DCAA/DCMA Discuss Run Rules for New Business Systems Rule
Apogee Consulting, Inc. has been focused on the new DFARS Business Systems rule since its ill-begotten conception back in early 2010. We submitted our comments and concerns to the DAR Council, and were disappointed that that interim rule (issued May 2011) addressed so few of our comments. Nonetheless, our anxiety was ameliorated somewhat by DCMA’s policy addressing implementation of the rule, which created a Contractor Business Systems Review Panel for the purpose of performing “a higher-level review of the COs final determination to disapprove a Contractor’s Business System, prior to notifying the Contractor in writing that the system is disapproved.”
We also reported on early implementation efforts, noting that it seemed that enterprise-wide systems (e.g., Accounting or EVM) might carry more financial risk than segment-specific systems, since significant deficiencies at one segment might trigger payment withholds across the enterprise if those deficiencies led to the entire system being disapproved.
Since that time, we’ve gathered up a few more tidbits of information for sharing with our readership.
First, DCMA has issued a process flowchart, updated its OneBook guidance, and created training for its contracting officers. You can find the Agency’s process flowchart and training slides on our site under “Knowledge Resources”—but only if you are a member. (Remember, membership has privileges!)
Second, DCMA held an “Industry Day” to discuss the new Business Systems rule on December 15, 2011. We weren’t invited (and couldn’t have attended even if invited), but we lucked into some good, detailed, notes from somebody who did attend that meeting. We’re going to cut-n-paste (with a little editing) from those notes for you.
A representative of DCAA told the audience the following–
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DCAA’s system audits will be attestation compliance audits and will state whether the contractor is compliant or noncompliant with each of the system criteria listed in the applicable DFARS clause. The DCAA report will connect the [alleged] deficiency to the purpose statements in the DFARS Clause – i.e., what does the system ‘provide for’.
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Any material weaknesses will be considered a system deficiency. However, DCAA is still determining whether any noncompliance with an individual system criterion will be considered a ‘significant deficiency’ within the meeting of the regulation. [Ed. Note: This was a concern that we raised to the DAR Council in our comments to the initial proposed rule.]
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Regardless of the foregoing, DCAA does not intend to be prescriptive or to dictate a contractor’s system policy and procedures. DCAA acknowledges that the business system criteria are broad and there is more than one effective way to achieve the desired internal control objective.
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DCAA will no longer issue Flash Reports as a means of identifying potential system deficiencies - they will issue a complete noncompliance report with adequate supporting detail. [Ed. Note: Finally! Good riddance to a terrible practice.]
Representatives from DCMA told the audience the following—
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DCMA’s view is that the new Business Systems rule is not to be applied as a punitive rule. Audit reports and related withhold determinations need to address the government’s risk.
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To ensure consistency in administration, Contracting Officers have been instructed to escalate and coordinate at the CACO level to ensure CACO/DACO agreement on proposed actions.
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The contractor will receive a ‘substantial’ out-brief from the auditor (or DCMA functional specialist) before the audit report is issued. The out-brief may be written and/or verbal; the focus will be on ‘meaningful’ engagement and/or discussion, not just an exchange of paper.
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If there is no reasonable expectation of harm to the Government then the deficiency would not be considered significant and the system would be approved.
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While it is true that ‘a corporate wide system or Shared Service disapproval could impact an entire corporation,’ the focus will be on identifying where the risk is to the government. [Note: In other words, the contractor may be able to argue that a significant deficiency at one segment should not lead to payment withholds across the enterprise.]
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While it is true that DCMA has established a Contractor Business System Review Panel, only ‘disagreements between the DCAA recommendation and the Contracting Officer determination’ will go to a DCMA Headquarters-level Board of Review.
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A Contracting Officer may not make an Initial Determination regarding the adequacy of a specific business system until the contractor receives a contract containing both the DFARS Clause 252.242-7005 and the specific clause related to the system at issue.
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If the contractor submits an effective Corrective Action Plan (CAP) as part of the contractor’s response to the CO Initial Determination, then the payment withhold could start at 2%.
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Contracting Officers ‘will – not may’ – reduce withhold upon submission of an adequate CAP with milestones.
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An adequate CAP must include discrete and measurable actions with realistic due dates and an explanation of how the corrective action plan will be monitored. The DCMA CO, in consultation with auditor or functional specialist, will monitor the contractor’s progress on the CAP. If the CO determines that the contractor is not making adequate progress, then the payment withhold will be increased. The Contractor should notify CO when the entity believes that the identified deficiencies have been corrected. The CO, with input from auditor/functional specialist, will determine whether all corrective actions have been completed, or whether there is a reasonable expectation (based on the evidence presented) to believe that the deficiencies have been corrected. If so, then the CO will approve the system and release the payment withholds.
