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Apogee Consulting Inc

Stopping Self-Dealing

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The term “self-dealing” is commonly understood to mean an individual’s conduct that consists of taking advantage of their position to act in their own interests rather than in the interests of a corporation or its shareholders. If the individual is an officer of the company, it’s often postured as a breach of the individual’s fiduciary duty.

I think it’s safe to say that most of us have experienced somebody’s self-dealing at least once in our work lives. Maybe it’s been the President or CEO who made sure the son-in-law (or nephew) was hired when there were more qualified candidates available for the position. Maybe it’s the Vice President who hired his old friend as a consultant even when there was no meaningful work to be done. Or perhaps it was the salesperson who closed the deal just in time to make their quota (and receive a bonus) by offering such a steep discount that the company was sure to lose money.

In each of the above examples, the individual put personal desires ahead of the company’s best interest, and used the authority of their positions to make it happen. They didn’t obtain any direct financial benefit from doing so (which likely would have been viewed as a prohibited conflict of interest), but they obtained an intangible benefit. In the hypothetical situation of the salesperson, there was a financial benefit (the bonus), but if that person had the authority to offer a discount (and/or it was approved by somebody who did), then they did nothing actionably wrong and got to pocket their bonus despite the harm they caused to the company’s bottom-line.

Thus, self-dealing is putting an individual’s interests ahead of the company’s interests, but doing so within approved channels.

We frequently see this situation when a company is organized into autonomous or semi-autonomous “silos.” Those silos have leaders, and those leaders tend to think first about the interests of their silos rather than the interests of the company as a whole. For example, one silo may compete with another for new business. In another example, one silo may deny providing resources or other assistance to another silo, even though (when viewed from the company’s perspective) that would be a logical action to take. Think of one silo that has a lot of top-notch software engineers: the other silo is struggling with a software project and could really use some temporary help. It would make sense to provide some high-end software engineers because a successful project benefits the company’s bottom-line; however, doing so might conceivably hurt the other silo’s projects.

So the request for assistance is denied and the company’s bottom-line is hurt. Importantly, though, nobody did anything wrong. There was no requirement to provide assistance and there were no consequences for refusing to provide assistance. It’s just the way things worked out.

Are we describing your company culture? Is your company largely comprised of independent silos that don’t cooperate very much?

How does a company culture get to be that way?

Simple: You get the behavior you incentivize.

If you tie salespeople’s compensation to sales quota—i.e., if you make the quota all about deal volume rather than profitable deal volume, then you get volume but not profit. If you create silos and then tie the compensation of those who run the silos to their individual performance, you get behavior that maximizes the individual silo’s performance at the expense of the other silos. We call it self-dealing but it’s just human nature.

Moreover, when you give people responsibility without accountability for their actions, then you pave the way towards self-dealing. If there are no consequences for hiring friends or relatives then it becomes part of the day-to-day culture. It is what it is, so to speak.

If you want to stop self-dealing you have to incentivize proper behavior and create consequences for improper behavior.

I worked at a multi-national engineering company for eight years. It was huge, with offices across America as well as Europe, Australia, and Asia. Despite its size and complexity, the company consistently ranked amongst the top tier of all companies in its industry. Often, it was ranked Number One. Forbes once named it “the most admired company” in its industry niche. How did it accomplish those feats?

First, the company tied all variable and incentive compensation to the company’s bottom-line, and not to individual or silo performance. There was an incentive compensation formula, and every executive knew it. The better the company performed, the more bonus payouts they received. They were actively incentivized to help each other out and keep the company’s bottom-line healthy.

The link between compensation and behavior flowed to the sales force. Salespeople were supposed to be businesspeople, and deals had to make sense financially or they wouldn’t be approved.

That same company took other measures to penalize poor decision-making and to reward smart decision-making. Could a person hire a relative or friend? Sure. It happened. But if that relative or friend didn’t perform up to expectations, then they didn’t last long.

Part of that company’s culture was the linking of pay and performance. Now, a lot of companies pay lip-service to that idea, but this company lived it. The theory was: if you are good then people will want to work with you. Project managers will fight to have you assigned to their projects. You’ll never want for work. But if you are a low performer, then you’ll have trouble finding work. People won’t want you around. Thus, the company spent a good deal of time looking at how people charged their time and seeking to identify those who had trouble finding projects to charge to. Too long without meaningful charges? Sorry, time to move on.

And then somebody was going to ask the hiring manager what they had been thinking during the original hiring decision. That was going to be a difficult decision to rationalize.

If you want to stop self-dealing you have to create a culture where not only is it frowned-upon, but it is actively disincentivized.

