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Apogee Consulting Inc

Pensions and Post-Retirement Benefits Scare Everybody

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One of the most important lessons that can be learned from marriage is to never say, “I told you so.” Being right is rarely a goal worth reaching; most times the long-term cost to the relationship isn’t worth the momentary warm glow that accompanies the phrase “Neener, neener. I was right and you were wrong.”

But this is a blog, baby. Different situation; different rules. So here it is:

We told you so.

We told you that the recent revisions to CAS 412 and 413 necessitated by the Pension Protection Act were going to be an unpleasant surprise to many.  But not to you—right?  As a reader of the Apogee Consulting, Inc. blog, you not only knew that this issue was going to surface like a bubble of smelly methane gas in the swamp of arcane government contract cost accounting rules, but you also knew that DOD was well aware of the coming scheiß sturm for a least the past six years—and did nothing.

And now the scheiße has hit the fan, so to speak, as recently published polemics demonstrate.  To wit—

The Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) is (according to Wikipedia) “functions as a think tank, ‘government watchdog’ and advocacy group for conservative fiscally causes.” (Here’s a link to their website.) If you want a hint as to their approach to campaigning against government waste, note that the organization’s phone number is 1-800-BE-ANGRY.

CAGW recently issued a report on contractor pensions and post-retirement benefits (PRBs) that seemed intended to incite Congress to DO SOMETHING about the price being paid by taxpayers for those particular items of cost. Here’s a link to the CAGW report in question.

The Federal Times ran a story about the CAGW report. Here’s a link to the Federal Times article. The article reported that—

Taxpayers contributed more than $3.3 billion to the pension programs of 18 of the biggest federal contractors in 2010, according to estimates by the Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) watchdog group. …

The CAGW estimates the government reimbursed Lockheed Martin Corp., the largest federal contractor, $988 million in 2010 for its pension payments. The figure for Raytheon was $667 million, and for Northrop Grumman Corp., $529 million.

CAGW’s methodology consists of extrapolating from two GAO reports concerning estimates of pension and PRB liabilities associated with Department of Energy (DOE) contractors. Note that the operative word in the Federal Times quote is “estimate”. One might also reasonably wonder whether DOE’s pension/PRB liabilities—which include personnel costs associated with several National Laboratories such as Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore (whose Operation & Management contracts have only recently been subject to competition)—would be a good representation of the liabilities of other Departments such as Defense. But that’s not the issue that we think readers should take with the CAGW report. No, the disputable issue is that CAGW has taken a position against reimbursement of defense contractor pension and PRB costs.

The Federal Times article quoted the CAGW report as follows—

This [reimbursement of contractor pension/PRB costs] can lead to moral hazard and higher federal spending, making it a challenge for all government agencies to meet their core mission and responsibilities, while at the same time using taxpayer money to subsidize investment decisions made by some of the most profitable corporations in the United States.

The Federal Times article reported that the CAGW report recommended several changes to the current government contract accounting policies affecting how contractors measure, propose, and bill for such costs. The article reported that CAGW “urged” the Federal government to—

  • Require that its reimbursements to contractors' pension plans be based on actuarial assumptions required under federal law, not the contractors' own assumptions.

  • Require that market losses in invested pension funds be recouped from the contracting companies that make the investment decisions, instead of taxpayers.

  • Stop reimbursing contractors for defined-benefit pension plans for new employees and instead reimburse them only for defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan.

This article in Washington Technology took a different approach to the CAGW report.  It told its readers—

The federal government is on the hook for billions of dollars in federal contractor private pension costs that possibly could have been avoided … Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) said … it has begun investigating situations in which the federal government has assumed ongoing responsibility for the cost of contractor pension plans. These situations have occurred primarily because of terms approved under cost-plus federal contracts, in which the government contributes to ongoing costs of contractor retirement benefits. …

‘Many of these companies sponsor defined benefit pension plans for their employees (in which) company officials control not only the level of benefits offered, but also the strategies used for investing plan assets,’ CAGW said …. ‘Since many cost-plus federal contracts include clauses that ensure these pension plans are fully funded even if the plans' investment benchmarks are not met, taxpayers ultimately bear the investment risks associated with pension fund investment decisions made by some of the most profitable corporations in the United States.’

