. Four of the six, however, provide that access on a ‘view-only’ or ‘read-only’ basis, meaning that DCAA auditors may not have physical or electronic copies of the reports but may view them and take notes in the presence of company staff. Company officials explained to us that they adopted this policy because the reports are sensitive and proprietary. One company provides copies only of the sections of the reports and workpapers that company officials consider relevant to DCAA’s work.

  • Of those six, four companies have policies that provide for DCAA access to the supporting workpapers for their internal audits upon request. Again, one company’s policy is to provide only workpapers for the sections of internal audit reports the company deems relevant to DCAA’s work. The other two companies have policies to not provide DCAA with access to supporting workpapers.

  • One company adopted a policy of not providing DCAA with access to its internal audits or workpapers.

  • one company denied DCAA access to two requested audits because company officials determined that the audits were related to commercial or other activities the company believed were not subject to DCAA’s review. Another company official said that the company would not provide DCAA with access to internal audits related to internal controls for information technology due to the potential threat of unauthorized individuals getting access to networks, critical applications, and confidential company or client data.

GAO reported that DCAA did not take kindly to being denied access to company internal audit reports (in the few instances when they were requested).  It reported—

For the company with the policy of not providing DCAA with access to internal audit reports, DCAA has cited the lack of access as preventing it from obtaining an understanding of the company’s internal controls and reported this as a deficiency in the audit of the company’s overall accounting system. DCAA concluded that without access to the company’s internal audit reports, DCAA could not determine if the company’s monitoring function was operating effectively and whether deficiencies were corrected. …

In another instance, DCAA reported a deficiency in another company’s control environment, citing the company’s policy of limiting access to sections of internal audit reports the company deemed relevant to contract oversight and not providing adequate and timely disclosure of audit reports that identified unallowable costs. The company changed its policy and agreed to provide DCAA with access to all audit reports the company determines to include findings related to government costs. However, auditors at one DCAA office who have requested internal audit reports from the company said that the company has not adhered to the revised policy and has continued to deny DCAA access to reports.

DCAA auditors provide various rationales for not requesting contractor internal audit reports.  We were interested by this paragraph in the GAO report—

Auditors from three DCAA audit teams stated that they did not believe that access to contractor internal audit information is critical to their own audit work and that the internal audit reports do not have enough detail to be helpful. They also stated that they are restricted by auditing standards in relying on the work of others. However, auditing standards do not restrict auditors from relying on the work of other auditors, including internal audit functions. While not reducing the level of work to be performed by DCAA auditors, consideration of relevant internal audit reports in planning related DCAA audits and performing risk assessments can provide useful information for planning DCAA’s scope of work and audit procedures.

We were also interested in this item:

DCAA has issued significantly fewer audit reports since 2008. The annual number of DCAA audits of the seven companies selected for this review decreased by almost 50 percent from 2008 to 2010. The number of internal control audits DCAA performed on the companies decreased from 128 to 62 in the same period. A DCAA policy official noted that DCAA decreased its number of control environment audits because it was waiting for a regulatory change that would redefine critical business systems for contractors.  As a result of this decrease, the number of internal audits necessary to supplement DCAA’s audit work also decreased during this time period.

That item, above, confirms (yet again) what we’ve been reporting on this site about DCAA productivity stats, as measured by audit reports completed. (Enough said about that.)

As we noted at the beginning of this article, GAO recommended that DCAA take a more organized and systematic approach to obtaining contractor internal audit reports. GAO opined—

The work of the internal auditors by no means replaces the work of DCAA auditors, but it could provide DCAA auditors with a basis for making a judgment about a company’s internal controls and help inform their audit planning, thereby making more effective and efficient use of DCAA audits

While we are a bit skeptical about how the average DCAA auditor would (or could) make use of a company’s internal audit reports, we have to agree that some of them might indeed be relevant. This is especially true since the new DFARS rule on contractor business systems mandates internal compliance reviews. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove compliance with the self-governance requirements without providing DCAA with the output of those reviews.

However, since not all internal audit reports are going to be relevant to DCAA, it seems prudent for contractors to categorize them, and to provide access to DCAA based on the category into which an internal audit report falls.  We think some of those categories might be:

  • Sarbanes-Oxley compliance-related.
  • General control or control environment-related.
  • Business-systems related.
  • Internal investigations performed under privileged.

No doubt many companies will have their own ideas regarding the appropriate categories, and how they will provide access to DCAA.  The point is, one should be proactive about the situation.  A written policy establishing company categories of internal audit reports, and stating how (or if) DCAA will be provided with access to those reports, would seem to be a relatively easy thing to do.

 

Supply Chain Transparency

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Our long-time readers know that we have a “special place” in our hearts for supply chain management. Our efforts advising program teams have convinced us that effective management of the program supply chain is the single most important key to program success. We’ve also ranted and raved about supply chain security and making sure counterfeit parts are excluded from qualified parts.

But we’ve never linked supply chain management with human trafficking.

Like many compliance professionals, we know about the FAR’s prohibition on engaging in such abhorrent activities.  We’ve opined before that the FAR prohibition goes too far, actually making engagement in legal commercial sex transactions a contract violation that could lead to contract termination.

But did you know that on January 1, 2012, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act becomes effective?  The attorneys at Venable LLP knew it, and they wrote up a summary right here. According to Venable, the new California law applies to retailers and manufactures doing business in California, if they have total annual sales of at least $100 million.

The Venable summary reports that the law requires covered companies to report on five areas, as follows—

1. Disclose the extent to which the company engages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by a third party.

2. Disclose the extent to which the company conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not an independent, unannounced audit.

3. Disclose the extent to which the company requires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in which they are doing business.

4. Disclose the extent to which the company maintains internal accountability standards and procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking.

5. Disclose the extent to which the company provides company employees and management, who have direct responsibility for supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the supply chains of products.

Whew! That’s quite a lot of disclosing to do. As Venable notes, “while compliance with the new law is simple insofar as all that is technically required is disclosure of what a company is doing to combat slavery in its distribution chain, the type of meaningful compliance necessary to enable a company to certify that it has met, and continues to meet, each of the five requirements noted above may require substantial effort.”

We continue to believe that effective management of suppliers/subcontractors is the key to program execution success. That being said, we recognize that, in this era of budget pressures and cost-consciousness, it’s perhaps unpleasant to have to contemplate adding staff and increasing the scope of activities in the realm of “supply chain management.” But with DCAA being “under-resourced” and hence unwilling and/or unable to perform its historical role in auditing subcontractors, the burden now falls more heavily on the primes and upper-tier subcontractors to “get their hands dirty” by auditing their lower-tier subcontractors’ pricing, business systems, CAS compliance, compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and other matters.

And now, we can all add compliance with California SB 657 to the list of things with which to be concerned.

What are you doing about adequately managing compliance risk in your supply chain?  We bet it’s not enough.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.