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What You Need to Know About the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act

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Each year, Bob Antonio publishes a world-class analysis of key public laws that impact government contracting, and this year was no exception. WIFCON’s breakdown of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is a must-read for informed compliance and contracting professionals. The reason that the annual NDAA (and other similar legislation) is so important to read is that the contents include Congress’ direction to the DOD. In other words, the contents of the NDAA (and other legislation) drive new FAR and DFARS Cases, which drive revisions to existing regulatory requirements. So to read the NDAA is to glimpse the DAR Council’s future rule-making.

As we scanned the 50 or so separate sections, these are the ones that struck us as being of most importance to our readership and clientele.

Section 803 extended the ceiling on contractor executive compensation, and applies it to all contractor personnel, not just the top 5 highest paid executives at every segment—“except that the Secretary of Defense may establish one or more narrowly targeted exceptions for scientists and engineers upon a determination that such exceptions are needed to ensure that the Department of Defense has continued access to needed skills and capabilities”.

Section 805 required the Director of DCAA to submit an annual report to Congress (separate from the Semi-Annual DOD IG Report) that contains—

(1) a description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies encountered during the conduct of contractor audits; (2) statistical tables showing--

(A) the total number of audit reports completed and pending;
(B) the priority given to each type of audit;
(C) the length of time taken for each type of audit;
(D) the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of unsupported costs); and
(E) an assessment of the number and types of audits pending for a period longer than allowed pursuant to guidance of the Defense Contract Audit Agency;

(3) a summary of any recommendations of actions or resources needed to improve the audit process; and (4) any other matters the Director considers appropriate.

Section 816 redefined the definition of the term “covered contract” for purposes of complying with the DFARS Business System clauses. The new definition is, “a contract that is subject to the cost accounting standards promulgated pursuant to section 1502 of title 41, United States Code, that could be affected if the data produced by a contractor business system has a significant deficiency.”

Section 818 has been extensively discussed by many industry and technical associations. It required the DOD to assess current processes for detecting and avoiding counterfeit electronic parts, and to enhance them (as well as related acquisition regulations) so as to ensure that weapons systems are free of counterfeit parts. (Longtime readers will recall, perhaps with nostalgia, our many pleas and rants on the topic of secure supply chains.)

Section 853 required an assessment of “the feasibility and advisability of establishing an inventory of rare earth materials….” Again, longtime readers may recall our two articles on the strategic importance of rare earth materials. New readers are advised to use the site’s key word search feature.

Section 862 encouraged contractors to support Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) programs. This may turn out to be an important Section, since DCAA has historically tended to treat such contractor efforts as unallowable contributions.

Section 2801 prohibited the use of “any form of cost-plus contracting” in relation to any military construction project or military family housing project. It will be interesting to see how the term “cost-plus” is used: whether it will be limited to forms of cost-reimbursement contracting, or whether it will be applied to all forms of “flexibly priced” contracts (which would include T&M contract types).

To sum it all up, there are a number of interesting provisions in the FY12 NDAA. Some will affect cost allowability and others will affect contracting with the Federal government. Stay tuned for the FAR and DFARS rule-making, which will be coming our way shortly.

 

Can the F-35 JSF Prevail Over Program Pressures?

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At $323 Billion, it was already the most expensive defense program ever, even before cost growth took the program value to $382 Billion. As costs have risen, the planned production volumes have decreased—from 3,000 to approximately 2,450 (not counting international sales). And the Pentagon just decided to delay 179 of those 2,450 aircraft. Frequent news stories and editorials critical of the program’s cost-growth, schedule delays and performance issues have led a National Defense Industrial Association blog to call it “a symbol of dysfunctional, overpriced Pentagon programs.” And that’s from a bona fide defense industry cheerleader.

When a test flight had to be cut short because of a fuel leak that resulted in an “in-flight emergency,” another erstwhile defense cheerleader, the Defense Industry Daily, opined that perhaps the Air Force’s “lofty rhetoric” should “be taken down a couple of notches”—because (in DID’s words) “Updating [USAF] doctrine to ‘maintain air dominance, 15 minutes at a time’ does not sound very convincing ….”

The Honorable Frank Kendall (Acting Under Secretary for Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) called the Pentagon’s decision to have the F-35 program enter production before flight testing was complete “acquisition malpractice” and said, “it should not have been done.” According to this Defense News story—

Kendall said that the Pentagon had made ‘optimistic’ predictions about the capabilities of design tools, simulations and modeling to build a fighter that would breeze through test flights without problems. ‘Now we’re paying the price for being wrong,’ Kendall said.