The article reported that CAGW stated that, “the structure of those contracts has encouraged several major federal contractors to maintain more expensive defined-benefits plans, even as most of government and private industry have moved away from those types of plans.”

We did, in fact, review the CAGW report. Here are some salient portions of that report—
Many of these [government contractors] sponsor defined benefit plans for their employees and they control not only the level of benefits offered, but also the strategies used for investing plan assets. Since cost-plus contracts include clauses that ensure these pension plans are fully funded even if their investment assumptions are not met, taxpayers ultimately bear the investment risk. …

Federal agencies have increased pension reimbursements to contractors in order to meet the PPA requirement that private company defined benefit pensions be funded to 100 percent of liabilities. … As a result, contractors often decide to contribute more than the minimum to prevent losing favorable tax treatment or to build credit balances that can be used in the out years to try to level the amount it budgets for pension contributions. Combine the PPA standards and internal agency policies with external factors, and the result is record contractor reimbursement costs. …

While the vast majority of corporations and private businesses have transitioned to defined contribution pension plans, defined benefit plans continue to be a mainstay for many of the largest federal government contractors. They are reaping billions of dollars in reimbursements because of contractual obligations, PPA funding, actuarial requirements, and economic and financial factors. …

On December 7, 2011, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Ranking Member John McCain (R-Ariz.) sent a letter to the GAO asking the agency to examine the cost of post-retirement benefit reimbursement at the Department of Defense (DOD). Their letter requested ‘an estimate of how much DOD has paid its contractors to backfill their pension plan shortfalls over the past 10 or so years,’ a ‘projection of future liabilities,’ an evaluation of ‘options for limiting DOD’s liability for contractor pensions, including but not limited to the options of eliminating reimbursement for all or some defined plans,’ and the savings that could be achieved from implementing the various options. It is anticipated that GAO will merge the senators’ concerns with an earlier request on the same subject matter from two other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and release the final report later this year.

So the CAGW report is getting play and Congress is concerned.  We want to share one more article on this topic with you.  It’s a Federal Times story from February 27, 2012.

The Federal Times story includes quotes from DOD Comptroller Robert Hale.  It reported—

The Defense Department has not yet budgeted for the additional pension costs, but estimates they ‘could be billions of dollars, conceivably,’ Defense Department Comptroller Robert Hale told ‘This Week In Defense News’ on Feb. 23.

‘I'm hoping that our vendors realize in tight fiscal times that they need to work with us to hold down weapons costs,’ Hale said. ‘We think there may be modest added cost, we'll just have to see, but we are going to have to start budgeting for them, and it is a question I'm asking internally as we look into our next budget plan.’

The cost to the Pentagon will depend on how the companies' pension funds fare in the stock market, Hale said. If investments do well and earn money, a greater part of the plans will be funded, he said.

However, if investments do poorly and pension funds become further underfunded, affected contractors would be forced to make greater payments to cover those liabilities, pension experts said. And that will mean more cost to the Pentagon.

The Federal Times story also reported—

With its roots in a 2006 law, the rule's impact should have been anticipated, giving Defense Department officials plenty of time to budget for the expected costs, said David Berteau, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.

‘How can this have snuck up on us and caught us unaware?’ he said. ‘I didn't hear any alarm bells.’ …

The impact of the new rule on government contracting costs could be dramatic given the tight budget environment most Defense Department agencies are operating under, Berteau said.

‘This is way more than a bookkeeping question,’ he said.

Because you read this blog, you know that we’ve been ringing the alarm bells for years.  More importantly, you also know that DOD Leadership has known about this issue since the passage of the PPA in 2006.  They knew, and they did nothing.  In fact, DOD Leadership issued direction that prohibited anything from being done.  They hid their heads in the sand.  They kicked the can down the street and made it somebody else’s problem to deal with. Pick your metaphor.