If you create positive incentives for supporting the company’s bottom-line and if you create disincentives for self-dealing, you have a good chance of creating a workplace culture where self-dealing will be minimized. I don’t think you’ll ever stamp it out entirely—because people are humans—but you should be able to minimize it.

If you work to minimize self-dealing, you may find you have created a culture of teamwork, where collaboration is the status quo. That kind of culture should lead to reduced attrition, reduced sick time, and a healthier bottom-line.

 

Upcoming Training Opportunities

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From time to time I participate in conferences, seminars, and/or other training opportunities. It looks like I’ll be doing so again, at two venues. For your information:

August 24 – 26 – I will be participating in the American Conference Institute’s 11th Annual Advanced Forum on DCAA & DCMA Cost, Pricing, Compliance & Audits. Link for the Conference is here. I have two pieces of the multi-day conference.

First, on August 24th I will be leading a 3-hour workshop on Contractor Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs). My co-instructors will be Mark Hijar (who has scads of experience with CPSRs) and Luis Avila (a Director from KPMG’s Government Contractor Services team). We’ll start with the basics and move into more advance areas, such as counterfeit electronic parts, cyber security, and the interplay between commercial items and inter-organizational transfers. I’ve seen the preliminary slide deck and it should be a valuable learning experience—if I do say so myself.

Second, on August 26th I will be participating in a panel discussing commercial item determinations. Led by Brent Calhoon of Baker Tilly, the other panelist will be Ryan Connell, of DOD’s Commercial Item Group (CIG). The three of us have spoken and decided we will be presenting a “Myth-Busting” panel primarily directed at prime contractors who have to assess the commerciality of their subcontractors. Together, we came up with more than 20 myths to be busted, and we are currently working to whittle the number down to ten. (After all, we only have one hour.) I’m excited to speak along side these two experienced, knowledgeable gentlemen.

Then in September, I’ll be co-instructing with “Don Acquisition” at a virtual class entitled “The FAR/DFARS Subcontract Flow-Down Course.” I love co-instructing with Don because he’s got years of experience and knowledge. He’s a former Professor at Defense Acquisition University (DAU), a former Contracting Officer, and has instructed numerous “FAR Boot Camps®.” I learn so much just watching him teach! Don’s teaching style is informed by his FAR Boot Camp® experience—i.e., minimal PowerPoint slides and maximum hands-on experiential learning. I touched on (some of) what I learned the last time I co-instructed with Don in this article.

Course objectives include:

  • Given a federal contract, determine which FAR and DFARS clauses were erroneously omitted or included

  • Given a federal contract, determine which FAR and DFARS clauses must be included in (i.e. flowed down to) a given subcontract

  • Given a federal contract, determine which FAR and DFARS clauses should be included in (i.e. flowed down to) a given subcontract to minimize the prime contractor’s risk

  • Given a set of flow down clauses from a prime contractor or higher-tier subcontractor, determine which clauses were included erroneously (subcontractor push-back)

If those objectives sound like something you might be interested in learning, the link to Don’s course is right here.

Anyway, that’s what’s happening in the upcoming training department. If you or your team would like customer-designed training, don’t hesitate to let Apogee Consulting – or Don Acquisition – know.

 

Bradken, Inc. Makes Public Statement Regarding Its Testing Fraud

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It’s long been a tenet of this site that the reason to discuss the compliance failures of various government contractors is to learn what went wrong so as to aid in preventing similar problems at your company. There is a maxim that’s been attributed to many authors (most commonly Otto von Bismarck): “Only a fool learns from his own mistakes. The wise man learns from the mistakes of others.” An old Forbes article stated it this way (without attribution)—"In Russian there is an expression: The wise man learns from someone else’s mistakes, the smart man learns from his own, and the stupid one never learns.”

We post this article so that others can learn from the mistakes of Bradken, Inc.

We wrote about Bradken in a very recent article, in which we discussed the company’s resolution of a 30 year-long fraud (allegedly) perpetrated by a senior quality testing employee. (As noted in the original article, we use the term “allegedly” because, while the company has apparently resolved the civil and criminal complaints it was facing, as far as we know the (now former) employee still faces charges—and people are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.)

Before you read any further, we suggest you follow the link in the paragraph above and familiarize youself with the story of the fraud and how Bradken resolved its legal woes. In that article, you’ll find additional links to Bradken’s civil False Claims Act settlement agreement and its criminal fraud deferred prosecution agreement. Those latter two documents are well worth reading.