Problems are cropping up on all three variants of the F-35 that would typically be expected in any highly ambitious next-generation fighter program, he said. ‘We didn’t model everything as precisely as we thought,’ Kendall said. …

Kendall said there is a tendency to start production too early, adding that the F-35 is an ‘extreme example.’ Barry Watts, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C., agreed with Kendall’s assessment. ‘My understanding is the amount of concurrency on this program is as great as or greater than any past program,’ he said.

Watts, who has been to Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, plant, described long lines of F-35s already being built. ‘Most of those, if they’re going to be operational airplanes eventually, are going to have to go back and have a bunch of changes made to them,’ he said. ‘That drives up cost and delays things.’

It’s not just operational issues that plague the program. The Defense Department has implemented “payment withholds” on the Lockheed Martin Fort Worth F-35 Prime Contractor facility. (And that’s after not paying out $614 Million in budgeted award fees for the development phase of the program.) Since the facility’s Earned Value Management System was “decertified” two years ago, the DOD felt it could no longer rely on Lockheed Martin to provide accurate cost and schedule performance information, and thus started decrementing program payments by two percent until LockMart’s EVM System can pass an audit.

If the foregoing wasn’t enough to cause migraines, POGO has reported a “slew of problems” with the aircraft, and ex-POGO Investigator Nick Schwellenbach has reported (on his new blog at Time.com) that the DOD Inspector General is performing a review of the program’s quality management system. Schwellenbach’s blog quotes the DOD IG as saying that, “the assessment will focus on conformity to specified quality management system(s), contractual quality clauses, and internal quality processes and procedures.”

Over at Federal Times, author Lawrence Korb (of the Center for American Progress) asked who will be held accountable for “F-35 program mismanagement”? Korb wrote—

In any profession when there is malpractice, the person or persons who commit the offense are held accountable. They lose their jobs or their licenses, or resign from sheer embarrassment.

But this is apparently not the case in the military-industrial complex when it comes to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the most expensive program in the history of the Pentagon, whose unit costs have risen from $69 million to $159 million and whose initial operational capability has been set back at least five years. …

Lockheed's most recent contract for building 32 F-35 jets overran its target cost of $3.46 billion by $245 million, or 7 percent.

As a result of the continuing problems with the F-35, Leon Panetta, Gates' replacement as Defense secretary, along with Carter and Kendall, have made a ‘management decision’ to slow production of the F-35 over the next two years. Nonetheless, Lockheed will receive $9.2 billion in the fiscal 2013 budget to build 29 planes, more than $300 million per aircraft. If anything, this will increase the cost, drive up profits for Lockheed, and keep Carter and Kendall managing this program and all the other weapons programs.

So much for paying the price for malpractice.

Taking a less incendiary approach to the question, the writers at Aviation Week & Space Technology recently addressed the topic of “Why Major Acquisition Programs Fail”. The authors wrote—

Kendall—a veteran of procurement politics and management—remarked than none of the problems he had seen during the Reagan administration have been solved, and he joked that acquisition has two main problems: ‘planning and execution.’ …

The Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation, Michael Gilmore, made … clear at a conference last year {the point that Pentagon planners know about program problems well ahead of time]: ‘Most of the time, when unrealistic requirements are promulgated, there are numerous people who know that they are unrealistic, so it’s not a case of their being not fully understood.’ The problem, Gilmore continued, is that there are ‘incentives to promise to deliver revolutionary capabilities quickly at low cost.’ …

… most military procurement systems reward companies that underestimate the cost of new programs. The first reward is winning the program, and the second is higher revenue as a result of overruns under development contracts that are cost-plus. (Development costs do overrun in the non-defense world—the Boeing 777 and 787 and Airbus A380 being good examples—but they are still small relative to the companies’ production revenue, so that even the 787 debacle has not threatened Boeing’s survival or independence.)

Higher acquisition costs also drive company growth, as do higher-than-predicted operating costs, particularly this century as more maintenance work was outsourced to contractors. The failure of the Global Hawk Block 30, whose operating costs were higher than the aging, manned U-2, is the exception rather than the rule: Most operators accept the overruns and reduce capability in other areas. …

Military planners—and it is overwhelmingly military planners—want to obtain a capability they cannot afford, or which is at the risky end of the spectrum. To avoid scaring those assessing or paying the bills, they either under-estimate how much it will cost, or they fudge the risk of the project, or both.