You knew it, because we told you so.

 

Human Capital Challenges of the A&D Industry

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We’ve been mulling this article over for a while, thinking about budgetary pressures facing defense contractors and the never-ending debate about right-sizing the Executive Branch’s workforce of government employees. You might think that, just because we focus on FAR and CAS and DCAA audit issues, we don’t also consider HR issues (aka “human capital” issues). If so, you’d be wrong.

The biggest problems aren’t numbers problems. The biggest problems—the most intractable problems—are people problems.

The biggest mistakes companies make aren’t about numbers.  They aren’t about defective pricing or false claims, or even about screwing-up the financial reporting. No. The biggest mistakes you’ll ever make are the ones involving human interaction. Almost certainly, your biggest mistakes will involve failing to listen to your workforce, or failing to ensure that knowledge is successfully transferred out of the heads of your senior, experienced, team and into the heads of the next generation.

Companies are going through the “rack and stack” process right now, deciding how to reduce costs while preserving abilities and skills. The Federal government is going through a similar process, albeit tailored to meet the unique protocols of the civil service rules. The same thing can be said for the military service.

The point is, the knee-jerk response to budgetary pressures is to slash headcount. And that’s not an incorrect response, if thought-through and strategically executed. Back in 2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology predicted as much as a 10% headcount reduction across the A&D industry, but also reported (perhaps with fingers crossed for luck) that A&D executives had learned from the mistakes that had been made in the 1990’s, when indiscriminate headcount reductions had significant down-stream ramifications, and thus would be smarter this time around. We remain similarly hopeful, but perhaps a bit more cynical that “one-size-fits-all-functions” mandatory headcount reduction percentages will remain the favorite tool of so-called “leaders” who seek to be perceived to be tackling the tough challenges while in reality they aren’t willing to do the necessary work that would lead to the right solution(s).

A recent white paper report issued by the mega-consulting firm, Accenture, discusses some of the challenges facing the A&D industry—and notes that A&D companies “are not yet taking the kind of comprehensive, value-driven approach needed to respond to the business, workforce, leadership and culture challenges ahead.” In other words, Accenture apparently thinks that your corporate leadership is failing at the job of preparing for the future. And Accenture may well be correct in its assessment.

Before we get too far into the Accenture report (called “High Fliers”), we want to give you a link to it, so you can read it yourself. Here’s the link.

The report discusses the challenges facing the A&D industry, including both the commercial airplane and defense sectors. We’re going to focus on the comments, findings, and recommendations relevant to the defense sector. The report sets up the situation thusly—

The defense industry will need to cope with falling budgets and lower government spending levels. For many companies that will mean looking abroad and competing in the international marketplace. These companies will need to put an increased emphasis on operating efficiency and on new kinds of partnerships and alliances. Deeply rooted in a military-oriented culture, defense companies will need to become more entrepreneurial and collaborative—not necessarily a traditional strength.

If one looks closely at these challenges, almost every one of them relies to a large extent on superior human capital—on the A&D workforce, its leadership and its culture. Yet the capabilities and performance of the workforce … are now being severely tested—in some cases straining the ability of organizations to respond. … Based on our research, we contend that companies must be taking action across a range of integrated areas [including] Talent, Leadership, Culture, and Organization. … An effective human capital strategy informs a company’s most important decisions about where and who to compete, and supports the enterprise as it balances short-term decisions with longer-term imperatives.

We have no problem with Accenture’s conclusions. More importantly, we think companies need to take the kind of actions that Accenture recommends, including—

  • Initiate broader workforce planning based on advanced, detailed capability models.

  • Re-focus on retention and development of top talent—the “high potential” employees.

  • Ensure that the current leadership team embraces “diverse thinking” and also fosters that attribute in the next generation of leadership.

  • Look to broaden the traditional engineering and/or military backgrounds and skill sets of corporate leaders.

  • Evaluate current cultural issues and challenges, and address them.

  • Decentralize decision-making as far out and down in the organization as possible.