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DCMA’s Business System Instruction [in the OneBook] provides that a payment withhold is only applicable to CAS covered contracts valued at $50M or more, that contain the DFARS Clause 252.242-7005;. However, the CO can apply a payment withhold on one or more contracts valued at less than $50M with CMO Contracts Director approval. The DCMA letter notifying the contractor of implementation of payment withholds will include a listing of the contracts for which it is to be applied.
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The Business System payment withhold is in addition to any fixed fee withholds because those withholds exist for different reasons
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If a system is not already “Approved”, “Adequate”, “Accepted” or “Disapproved”, then it is considered “not evaluated”.
Apparently, some disagreement emerged between DCAA and DCMA regarding the responsibilities of a prime contractor when its subcontractor has had a system disapproved and payment withholds initiated. According to the meeting participant—
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DCAA opined that subcontractors should withhold costs on cost-type invoices before submitting to prime contractor
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DCMA stated that there is no provision in the rule to flow-down the withhold requirement from prime to subcontractor. In any case, there is no ‘privity of contract’ between the prime contractor’s CO and the subcontractor. According to the clause, the DCMA CO has the responsibility to implement payment withholds on Progress Payments and Performance Based Payments. Thus, the prime contractor can’t really step into the role of the CO to implement payment withholds. If this were even possible, how would it work in practice—would the prime contractor hold the money in its own bank account or somehow forward to the DCMA CO?
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DCMA noted that subcontractors who have disapproved systems will have withholds implemented on their prime contracts, so they are incentivized to correct their systems in any case.
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DCMA also noted that they still need to work out the implementation of payment withholds on Interorganizational Transfers.
From our perspective, it’s good to see that DCMA is figuring-out (and letting contractors know) how it will be implementing the new rule. We recommend that our readers carefully review the bullet points above and consider “socializing” the new run rules with employees. It would also seem desirable to review the “run rules” with government oversight officials in order to make sure everybody has the same understanding of how the payment withholds—should they be deemed necessary—will be implemented.
We note that DCAA has taken a hardline stance (as has become all too typical of the audit agency), asserting that the new rule applies to subcontractor invoices to prime contractors. While we are pleased to see DCMA (quite correctly) disagree with that position, we worry that DCAA will apply its flawed logic to its system reviews. DCAA might well assert that a prime contractor’s accounting system has a significant deficiency because subcontractors are not directed (by the prime) to implement payment withholds when the subcontractor’s business systems have been disapproved.
Despite potential problems we continue to be encouraged that DCMA is thinking through its process, and that the process appears reasonable (given the inherent problems in the rule itself). Obviously, the reasonableness of the process turns on the subjective nature of the definition of “significant deficiency” and how the DCMA COs will link the alleged significant deficiencies to the government’s risk of making overpayments to contractors.
The proof, as they say, will be in the pudding.
In the meantime, we’ll stay focused on DOD’s implementation of this new rule.
DOD Adopts Final Rule on IR&D Reporting
We first brought this rule to your attention when it was issued as a proposed revision to the DFARS Supplemental Cost Principles. We didn’t have many nice things to say about it. We wrote—
… our point of view is that the statute permits (or requires) the Secretary of Defense to obtain contractor IR&D information ‘in a reasonable manner.’ But the statute does not permit the DOD to make a contractor’s IR&D expenditures unallowable if it fails to comply.
We invited readers to submit comments on the proposed rule to the DAR Council. Did you?
Regardless of the comments received—or perhaps in spite of them—the DAR Council issued a final rule on January 20, 2012.
One of the key changes between the proposed and final rule was the elimination of the $50,000 reporting threshold. Comments noted that, as drafted, the proposed rule was ambiguous in that it was unclear whether the $50,000 threshold applied to a single IR&D project or to the contractor’s aggregate IR&D spend in a single fiscal year. Instead, the final rule now applies only to—
… major contractors, which are defined as those whose covered segments allocated a total of more than $11,000,000 in IR&D/B&P costs to covered contracts during the preceding fiscal year.
That’s good news, because it will exempt a large number of defense contractors—especially small businesses—from the new IR&D reporting requirements.
What reporting requirements, you may well be asking.
Well, the new rule states that if you want your IR&D expenses to be considered allowable by the Department of Defense, then you must make an annual reporting of each IR&D project to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) using DTIC’s on-line input form. If you don’t make that report, DCAA and your cognizant ACO may consider your IR&D expenses to be unallowable for purposes of reimbursement by DOD.
