• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

The Defense Industrial Policy Debate, Election-Year Version

E-mail Print PDF

 budget_cuts

We recently wrote about the budget pressures facing the Federal government in the context of comparing the costs of “in-sourcing” versus “outsourcing”.  But the policy battles between the in-sourcers and the outsourcers is simply one aspect of the overall budgetary debate taking place in this election year—and the Pentagon is at the center of the budgetary cross-hairs.

The Pentagon’s policy problem may be described as one of “defense industrial policy”—i.e., how to effectively manage the defense industrial base to cut the costs of weapon systems, while at the same time preserving critical skills unique to the aerospace/defense industry and making sure key strategic suppliers don’t fold-up their tents and sneak away in the night, leaving landlords looking for back rent money.  It’s not a skill that the Pentagon historically has been known to possess.

In this article in National Defense magazine, author Sandra Erwin discusses the defense industrial policy debate.  She wrote—

The Pentagon [historically] has shown little appetite for picking winners and losers, and has been more comfortable with a laissez-faire approach. After the Cold War ended, the Defense Department stepped out of the way and for five years let contractors consolidate at will. … Industrial policy mandates have existed since the 1950s but most administrations have ignored them, particularly in the post-Reagan era when even the suggestion that the government should manage the private sector is laughed off as a grandiose Stalin five-year plan. …

A recent study by the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments predicts an ‘erosion of design capabilities for military-unique products’ and calls for the Defense Department to actively protect segments of the defense industrial base that are ‘truly important to retain,’ such as tactical aviation, nuclear submarines and spy satellites. ‘It is not unrealistic to foresee a day in which the U.S. defense industry no longer possesses the design or production capabilities for certain weapons systems,’ says the study.

The prevailing attitude that the defense industry is a free-market, Darwinian system is a myth, CSBA analysts contend. They note that the defense industry is a highly regulated sector of the U.S. economy in which the government is both the sole customer and the regulator. It is a ‘serious misunderstanding of the realities of weapons acquisition in the United States to think that the U.S. defense industry operates like a normal free market,’ says the study.

Defense policymakers assume that the industry has the ability to automatically resize as demand changes and still maintain competitiveness, but that is not how it works, says Marty Bollinger, director of Booz & Company’s aerospace and defense practice.  Within the core of defense companies that produce military-unique equipment, the idea that there is a free market or real competition is a fairy tale, Bollinger says.

In this Reuters article, Frank Kendall (Under Secretary for Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, Acting) tried to walk a nice tightrope between reassuring contractors that the Pentagon will protect them, while warning them that they better reduce prices and focus on delivering on-time and on-budget.  The article reported—

The Pentagon's acting acquisition chief Frank Kendall assured industry executives on Tuesday that there was still money to be made in defense, but said companies would have to deliver weapons within budgets and on time to be competitive. … ‘If you are not delivering on cost and schedule ... you are very vulnerable,’ Kendall … told a conference hosted by Aviation Week. …

Tighter budgets will increase competition for fewer programs, U.S. defense officials and industry executives said at the conference … They predicted that the number of bid protests would grow, and said companies would have to redouble their efforts to cut costs and overhead to be competitive. …

Discord between the U.S. Defense Department and its suppliers has led to protracted contract competitions because of what they called onerous contract terms. …

‘We're not looking to put you out of business,’ Robert Hale, the Pentagon's top budget official, said at the conference on Tuesday.

Readers will note that Messrs. Kendall and Hale were reiterating the same talking points Mr. Shay Assad recently uttered.  We wrote at the time—

Mr. Assad has emphasized several times that he’s not looking to impact contractor profitability—just their costs.  He’s fine with contractors making a reasonable profit (as he should be, given that it’s official Government policy).  He reiterated this position again, quite recently, and the MSM and others who follow the defense industry picked-up on his words and reported them (again) as if they were some kind of promise of safe-harbor in the upcoming storm of sequestered DOD budgets.