  • Develop a continuous change management capability, so as to move toward a more agile company and workforce.

  • Reexamine the current governance and incentive structures so as to enable the foregoing.

There’s a lot more that can and should be said about the Accenture study. Time constraints (and fear of an allegation of copyright infringement) act to limit what we can write. In addition, Accenture has not paid us anything and we are not going to shill for free.

So go read the Accenture report. We think it’s worth your time.

The problem, of course, is that the people who most need to read it probably won’t. They won’t want to read about the approach they should be taking, because then they will have to acknowledge their own leadership failures. Consequently, you need to be smart about how you get the report into their hands and how you spin the need for a strategic approach instead of a knee-jerk reaction. You can do it. We have confidence in you.

More importantly, your co-workers are depending on you.

 

“But it was a Facilitation Payment, I Swear!”

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Last week, the Department of Justice announced that U.S. Army Reserve Sergeant Amasha King, age 33, had pleaded guilty to one count of “conspiracy to defraud the Department of Defense.”

Sergeant King served at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.  We’ve written about Camp Arijfan before.  We had more to say about the rather infamous Camp here, where we noted “nearly unbelievable levels of corruption.”  At least sixteen individuals have pleaded guilty to bribery and money laundering and other counts of fraud and corruption.  Sergeant King makes seventeen—so far as we know.  The true count may be higher.

Sergeant King served in the 347th Finance Battalion where she “was responsible for receiving and processing pay vouchers and invoices from military contractors for various contracts and blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), including BPAs for bottled potable water.”  King was responsible for approving contractor payments and for issuing payment checks.

King took money from one contractor—about $20,500, according to the DOJ announcement—in order to ensure that the contractor’s invoices were processed “much faster than usual.”  King directed the contractor to make wire payments to people in the United States, and to ensure that the individual wire transfer amounts were less than $10,000, so as to avoid bank reporting requirements.

According to the DOJ announcement—

King agreed to receive money from a military contractor in return for defrauding the United States by preferentially processing the contractor’s invoices outside of the proper procedures and protocols for payment.  This allowed the contractor to be paid much faster than usual and ultimately to bid for more contracts than it otherwise could have financed.

We are against government employee corruption as much as the next guy, perhaps more than most (based on the word count we’ve devoted to the topic).  But in this case, we’re unsure how heinous the crime actually was.

This strikes us as a case of “facilitation payments.”  Facilitation payments, according to this anti-corruption website, are defined as “a form of bribery made with the purpose of expediting or facilitating the performance by a public official of a routine governmental action and not to obtain or retain business or any other undue advantage.”

The website goes on to say—

A distinction is generally made between facilitation payments and outright bribery and corruption. In some countries, it may be considered normal to provide small unofficial payments under certain circumstances, although this practice is illegal in most countries.

Facilitation payments are one of the unsettled questions in the OECD Convention, meaning that the convention does not establish them as an offence….

Some countries i.e. the United Kingdom and Germany criminalise facilitation payments abroad. Other countries, such as the United States, do not prohibit such payments abroad and have no upper limit for them, although only very low amounts of money would be regarded as facilitation payments.

It’s very clear that U.S. Government officials and military service men and women cannot accept “facilitation payments” in order to expedite execution of their duties.  On the other hand, it’s not like the Sergeant’s actions as reported here were, themselves, violations of any laws.  She simply ensured that contractually obligated payments were made, albeit faster than would normally be the case.

Despite the DOJ attorneys trying to make the point that early receipt of contractually due payments permitted the contractor to “bid for more contracts than it otherwise could have financed,” we think that’s a fairly speculative stretch.  That’s a pretty tenuous benefit, if benefit it was.

We have an out-of-the-box idea.  Make it an official practice: offer expedited payment processing to all government contractors.  How much would your company pay to receive DFAS payments in ten days?  One week?  Three days?  How much would it be worth to you, in terms of the time value of money?

Look: there’s a budget deficit at the moment.  (Maybe you’ve heard about it?)  Our idea would generate some cash that would seemingly help with that problem.  Maybe the Pentagon should consider it.