As the DAR Council noted in its promulgating comments, there has always been a rule in the DFARS Supplemental Cost Principles (at 231.205-18(c)(iii)(B)) the establishes the rule that “allowable IR&D/B&P costs are limited to those costs for projects that are of potential interest to DoD.” The issue is that DOD hasn’t focused on enforcing that rule in quite some time. More specifically, DCAA has not had a formal role in reviewing IR&D costs to determine allowability in accordance with that rule in recent memory.
In sum, the new rule establishes two requirements: (1) reporting to DTIC, and (2) review of the information reporting by DCAA and the cognizant DOD ACO to determine which IR&D projects are “of potential interest” to the Pentagon. Failure to meet the first requirement will lead to disallowed IR&D associated with specific, individual, IR&D projects.
At first blush, it should be fairly easy to establish that your IR&D projects are “of potential interest” to DOD. Savvy contractors will have a Technology Roadmap and their IR&D expenditures will like to that Roadmap. But the reality is that the individual IR&D project descriptions are going to have to be clear and easily comprehensible by non-technical auditors and contracting officers—and experience has shown that project description clarity is more honored in the breach. Further, it is not clear how classified IR&D projects will be reported, reviewed, and vetted—since the DAR Council stated that “Only unclassified IR&D project summary information should be provided.”
We also think defense contractors with direct sales to foreign customers may run into problems. DCAA may well assert that any IR&D projects related solely to those direct foreign sales are not of potential interest to DOD, and thus not allowable costs under the revised DFARS Supplemental Cost Principle. That may be a tough sell for some.
Any entity that is foreign-controlled may also have trouble explaining to DCAA why its corporate IR&D projects—perhaps performed OCONUS—are of potential interest to the U.S. Defense Department. Again, we believe that success in “selling” the potential benefit to Pentagon will be based on the clarity of the project description(s) and the linkage between the company’s Technology Roadmap and the current/future mission of the DOD.
Fun times ahead!
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Moments of Transition
In late January, 2012, our “friends” at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) noted that General James Cartwright (USMC, Retired), former Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had joined the Board of Directors of Raytheon Company. Despite POGO’s somewhat mean-spirited insinuations to the contrary, the transition from military service to defense contractor is not at all unusual. There is no reason at all to believe that General Cartwright will do anything but add value as a senior advisor and leader of the Top 5 defense company.
POGO also reported that former Under Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn had accepted the position of CEO at DRS Technologies, a subsidiary of Finmeccanica.
We also want to report that Michael Thibault, former executive at DCAA and former co-chair of the Commission on Wartime Contracting, has found a new position after the sun-setting of the CWC—as Vice President of Government Finance and Compliance at DynCorp International. According to this report at FederalTimes.com, Thibault was expected to help DynCorp fight fraud, waste and abuse. Readers may remember that the CWC raked DynCorp, and other “contingency contractors” supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, over the proverbial coals during several years of hearings.
The same FederalTimes.com report noted that former Department of Defense Inspector General, Gordon Heddell, had found a position with Booz Allen Hamilton, as a “senior executive advisor.”
Though POGO had some nasty comments regarding Lynn and Cartwright, they were noticeably kinder to Thibault and Heddell. In this blog post, POGO wrote—
Unlike some revolving door situations, the hiring of Michael Thibault and Gordon Heddell seems based more on higher principle than on purely political or economic gain. We can only hope that the skills they developed as watchdogs and fighters of fraud, waste, and abuse will continue to serve the public interest.
We think POGO treated the transitions of the “former watchdogs” differently than it treated the transitions of the former DOD leaders. At best, POGO displayed an interesting level of naiveté if it attributed the hiring of Thibault and Heddell to a “higher principle than … purely political or economic gain.” We see the transitions of Lynn, Cartwright, Thibault, and Heddell as essentially being equivalent in both form and substance.
One transition that is a bit different from those we’ve discussed heretofore—and also a bit sadder—is the rather abrupt retirement of (Admiral) Jim Maslowski (US Navy, Retired) from his position as President of Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC). Readers may remember our article on the travails of HBDC as it pursued award of the Light Air Support (LAS) contract, and its subsequent bid protests. In our article we focused on questions regarding the HBDC Contracts Manager, who apparently left a critical piece of correspondence in his in-box for two weeks before reading and acting on it. We wrote—
Was the HBDC contracts manager sick or on vacation? Was he or she busy with other pressing matters? The GAO didn’t say and we may never know. But still, it says something (to us, anyway) that correspondence from a customer regarding a competition for what was potentially more than a billion dollars’ worth of business just sat in an in-box for two weeks. … HBDC … has to explain (to its Board of Directors and shareholders, if to nobody else) why a critically important piece of correspondence lay unopened for two weeks, letting regulatory deadlines lapse in the meantime. (We would not want to be in that contracts manager’s seat right now….)
