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ASBCA Throws Out Untimely Government Claim for Increased Costs from Changes to Cost Accounting Practice

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First things first.  Thanks to the website PubKLaw.Com for bringing this important ASBCA decision to our attention before the Board published it on its own website.What makes this particular ASBCA decision important is the following:

The Board of Contract Appeals dismissed the Government’s case against Boeing because it was filed more than six years after the claim accrued.

We’ve reported on this issue before—namely, right here.  In fact, the Board cited to that particular decision as support for its decision in the Boeing matter.

Let’s recap.

  • In October 2000, Boeing submitted a revised CASB Disclosure Statement that included revised cost accounting practices, to become effective January 1, 2001.
  • Upon request, Boeing provided a cost impact analysis.
  • The cost impact analysis was audited by DCAA, who issued its audit report on June 14, 2002 to the cognizant DCMA administrative contracting officer (ACO).  That audit report asserted that Boeing’s changed cost accounting practices would result in $7.4 million in increased costs (consisting of decreased costs on Boeing’s fixed-price contracts).
  • On September 15, 2003, the cognizant ACO prepared a “prenegotiation memorandum that “a determination that Boeing's accounting revision was not in the government's interests, barring the government from paying resulting increased costs, and described a negotiation strategy for obtaining reimbursement of costs the government had incurred.”
  • On September 17, 2003, the cognizant ACO wrote Boeing stating the findings and offering to settle the matter by using Boeing’s cost impact to establish the unallowable increased costs.  To Boeing’s numbers, the ACO added amounts for assumed profit and an interest rate on the costs.
  • On December 23, 2003, Boeing responded to the ACO’s letter, disagreeing with pretty much everything.
  • “The accounting change was raised at a series of additional meetings between the parties between 2004 and April 2005. During those meetings, Boeing also contended that the accounting revision's effect upon fixed-price contracts should not have been included in the assessment of its costs, and that interest was not recoverable by the government.”
  • “Subsequently, between 2005 and 2010, some ‘intermittent discussions and evaluations continued between [the contracting officer] and Boeing representatives in an attempt to settle the matter’.”
  • On October 25, 2010, the ACO issued a Final Decision, demanding $6.42 million from Boeing.
  • Boeing submitted an appeal of the ACO’s Final Decision to the ASBCA.

In the words of the ASBCA decision:  “Quite simply, [Boeing] contends that because the decision was issued more than six years after the government's claim for those costs accrued, it is a nullity.”The Government argued against Boeing’s motion, but on rather interesting grounds.  The ASBCA summarized the Government’s arguments as follows—

The government's 25 October 2010 final decision quite succinctly describes the events upon which it premises its claim, and demonstrates that the government knew of those events more than six years earlier. …

Although it does not deny the accrual date of its claim, the government advances two arguments in response to Boeing's motion. First, the government suggests that its 25 October 2010 decision is not the relevant final decision in this appeal. According to the government, the contracting officer's 17 September 2003 letter to Boeing is the contracting officer's final decision asserting the government's claim for the costs of the accounting revision. … Alternatively, the government contends that its 25 October 2010 final decision is valid because the six-year limitation for bringing the claim was equitably tolled by Boeing's conduct …. Neither argument is persuasive.

We’ll elide recital of the Government’s first argument, focusing instead on the second argument.  As the ASBCA wrote

As support for its contention, the government emphasizes that three months after the contracting officer issued the 17 September 2003 letter, Boeing ‘unexpectedly took issue with each and every facet of the...1etter’… . The government contends that Boeing could have raised that issue sooner, and then waited another year and a half, until 14 April 2005, before presenting the evidence it claimed supported that position. Similarly, the government complains that Boeing initially agreed in 2002 that the accounting revision costs affected fixed price contracts, but then reversed that position during discussions in 2004. …

The government summarizes its position by accusing Boeing of leading the contracting officer ‘to believe that the contract adjustment issue was on the verge of settling’ but then it ‘belatedly interjected entirely new, overriding issues into the discussions; and finally it compounded the situation by providing supporting information in a thoroughly, untimely manner.’ According to the government, these actions breached Boeing's duty not to ‘hinder or delay the [government] in performance of the contract’ by ‘play[ing] [the contracting officer] along’ which then ‘induced [her] into allowing the limitations period to pass.’ Therefore, the six-year limitation should be considered tolled.