 

NASA Travel Management Can Be Improved, Says NASA IG

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Credi_Card_SecurityFirst, thanks to the Federal Times for bringing this issue to our attention. Its story on the topic can be found here. But we are not going to recap the FedTimes story, because we obtained the official NASA IG report in question, reviewed it and, thus, have our own opinion to share with you.

NASA’s nearly 16,000 travelers spend roughly $80 Million on travel-related expenses each year. To use the hook from a popular 90’s song: isn’t it ironic that NASA seems to suffer from many of the same internal control issues that its contractors suffer from? The recommendations in the NASA IG report were reminiscent of many DCAA and other audit reports we’ve read throughout the years. For example—

  • Failure to review credit card usage reports to identify inactive cards

  • Failure to cancel employee credit cards upon separation/termination

  • Employees approving supervisor’s expense reports

  • Use of company credit cards for personal expenses

See? We’re all in the same boat!

This is why you need to review the NASA IG report in some detail, to see if any of its recommendations can be applied to your own situation. If you think you have more important issues to deal with, we’re going to have to disagree with your assessment of the situation.

Improving controls over employee travel expense reimbursement is one of the more important initiatives that a growing government contractor (or, as it turns out, an established government agency) can tackle. At the same time, it’s also one of the hardest, since it involves “cultural” issues and, often, issues of perceived employee entitlement. Because business travel often involves long hours and other aspects of personal sacrifice, there is (often) a sense on the employee’s part that s/he is “owed” some type of offsetting compensation. Thus, there is a built-in rationale for violating company travel policy—especially in “gray areas” where the policy is ambiguous.

To combat the temptation to violate company travel policy, it is important to have a very clear employee travel policy that minimizes the “gray areas” and explicitly sets forth expectations regarding what expenses will (and will not) be reimbursed. It is important to establish what expenses will (and will not) be claimed as allowable with respect to government billings. And it is important to establish rigorous internal controls that detect employee violations of company policy and which, by their very nature, act to deter potential wrongdoing.

The foregoing advice is essentially what the IG told NASA management.

The NASA IG reported that NASA’s controls over its employee travel card program were “generally effective.” The IG reported—

We found that NASA was effectively monitoring travel card use, that NASA’s travel card policies and procedures are generally consistent with OMB guidelines, and that the Agency was providing employees with appropriate training. We also found that most NASA employees used their travel cards appropriately and paid their bills on time, and that NASA was effectively monitoring employee payments and reminding employees when their accounts were past due.

Regardless of the foregoing, the IG offered recommendations for improvement that would tend to strengthen existing controls.  (When do they not?)  Here’s what the NASA IG recommended—

  • More than 900, or 6 percent of travel cards, had never been used. NASA should cancel them.  In addition, NASA should periodically monitor credit card usage and, based on usage, establish appropriate credit limits or cancel accounts.

  • 28 cardholders had separated from NASA, but still had active credit card accounts. NASA should cancel accounts at the time the employees leave the agency.

  • The IG tested a sample of 176 credit card transactions and found 9 instances of “improper or questionable use that had not been detected by NASA.” Nonetheless, it found that NASA’s controls were “generally effective.” (Remember that error ratio the next time DCAA reviews your controls.)

  • 4 of the 9 “gotchas” were for personal or non-travel related expenses (e.g., $773 for personal travel expenses); the employees had never sought reimbursement but use of the NASA credit card for such expenses violated policy.

  • In 5 of the 9 transactions, the NASA IG was less certain: it reported that “it was not clear whether charges were allowable because the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) does not clearly prohibit certain types of expenses and NASA has not issued supplemental policy to clarify the FTR.” Examples of these “questionable” expenses included purchases of in-room movies and expenses for additional days that preceded or followed an official trip.  The IG recommended that the existing NASA travel policy be revised to address these ambiguous areas. In addition, the IG found that the existing NASA travel policy was generally out-of-date and needed to be brought current.

