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Government Loses Yet Another Statute of Limitations Case

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insanity-einstein_22
In December, 2009, we reported to our readers that McDonnell Douglas (Boeing) had won a victory in a defective pricing dispute, because the government failed to assert its claim within the Contract Dispute Act’s six-year statute of limitations. In that ASBCA case, it took DCAA more than 3 years to complete its post-award audit of McDonnell Douglas’ subcontractor and to issue its draft report to DCMA. It took another fourteen months for DCMA to send a letter to Boeing, “seeking comments” on the matter in order to finalize the audit report. (The final audit report was issued about a month later—nearly 52 months after DCAA commenced its audit.

It took another six years for the cognizant DCMA Contracting Officer to issue a final decision.

The ASBCA was quick to find for Boeing. The Judge wrote—

Because the government’s defective pricing claim upon which the COs’ decisions were based is time-barred and not cognizable under the CDA, the COs’ decisions asserting the claim were not valid. If there is no valid CDA claim, any purported CO’s decision on the matter is a nullity and we do not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the purported decision.

In January, 2012, we reported to our readers that Boeing had won another victory at the ASBCA. In that dispute, which concerned a disclosed change in cost accounting practice, Boeing submitted a revised Disclosure Statement in October 2000. DCAA issued an audit report concerned the cost impact associated with the change in June 2002. In September, 2003, the cognizant ACO began negotiations with Boeing. Between December 2003 and April 2005, the parties attempted to resolve the dispute through negotiation. The parties continued to discuss the matter “intermittently” until 2010. Ultimately, negotiations proved unsuccessful and, in October, 2010, the ACO issued a Final Decision—and Boeing appealed that Final Decision to the ASBCA.

The Judge wrote—

Because the government's 25 October 2010 final decision claiming the accounting revision costs was untimely, it is not valid. Given that it is invalid, it is a nullity and we lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from it. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The maxim, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting different results,” is generally attributed to Albert Einstein. A more reasonable litigant (or perhaps one who was spending his own money instead of the taxpayer’s money) might give up on the issue and stop litigating disputes that were over six years old. But not the U.S. Government. No, indeed. Instead, they keep litigating the same CDA statute of limitations issue over and over again, expecting different results.

In the latest defeat for the Government, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims threw out the case against Raytheon Company. The matter concerned an Advance Agreement between Raytheon and the Department of Defense, covering some retirement obligations the company had inherited in its acquisition of certain parts of Hughes Aircraft Company. The Advance Agreement was executed in 1999, and included a provision that made the allowability of retirement costs subject to DCAA audit. Raytheon claimed $106 million pursuant to that agreement, but in 2003 DCAA asserted that $4.75 million of that amount was unallowable. Raytheon shrugged and credited the Government for the allegedly unallowable amount. And that’s where the parties stood until 2007.

In 2007, the DOD Inspector General issued a report that criticized the 2003 DCAA audit. In response, DCAA issued a “supplemental report” in August 2008—asserting in that second report that $25 million of Raytheon’s costs were unallowable. In December 2008, the cognizant DCMA Contracting Officer issued a Final Decision. Raytheon filed suit.

Raytheon sued for a “declaratory judgment” that the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision was “void and of no effect.” The COFC decision was quite short, as these things go. It was eight pages long. Although the Court discussed a number of Government theories, they were not persuasive. The Judges wrote—

Defendant had been aware of all the information on which it based the $25 million government claim for nine years before the contracting officer issued his decision in 2008. The decision conflicted dramatically with results of the first audit, issued in 2004, which used information identical to that employed by the second set of auditors in 2007. The only event occurring after defendant signed the Advance Agreement in 1999, and before the 2008 contracting officer’s final decision, was the Inspector General’s report criticizing DCAA’s $5 million first audit.

The $25 million government claim in this proceeding is barred by the Contract Disputes Act’s six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment declaring that the contracting officer issued his final decision beyond the statute of limitations of the Contract Disputes Act is GRANTED. All other pending motions are moot and therefore DENIED.

Boeing has won twice at the ASBCA; now Raytheon has won at the Court of Federal Claims. When will the Government get the message that the CDA’s statute of limitations will be strictly enforced by the Courts?

Or, perhaps, they will keep litigating the same issue over and over, expecting different results.