As noted above, the Board was unconvinced by the Government’s arguments.  It concluded—

We do not perceive any misconduct by Boeing that could have induced or tricked the government into missing the deadline for submitting its claim for the accounting revision costs. We do not perceive any misconduct by Boeing that could have induced or tricked the government into missing the deadline for submitting its claim for the accounting revision costs.  … Although Boeing may have unexpectedly disputed her conclusions, which it continued to do with various arguments and materials it presented to her in meetings that occurred over the next year and half, nothing about that constituted misconduct, or should have induced her not to protect the government's rights. If anything, Boeing's continued resistance to the government's conclusions, and to settling the matter, should have heightened the government's awareness of the need to issue a final decision to preserve its claim before the deadline expired. It should not have caused the government to believe that a final decision would be unnecessary. …

Given the facts, it seems clear that it was lack of diligence, and not any misconduct by Boeing, that was the reason the government sat on its rights here until it was too late.

The Board devoted considerable attention to other cases and matters that may have had implications on its decision, a recital that we will spare our readership.  (You are welcome.)The Board concluded with the following statement:

Because the government's 25 October 2010 final decision claiming the accounting revision costs was untimely, it is not valid. Given that it is invalid, it is a nullity and we lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from it. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

As was the case with the defective pricing matter we previously brought to your attention, the Government’s failure to file a claim within six years of believing it had been injured caused it to lose its case.  We expect the Government to appeal this decision but, until then, this is a great victory for Boeing.

 

Fraud is All in the Family

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The Department of Justice press release headline caught our attention, but it was the story that caught our sense of irony.

The headline? “Father and Son Convicted for Fraudulently Billing NSA Over $1.455 Million During a 10 Year Period.”

Yes, it’s true. In mid-December 2011, the DOJ announced that a Federal jury had convicted William Turley and his son, Donald Turley, “of conspiring to commit and committing wire fraud arising from a fraudulent billing scheme.”

The Senior Turley owned Bechdon Company, which manufactured “metal, plastic and sheet metal parts and other specialty items for customers including the National Security Agency (NSA).” The Junior Turley “served as the program manager on the NSA contract.” According to the press release, the Turleys “instructed employees to inflate the amount of hours they spent working on NSA jobs and in some cases, to misreport the time they spent working on the NSA jobs.

The Turleys were caught through responses to “voluntary interviews and polygraph examinations” related to obtaining NSA security clearances. During his interview, the Senior Turley was asked whether he had ever committed a crime. He “admitted to ‘moving time around’ on the NSA contract and admitted his conduct was ‘illegal’.” During his interview, the Junior Turley “admitted that in the week prior to his interview he had inflated the amount of time he recorded working on NSA jobs on his own daily time cards and had instructed Bechdon employees to inflate the hours they worked on NSA jobs on their daily time cards.”

Whoops!

But that’s not even the best part of the story. The best part concerns the third Turley—Christina Turley Knott, who worked as a bookkeeper for Bechdon, where as part of her duties she prepared and submitted invoices to the NSA.  She was also embezzling from her father’s company.

The DOJ reported—

William and Donald Turley became aware that from 2002 through 2005, Christina Knott embezzled approximately $4.5 million from the company, but chose not to pursue claims against Knott for fear that she would reveal their scheme to defraud NSA.


The DOJ is seeking forfeiture of $1.4552 million that the Turleys misbilled NSA—as well as Turley-owned residences in Annapolis and Owings, Maryland, and in Palm Beach, Florida.  The two male Turleys are facing 20 years in prison for their crimes.

The female Turley, who failed to report her embezzled funds as income on her Federal tax return, also pleaded guilty to fraudulently billing NSA.  She is facing up to 20 years in prison for her role in the conspiracy and three years in prison for the tax offense.

So just to be clear: The daughter stole more than $4 million—and would have gotten away with it, too—if not for her meddling brother and father, whose answers to their security interviews revealed a plot to steal a relatively paltry $1.45 million from the U.S. Government.

We think you’ll agree with us that these crimes were all in the family.