If a program is ‘on budget,’ it is more difficult to cancel. If the paperwork looks good, then officials have to look elsewhere to find more funding to actually get the program up to the implied status. In turn, other projects are salami-sliced as billpayers, which then starts to imperil those programs. Alternatively, the original, badly estimated, badly specified program is stretched out yet further, a move that always costs more in the longer term.

Getting back to the F-35 program, the Defense Acquisitions Board (DAB) recently “recertified” the program after a Nunn-McCurdy Breach, but continuing cost growth and budget problems (especially related to a new cost estimate of $1 Trillion for program sustainment costs) “might force the Pentagon to slow production down further or trim flight hours for aircrew”—according to this article at Defense News. The article reported—

Because of the way sustainment costs are calculated, affordability is still a problem, and that might mean that the number of aircraft bought in the near term might be further truncated or that flight training hours are curtailed, [a senior defense official] said. The numbers are expected to fluctuate during the next five years.

Additionally, costs associated with military construction still have to be sorted out.

Eight nations other than the USA have contributed funding to the program. The initial program budgeting assumed sales of 3,100 aircraft to international partners. The eight partners included Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Turkey, Denmark, Holland, Norway, and Italy. In addition, both Japan and Israel have committed to the program.  

This recent Reuters story reports that “Britain has deferred to 2015 a firm commitment on how many Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets it will buy, adding to uncertainties over the multinational program.”

This recent article reports—

Defense Minister Giampaolo Di Paola said Italy would cut investment in the radar-evading new fighter, although he said the plane was ‘still an important commitment’ for the country's defense system. He gave no details, but Italian media reports forecast Italy would cut 40 warplanes from the 131 originally planned.

That same article added—

Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay repeatedly dodged a question on Tuesday on whether the government was rethinking its planned F-35 purchases, saying only that Canada was committed to buying aircraft that would aid its troops. … Turkey has halved its initial order for four planes, part of a larger order that it has not yet reduced, and Australia is thinking about changing the pace of 12 initial orders.

The issue yet to be faced is what happens if unit costs increase to the point that the aircraft become unaffordable—either for budgetary or for political reasons—by the international partners who have made commitments to acquire a certain number of aircraft? We alluded to this problem in a previous F-35 article, where we wondered whether LockMart might “find itself the builder of a white elephant fighter whose lack of economies of scale make the plane unaffordable for its international partners.”

So to sum it all up, these are clearly tough times for the Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program. Navy Seals have a saying: “It pays to be a winner.” The Lockheed Martin program management team and its executives are learning what happens to the guy that finishes near the end of the pack. It’s not that the guy is a loser—not at all. After all, he finished and didn’t quit. It’s just that the guy isn’t a winner. Winners get to rest and recuperate, while non-winners have to work harder.

The F-35 program team needs to work a lot harder in order to make the cut.

 

Business Systems Rule Continues to Shock and Awe

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The final DFARS business system rule (henceforth: “BizSys Rule”) hadn’t been out for 24 hours before Apogee Consulting, Inc. began to hear from our small (yet clearly fanatical) group of readers asking for our take on the matter. Or—as could be fairly said—we were being asked for yet another of one our opinions on the final set of regulatory requirements. The last OpEd piece was right here.

The final BizSys Rule’s language didn’t have much in the way of substantive changes from the interim rule, which was issued May 18, 2011. We found the DAR Council’s promulgating comments to be of more interest. Here are some quotes we’d like to share with our readers—

Comment: A number of respondents stated that DCAA and DCMA are not properly staffed to address the new DFARS rule. Further, with regard to EVMS, the rule provides extensive authority to contracting officers and DCAA and DCMA auditors in evaluating implementation of the ANSI/EIA 748 standard, which was intentionally designed to be flexible. According to the respondents, the magnitude of programs and contractors requiring EVMS surveillance and assessment inherently results in less experienced personnel in positions with this authority. The respondents suggested that Government resources are not adequate in numbers or depth of skills to provide the required oversight.

Response: This rule does not add additional oversight responsibilities to DCAA and DCMA, but instead mitigates the Government's risk when contractors fail to maintain business systems, as is required by the terms and conditions of their contracts. Contracting personnel will continue to make appropriate determinations in accordance with this rule. DoD has been taking measures to align resources and ensure work is complementary. The increased cooperation and coordination between DCAA and DCMA will enable DoD to employ audit resources where they are needed.