Anyway, Bradken apparently resolved its legal problems; a part of the resolution was to publish a public statement regarding what happened and what Bradken learned from its problems, so that others could learn from Bradken’s mistakes. Here’s a link to that public statement. We strongly recommend you read it in full and even consider saving it for future reference.

Here are some quotes from Bradken’s public statement that caught our eye. We have italicized certain words for emphasis and removed some words for length (as indicated by use of ellipses), but otherwise have changed nothing.

  • The impact of these startling admissions from a trusted employee would reverberate for years to come. Three years later, and after a process that encompassed a massive internal review, a full-blown Government investigation, and thousands of hours of time from employees and consultants, Bradken has come to understand that, between 1985 and 2017, the employee falsified hundreds of test results, resulting in the installation of substandard steel on numerous Navy submarines.

  • Bradken failed to detect the senior metallurgist’s falsified test results for years because it lacked sufficient internal controls, and instead relied too heavily on the integrity of a single employee. For example, test results were typically handwritten on notecards and later entered into multiple databases. The senior metallurgist generally maintained the accurate results in one database, and recorded fraudulent, passing, results in a second database, which the senior metallurgist used in Bradken’s certifications to the customer. If these activities had been subject to oversight, or if Bradken had engaged in periodic internal audits of the various recordkeeping systems, it would have discovered the fraud many years earlier.

  • Following its initial disclosures, Bradken commenced a records review to ferret out other instances of potentially discrepant test results. Bradken undertook a review of test result records covering the prior ten-year period and reported all data discrepancies it discovered. … unfortunately, Bradken’s review did not identify … all of the falsifications. Those falsifications were discovered only when the Government reinitiated and expanded its own investigation, analyzing records going back to the 1980s. The Government’s investigation detected many more instances of fraudulent alterations by the senior metallurgist that Bradken had previously failed to identify through its limited review. The government also discovered patterns in Bradken’s internal data … that demonstrated that the discrepancies were the result of deliberate fraud. Over the last 18 months, Bradken has cooperated with the Government’s investigation, making employee witnesses available for interviews, producing hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, responding to all requests for information, and hosting site visits and equipment demonstrations for Government investigators. … But Bradken has learned that true cooperation means more than just responding to requests as they are received. It also means independently seeking evidence of wrongdoing within the company, rather than making the Government find it for you. In other words, true cooperation means not just being reactive, but being proactive.

  • Both the Government's investigation and Bradken's internal review revealed no evidence that any member of Bradken's management was aware of or involved in the fraudulent conduct of its senior metallurgist at the time it occurred. … Bradken recognizes that its own lack of internal controls allowed this fraud to go undetected. Bradken also recognizes and accepts that as a corporation it is criminally and civilly liable for the actions of its employees—even if the employee's conduct violates corporate policies.

This is one of those situations where everybody in the compliance profession can learn something from the mistakes of others. This could have happened to any company who chose not to invest in internal control systems because risk analysis failed to properly evaluate risk, probability, and consequence. We cannot let our companies “pooh-pooh” compliance risks and therefore put themselves into a similar situation.

Only fools will fail to learn from Bradken’s mistakes.

Don’t let your company be foolish.

 

DCAA and COVID-19

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It’s been obvious for some time that the majority of DCAA audit guidance is no longer available to the public. As we’ve noted publicly, for years the number of MRDs (Memoranda for Regional Directors) published on the DCAA website has dropped precipitously. (There have been only two MRDs published in the first half of calendar year 2020.) The DCAA publication “Information for Contractors” is woefully out of date, carrying a current publication date of 2012. The DCCA Contract Audit Manual (“CAM”) used to be the sine qua non for audit compliance professionals; but that tome has slowly been eviscerated—to be replaced in large part by a “Selected Area of Cost Guidebook” that is perennially under construction.

Still, from time to time DCAA manages to surprise us with interesting nuggets of audit guidance.

But you have to know where to look!

Over at the DCAA website, under the “Customers” tab – way at the bottom – is a tab entitled “FAQs.” Historically there have been two FAQs under that tab: FAQs for Contracting Officers and FAQs for Contractors. Each is worth reading.

But recently a third FAQ was added: FAQs COVID-19.

With a publication date of July 31, 2020, the COVID-19 FAQ addresses audit issues/concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act, and Section 3610 of the CARES Act. You should go read it.

There are 13 Frequently Asked Questions (and answers) in the guidance document. We are not going to repeat them all here. However, we will note a couple (actually three) FAQs that caught our eye.

9. Is the audit team responsible for considering the impact of COVID-19 on existing and future forward pricing engagements?