 

Ah, to be a Nontraditional Defense Contractor

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We recently submitted a paper to the NCMA Macfarlan Writing Program, in which we compared the acquisition reform efforts of the Obama Administration to those of the Clinton Administration.  The bottom-line is that we characterized the Clinton-era reform efforts as being focused on decentralization and individual discretion while breaking down market-entry barriers, while we characterized the Obama efforts as being focused on centralization and enhanced oversight.  But of course that was an oversimplification.

We were reminded that the reality of the situation is more complex than any medium-length paper can describe, when a final DFARS rule was published in the Federal Register, creating opportunities for DOD acquisition officials to award contracts to “nontraditional defense contractors” via streamlined procedures for acquisitions of “military-purpose nondevelopmental items.”

As the final rule states—

Under this pilot program, DoD may enter into contracts with nontraditional defense contractors for the purpose of--

--Enabling DoD to acquire items that otherwise might not have been available to DoD;

--Assisting DoD in the rapid acquisition and fielding of capabilities needed to meet urgent operational needs; and

--Protecting the interests of the United States in paying fair and reasonable prices for the item or items acquired.

This pilot program is designed to test whether the streamlined procedures, similar to those available for commercial items, can serve as an effective incentive for nontraditional defense contractors to (1) channel investment and innovation into areas that are useful to DoD and (2) provide items developed exclusively at private expense to meet validated military requirements.

Sounds pretty Clinton-like, doesn’t it?

How does the pilot program work?  Well, the final rule doesn’t tell you that.  It basically just says the interim rule is being adopted as a final rule without changes.  For the intricacies of the pilot program’s inner workings, you need to go to that interim DFARS rule, published in the Federal Register on June 29, 2011.

From the interim rule, you can see that a new DFARS Subpart (212.71) has been added to the DFARS Section on Commercial Item Acquisition (Part 212).  Essentially, contracting officers may treat qualifying contract actions awarded to qualifying companies as acquisitions of commercial items.  But as they say, “the devil is in the details.”

Let’s get dirty into the details, shall we?

The first thing you need to know is how to determine whether a company is a nontraditional defense contractor.  According to the rule, a nontraditional defense contractor …

… means an entity that is not currently performing and has not performed, for at least the one-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by the Department of Defense for the procurement or transaction, any of the following for the Department of Defense--

(1) Any contract or subcontract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards prescribed pursuant to Section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. section 1502) and the regulations implementing such section; or

(2) Any other contract in excess of the certified cost or pricing data threshold under which the contractor is required to submit certified cost or pricing data.

You might also want to understand what procurement actions are subject to the opportunity to use streamlined procedures. The streamlined procedures are available for “military-purpose nondevelopmental items”.  

What are those items?  The rule states—

 Military-purpose nondevelopmental item means a nondevelopmental item that meets a validated military requirement, as determined in writing by the responsible program manager, and has been developed exclusively at private expense. An item shall not be considered to be developed at private expense if development of the item was paid for in whole or in part through--

(1) Independent research and development costs or bid and proposal costs, per the definition in FAR 31.205-18, that have been reimbursed directly or indirectly by a Federal agency or have been submitted to a Federal agency for reimbursement; or (2) Foreign government funding.

In order to avail themselves of the streamlined procedures, contracting officers must award contracts that meet the following requirements.  The rule states—

Each contract entered into under the pilot program shall--

  1. Be awarded using competitive procedures;
  2. Be a firm-fixed-price contract, or a fixed-price contract with an economic price adjustment clause; 
  3. Be in an amount not in excess of $50 million;
  4. Provide--
    1. For the delivery of an initial lot of production quantities of completed items not later than nine months after the date of the award of such contract; and
    2. That failure to make delivery as provided for under paragraph (d)(1) may result in termination for cause; and
    3.  Be-- 
      1. Exempt from the requirement to submit certified cost or pricing data; 
      2. Exempt from the cost accounting standards under section 26 of the Office of Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 1502); and
      3. Subject to the requirement to provide data other than certified cost or pricing data for the purpose of price reasonableness determinations.

One final point.  As the rule-makers noted in the final rule, this opportunity is only authorized by statute with respect to awards of prime contracts by the DOD.  They expressly stated that it is not to be flowed-down by prime contractors to subcontractors—i.e., it cannot be used by prime contractors or higher-tier subcontractors   At least, that’s the opinion of the DAR Council.  We’re not so sure that Congress would agree with that interpretation of the statute.