Comment: A respondent expressed concern that DCAA has not updated its guidance to reflect the definition of significant deficiency. According to the respondent, DCAA has not issued audit guidance to align its definition of significant deficiency to that in the NDAA and interim rule. DCAA's latest guidance in its MRD 08-PAS-011(R) dated March 2, 2008, starts out defining a significant deficiency as a ``potential unallowable cost that is not clearly immaterial.'' However, in MRD 08-PAS-043(R) dated December 19, 2008, DCAA clarified its guidance that ``DCAA only performs audits of contractor systems that are material to Government contract costs'' and that a contractor's ``failure to accomplish any applicable control objective should be reported as a significant deficiency/material weakness.'' The respondent stated that DCAA's clarification changes the criteria from a ``potential unallowable cost that is not clearly immaterial'' to if any deficiency is found during an audit, it is reported and the system is rated as inadequate. The respondent expressed concern that DCAA's guidance is constantly changing with no oversight body to regulate its audit policies.

Response: DCAA is in the process of updating its guidance and will report significant deficiencies in accordance with the definition of significant deficiency in this rule, as set forth in section 893 of the NDAA for FY 2011. Additionally, contracting officers will administer this rule according to the requirements in section 893 of the NDAA for FY 2011, as implemented in this rule.

Comment: With respect to the language relating to the finding of a significant deficiency by the contracting officer, the interim rule states: ``The initial determination by the Government will describe the deficiency in sufficient detail to allow the contractor to understand the deficiency.'' A respondent suggested that this language be expanded to include a specific explanation as to how the deficiency identified was determined to be a significant deficiency and further, why information produced by the business system under review is considered not to be reliable in accordance with the requirements of the enabling legislation, the NDAA for FY 2011, which defines a significant deficiency as ``A shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of DoD to rely upon information produced.''

Response: ``Significant deficiency'' means a shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the Department of Defense to rely upon information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes. The contracting officer's significant deficiency determination will describe the significant deficiency in sufficient detail to allow the contractor to understand the deficiency. This rule incorporates criteria for each business system, which define the aspects of the system that materially affect the ability of DoD to rely on information produced. Determinations of significant deficiencies will be based on the contractor's failure to comply with the business system criteria.

Comment: A respondent expressed serious reservations as to the need for the rule, and identified potential harms to contractors if the rule is administered in an inconsistent or arbitrary fashion. According to the respondent, because the determination of a system deficiency is dependent upon the subjective interpretation of critical system criteria, application of the rule could well lead to inconsistent treatment by individual contracting officers and their DCAA advisers.

Response: This rule incorporates criteria for each business system, which define the aspects of the system that materially affect the ability of DoD to rely on information produced. Determinations of significant deficiencies will be based on the contractor's failure to comply with the business system criteria. Each significant deficiency must be determined on its own set of facts and ultimately decided by the contracting officer.

Comment: A respondent stated that the term ``material'' requires better amplification in the final rule to reduce variability in interpretation. The respondent suggested that the final rule should specify that when determining materiality, a contracting officer or auditor should rely on established Government standards such as CAS and Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board statements.

Response: The rule requires that an acceptable business system comply with the system criteria set forth under each of the six business system clauses. The criteria for each business system defines the aspects of the system that materially affect the ability of DoD to rely on information produced. Determinations of significant deficiencies will be based on the contractor's failure to comply with the business system criteria. For example, the system criteria under the clause at DFARS 252.242-7006, Accounting System Administration, requires that the contractor's accounting system ``shall provide for *** Accounting practices in accordance with standards promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards Board, if applicable, otherwise, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.'' Each significant deficiency must be determined on its own set of facts regarding compliance with the system criteria.

Comment: A respondent suggested standardization of two contractor requirements across all business systems to (1) monitor and periodically review the business system to ensure compliance with established policies and procedures and (2) upon request, present results of those internal reviews to the administrative contracting officer (along the lines of DFARS 252.242-7004(c)(2) and (d)(10)). Currently, both requirements are included in the interim rule, but not for all business systems.