In addition to the points listed above, the NASA IG also had some findings that were buried in the report.  These additional findings included—

  • 45 NASA employees had the authority to self-approve both travel authorizations and claims for travel reimbursement, so there was no additional level of review being applied to their decision-making. The IG found that 22 of the 45 should have been submitting their travel reimbursement claims for additional review/approval, but were not doing so.  The IG noted, “During our audit period, NASA self-approvers incurred $552,000 in travel expenses charged to their individual credit cards.”

  • Subordinate employees approved the travel reimbursement claims of their superiors in violation of existing NASA policy.

  • NASA could not adequately demonstrate that applying the rebates it received from the credit card issuer (about $5 million) as a credit to its general working capital fund met the OMB requirements that the rebates be applied to the “appropriation or account from which the funds for purchases were expended.” (Readers may recall that other contractors have had problems in this area.)

  • “NASA’s charge card issuer reported that from June 2010 through July 2011, 36.5 percent of purchase cards and 3 percent of travel cards had been compromised in the sense that card information (e.g., card number, cardholder’s name) may have been obtained by an unauthorized source.” This is possibly a finding more related to the security of the credit card provider than it is a NASA-related finding—but it does point out the need to discuss credit card security within applicable policies, and to educate employees about what to do if they learn that their information has been compromised in some fashion. A strong policy has a defined process flow and provides employees with appropriate points of contact from whom to obtain any required assistance.

To conclude, we very much appreciate the findings and recommendations within the NASA Inspector General report, because we think it offers our clientele (and readership) an opportunity to evaluate their own policies and controls, and identify opportunities to enhance and improve them. In our view, it would be a shame to ignore these valuable lessons just because they related to a government agency, or because you are too busy fighting fires elsewhere.

 

Ineligible Healthcare Dependents – Round 4

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Dog_with_a__Bone

We promise to stop beating this dead horse when DOD stops flogging it.  Until then, we will continue to bring you news regarding this exemplar of misapplied Pentagon oversight.

For those less familiar with the situation to date, here are a couple of links to get you up to speed:

  • August 2009 – We opine that DCAA audit guidance is “troubling” and “contractors should immediately review their procedures associated with verifying dependent eligibility and shore them up as appropriate.”

  • October 2010 – DCMA tells its Contracting Officers that HQ has agreed with DCAA that healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents should be treated as “expressly unallowable” costs.  So much for Contracting Officer “independent business judgment.”

  • March 2011 – DCAA issues updated audit guidance to direct auditors that they should treat instances of contractors inadvertently claiming costs of ineligible dependents as a noncompliance with the requirements of Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 405.

In the last update we concluded with a plea for the use of materiality and proportionality by government oversight officials.  We wrote—

This insanity can be stopped, but only if adults step in to supervise the children.  DCMA and DCAA are clearly caught up in ‘much ado about nothing’ and DOD leadership needs to realize the price that is being paid by its contractors, who will have to resolve these issues through the courts—since they see no other avenue available to them.

Well, here we are yet again—this time with a bit of a mixed message from DOD Leadership.

On February 17, 2012, Mr. Shay Assad, DOD Director of Pricing, issued a policy memo addressing this issue.  Here’s a link to the memo in question.  Mr. Assad, who has acted as intermediary in related matters before, wrote—

… costs that were incurred for ineligible dependent health care are unallowable under FAR 31.201-3 because it would be unreasonable to reimburse costs incurred due to invalid claims made by employees, also the costs are in violation of the selected cost principle at 31.205-6(m). …

The Department of Defense will continue to disallow ineligible dependent health care benefit costs.  To the extent that these costs were bid on fixed price sole source contracts, the costs were an inaccurate representation of the allowable cost.  Contractors are encouraged to voluntarily refund the increase in price they received on their fixed price contracts as a result of including these unallowable costs in their proposals and hence, their negotiated prices.  In some cases the ineligible health care benefit costs may have resulted in defectively priced contracts that were certified in accordance with TINA.