Here’s a GovExec article on the subject.  It discusses Mr. Kendall’s assurances as well as warnings from industry associations that cuts are going to hurt smaller companies the most.  It reported—

Fred Downey, vice president of national security at the Aerospace Industries Association, told Government Executive that ‘ongoing reductions in defense spending coupled with the threat of sequestration cuts are causing a great deal of concern among smaller companies in the supply chain. Many of these companies have unique capabilities that could be lost if their workflow is interrupted by cancellations and delays.’ …

Alan Chvotkin, executive vice president and counsel of the Professional Services Council, which represents contractors, said the comments were ‘reassuring in that they demonstrate renewed attention at high levels. But a bailout, for lack of a better word, should not be counted on as a strategy by companies as the Pentagon takes steps to make sure the supply chain is not disrupted.’

On a related note, Jim McAleese issued a detailed look at the DOD’s FY 2013 budget request, and concluded, “Strong Performers are being rewarded.  Poor Performers will be fired.”  So it’s not necessarily only critical skills that the DOD Industrial Policy Directorate needs to consider; it’s program execution skills as well.

The foregoing messages should not be news to readers of Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s blog.  We’ve been pushing program execution and supply chain management for years.  For example, in this article we opined that—

We can save quite a bit of money if we manage programs better in an environment that’s conducive to effective program management. Congress can save money by reducing funding uncertainty and by rationalizing acquisition statutes and regulations. DOD can save money by partnering with its contractors instead of attacking them and by improving the quality of its acquisition management workforce. And contractors can save money by partnering with their subcontractors instead of trying to maximize their own profit at the expense of their subs

What’s more, way back in August, 2009, we warned readers by saying, “Look for increased pressure to cut costs and to trim overhead.”  In this self-titled “rant,” we opined—

As we reported in this article, many major defense acquisition programs are dependent on rare earth magnets produced in China.  You have a problem with that?  It’s called free-market capitalism, cupcake.  Free-market capitalism is what our country is supposed to be about.

Free-market capitalism is what happens when companies close-down production in locations with high labor costs or high insurance costs or high income taxes, and move their production facilities and/or workforce down the road a piece to where it’s cheaper to operate and the margins are higher.  If by “down the road” one means “across the ocean to a foreign land” then so be it.  You don’t like the results, then change the business climate, sweetheart. 

You got a problem with loss of manufacturing capacity, loss of skilled jobs and industrial capacity, loss of critical technologies, and/or loss of ability to produce “American-made” defense weapons and programs?  Then you better turn the Titanic around, Einstein, ‘cause the Pentagon hit that particular iceberg about 20 years ago.

In the meantime, while you’re running for the wheelhouse and pleading with the Captain to turn the ship around, we have work to do.

Finally, we want to point readers toward this little piece discussing DOD’s FY 2012 budget request to Congress.  In that blog article, and in the context of surviving DOD budget cuts, we asserted—

Program execution matters. … Perhaps you should let the funding games play out as they may, trusting that your political action committees and lobbyists will do their jobs while you do yours. To that end, may we suggest (once again) that program execution and supply chain management be your priorities. In this new age of fiscal slash-and-burn, with a new (and perhaps newly focused) Congress sensitive to taxpayers’ concerns, nobody wants any more bad news. Your program’s on-time delivery and on-budget spending will be the good news that may guarantee you continued funding, now and into the future.

As we look at the recently enacted FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, or as we peruse McAleese’s analysis of the DOD FY 2013 budget request to Congress, we see no reason to change our consistent position on how best to handle the current and forecasted budgetary pressure on DOD programs.

While the DOD Industrial Policy Directorate pursues its “S2T2” analysis of the defense industrial base (and we wish them good luck with that), and while industry associations such as AIA, PSC, and NDIA fire up their legislators to oppose defense cuts while current law (and several grass-roots political groups) call for them, we think the best strategy for contractors is to execute spectacularly well on the contracts they have in-house.  And as our readers know, this means managing program supply chains spectacularly well, as well.

 

Will In-Sourcing Help Solve Federal Budget Problems?