Answer: Yes. Auditing standards require auditors to consider the impact of known information up to the date of audit report issuance. The circumstances and manner in which each contractor and our audits have been impacted by COVID-19 will vary. Events such as layoffs, maximum telework, shut downs, slow-downs, new personal protective equipment, et cetera could impact forward pricing rates. Also impacted is to what degree historical data (prior to and during the COVID-19 national emergency) accurately represents future operations. Auditors should assess how the contractor’s current and future operations have been impacted by COVID-19 and develop audit procedures to address identified risks.

If the contractor’s proposal does not consider the potential impact of COVID-19 and the impact is significant enough that its disclosure is necessary to ensure the proposal is representative, the auditor should determine if the contractor plans to revise the proposal, notify the requestor, and take appropriate action.

11. If we observe the contractor extracting a report from its system via cloud meeting (e.g., Webex), is this sufficient or does the audit team need to observe the contractor in person to avoid a scope limitation?

Answer: The observation performed via cloud meeting may be sufficient. If, in the audit team’s professional judgment, the quality of the audit evidence obtained through the cloud meeting was sufficient for their intended purpose, then a scope limitation is not required. If this is the case, the audit team will not need to perform the observation in person after we resume normal operations.

13. Is a CAS Disclosure Statement revision creating a COVID-19 Leave cost category considered a cost accounting practice change requiring a cost impact proposal?

Answer: No, the establishment of a new cost category is not a cost accounting practice change requiring a cost impact proposal.

We’ll leave the other ten for those sufficiently intrepid to follow the link.

 

Small Business Reporting Concerns

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From time to time we discuss small business reporting issues. Also known as socioeconomic reporting, the requirements are implemented by FAR Part 19 and associated contract clauses, as well as by agency supplemental clauses. In many cases the contract language prescribes rules for how to calculate subcontract award percentages for the various socioeconomic strata the Federal government wants to see reported.

In general, the rules of what to report and how to calculate the metrics for reporting are complex and nuanced. The whole situation is counter-intuitive and the more cynical amongst us may be tempted to call it just a game. Nonetheless, it’s real and it’s important. Prime contractors willing to commit to tough socioeconomic subcontract award goals often receive a competitive advantage.

We recall one article we posted here three years ago, about a shipbuilder who lost more than $1 million in award/incentive fees because it made math errors in its socioeconomic reporting calculations and, when corrected, its true small business subcontract award percentages were below the contractually required levels. Oops!

In that same article, we wrote—

… small business plans need to be more than paper. … In order to successfully implement your plan, it needs to be ‘owned’ by somebody in your organization with authority to make it happen, and there needs to be policies and procedures that describe how it will work. Those policies and procedures must be cross-functional, in that everybody who makes a decision regarding which entities receive work must be aware of the overall organizational commitments.

Too often we have seen ‘paper’ plans with no ownership, with no accountability or responsibility or authority, and with little or no policies and procedures that describe their workings. When we encounter such situations, we can say, with a high degree of confidence, that those plans will never be successful.

We were reminded of that old article and our commentary when we read a recent Department of Energy Office of Inspector General report about errors in small business reporting by two Hanford site contractors, Mission Support Alliance, LLC (MSA) and CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC). In case you care, MSA is made up of Leidos and Centerra Group, plus ancillary team members, whereas CHPRC is a subsidiary of Jacobs (formerly Jacobs Engineering Group), who acquired CH2M at the end of 2017.

The DOE OIG looked at both MSA’s and CHPRC’s socioeconomic reporting, and did not like what it saw. We gave you a link in the paragraph above, but let’s summarize the findings.

Looking first at MSA, it seems that its prime contract defined both “self-performed” and “subcontracted” work. According to the IG, the contract limited the amount of work that MSA could self-perform to 60% of total contract value, and required MSA to subcontract at least 25% of total contract value. The IG found that, although MSA reported meeting those requirements, its calculations had errors; and when those errors were corrected, it did not it fact meet those requirements—"resulting in a potential breach of contract.”

As with many IG reports we see, there is a mix of facts and judgment that underlie the reported findings. Factually, MSA inaccurately excluded $574 million in large business subcontractor team members’ costs from its self-performed work scope calculations. Judgmentally, the IG did not give MSA credit for subcontracting $333 million to small businesses through a subsidiary because “we were not able to verify the amount of work scope subcontracted by the subsidiary.” While auditors must of course be professionally skeptical of assertions, we are not aware of any requirement that MSA obtain, retain, or provide verification of socioeconomic statistics reported by an affiliated entity.