 

 

Lockheed Martin Agrees to $15.8 Million FCA Settlement

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On March 23, 2012, Lockheed Martin agreed to pay $15.8 million to settle allegations that the company mischarged the U.S. government for “perishable tools” used on major aircraft programs, including the F-22 and the F-35. What caught our eye was not necessarily the size of the settlement (it’s rather small as such things go) but, instead, it was the fact that it was LockMart’s subcontractor (Tools & Metals, Inc., or TMI), that did the actual mischarging. LockMart just added burden and fee to the subcontractor’s costs, and invoiced the government. Normally, it’s rather difficult to establish liability under the civil False Claims Act (FCA) for (presumably unknowingly) passing on improper costs to the government.

As many readers are likely aware, the civil False Claims Act was amended in 1986 to establish defendant liability for “deliberate ignorance” and for “reckless disregard” of the truth. So to prove that LockMart was liable, the government needed to show that it acted in deliberate ignorance or with reckless disregard for the accuracy of TMI’s invoices. That is not as difficult as showing scienter (i.e., knowing intent), but it’s not especially easy to do either.

Readers also need to understand that the government typically holds the Prime accountable for the actions of its subcontractors. Accordingly, if the subcontractor commits “defective pricing” then the government’s remedy is to assess the pricing impact at the Prime level, and leave it up to the Prime to recover the price adjustment through legal action against the subcontractor. That’s called “privity of contract” and it basically means that the contract is between the Prime and the government, so the government has no means of reaching the subcontractor.

Now, privity of contract is not always in play. For example, many times the cost impact(s) of CAS noncompliances will be assessed against the subcontractor and not the Prime—particularly if the subcontractor is a large company. (We note legal precedents that say this should not be the case, but in our experience it is the case, regardless of legal opinions to the contrary.)

In this particular instance, it seems that the government went after the subcontractor (TMI) first, then came after the Prime (Lockheed Martin) separately. (We caution readers that our interpretation of the situation may be wrong; we have no inside information and have only the tidbits in published news stories to guide us in our analysis. So caveat emptor.)

The news story (link in first sentence, above) reported—

In March 2006, Todd B. Loftis, a former TMI president, was sentenced in federal court in Fort Worth, Texas, to 87 months in prison and ordered to pay $20 million in restitution after his December 2005 guilty plea in connection with his role in the scheme.

Loftis had waived an indictment and pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging conspiracy to defraud the government with false and fraudulent claims. He admitted that from 1998 through 2004, as president and chief operating officer at TMI, he, along with others, conspired to defraud the Defense Department and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics by obtaining payments from both through false and fraudulent billings. …

In order to cover up this activity, the government said, Loftis and others under his direction created false invoices using a computer scanner to remove actual pricing data and substitute fictitious data to give the appearance of legitimate pricing. Loftis was able to control the audit sample of invoices as well so as to limit the possibility that a fraudulently priced part would be found. After the audits, Loftis ordered the fraudulently created documents and computer files to be destroyed.

TMI and Loftis realized approximately $20 million in profits on these fraudulent sales to the government, prosecutors said.

The foregoing provides details regarding how TMI perpetrated its fraud, but it doesn’t address LockMart’s culpability. Where was the deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard?

The first thing we noticed in the story was the following sentences—

In 1998, TMI … obtained a sole-source integrated supply contract with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics to supply all of Lockheed’s perishable tools for the manufacture of airplanes including the Defense Department’s F-16, F-22 and other military needs in Fort Worth, San Diego and Marietta, Ga. Perishable tools are the drill bits, router bits and other small tools that are used in the manufacturing process.

We wonder why TMI was able to win the subcontract award. Now, perhaps TMI had some kind of proprietary technology that made its “drill bits, router bits and other small tools” the only ones that met LockMart’s requirements. That kind of technology certainly would justify a sole-source subcontract award. But we are skeptical that would have been the case. In fact, we bet that more than one company in the USA offered such perishable tools, and would have been willing to submit bids on the subcontract, had LockMart opened up the opportunity to competition.