E-mail Print PDF

For at least a decade, the Federal government has used A-76 competitions and other opportunities to replace government employees with contractor employees—a practice generally known as “outsourcing”.  It was generally held that outsourcing resulted in taxpayer savings.  But late last year, the self-appointed watchdogs over at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) released a study that claimed that using contractors to perform services formerly performed by government employees “actually increases costs to taxpayers” instead of resulting in savings.

POGO asserted that “while federal government salaries are higher than private sector salaries, contractor billing rates average 83 percent more than what it would cost to do the work in-house.”  POGO reported—

POGO’s study compared 35 federal job classifications, covering more than 550 service activities. The occupations included everything from auditing and law enforcement to food inspection. The results surprised even POGO investigators…

In 33 of the 35 job classifications POGO looked at, the average contractor billing rate was significantly steeper than the average compensation for federal employees. The two jobs where it was more cost-effective to hire contractors were groundskeeper and medical records technician.  So when the White House needs its lawn mowed, it shouldn’t hire in-house. Still, in every other case, it was cheaper for the government do the job itself.

In some occupations, the difference in price was so dramatic, any coupon-clipping soccer mom could easily have seen the government was getting ripped off. When the government hired a claims examiner for example, it paid the contractor nearly five times more than if it had gone with a federal employee.

(Emphasis in original.)

In a follow-up article, POGO asserted the following—

For years, federal agencies have assumed that outsourcing work to contractors would reap the benefits of private sector efficiencies and save taxpayer dollars. Policy makers have debated the size of the government and whether federal employees are overpaid, often relying on studies that simply compare federal and private sector salaries.
However, those analyses have not recognized that the cost of outsourcing is not what the employees of contractors are paid by their employers, but rather the amount that the government pays to the employing private sector contractors. As a result, previous analyses did not reflect the fact that actual government contractor billing rates for federal service contractors are significantly higher than the full costs (salary and fringe benefits) of hiring federal employees.

In that same article, POGO also responded to several criticisms it had received regarding its methodology.

Long-time readers of our blog may recall that we’ve addressed this issue before.  We reported on a GAO study that indicated that use of State Department employees to perform OCONUS security functions was significantly more expensive than using contractor employees.  As we reported—

So in three of four contract scenarios evaluated, using contractors actually saved the State Department money.  And not just a little bit of money—GAO reported that use of Government employees was more than 10 times more expensive than using contractors.  Moreover, where use of Government employees would have been cheaper, GAO noted that ‘because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million.’  In other words, when one adds the additional $162 million in government costs to the State Department’s estimated annual estimated cost of $240 million, one gets $402 million versus the contractor’s charges of $380 million—i.e., the contractor is marginally cheaper.  To sum up, GAO found no instance where use of State Department employees to replace contractors would result in any cost savings to the U.S. Government or to the taxpayers.
That GAO finding was consistent with the viewpoint expressed by Dr. Loren Thompson of The Lexington Institute.

Adding more acquisition, audit, and program management professionals to DoD’s ranks … will compound the problem. … Dr. Thompson notes that those new heads will take additional funds—not just to cover the costs of salary and benefits, but also to cover the costs of training, equipping, housing and supporting them. As Dr. Thompson notes, ‘When you add up all these costs, the long-term burden of taking on 20,000 new acquisition professionals will be over $80 billion -- which just happens to be the projected cost of buying a replacement for the Trident ballistic-missile sub.’

So POGO says it’s dramatically more expensive to use contractor employees, while GAO and Dr. Thompson have reached the opposite conclusion.  Who’s right?

Well, we’re not sure.  But in late January, 2012, Government Executive reported on a study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that government employees received higher compensation than their private industry counterparts—but that the pay gap varied by education level.  GovExec reported—
In a comparison of civilian federal employees to private sector workers with similar observable characteristics, CBO found that federal workers come out on top in average wages (2 percent higher), benefits (48 percent higher) and total compensation (16 percent more). … After separating out the data by level of education, more distinctions became apparent. Federal civilian workers with only a high school diploma or less fared much better than private sector employees with the same: They earned 21 percent more wages, 72 percent higher benefits and 36 percent more in total compensation.