Response: While the system criteria language is not standardized across all business systems clauses, each business system clause contains system-specific requirements for contractor monitoring and disclosure. For example, under the property system criteria, the contractor is required to ``establish and maintain procedures necessary to assess its property management system effectiveness, and shall perform periodic internal reviews and audits. Significant findings and/or results of such reviews and audits pertaining to Government property shall be made available to the Property Administrator.'' Furthermore, the contractor ``shall periodically perform, record, and disclose physical inventory results.''

Let’s be clear here: we are sharing with you only a small snippet of the promulgating comments. There are 51 comment categories in the final rule, with multiple comments appearing in each category. The above quotes are the ones we think need some management focus; but, of course, you should read them all.

In a previous blog article, we shared the travails of Huntington Ingalls Industries, who became the first contractor reported to have payment withholds imposed under the new BizSys Rule. Reports have recently emerged about the second contractor to see payment withholds—Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth-based Aeronautics Division—prime contractor for the F-35 Lightning II JSF program.  The news was first reported by Bloomberg here.

The payment withholds were imposed because of significant deficiencies in the operating unit’s Earned Value Management System (EVMS). According to the article, “the withholding will start in March with billings made under a new production contract of about $4 billion for as many as 30 F-35 fighters.” Because LockMart had submitted a Corrective Action Plan, the payment withholds will be set at two percent instead of five percent.

Fort Worth’s EVMS has been “decertified” since 2010, when the DCMA identified noncompliances with “about half” of the 32 system criteria and also found a failure to make progress on corrective actions, according to this October 2010 story at AW&ST. Our “friends” at POGO obtained, and publicly posted, the 2010 DCMA report here. But it was not until LockMart was awarded the latest F-35 production contract, which contained the complete set of May 2011 BizSys Rule clauses that the payment withholds could be implemented.

Huntington Ingalls. Lockheed Martin. We wonder who will be next in the DOD payment withhold sweepstakes?

 

New Law Imposes Taxes Then Makes Them Unallowable

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Excise_Tax
We quote from the February 22, 2012 Federal Register notice of a proposed FAR revision to implement FAR Case 2011-011—

The James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111–347) was signed into law and effective on January 2, 2011. Section 301 of the law amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by adding a new Section 5000C, Imposition of tax on certain foreign procurements (26 U.S.C. 5000C). This new section imposes on any foreign person that receives a specified Federal procurement payment a tax equal to 2 percent of the amount of such specified Federal procurement payment. Additionally, the law stipulates that no funds are to be disbursed to any foreign contractor in order to reimburse the tax imposed.

According to the proposed rule, the 2 percent tax on payments to foreign “persons” will not only be unallowable, it also cannot be proposed in estimates for fixed-price proposals (even if the FAR Cost Principles do not apply to the procurement). The proposed rule specifies that “the costs for the 2 percent tax [cannot be] included in foreign fixed-price contracts and foreign fixed-price contracts with foreign governments.”

The foregoing summary is perhaps superficial, and likely omits nuances and complexities that matter to compliance professionals. So with your kind permission, we’ll take some time and dig into this a little bit.

Importantly, the excise tax does not apply to every contract with a foreign entity. Instead, it is imposed on contracts for (a) goods that are manufactured by foreign entities outside the United States, or (b) services performed by foreign entities outside the United States, when the country in which the goods are produced (or services provided) is not “party to an international procurement agreement” with the United States.

Unfortunately for us all, the statute fails to define what is meant by the term “international procurement agreement,” so we are left in the wilderness of ignorance, searching for direction. Fortunately for us all, the “Big 4” accounting and professional services firm, Deloitte, thinks it has some good direction to give us, which you can find right here. The folks at Deloitte assert—

Although a payment can be received tax free if a relevant ‘international procurement agreement with the United States’ applies, the Act does not provide any definition of that term. We understand, however, that it was intended to include the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), as well as free trade agreements (FTAs) between the U.S. and other countries that contain government procurement-related obligations.
  • The GPA is a ‘plurilateral agreement’ of the WTO in which a signatory country agrees not to discriminate against suppliers of goods and services in other signatory countries in the area of government procurement. As a plurilateral agreement, some, but not all, of the WTO members have agreed to be bound by its provisions. To date, 40 WTO members have signed the GPA, including Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, the 27 EU Member States and the U.S. However, many major trading partners of the U.S. have not signed the GPA, including China, Brazil, India and countries in the Middle East (although a number of these countries are currently negotiating accession).