The story reported that the government was “accusing the firm of contributing to the inflated amounts paid by the government by failing to adequately oversee TMI’s charging practices and by mishandling information revealing these practices.” Thus, according to the story, it was not so much a matter of inappropriately awarding the subcontract, as it was a matter of failing to ensure that TMI was submitting accurate invoices. We have reported on DCAA’s concerns with similar matters before. In that article, we quoted DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald as follows—

During our review of prime contractor billings and incurred cost audits, DCAA has identified situations where the prime contractor has not awarded its fixed-price subcontracts based on fair and reasonable prices leading to unreasonable or unallowable costs being paid by the Government. … in those cases where the subcontract is sole source, it is often difficult to obtain cost data to ascertain the reasonable costs without access to the subcontractor’s books and records. DCAA access to subcontractor books and records is generally limited and dependent on the flow down by prime contractor to the subcontractor of the appropriate FAR clauses, and in instances of fixed price subcontracts, virtually nonexistent. … Since DCAA does not have access to the subcontractor’s books and records, we were unable to determine through other processes the reasonableness of the prices being paid to the subcontractor and subsequently passed on to the Government for reimbursement. … The FAR audit access clause does not provide for Government access to the subcontractor’s costs records when the subcontract is firm-fixed-price.

Because DCAA was not able to verify the “reasonableness” of the subcontractors’ prices, they questioned the entire amount paid to the subcontractor as being “unreasonable.”

Now, we are not saying that LockMart’s situation with TMI is the same as the one that Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the Commission on Wartime Contracting back in July 2010, but we don’t think it’s too dissimilar either. In both cases, the Prime contractor was held responsible for proving adequate oversight of its subcontractors. That oversight responsibility was considered to encompass more than just technical performance; it was also considered to encompass monitoring the accuracy and appropriateness of the original negotiated prices as well as the accuracy and appropriateness of invoices.

Lockheed Martin settled and it’s unclear why the company chose to do so. Clearly, there’s more to the story than was reported in the media.

The lesson here, if one can be taken from such scanty information, is that Primes need to focus on subcontractor management. (Long-time readers may recall that this is a familiar theme on this blog.) More importantly, Primes need to perform sufficient due diligence to ensure the appropriateness of the initial subcontract award pricing, and to perform some limited audits/reviews of subcontractor invoices. In this particular case, we would start with trying to gain an understanding as to why a sole-source subcontract award was thought to be justified and how pricing reasonableness was established.

 

 

DOD Reveals How Nonmajor Contractors Are Being Impacted by CAS 412/413 PPA Harmonization

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The “day of reckoning” that we predicted nearly two years ago has arrived.

The Honorable Shay Assad, DOD Director of Pricing, issued a memo on March 27, 2012 providing guidance to DCMA Contracting Officers on how to handle the recently enacted changes to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 412 and 413.

And Mr. Assad’s memo confirms what several industry insiders had long suspected: there is a class of government contractors who will miss out on the equitable adjustments to which they would otherwise be entitled if there were any real equity to be found in CAS administration. They will have to comply with the revised CAS requirements, but they will not be able to claim contract price adjustments for any increased costs associated with the revisions.

Let’s first define the class of contractors who are affected by the CAS 412/413 revisions. The affected contractors have defined-benefit pension plans. And they are required to comply with CAS 412 and 413 because they are either (a) fully CAS-covered or (b) subject to the FAR Cost Principles (namely the Compensation Cost Principle found at FAR 31.205-6(j). Let’s be clear: the majority of government contractors do not have defined-benefit pension plans; instead, they have defined-contribution pension plans. But enough do have such plans that the CAS revisions, intended to “harmonize” the CAS with the requirements of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, will create a fairly large ripple in the contract costs paid by DOD. Those contractors will be entitled (pursuant to the CAS administration regulations) to submit a “Request for Equitable Adjustment” (REA) that will make them whole from the cost impacts on their existing contracts from implementing the new pension cost accounting rules.

Now let’s define the class of contractors who will be screwed over by the CAS revisions. These contractors have defined-benefit pension plans but they are not subject to full CAS coverage. Instead, these contractors are required to comply with CAS 412 and 413 solely because they are performing on contracts that contain the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause (FAR 52.216-7), and the allowability of their pension costs is conditioned on complying with the requirements of CAS 412/413, because the FAR Cost Principle at 31.205-6(j) requires that they do so. The Assad memo confirms that these contractors will not be entitled to submit REAs to be made whole from the cost impacts on their existing contracts from implementing the new pension plan cost accounting rules.