Government workers with bachelor’s degrees still did better, but not by as much. Though they earned roughly the same hourly wages, they made 46 percent more in benefits and averaged 15 percent higher total compensation than their private sector counterparts.

In contrast, among employees with a professional degree or doctorate, federal workers earned 23 percent less in wages and 18 percent lower total compensation, while receiving about the same benefits as the private sector employees with identical degrees.

In addition to the foregoing, GovExec reported that CBO found that Federal employees averaged four years higher in age—45 years versus 41 years.

This debate is not going away as long as there is a Federal budget deficit and politicians ready to point fingers at one side or the other.  In the meantime, our readers may want to consider in detail the various studies summarized in this article--the POGO study, the GAO study, and the CBO study—and decide for themselves who’s right and who’s wrong.

While you’re doing that, we’re going to be busy reading a recent Accenture study on “human capital” issues facing the A&D industry, which is going to be the subject of a future blog article.

 

Booz Allen Hamilton Suspended, Proposed for Debarment

E-mail Print PDF

Procurement_Integrity
Booz Allen Hamilton is a large government contractor, recently reporting $5.6 Billion in annual sales and a backlog of $10.9 Billion.  Reportedly it has received more than 3,500 individual government contracts and task orders.  So the company may well be presumed to know something about contracting with the Federal government.  But apparently the company’s knowledge of Federal procurement rules—not to mention the standards of ethical business conduct—varies by geographic region.  

We reach that conclusion after learning that Booz Allen Hamilton’s San Antonio, Texas, office was suspended by the U.S. Air Force.  Four BAH San Antonio employees were individually named by the Air Force.  The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reported it right here.  The Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) linked its readers to this Federal Times article, which reported it as well.  MySanAntonio.com also had a report focusing on the local issues.

POGO also linked to the official Air Force Memorandum on the proposed debarment.

From perusing the reports linked above, we have gathered the following—

Lt. Colonel Joselito Meneses was the “Deputy Chief, Information Technology Division, Office of the Surgeon General, Air Force Medical Support Agency at Brooks Air Force Base (located just outside San Antonio, Texas) until his retirement in May 2008.  BAH hired Meneses in April 2011, giving him the title, Senior Associate, and responsibility for “business development in the regional military and civilian health markets and was in charge of all Air Force medical accounts.”  

When Meneses left the Air Force, he brought with him a little memento of his service:  an external hard drive on which he had copied “non-public information,” including proprietary information related to a $75 Million Information Technology Modernization Services contract held by a BAH competitor.  The information Meneses had retained included “CLIN pricing data, the labor mix [of the competitor], and the associated labor rates by labor category.”  For those who cannot put that information into proper context, it reasonably would be considered to be “source selection information” and BAH's possession and use would fall under the Procurement Integrity Act.

When Meneses forwarded his information throughout the BAH San Antonio office, one might reasonably think somebody would have remembered their BAH ethics training or basic regulatory compliance training, and stopped everything at once while contacting BAH attorneys.  But no.  As the Air Force noted, “none of the subjects instructed or informed Mr. Meneses that his disclosure was improper.”  Instead, one BAH employee replied with a nice “Thanks for sharing.”

Not only did BAH not take any action to halt the improper use of the competitor’s proprietary information, Mr. Meneses was made a part of the BAH Capture Team that was competing for the follow-on contract.  But that Shangri-La state of ignorance didn’t last a full month: eventually a member of the pricing department came across the information and realized the depth of the hole the company had been digging—and called the BAH attorneys.  

Mr. Meneses was fired about 10 weeks later.

BAH San Antonio decided not to pursue the follow-on contract it had been targeting.

The Air Force debarring official summed-up his feelings thusly—

The conduct … raises serious concerns regarding Subjects’ business integrity, business honesty, and compliance with government contracting requirements, and the adequacy of BAH San Antonio’s ethics and compliance program, including the training provided to its employees.
Well, yes.