But if you happen to qualify as a “nontraditional defense contractor” and would like to sell “military-purpose nondevelopmental items” to the Defense Department, then this pilot program might well be your ticket.

On the other hand, if you are truly a “nontraditional defense contractor” then we don’t expect you’d be reading this blog, now would you?

 

DOD Proposes to Ease Audit Burden on DCAA Reviewers of Interim Vouchers

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Receipts

On January 19, 2012, the DAR Council published a proposed rule in the Federal Register which would, if implemented as drafted, ease the burden on the poor, overworked, DCAA auditors who are stuck reviewing contractors’ interim vouchers.

We recently published some comments (found on GovExec.com) from self-identified DCAA auditors.  One of those rather plaintive comments said—

… Visit my office and I'll tell you about what is really happening in DCAA. Two of five teams in my office do nothing but process vouchers. Second, the only audits we perform are forward pricing. The CIGIE police have gigged my office to death on forward pricing especially FPRAs and we waste hundreds of hours on just working paper documentation. Third, my backlog of incurred cost is growing and I have no hope of ever getting to it. We have not auditing an incurred cost submission since 2009. Lastly, we have lost all credibility with contracting officers and they are awarding contracts and closing contracts without DCAA audits because we are not timely. We want to issue reports on time, but the working paper requirements and the review process is so onerous that we cannot possibility be timely. …

We helpfully italicized the second sentence in the above comment.  According to the commenter, about 40 percent of the local DCAA workforce was occupied reviewing interim vouchers.  Which is one large reason why recent DCAA productivity statistics are—shall we say?—less than confidence-inspiring.  When about 40 percent of your workforce is busy looking at interim vouchers—vouchers that will need to be audited again during close-out audits, and which may be sampled as part of any Accounting System review—then it doesn’t take a management consultant to figure out that you’re wasting everybody’s time.  And wasting taxpayer dollars along the way.

Most of us know the reason for this preoccupation with interim voucher reviews.  It stems from an ill-advised decision (made back in 2008/2009) to withdraw contractors’ “direct-billing authority” and impose an intermediate audit step between the contractors and the DFAS paying office.

At one point in time, we thought DCAA might have recognized the unintended consequences of its decision, and might be backing-off its interim vouchers reviews through a DFARS Class Deviation.  But no.  DCAA quickly stomped on the ray of hope offered by the Class Deviation.  According to DCAA, the Class Deviation applied only to “nonmajor” contractors—such as small businesses.  Everybody else was still subject to interim voucher reviews, no matter what the impact on DCAA’s productivity stats.

So, enough with the background and back to the proposed rule.  As the policy-makers at the DAR Council stated—

This rule proposes to revise requirements for approving interim vouchers. Interim vouchers that are selected using sampling methodologies will be reviewed and approved by the contract auditors for provisional payment and sent to the disbursing office after a pre-payment review. Interim vouchers not selected for a pre-payment review will be considered to be provisionally approved and will be sent directly to the disbursing office. All provisionally approved interim vouchers are subject to a later audit of actual costs incurred.

And that’s pretty much it.

The obvious effect of the rule would be to reduce the auditors’ workload.  They will not need to review 100 percent of the contractor’s interim vouchers.  Instead, they can take a sample of the interim vouchers (sample methodology carefully not specified) and let the others pass.  It’s going to free-up audit resources and permit them to be redeployed on more value-added audits.  This is good news for DCAA.

And it’s really good news for defense contractors, as well.

 

United Space Alliance is the Status Quo of Space Launch Capability

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Falcon_HeavyA recent story at Aviation Week & Space Technology discusses challenges faced by the United States as it looks to the future of its space launch capability.  It told its readers—

The U.S. must overcome the growing challenges of rising launch costs and aging propulsion systems if it is to gain much needed efficiencies and maintain its global lead, warns Gen. William Shelton, commander of Air Force Space Command.  

Although the past 81 consecutive national security launches mark “an unprecedented record” for U.S. space launch, Shelton says ‘we pay a huge financial premium for that success.” Alternatives must be found to offset these costs, he adds. “Don’t get me wrong. I’m not suggesting we want to do launch on the cheap, but there are places we can look to reduce costs without affecting our sterling record of success,’ he says.