Don’t believe us? Here’s the memo in question.

The memo states that, effective February 27, 2012, the Cost Principle at 31.205-6(j) “will be construed to reference the new CAS 412 and 413,” but “a cost-type contract awarded before February 27, 2012 that is not fully CAS-covered, will not have the calculation of the costs changed for the life of the contract…” (Emphasis in original.) The rationale for this approach is that “the Cost and Payment Clause specifies the FAR/DFARS cost principles in effect on the date of contract award as the standard for allowability.” (Emphasis in original.)

Now, in fairness we have to acknowledge that the number of contractors who will be (a) impacted by the CAS 412/413 revisions and (b) are not subject to full CAS-coverage is not that large. In fact, we have no ability to estimate whether there are scores of screwed-over contractors, or perhaps only one or two. But we bet if you are one of those unlucky contractors, you know who you are and are steaming mad about this situation.

The Assad memo contains a lot of meat regarding how the impacts of the CAS revisions will be implemented by the affected contractors. It discusses impacts to Forward Pricing Rates, how the REAs will be processed, an extension of the normal 60-day advance notification rule for changes to contractors’ Disclosure Statements, and how impacts by subcontractors are to be handled by the Primes. That’s all important stuff and if you are an affected contractor you need to understand all that. The rest of you won’t care, nor should you.

But what caught our eye was the treatment of the nonmajor contractors who are impacted by the rule but have no right of recovery because they technically are not subject to the CAS themselves. We have long argued that it makes little sense to exempt contractors from the burdensome requirements of CAS coverage, only to condition cost allowability on compliance with certain aspects of the Standards. And now, once again, we see the inequity of that situation.

Sorry guys, you’re out of luck on this one.

 

 

Should DCAA Be Disbanded? The Clock is Ticking …

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“Should DCAA be disbanded?” This is a question we examine from time to time on this blog—the most recent example being this article. In the article, published about a year ago, we surveyed a number of commenters—some with more knowledge than others—and concluded with the following assessment:

So where does the DOD’s premier audit agency go from here? It has a growing backlog of unfinished audits, a demoralized workforce, and customers who are turning to outside audit firms (and paying more) in hopes of getting more timely audit reports. What should be done?

Look, we make our living dealing with DCAA auditors and helping contractors successfully pass DCAA audits. The status quo keeps us busy and puts money in our pockets. But in all intellectual honesty, we are forced to say, this agency needs to immediately turn a 90 degree course correction. If it can’t do that, then we think another agency needs to take its place.

Since then, we’ve been nibbling around the edges of the question, asserting from time to time that the new DOD Pricing Center has, as its primary goal, the objective of eliminating the need for DCMA Contracting Officers to rely on DCAA “forwarding pricing” audits. We think—and we’ve heard our supposition confirmed by senior DCMA leadership in so many words (without anybody expressly saying so)—that DCMA wants to be able to evaluate and negotiate contractors' cost proposals and forward pricing rate proposals without DCAA’s involvement.

We told our readers about Section 805 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires the DCAA Director to submit a (new) annual report to Congress. That new report will contain a considerable amount of metrics and statistics, the kind of stuff that we subsequently opined “could be very useful for those assessing DCAA’s management direction.”

We also spent considerable word count acquainting readers with the recent report issued by the House Armed Service Committee’s Panel on Business Challenges within the Defense Industry. That report contained quite a few recommendations based on input from a number of sources (including defense contractors themselves). Many of the recommendations seemed designed to address perceived DCAA and DCMA shortcomings. For example—

  • Congress should direct the Secretary of Defense to increase oversight of the management, functionality, and operations of DCAA and DCMA to reduce the backlog of audits, and to improve the audit agencies’ relationship with the industrial base.

  • Congress should direct the Secretary of Defense to examine the Department’s organizational structure and assess the feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the Department to realign DCAA and DCMA to improve communications, audit performance, oversight, and management.

That’s pretty heady stuff. But perhaps the more telling recommendation is the following—

  • Congress should examine other alternatives, to include the establishment of a self-regulatory option, to providing auditing, accounting and advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts and examine the feasibility of using such alternatives for the DIB to potentially reduce or eliminate many of DOD’s internal audit organizations while ensuring compliance with statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements.