As POGO notes, prior to distributing his ill-gotten data, Meneses had attended “at least six days of orientation and training—including training on the company-wide ethics program.”  So either the training was ineffective, or the employees in question decided to proceed despite what they had learned.  Regardless, BAH has learned some lessons about the efficacy of its training program.

We recently reported that BAH had hired former DOD Inspector General Gordon Heddell as a “senior executive advisor.”  On September 30, 2011, the Air Force suspended and moved to debar BAH San Antonio and called the corporate ethical culture into question.  On January 1, 2012, BAH hired Mr. Heddell.  Coincidence?

We doubt it.

 

 

Yeah, This Would be Why Your Choice of Attorney Matters One Heckuva Lot

E-mail Print PDF

Penny_Wise

Occasionally we are asked to assist small companies with matters that are clearly in the province of legal counsel.  When faced with such requests, we decline as courteously as possible and offer to recommend one or more attorneys to the interlocutor.  Sometimes people simply, and directly, ask us for such referrals.  In each case, we try to recommend at least two, or preferably three, attorneys who have knowledge and experience in the government contracting arena.  And that’s where our involvement in the matter ends.

To those requestors who are seeking pro bono legal assistance: count us out.  That’s between you and the attorney.  We note for the record, however, that if you can’t crisply explain your business entity’s mission and why you deserve to get free legal assistance while everybody else has to pay through the nose, then we don’t think too much of your chances of getting what you want.  (Oh, and to the nice lady who offered to construct a temporary website just so the attorneys could visit it to learn about your NFP entity, we hope you eventually realized why that was not a step that was going to inspire confidence and lead them to giving you free services.)

But make no mistake: when you go into battle against the Federal government, you need the very best attorneys you can afford to hire.  Today we’re going to explore two cases which offer support for that axiom.

SplashNote Systems, Inc. (ASBCA No. 57403, Nov. 29, 2011)

We missed this one when it was published in early December and we need to acknowledge and thank Karen Manos’ Government Contract Costs, Accounting & Pricing Report (West Publishers) for bringing it to our attention.  As Ms. Manos (Co-Chair of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher’s Government Contracts Practice Group) noted, “For a case with so little at stake, the recent decision … cuts a surprisingly broad and destructive swath through the Federal Acquisition Regulation cost principles.”  See the full ASBCA decision right here.

SpashNote, represented by its President and CEO, Mr. Scott Tse, appealed an ACO decision demanding $84,950 in indirect costs that had been determined to be unallowable.  The costs in question included deferred IR&D expenses ($59,417), a bonus paid to Mr. Tse ($34,168), and local meal expenses “to discuss recruiting with professional colleagues” ($478).  

With respect to the deferred IR&D the ASBCA disagreed with SpashNote’s assertions that that the IR&D cost principle (at 31.205-18(d)(2)) was permissive and that an advance agreement regarding acceptance of the costs was optional.  The ASBCA also disagreed with the assertion that the company was required to defer its IR&D costs under SFAS No. 86.  Finally, the ASBCA disagreed that the Government was estopped from disallowing the deferred IR&D costs, since it had not previously raised the issue during prior DCAA accounting system reviews and (limited scope) audits of the company’s 2004 incurred costs.

As Ms. Manos opined in the CP&A Report, “The ASBCA seems to have missed the point of FAS 86. … After ‘technological feasibility’ has been established, the software is no longer IR&D, and is therefore subject to FAR 31.205-25, Manufacturing and production engineering costs, rather than FAR 31.205-18.  Unlike FAR 31.205-18 … 31.205-25 expressly contemplates the capitalization and amortization of production development costs.”

With respect to Mr. Tse’s bonus, the ASBCA decided that it was a distribution of profits and thus unallowable, even though (as Ms. Manos noted) “the Government determined that Mr. Tse’s total compensation was reasonable and despite SplashNote’s evidence that it had a bonus agreement and an established bonus plan that it consistently followed.

With respect to the claimed recruiting-related meals, the ASBCA decided that they were also unallowable, primarily because SplashNote failed to provide sufficient information to show that the costs complied with the 31.205-43 Cost Principle.  In addition—as Ms. Manos noted—“the ASBCA conflated the requirements for recruiting costs and travel costs.”