If you took the time to refresh you short-term memory with our three previous articles, you should already be feeling a stabbing feeling in the back of your skull.  There may be some momentary nausea and disorientation.  Ignore all that, get a hold of yourself, and let’s evaluate DOD’s current position, vis-à-vis some significant moved goalposts.

The first thing you ought to notice in the foregoing policy statement is that it is being asserted that the costs in question should be unallowable “because it would be unreasonable to reimburse [them].”

You know what you do when you ass-ert something?  Yeah, that.

Anyway, that assertion is wrong.  First, “reasonableness” is a term of art, defined by the general (or “cornerstone”) cost principle at FAR 31.201-3 (“Determining Reasonableness”).  “Reasonableness” is an allowability evaluation criterion that is applied to costs claimed by a contractor.  It does not apply to the decision-making of the DOD Leadership Team.  (If it did apply, then … wow.  So much language would have to be stricken from the regulations.  But we digress.)  

That clear misuse of the term was our first indication that this policy position was going to be as firm and tenable as Birnham Wood.  (Yeah, it’s a Shakespeare reference.  Go look it up.)  But that’s not the end of the analysis, by any means.  Let us continue:

We don’t know—and neither does the DOD Leadership—whether or not it would be reasonable to permit contractors to include the costs of ineligible dependents in costs they propose, negotiate and, presumably, bill to the Pentagon.  We don’t know the amount of such costs, and how much it would cost to identify and segregate them from other claimed costs.  Is DOD proposing that contractors each spend $10 million in order to save $50,000?  We hope not, because that would be an unreasonable waste of contractor (and taxpayer) funds.  To restate: it may be entirely reasonable to permit contractors to claim such costs—if the costs are immaterial in amount and the expense of identifying them and excluding them would exceed the amounts being claimed.  We don’t know the facts (and neither does Mr. Assad), and so it’s clearly premature to assert that reimbursing the costs is (or would be) unreasonable.

Let’s also remember that “reasonableness” has a fairly lengthy FAR definition which can be summed up as the comparison of the nature of the activity and the amount of costs in question to “that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business.”  Since this issue has been, by all reported accounts, a problem across the entire defense industry, we wonder whether it might be found to meet the FAR reasonableness test simply by existing in the first place.  But that’s for the Courts to decide….

We also want to smirk a bit at the assertion in the policy memo that the costs in question are “in violation of the selected cost principle at 31.205-6(m).”  Maybe.  Or maybe not.  The policy memo summarizes the requirements of that piece of the Compensation Cost Principle in its first sentence (without—we note—an   attribution, and before it subsequently misapplies the term “reasonable”).  Putting aside the “reasonableness” focus for a minute (out of the kindness of our hearts), let’s look at the implied assertion that ineligible dependent health care costs are unallowable because they are in violation of the contractor’s established policy.

If that’s the only basis for the cost disallowance, then the fix would be entirely straight-forward.  Each contractor should simply amend its policy to permit formerly ineligible dependents to now be eligible for health care benefits.  There.  Problem solved.  And you’re welcome.

The thing is: that change is already in process.  And the Federal government is mandating it.

What do we mean?  Well, check out the details of President Obama’s health care reform.  You will note that one of the individual reforms is to mandate coverage of young adults on their parent’s health care benefit plans until they are 26 years old.  That’s a fairly decent proportion of the formerly “ineligible” dependents right there.  So the Pentagon’s problem is already shrinking by executive direction (or public law, if you prefer).

But returning to the matter at hand, we are left with the unfortunate conclusion that this entire problem is all about contractors’ policy.  Rewrite the policy and what do the auditors have to base their assertions upon?  Nada.  Zip.  Nothing.

But we are not done yet.  Not by a long shot.

Look at the second paragraph in the policy memo.  We’ll repeat it for your convenience:

To the extent that these costs were bid on fixed price sole source contracts, the costs were an inaccurate representation of the allowable cost.  Contractors are encouraged to voluntarily refund the increase in price they received on their fixed price contracts as a result of including these unallowable costs in their proposals and hence, their negotiated prices.  In some cases the ineligible health care benefit costs may have resulted in defectively priced contracts that were certified in accordance with TINA.