Another area of judgment concerned $5 million in subcontract awards to a small business that became a large business during contract performance. Although the DOD OIG report provided no details – and it’s certainly possible that either the DEARS or the contract specified how this situation should be handled – normally the situation is governed by 13 CFR § 121.404. That section does not require a change in the socioeconomic business size unless the subcontractor recertifies, as it must in certain situations. Thus, we are left wondering whether the subcontractor was required to recertify and MSA failed to obtain the new certification, or if MSA obtained the new certification and failed to use it properly, or if MSA properly reported the stratum of the subcontractor because no recertification was required.

Finally, we need to talk about MSA’s small business subcontractors used to manage incumbent employees. The IG noted that—

MSA and CHPRC inherited responsibility for certain employees of the previous contractor and had to offer them first right of refusal to employment. These employees, referred to as incumbent employees, were eligible to continue participation in the Hanford Site Pension Plan and accrue Benefit Service, as defined in the Hanford Site Pension Plan. To provide employment for certain incumbent employees, MSA and CHPRC arranged employment through its subcontractors, many of which were small business entities.

The DOE IG refused to agree that MSA should receive $233 million of small businesses award credit when reporting awards to incumbent employee management subcontractors. This is another area of judgment that affected the audit report. The basis for the IG’s conclusion was that there was an employer-employee relationship between MSA and the employees, notwithstanding the fact that there was a subcontractor in the middle. The IG report stated that—

… MSA:

  • Provided the employees;

  • Assigned and supervised the work to be performed;

  • Directed when, where, and how work was performed;

  • Controlled training and development;

  • Provided workers with necessary tools, equipment, and work facilities;

  • Provided administrative support functions (i.e., payroll, human resources, etc.); and

  • Controlled employee termination authority.

In contrast, the small business entities did not provide employer functions for the incumbent employees, as expected.

In other words, those small businesses didn’t seem to add any real value to the management of the incumbent employees, in the judgment of the DOD OIG auditors.

Importantly, MSA’s (and CHPRC’s) alleged use of “shell” subcontracts (our term, not the auditors') also led to allegations of unallocable contract costs. The audit report stated—

… the subcontractors with incumbent employees charged MSA for employer administrative functions, despite no apparent corresponding benefit. It appeared that MSA already provided most employer administrative functions but still charged the Department of Energy for the associated costs. When we asked MSA officials for justification to support the incumbent employee subcontractors charging indirect costs for employer administrative functions, they could not provide specific details of the subcontractors providing employer functions. Due to the scope of our audit, we did not determine an exact dollar amount of potentially unallowable costs. It is MSA’s responsibility to review these subcontractor indirect costs for allocability and the Contracting Officer’s responsibility to determine the extent to which they are unallowable. These indirect costs could be up to an estimated $31.6 million.

We’ve spent a lot of time on MSA’s issues. What about CHPRC? As with MSA, the DOE IG asserted that CHPRC excluded a large business subcontractor team member from its self-performed work scope. In addition, CHPRC has the same issues as MSA does with respect to subcontractors that managed its incumbent employees. However, the DOE OIG concluded that “when we adjusted CHPRC’s reported figures, it appeared that CHPRC may still be able to meet its self-performance and small business subcontracting contractual requirements, as of September 2018.” Thus, CHPRC’s issues do not seem as serious as the ones that MSA is facing.

Let’s conclude this by looking at causality. The DOE OIG audit report stated—

The issues we identified in this report occurred, in part, because of weaknesses in MSA’s and CHPRC’s prime contract oversight. Specifically:

  • MSA did not have formal procedures for reviewing and validating its own small business subcontracting reports.

  • MSA and CHPRC did not adequately evaluate the appropriateness of incumbent employee subcontract arrangements.

MSA lacked formal procedures for reviewing and validating its small business subcontracting reports, which included self-performance figures, prior to submission to the Richland Operations Office. According to MSA, not including team member costs as self-performed work scope was an inadvertent mistake because the MSA personnel involved did not appreciate that the self-performed work limitation in its contract applied to subcontract costs awarded to large business subcontractor team members. If MSA had detailed procedures for reviewing and validating small business subcontracting reports, MSA likely would have identified these discrepancies on its own.

Now go back and read the quote from one of our previous articles on small business reporting. The one where we asserted that “there needs to be policies and procedures that describe how it will work.” Yeah. That.

As noted, there is a mix of both factual and judgmental findings in the DOE Office of Inspector General audit report. One might reasonably take issue with some of the more judgmental aspects of the report; however, it seems inescapable that a prime contractor must have robust policies and procedures, to include appropriate internal controls, on its socioeconomic reporting. This is especially true where there is contract language that makes certain metrics that are otherwise just goals into mandatory requirements.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.