Speaking specifically about the RS-68 and RL10 engines that form the propulsion backbone of the current Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) launcher fleet, Shelton says ‘the RS-68 was designed about 20 years ago and the RL10 was originally designed back in the 1950s — for technology that’s pretty doggone old.’ And the upper-stage engines are ‘red-lined on just about every launch we do, running at 25% over the originally designed chamber pressure,’ he adds. ‘I’ve said for years that the person or company or person who finds a breakthrough in space propulsion will become very wealthy. It’s got to happen because it’s just too expensive to get hardware and people to orbit.’ …

Although engine performance is currently adequate, Shelton believes the real benefits could be found in improving manufacturing processes, which he adds ‘leave a lot to be desired.’ Citing the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne RL10, he says each engine ‘requires more than 8,000 man touch hours — more than a hand-built Lamborghini if you can believe that.’

The EELV fleet is operated by the United Launch Alliance, a “50/50 joint venture” between Lockheed Martin and The Boeing Company.  The Pentagon recently awarded ULA a firm, fixed-priced contract valued at $1.5 Billion for the launching of “three top secret U.S. spy satellites and six other critical national security spacecraft” by mid-2014.  The news story (link above) reports—

Among the cargoes: three National Reconnaissance Office payloads, two Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) spacecraft, two Defense Meteorological Satellites Program (DMSP) military weather satellites, an advanced Navy 3G communications spacecraft and a payload dubbed Air Force Space Command-4.

That’s great news for the joint venture, which historically has been relative immune from budget cuts because of its importance to the USA’s national security.  But that doesn’t mean that its operations have been trouble-free.

For instance, we’ve posted a couple of stories about allegations that ULA may have reaped $271 million in improper payments from its government customers.  The last time we heard about this issue was back in August 2010, when we reported that DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald—

… called on the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to notify the United Launch Alliance team (of which Boeing is one of two team members, along with Lockheed Martin) that the costs are in non-compliance ‘with federal accounting standards’ and are ‘unallowable.’

DCMA did not make that notification at the time, nor have we heard much from the agency regarding this issue since then.

More recently, GAO issued report GAO-11-641 in October 2011, in which it stated—

DOD officials believe the launch industrial base is unstable and plan to implement an acquisition strategy they believe will help stabilize it. The leading proposal would commit the government to a block buy of eight common booster cores--the main component of a launch vehicle--each year, for a 5-year term. However, this approach may be based on incomplete information and although DOD is gathering data that it needs as it finalizes the new acquisition strategy, some critical knowledge gaps remain. …

Additionally, some subcontractor data needed to negotiate fair and reasonable prices are lacking, according to Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reports, and some data requirements were waived in 2007 in exchange for lower prices. Mission assurance comprises numerous activities to ensure launch success, but DOD has little insight into the sufficiency or excess of these activities. The expected block buy may commit the government to buy more booster cores than it needs, and could result in a surplus of hardware requiring storage and potentially rework if stored for extended periods. Also, DOD is gaining insight into the rise in some engine prices, expected to increase dramatically in the near term, but it is unclear how this knowledge will inform the expected acquisition approach or subsequent negotiations. …

So the status quo has been very nice for ULA (absent a few bumps along the way), but the status quo may be changing in the future, because of new companies eager to enter into the EELV marketplace.  Among those new companies is Space Exploration (SpaceX).  We’ve reported on SpaceX before—notably right here.

In October 2011, SpaceX issued a press release that stated—

The U.S. Air Force is the largest launch customer in the world, but is currently served by a monopoly provider whose prices have consistently risen. Equitable criteria for new entrants, coupled with meaningful opportunities for competition, would save the American taxpayer billions.

‘Fair and open competition for commercial launch providers is an essential element of protecting taxpayer dollars,’ said Elon Musk, SpaceX CEO. ‘Our American-made Falcon vehicles can deliver assured, responsive access to space that will meet warfighter needs while reducing costs for our military customers.’

ULA appears to be nicely positioned for the near term.  But in the longer term, we suspect its sweet status quo position will be threatened by smaller, less expensive, more nimble innovators such as SpaceX.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.