  • FTAs that contain government procurement obligations include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and bilateral FTAs between the U.S. and Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Peru and Singapore.
The folks on the FAR Councils were smart enough not to try to define terms that weren’t otherwise defined for them, even if that meant that we compliance practitioners would be left in the wilderness of ignorance. As a result, they have proposed to revise the Cost Principle at 31.205-41 (“Taxes”) to state that “any tax imposed under 26 U.S.C. 5000C” will be unallowable. Similarly, several solicitation provisions and contract clauses were proposed to be revised by making reference that same section of the Internal Revenue Code. (See, e.g., 55.229-3, -4, -6, and -7.)

Consequently, in order to determine whether or not an excise tax should be imposed, and whether or not estimated project margins should be reduced by the value of that 2 percent excise tax, you first need to know (a) the country involved, and (b) whether that country has signed a Trade Agreement with the U.S.A. These decision points will need to be addressed at the time the proposal is being prepared—or, even better, at the time of the bid/no bid decision.

Remembering that this is a proposed rule—and not a final rule—readers may want to offer comments to the FAR Councils regarding FAR Case 2011-011.

Were we to offer our comments, we might focus on addressing the inequities involved in mandating a tax and then making it unallowable—especially when the tax appears to be applied somewhat inequitably only on foreign concerns of certain countries. The obvious result of the imposition of the excise tax would be to hurt the ability of foreign contractors to compete with U.S.-based contractors. But the other, perhaps unintended, result would be to make it harder for U.S. contractors to sell their goods and services in the international marketplace.

“How so?” you well may ask. Let us explain our thinking.

In 2010, the United States of America exported about $170 Billion worth of military goods and services to other nations (according to this article). As U.S. defense budgets decline, U.S. aerospace and defense companies (such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon—to name just a few of the biggies) must rely more and more on their international sales in order to maintain top-line revenue, their stock prices, and their workforces. It is axiomatic that international sales are key to maintaining, or growing, existing market share.

Frequently, in order to close an international deal, companies must agree to a certain amount (or percentage) of “offset” work. As the Wikipedia article we linked-to explains—

As an example of a defense offset proposal we could describe a hypothetical case of Nation P (Purchaser) buying 300 tanks from defense company S (Seller, of Nation S). The total sale contract is $400 and Nation P (Purchaser) requests 120 % of offset. Defense Company S (Seller) is obliged to fulfill an offset equal to 120% of the sales contract, that is 480 M USD. Nation P agrees on a list of specific offset deals and programs to fulfill the agreed total obligation with Company S (Seller). The offset agreement includes both direct and indirect offsets.

The point is, in the foregoing example, Company S is obligated to provide (among other things) a certain amount of subcontracted work to companies located within Nation P. Under the proposed FAR rule (and pursuant to the requirements of the Public Law), unless Nation P is a signatory to a Trade Agreement with the U.S.A., its offset work will be subject to the 2 percent excise tax, which will come out of the profit of the foreign entities, since it neither can be priced-in to bids nor claimed as a reimbursable expense.

That’s going to make executing offset agreements harder, which is going to make exporting defense goods and services harder. A slow-down in exports is going to put additional pressure on the future revenue of U.S.-based A&D companies, which is going to lead to further cost-cutting measures such as workforce reductions.

So that’s our thinking. As you might guess, we are not big fans of this proposed rule, or of the statutory provision that mandated it.

We could mention that including this particular provision in a statute designed to compensate 9/11 First Responders might create the perception that it is a thinly veiled attempt at retaliation aimed at certain countries. We’ll give the drafters the benefit of the doubt on that one. But it might also reasonably be viewed as one more attempt to protect the U.S.-based A&D industry from international competition. If so, wouldn’t it be ironic that the same provision designed to protect U.S.-based contractors might end up hurting them in the long-run?

The foregoing situation is sometimes called creating “unintended consequences.”

So that’s what we would say, if we were submitting comments on this proposed rule. The thing is, since the rule-making is mandated by Public Law, we don’t believe that the Councils have much latitude in the changes they can make. The time to have commented was when the Bill was being considered by Congress. Now it’s pretty much a done-deal.

 

Revenge of the Dragon Lady: Another USAF Procurement Puzzler

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You remember Darlene Druyun, don’t you?