But that’s not all. We have seen several other, related, articles and op-ed pieces that suggest policymakers are considering a significant restructuring to DCAA.

This National Defense Magazine blog reviews the HASC report and reports—

Burdensome regulations and arcane auditing requirements are driving many companies to quit the defense market, and are deterring new suppliers, the report said. As a result, the panel will be asking the Pentagon to study options for outsourcing auditing responsibilities to independent agencies. …

The auditing reforms that [Representatives] Shuster and Larsen propose are likely to spark controversy, as they are a radical departure from the way the Defense Contracts Auditing Agency does business. But Shuster said he believes a FINRA-like model — where a financial industry-funded agency is in charge of enforcing regulations — could be applied to defense in order to relieve an overstretched DCAA work force. This approach would still allow for high-level government has oversight, he said. An outside group can ‘do things more efficiently,” said Shuster. ‘We are going to have to study this.’

Larsen cautioned that outsourcing auditing functions does not mean backing off anti-fraud initiatives. But when he heard that a company four years ago spent three days tracking down $58 he knew something was wrong. ‘That’s the other extreme,’ he said. ‘Perhaps there’s a happy medium.’ …

The defense contracting and auditing environment is as bad or worse than it was 10 years ago, said Shuster. ‘Program managers are more risk-averse than they were 10 years ago,’ he said. ‘And I don’t know that we can legislate that.’

The foregoing blog is published by an defense-related industry association (the NDIA) and its anti-DCAA reportage might be discounted on that basis. But we found another source, the Center for American Progress, whose progressive (and presumably liberal) credentials are above reproach. Here’s what they had to say about this issue—

Three years ago, as many as 30,000 audits of government contracts a year were conducted annually. That number has now plunged to 10,000 audits per year despite the fact that the dollar value of contracts issued has remained steady. The time taken to check up on proposed prices before a contract is awarded now stands at 72 days, up from 28 days only two years ago. …

DCAA responded to [GAO’s] criticisms by emphasizing additional work documentation, but now questions are being raised if the agency isn’t placing too much emphasis on following questionable practices that add little to the quality of audits, to the detriment of conducting hard hitting audits. ‘In a time of scarce government resources and an inadequate contracting workforce, the government must evaluate where it is most vulnerable and focus resources where they can most effectively protect taxpayer dollars,’ said Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-MO) at a recent congressional hearing on fixing the existing auditing system.

In response to the critical GAO report and Congressional hearings, the Defense Contract Audit Agency has attempted difficult shifts in its bureaucratic culture over the past three years. However, many believe that these changes have not been for the better, but have actually lessened oversight of government contractors. In particular, DCAA now seems to be focusing on fewer contracts, and this is clearly not good enough.

The foregoing was essentially a preface to the report on DCAA issued by the Center. The report “profile[s] the different reasons audits by the Defense Contract Audit Agency sometimes fail, and what’s been done to correct these failures in the past.” One of the recommendations contained in the report is to “evaluat[e] whether the Defense Contract Audit Agency should report directly to Congress rather than to the Pentagon as is presently the case.”

You can find the Center’s report right here. It contains little that’s new, but does provide some fascinating behind-the-scene details. For example—

Shortly before he retired, Bill Reed was fond of showing his staff a PowerPoint slide that claimed that the cost of a DCAA audit was $116.24 per hour in 2006 compared to the Big Four audit firms such as KPMG and Price Waterhouse, which billed an average of $162.81. But in reality, DCAA’s costs were lower for one simple reason—it had far fewer qualified auditors than the Big Four allowing it to pay lower salary costs. In 2011 Patrick Fitzgerald, the director of DCAA, estimated that just 28 percent of his staff were qualified CPA’s compared to a Big Four rate of closer to 50 percent.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is also unusual in that many of its managers and supervisors are not qualified CPAs, yet they are required to sign off on audits, a practice that would be illegal in the commercial world. This practice has caused dissent in the ranks of the staff that are qualified to sign off on audits in public practice but prohibited at the agency, sending a signal that loyalty was promoted over competence.