Not to mention, of course, why its proposal for such a ‘must-win’ competition was so flawed that the Air Force threw it out as being (essentially) uncorrectable. Did HBDC have the right skill sets? Did they put the company’s varsity team on the proposal? What went wrong?
We focused on the poor HBDC Contracts Manager, but apparently we should have aimed higher. The HBDC Board of Directors apparently held Admiral Maslowski responsible for the fiasco we described in our article. His departure was abrupt and unplanned-for, as the company has appointed an interim President while they search for a suitable successor. In the meantime, though, Admiral Maslowski isn’t disappearing entirely. The company’s press release stated, “Upon retirement, Maslowski will continue as a consultant to HBDC and its business development efforts with the title of Vice Chairman, HBDC.”
We have no doubt Admiral Maslowski will continue to be paid as a consultant. We assume that was a part of his negotiated exit deal. As to whether he will actually perform any “business development” efforts in return for those transitional consulting fees … well, let’s just say that experience has made us a bit cynical in that area.
J. Michael Straczynski has written—
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.
As we look at these five men moving through their moments of transition, we wonder what the shape and direction of their future will be.
Who’s The Top Gun in the Defense Industry?
Each of the major defense contractors thinks it is better than its competitors. It’s a point of pride. Moreover, it’s endemic to the corporate culture of each company. But from an outsider’s (hopefully) more objective point of view … which one is Top Gun?
This is important because each company seeks to woo analysts and investors. Each seeks to maximize the metrics perceived to be important to stock analysts. So when an outsider analyzes the companies and publishes the results, it’s worth taking a look at.
Over at Seeking Alpha, “Diesel” compared Raytheon, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin to “find out which one provides the best value” to shareholders. Note that “Diesel” did not include Boeing in the comparison “because less than half of BA's revenues come from the defense industry.”
“Diesel” compared the four mega-defense contractors on ten metrics, including profit margins, Return on Equity (ROE), Debt/Equity Ratio, Price to Book Ratio, Current Dividend Yield, 5-Year Average Dividend Yield, Payout Ratio, 5-Year Dividend Growth, Price/Earnings Ratio, and 52-Week Stock Price Change.
One problem with “Diesel’s” analysis is that each metric had the same weight. In other words, in the analysis ROE is equal to 52-Week Price Change. In reality, some metrics are more important than others. Moreover, Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) was not included in the analysis; that’s an important metric to defense contractors.
But enough of the methodology, let’s get to the results. Of course, you can review “Diesel’s” article right here, if you want more detail.
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Profit Margin—Winner: General Dynamics, with a profit margin of 8 percent.
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ROE—Winner: Lockheed Martin, with a ROE of 80 percent, beating the competition by a wide margin.
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Debt/Equity Ratio—Winner: General Dynamics, edging out Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman.
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Price/Book Ratio—Winner: Northrop Grumman.
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Dividend Yield—Winner: Lockheed Martin, with a current yield of roughly 4.75%.
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5-Year Average Dividend Yield—Winner: Northrop Grumman.
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Payout Ratio—Winner: General Dynamics, with a ratio of less than 25%.
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5-Year Dividend Growth—Winner: Lockheed Martin had the most dividend growth over the past five years.
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Price/Earnings Ratio—Winner: Raytheon and Northrop Grumman tied, with General Dynamics just behind the two.
- 52-Week Price Change—Winner: Lockheed Martin.
Overall Winner: Lockheed Martin
“Diesel” ends the analysis with the following statement—
Lockheed Martin is a strong buy with these fundamentals. This is good stock for long term (3-10 years) value investors. … In the last decade, there is a linear growth [in dividend yield] and the stock never paid less than the year before in dividends. During the same time, the stock's capital gain was about 64%.
The thing is, “Diesel” is so focused on the trees, he has no awareness of the forest. In addition to the methodological concerns we noted above, there is no discussion of the macro issues facing the industry. There is no mention of the looming near-term cuts to the defense budget, or of the ability to export aircraft and arms given the possibility of a European recession. In other words, “Diesel” is focused on historical metrics to the exclusion of obvious and near-term market issues facing the industry.
They say that “past performance is no guarantee of future returns” on most prospectuses. We agree. Caveat emptor.
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