To sum up, this decision is a great example of why you need to hire knowledgeable and experienced government contracts attorneys when you decide to take on the Federal government in a court of law.  Mr. Tse represented his company and clearly failed to raise many of the points Ms. Manos—one of the top government contract practitioners in the country—noted in her commentary regarding the decision.  As a result, SpashNote lost its case, spectacularly.

General Dynamics Ordance & Tactical Systems, Inc. (ASBCA Nos. 56870, 56957, Feb. 3, 2012)

This case is a great example of how really good attorneys manage a difficult case.  This is not a final decision on the merits of the case; instead, it involves the disposition of a motion for sanctions, filed by GDOTS against the U.S. Army.  Basically, GDOTS’ attorneys (notably David Churchill of Jenner & Block) had to push the ASBCA Judges to sanction the Government attorneys while respecting the legal niceties.  Talk about a tough balancing act!

Here’s a link to the full ASBCA decision on the motion for sanctions.

For starters, you need to know that GDOTS has been looking for $18.2 Million from the Army “to recover unanticipated costs based upon claimed inadequate government estimates of ammunition quantities”.  This matter has been in litigation since 2009—roughly three years.  And while the matter has been pending, Contract Disputes Act interest has been accruing.  By now, we’re guessing that the Army is on the hook for far more than the original $18 Million.

The contentious issue at the heart of this decision concerned whether or not the Army would release documents it asserted contained protected trade secrets of GDOTS’ competitor, Alliant Techsystems (ATK).  The presiding Judge reviewed the documents in camera, and described them as follows—
For the most part, these documents consisted of e-mails between government employees that referred to ATK unit prices and production capacity for specified rounds of ammunition at the government-owned, contractor-operated facility known as the ‘Lake City Army Ammunition Plant’ (LCAAP), or related to information from which this type of information could be derived.

The Board acknowledged that the documents contained ATK trade secrets, but issued an order directing the Army to disclose them anyway, under a protective order.  The Army continued to refuse to turn over the documents and, three months later, GDOTS filed a motion for evidentiary sanctions.  Nearly a year passed, with motions and replies and counter-motions being filed.  Eventually, GDOTS “renewed its motion for evidentiary sanctions.”

Nearly two months later, the Army produced the documents—but “redacted the information that is the subject of [GDOTS’] motion for sanctions.”  The ASBCA was not pleased.  The Judges wrote—

We have considered the following factors in determining whether sanctions should be imposed in Board appeals: the willfulness of the offending party; the degree of prejudice involved; the delay, burden and expense incurred by the movant; and evidence of the offending party's lack of compliance with other Board orders. … we believe that the Army's refusal to comply with the Board's orders was neither accidental, inadvertent or negligent, nor was the Army's action impetuous or without aforethought. The Army's refusal was knowing, deliberate and intentional and was submitted to the Board in writing. …

As a result of the foregoing, the ASBCA decided to impose evidentiary sanctions.  In the words of the Judges—

We draw an adverse inference from the Army's refusal to provide the disputed discovery information to appellant's counsel, specifically, that said evidence, if disclosed, would show that there was relevant information available to the Army that it failed to consider when developing the estimates in question for the solicitation documents, thereby causing the estimates to be inadequately or negligently prepared.

That finding sounds pretty benign, but in reality it was a body blow (if not a right hook to the jaw) of the Government’s case.  The GDOTS attorneys had successfully walked the tightrope and had positioned their client for a successful outcome.

This is what you want from your government contracts attorneys.  Whether you are seeking premier subject matter expertise (as Ms. Manos casually displayed) or a mastery of litigation strategy and tactics (as the Jenner & Black attorneys demonstrated), you want the best on your side when you take on the U.S. Government.  Yes, you are going to pay quite a bit.  And regardless of the expertise of your attorneys, it’s going to take a frustratingly long time to get your case heard.  But having the right attorneys on your side is going to increase your chances of a successful outcome.