Ms. Druyun—called by her subordinates “the Dragon Lady” because of the way she ran her fiefdom in the US Air Force’s acquisition realm—was sentenced to nine months in prison and fined $5,000 for her corrupt role in fixing contract awards to The Boeing Company. Boeing’s CFO was fired and its CEO resigned for their roles in the scandal. Boeing ultimately settled with the U.S. Department of Justice for $615 million. Almost two years ago, Aviation Week & Space Technology ran a piece on the sixth anniversary of her guilty plea.

And today, we are reminded once again of the Dragon Lady as we ponder the USAF procurement puzzler that is the recent award of the Light Air Support (LAS) contract. We first wrote about the issues associated with the LAS contract award right here. In that article we had some strong words about the “fiasco,” and pointed the finger at both Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC) and the Air Force. We wrote—

The Air Force could have resolved this with some open communication as to why HBDC was excluded from the competitive range. … Remember, the Commander-in-Chief has promised taxpayers more transparency, and his folks clearly are not living up to his pledge.

HBDC still has to explain (to its Board of Directors and shareholders (if to nobody else) why a critically important piece of correspondence lay unopened for two weeks, letting regulatory deadlines lapse in the meantime.  (We would not want to be in that contracts manager’s seat right now….)

Not to mention, of course, why its proposal for such a ‘must-win’ competition was so flawed that the Air Force threw it out as being (essentially) uncorrectable. Did HBDC have the right skill sets? Did they put the company’s varsity team on the proposal? What went wrong?

It is incorrect to posture this story in terms of ‘USA versus Brazil’. That’s not what this is about. What it is about, quite clearly, is having the Air Force act like stewards of taxpayer funds, and explain their decision-making. The Air Force is hunkered-down and lawyered-up, and acting like this is an adversarial relationship. Instead, they need to come clean and make this all go away.

HBDC needs to understand why it screwed-up, so we can get the warfighters the light air support (and reconnaissance) necessary to minimize the loss of life in the war zone.

Soon after we wrote the above, HBDC President Jim Maslowski abruptly announced his retirement. We told our readers, “The HBDC Board of Directors apparently held Admiral Maslowski responsible for the fiasco we described in our article. His departure was abrupt and unplanned-for, as the company has appointed an interim President while they search for a suitable successor.”

What’s new?

Well, on February 29, 2012, the Air Force announced that it was terminating Sierra Nevada Corporation’s LAS award (for “convenience” we assume). And not only was it terminating SNC’s contract, but it was also going to “launch an investigation into the original [source selection] decision.” That didn’t sound very good. The official USAF announcement (as published in the AOL Defense article linked to above) read—

Today, the Air Force advised the Department of Justice that it will take corrective action on the Afghanistan Light Air Support contract and will set aside the contract award to Sierra Nevada effective March 2, 2012. Michael B. Donley, the Secretary of the Air Force, said, ‘While we pursue perfection, we sometimes fall short, and when we do we will take corrective action. Since the acquisition is still in litigation, I can only say that the Air Force Senior Acquisition Executive, David Van Buren, is not satisfied with the quality of the documentation supporting the award decision.’ Additionally, General Donald Hoffman, commander of Air Force Materiel Command, has initiated a Commander Directed Investigation into the matter.

Yeah.  No, that really didn’t sound good.  At all.

Anytime you’ve got the Secretary of the Air Force commenting on the deficiencies of a contract award, you can be fairly sure there are going to be career-limiting consequences for some body, or bodies.

In a follow-up story at DefenseNews, Air Force General Norton Schwartz called the LAS contract award situation “an embarrassment” and “a profound disappointment.” The story reported—

The move comes as a damaging setback for the Air Force, which has tried to reform its weapons-buying practices after a drawn-out competition for a new aerial refueling tanker that was plagued by scandal and controversy. … The four-star general warned of drastic disciplinary action if the investigation reveals the contract was derailed by wrongdoing.

‘I can assure that if it wasn’t an innocent mistake, there will be hell to pay,’ he said.

He said the ‘stakes are high’ and that the Air Force would work hard to remedy the problem. ‘We will work our asses off,’ he said.

The reference in the DefenseNews story, of course, is to the KC-X aerial tanker competition, which has been the subject of several blog articles on this site. During that completion, the Air Force promised to put its best and brightest acquisition professionals on the procurement, so as to forestall problems such as bid protests. Despite the assurances, the KC-X competition stands out as a poster child for what not to do.

Let us all hope that there is a new generation of Air Force acquisition “best and brightest” who can quickly get to the bottom of this fiasco and correct the situation. Apparently, the old guard ain’t cutting it.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.