‘By permitting non-CPAs to manage CPAs in audit work, DCAA culture has turned the established auditing profession on its head,’ a 20-year veteran of DCAA in northern California says. ‘It is the equivalent of a novice directing a journeyman on how to build a house or conduct any other trade or profession that has developed and refined its purposes and standards over the centuries.’ He estimated that in one year audits of $2.8 billion of the $4 billion were put under the responsibility of non-CPAs supervisors at the Peninsula branch office just south of San Francisco.

The report concludes—

Three years ago the Defense Contract Audit Agency came under fire for an obsession with getting through too many audits, too quickly. ‘We’re talking about serious sirens, bells and whistles all going off at the same time,’ said Sen. McCaskill at a 2008 hearing in Congress. ‘I think the system is failing. The culture is broken, the performance metrics are broken, and the oversight is broken.’

Today the opposite is true—contractors are now complaining about the auditors taking too long to determine prices. It is clear that the federal government needs more professionally qualified auditors to get the job done. ‘DCAA cannot always accommodate non-Department of Defense requests for audit support,’ said Thomas Skelly, the director of budget services at the U.S. Department of Education, in a recent congressional testimony. ‘Obtaining audit support from a non-governmental firm can be costly and time-consuming.’

While we do not agree with all (or even with many) of the report’s recommendations, we think it supports our assertion that DCAA is coming under scrutiny from many diverse stakeholders. We think it supports our assertion that DCAA is moving into the cross-hairs of a number of powerful parties, who may well seek to significantly restructure or even eliminate the audit agency altogether.

As if to reiterate and strengthen our assertions, Government Executive published this story on the testimony of Pratap Chatterjee (the author of the Center’s report) before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Ad hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight. The story quoted Chatterjee’s testimony as follows—

Additionally, Chatterjee said, because most contracts come from Defense, the Defense Contract Audit Agency handles the lion’s share of all federal contracting audits. Since DCAA is nestled within the Pentagon, it is unable to maintain proper independence when making decisions about the fiscal responsibility of military contractors, he said.

Chatterjee would instead like to see a new Federal Contract Audit Agency, which would reside outside the Pentagon, allowing it to maintain independence when attempting to recover taxpayer dollars contractors spent improperly. However, he did not formally recommend such an agency in his report.

We think we’ve made our point.

 

 

Having Solved All Other Acquisition Problems, DOD Focuses on Healthcare Costs of Ineligible Dependents

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In 2004, when confronted with the procurement scandal caused by the illegal behavior of Darlene Druyun and the leaders of The Boeing Company, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously opined that the root cause was “very little adult supervision” over Ms. Druyun’s decisions at the Pentagon. Rumsfeld was quoted as saying—

‘So what you had with all these vacancies over a 10-year period . . . the only continuity was that single person, who's now pled guilty and is going to go to jail. … When you have that long period of time, with . . . no one above her and no one below her, over time I'm told that what she did was acquire a great deal of authority and make a lot of decisions, and there was very little adult supervision.’

We were once again reminded of Rumsfeld’s opinion of Pentagon leadership when the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) issued a guidance memorandum on March 23, 2012, concerning “Unallowable Costs for Ineligible Dependent Healthcare Benefits.”

We’ve written about this topic several times before, most recently right here. That article discussed a policy memo issued from Mr. Shay Assad (Director, Defense Pricing) to two colleagues: the Director of DCAA and the Director of DCMA. We had some problems with Mr. Assad’s memo, and we weren’t particularly shy in expressing them. In that article, we concluded as follows—

In our view, this has always been ‘much ado about nothing’ and we are sad that the DOD policy-makers can’t move on to something more important, like contractor defined-benefit pension costs.  Like a dog with a bone, they keep worrying and worrying at it.

Maybe they should just bury this particular bone in the ground for a while.  We’re quite sure there are more meaty issues around to deal with.

Perhaps it’s just the normal policy flow-down, but DCMA’s guidance memo, issued a month after Mr. Assad’s memo, brought back the feelings of amazement, frustration, and pity that we feel every time this issue is dealt with by DOD leadership.

Really? This is how they choose to spend their time? This minor ankle-biter of an immaterial annoyance, this piffle, this nothing—this is the top priority right now in contractor oversight? Have Messrs. Assad, Williams and Fitzgerald nothing better to do with their time? (Hint: we believe they do.)

Certainly taxpayers deserve far better than this.