Availing yourself of your rights under the Contract Disputes Act is a tough choice and a tough road to walk.  You may have less than $100,000 or more than $18 Million at stake.  Regardless of the amount in dispute, it is not the time to count pennies.


 

Follow-Up to Better Buying Power

E-mail Print PDF

BBP

One of the over-arching themes of the Pentagon’s strategy to cope with declining defense spending is called the “Better Buying Power” Initiative.  It’s a wide-ranging attempt to rein-in the costs of weapon systems through five major attack vectors, including—

  1. Focus on affordability during requirements planning

  2. Incentivize contractor efficiency and productivity

  3. Increase competition

  4. Improve “tradecraft” on acquisition of services

  5. Reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy

We’ve posted a number of articles on the BBP, though it’s been awhile.  A good exemplar of our reporting can be found right here.

In the past several months since the BPP Initiative was unveiled, the Pentagon bureaucracy civil service has been busy inculcating it into the culture of the acquisition workforce.  Did you know that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) has created a website devoted to the BBP Initiative?  Here’s a link to that site.

Following the links at the DAU site, we found this nice resource: a series of BBP training modules.  One of the training modules we reviewed was called, “Reward contractors for successful supply chain and indirect cost management.”

Well, yes.  We agree that contractors should be rewarded for managing their supply chain, as well as for managing their indirect costs.  No problem there.  We liked the concept so much that we downloaded the PowerPoint training slides and added them to our website Knowledge Resources.

While the training slides too frequently restated history instead of providing knowledge, there were some nice gems to be found inside.  For example, here are some points from the slides:

  • DoD pays profit/fee to prime contractors on work subcontracted by the prime contractor to subcontractors.

  • The level of profit should be calculated to reward performance. Profit on subcontracted work is meant to compensate the prime for taking on the burden of managing subcontractor risk and delivering subcontractor value.

  • The alternative is for the Government to manage the subcontractor itself ― Component Breakout.

  • Higher profit should be awarded to management of higher-risk subcontracts, and higher profit should be given when the prime succeeds in driving down subcontractor costs every year.

  • If contractors do not aggressively reduce supply chain costs, the government should consider component breakout.

  • The Program Manager should analyze if each contractor is aggressively managing and competing the supply chain in order to make breakout decision at each major milestone.

  • The Program Manager and his contracting team should structure contracts and deliverables to insure that they have the information they need to analyze and monitor supply chain management, and execute breakouts at each major program milestone and as needed to control program cost.

  • In order to facilitate active government supply chain visibility and future breakout of key sub-systems, parts, maintenance, and support, the program office needs to actively pursue and manage data rights to all aspects of the program.   

While we don’t agree at all that cost reduction is the most important element of subcontractor management, we are pleased to see that DOD is distinguishing contractors on the basis of successful subcontractor management.

With respect to indirect cost management, the training slides offered the following points—

  • Profit on overhead should incentivize the prime contractor to control overhead cost as well as direct cost.

  • Control Direct Costs when incentivizing  Indirect Costs reductions  

    • If not controlled, we will incentivize the contractor to shift  costs from one cost category to another cost category without realizing any overall cost reduction
  • Profit / Fee incentives should focus on reducing areas of major cost (“heavy hitters”), in order to reduce overall cost

Notice that DOD has (smartly) noted that a mono-focus on indirect costs will simply drive its contractors to make more costs direct charges.  Instead of focusing solely on the indirect side, DOD will (hopefully) focus on cost reductions that affect the program’s bottom-line cost.

Look, we don’t necessarily agree with everything in this particular training deck.  We don’t think cost reductions at the supplier/subcontractor level are best indicator of supply chain management success.  We don’t think that more competition is a panacea and will automatically lead to reduced prices.  We don’t think indirect cost reductions are as easy as DOD thinks they are, given the additional costs driven by DOD’s bureaucratic and heavy-handed regulations.

But we also think that this represents a good first step.

Why not visit DAU’s BBP Initiative site and see for yourself?


 


Page 190 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.