Again, the assertion that the costs of the ineligible dependents “were an inaccurate representation of the allowable [health care] cost” is completely without support and absolutely up for debate.  The policy memo is fairly clear that the health care costs in question are being bid, accounted-for, and billed as part of contractors’ “fringe benefit” indirect cost pools.  If that’s so, then the question of fact that needs to be answered is whether the costs of the ineligible dependents were of sufficient magnitude to change the indirect cost rate being proposed (and accounted-for, and billed).  If the costs were de minimis in amount and did not affect the indirect cost rate, then the costs were not inaccurately represented and the Government suffered no harm.

Further, we need to point out that FAR 31.102 undercuts the memo’s assertions.  It states (in part)—

However, application of cost principles to fixed-price contracts and subcontracts shall not be construed as a requirement to negotiate agreements on individual elements of cost in arriving at agreement on the total price. The final price accepted by the parties reflects agreement only on the total price.

(Emphasis added.)

In other words, even if the fringe benefit costs proposed on Fixed Price contracts were inflated by the inclusion of the costs of ineligible dependents, once the price is negotiated it no longer matters.  The price was fair and reasonable, and that’s sufficient for government contracting purposes.

Given the foregoing, it should be clear that there had better be a compelling business reason that would lead one to think it was appropriate to agree to a “voluntarily refund” of any price increase (assuming one even existed).  We note the thinly veiled threat in the memo that contractors who fail to “voluntarily refund” their allegedly ill-gotten gains may be subject to allegations of defective pricing.  That’s pretty much a crock an error, in our view.  We don’t think that threat should play a factor in the decision-making surrounding this entire brouhaha.

The Truth-in-Negotiation Act (TINA) is a disclosure requirement, not a use requirement.  In order to disclose, somebody has to know.  Logically, the contractor had to know it had ineligible dependents; it had to know the number of ineligible dependents; and it had to know how much health care costs were being increased by the ineligible dependents.  And knowing, it had to fail to disclose.  Given that most contractors didn’t even know about the issue until DCAA decided to make an issue of it, that series of “had to knows” is very unlikely to have happened.  

And we’re not even going to go into the FAR 2.101 definition of “cost or pricing data” (another term of art) that states that such data is that which, “prudent buyers and sellers would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly.”  We’re not going to wonder whether anybody in their right minds would expect the cost of ineligible dependents to “significantly” affect price negotiations.  Because if we did wonder about that, we’d be very skeptical.

So, having hopefully poked a few holes in the policy memo, you might reasonably think we’d be done.  But first we have a few more shots to fire.

The Assad policy memo concludes with the following statement—

The Department will not pursue application of penalties under FAR 42.709 to these ineligible dependent health care benefit costs.  However, it is our intention to amend the DFARS to make future ineligible dependent health care benefit costs expressly unallowable and thus subject to penalties.

We are pleased that the Pentagon policy-makers realized that it was going to be a bumpy road, fraught with peril, to try to assert that the costs were expressly unallowable.  (See our previous comments on that issue in the links above.)  Apparently somebody read the case law and realized it was going to be a loser.

But the fact that Mr. Assad’s organization feels so strongly about this issue that it wants to amend the DFARS to bolster its position is just … puzzling.  It never was that big of a deal and, as the memo itself acknowledges, “contractors, in large measure, have already corrected the problem and they are now not including the costs … in their claimed and estimated indirect rates.” So, problem solved—but apparently that’s just not good enough for the folks at the DOD.  They seemingly feel the burning need to put a stake in the heart of this issue so that it can never rise again.

In our view, this has always been “much ado about nothing” and we are sad that the DOD policy-makers can’t move on to something more important, like contractor defined-benefit pension costs.  Like a dog with a bone, they keep worrying and worrying at it.

Maybe they should just bury this particular bone in the ground for a while.  We’re quite sure there are more meaty issues around to deal with.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.