But let’s pull the plug on the ranting. (Just for a minute: we’ll get back on our soapbox in just a paragraph or so.) Let’s take a look at this latest policy memo and see what it tells DCMA Contracting Officers to do with their FAR-given “independent business judgment.”

According to the DCMA policy memo, DOD “will continue to disallow ineligible dependent healthcare benefit costs.” We’ve discussed the various theories as to why those costs might or might not be allowable, and whether they did or did not affect pricing of DOD contracts, and whether inclusion of such costs did or did not result in “defective pricing” under TINA. (See our previous articles on this subject.) So we’ll not rehash those theories here. Suffice to say, we think the DOD’s position on allowability has a foundation that’s on very thin ice.

Moreover, we continue to wonder with some trepidation at what this direction portends for the future of DOD oversight. We are concerned by the rather unusual phenomenon of DCMA Headquarters directing Contracting Officers to find a certain category of costs unallowable, without permitting those COs to weigh the individual facts and circumstances of each contractor’s situation. Either the COs have authority to make the decision, or they do not. If they don’t have the authority, then let’s all stop pretending that they do. Let’s have Charlie Williams, Jr. make all contracting decisions via email or some other electronic medium that facilitates the kind of autocracy that seems to be developing at Fort Lee.

The DCMA policy memo magnanimously clarifies that penalties will not be assessed on the costs that HQ has determined to be unallowable. Too bad it’s a false concession—i.e., DCMA is conceding something that is a certain loser in Court. There is no way that these costs are “expressly unallowable” and subject to penalty. And DOD knows it—which is why they have decided not to pursue penalties … at this time.

The policy memo notes that the Defense Department will pursue “application of penalties under FAR 42.709” when “DFARS is amended to make future ineligible dependent health care benefit costs explicitly expressly unallowable.” Let’s explore that phrasing.

The Shay Assad memo stated that it was DOD’s “intention to amend the DFARS to make future ineligible dependent health care benefit costs expressly unallowable and thus subject to penalties.” Okay. We had some choice words about the decision to solve, by regulatory rule-making, a problem that Mr. Assad himself admitted had been “largely corrected” and was no longer a problem. We thought then, and continue to think today, that it is a colossal waste of time and resources.

But notice that the current DCMA memo takes a bit of a different tack. While Mr. Assad discussed an “intention,” the DCMA memo assumes that intention is a done deal. In other words, DCMA is telegraphing that it expects to ram the rule through the public comment process and ignore any public input that might point out what a colossal waste of time and resources this whole issue is. Obviously, we’re speculating here without much supporting evidence. But you wait and see what happens with the upcoming DFARS Case on this issue. See if we’re not being a little prescient here.

One final thing.

DCAA has asserted that inclusion of the costs of ineligible healthcare dependents is a noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 405. We disagree with that assertion. The DCMA policy memo continues the DCAA charade, directing DCMA COs to “obtain a cost impact proposal from the Contractor identifying the amount of the unallowable ineligible dependent health care costs that were included in indirect cost proposals for all open years.” Upon receipt of that cost impact proposal, the CO is directed to “negotiate the amount of unallowable ineligible dependent health care cost or when negotiation is not feasible, make a written decision that states the sum certain is unallowable.”

Readers, you must understand that the costs involved here generally are very minimal. It’s pretty clear that not more than two or three percent of a contractor’s total population is actually ineligible for healthcare coverage. But more importantly, jn some cases, there is almost no additional cost associated with the ineligible dependents. For example, if you already have family medical coverage for five dependents—one of whom is ineligible—the difference in cost between four and five dependents is truly de minimis. In other words, this entire issue is a “tempest in a teapot” and not worthy of any more time spent trying to solve it.

SecDef Rumsfeld thought that inadequate “adult supervision” led to a situation where one DOD acquisition official had too much authority and too little oversight. As a result of the lack of adult supervision, several people went to prison and several major defense programs were significantly impacted. One would have hoped that DOD leadership would have learned from that situation, and taken steps to implement better reviews over the decision-making of such officials.

Yet here we are, eight years later, faced with a similar lack of adult supervision. We have two or three members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) who have embarked on a course of action that wastes the time, money, and resources of all involved. They have created a problem that exists only in their own minds, and refuse to let it go.

Where is the adult supervision at DOD?

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.