USAID Contractor Diverts Funds to Bogus Subcontractors
Mark-Anthony Elisha Adams, age 43, of Fort Washington, Maryland, held the position of Deputy Director at MasiMax Resources, Inc. MasiMax, a contractor to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), was acquired by RTI International in 2009 and has not existed as a separate entity since 2010. In 2011, RTI became aware of a possible subcontracting problem with MasiMax’s prime contract with USAID, and notified authorities.
An investigation by the USAID’s Inspector General and other Federal officials determined that Adams allegedly approved more than $1 Million in fraudulent invoices from “subcontractors” controlled by Adam’s wife and his friend. According to the story by Law360 (subscription required)—
Mark-Anthony Elisha Adams, 43, and his wife, Latasha Bell, 36, of Fort Washington, Md., pled not guilty to charges including wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to launder money and aggravated identity theft in Washington federal court … The indictment alleges Adams forged a coworker's name on various forms to get the bogus invoices approved. In one case, the couple allegedly submitted an invoice for more than $3,600 for an honorarium and per diem for ‘Latasha S. Bell, Ph.D.,’ purportedly a participant in a research program attending a meeting in Tanzania. … Lipscomb, 42, of Aliso Viejo, Calif., pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud on March 2 in connection with the alleged scheme and agreed to forfeit more than $386,000. He was released on his own recognizance pending sentencing. He faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine, prosecutors said.
The Law360 story noted that the funds allegedly diverted by Adams were intended to benefit global public health initiatives, including fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. The story quoted prosecutors as follows—
‘Instead of the funds being used to assist in the treatment of conditions such as HIV/AIDS, the money was allegedly used by Mr. Adams and Ms. Bell to pay for expensive home renovations and purchase luxury vehicles such as a Cadillac EXT and a Mercedes S550.’
Normally we like to probe stories such as these to determine whether better internal controls may have detected this type of wrongdoing earlier. In this case, we have a company executive who allegedly forged a coworker’s invoice approval. But there has to be more to this story, because it should take more than an approved invoice to generate payment to a subcontractor. There also needs to be an executed subcontract. That subcontract needs to have been awarded and the price determined to be fair and reasonable. We don’t know whether that happened or how normal corporate procurement processes were subverted. All we know is that within a couple of years of acquiring MasiMax, RTI International detected some irregularity that caused them to bring in the authorities.
The Law360 article reported RTI’s reaction as follows: “From our perspective, I think we've been wronged. Clearly the government has been wronged, and we really hope justice is carried out in this case." We are guessing that justice will be carried out.
Auditor Wins Battle Against NASA in $279 Million Breach of Contract Case
 On March 21, 2012, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims granted a motion for partial summary judgment, ruling for the CPA firm of Horn & Associates in its $279 Million breach of contract suit against NASA. Details are sketchy, but Law360 (subscription required) reported the case as follows—
NASA contracted Horn & Associates Inc. in 2004 to look at its books and determine whether the agency had overpaid for various services over a 10-year period. After Horn began work, NASA began to dispute what exactly it had contracted the firm to do.
From what we can gather, NASA issued an RFP for firms to assist in auditing contracts for improper payments. The RFP specified that the auditors would review only firm fixed-price contract types. When Horn & Associates submitted its proposal it “recommended” that NASA review all contract types. Law360 reported—
When NASA awarded the contract to Horn & Associates, it included a clause stating ‘[t]he contractor shall perform a primary audit recovery on all contract payments for the period beginning Oct. 1, 1997 through Sept. 30, 2003, identifying overpayments and/or underpayments.’
Accordingly, the dispute between the contracting parties centered on whether NASA had, or had not, hired Horn & Associates to audit all contract types, or just firm fixed-price contract types. NASA itself was confused about what it had hired the auditors to audit. The Law360 story stated—
Evidence of NASA’s confusion about what was required under the contract was evident by emails that went back and forth with different language about it, according to the judge’s opinion. NASA eventually provided Horn & Associates with some information about contracts other than fixed ones.
Judge Horn of the COFC (no relation to the plaintiff) found that the language in the contract superseded the language in the RFP. The Judge found, further, that if there was any ambiguity, the doctrine of contra proferentum would dictate that the ambiguity be construed against the drafter (i.e., NASA).
Law360 quoted Judge Horn’s decision as follows—
‘In this case, the contracting officer, with authority to do so, issued and signed the order, with its attached statement of work to audit all contracts,’ the judge said. ‘The contracting officer personally put the order number on the upper right hand corner of each page of the order, including the statement of work identifying the scope of work as encompassing all contracts, signifying the contracting officer’s review and approval of the language of the order and the statement of work attached thereto.’
Being interested in this David vs. Goliath victory, we contacted Mr. Horn, who told us—
“We think we have a good case and we won the first of a series of battles that we are expecting. We just hope we win the war! You never know in these situations until the check clears the bank.”
It is important to remember, in the words of Mr. Horn, that this represents one battle in a long campaign. But should Horn & Associates prove victorious at the end of the war, they will cash a whopping $279 Million check. We wish them the best of luck.
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TriWest Learns Price of Fraud by Losing $20 Billion TRICARE Contract
On March 19, 2012, Federal Times reported that the Pentagon had awarded the latest military healthcare contract (called TRICARE) to UnitedHealth Military & Veterans (UHMV), a part of the UnitedHealth Group. The incumbent contractor, TriWest, lost the contentious competition and nobody at Federal Times was quite sure why.
But the author of the Federal Times story noted two interesting facts that may have played a role in TriWest’s loss.
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During the competition, “new bids” were solicited “after UnitedHealth Group argued that Tricare chose contractors that promised to negotiate discounts with health providers at levels below Medicare. That, they said, forced contractors to focus on low costs rather than quality care.”
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In September, 2011, TriWest “was ordered to pay $10 million after a whistle-blower lawsuit said the company ‘systematically defrauded’ Tricare by not passing on savings to the government gained through negotiations with health care providers; by pushing through large numbers of claims without checking them for errors to avoid late fees; and by paying for ineligible beneficiaries, non-covered services, unknown services and services paid for by another provider.”
So while nobody knows for sure what the debrief would tell TriWest, the clear implication is that TriWest’s hands were tainted by fraudulent conduct, which caused the company to lose out on the $20 Billion TRICARE award.
A couple of weeks later, Bloomberg reported that TriWest had protested the award decision at the GAO. According to the Bloomberg article, TriWest argued that—
The U.S. Department of Defense made an ‘inexplicable decision’ to award the contract to UnitedHealth, ‘a company with a long history of performance problems and legal issues, and with no history of providing health care to the military,’ David McIntyre Jr., TriWest’s chief executive officer, said in a statement yesterday. TriWest’s bid was lower than UnitedHealth’s offer and also included ‘several hundred million dollars’ in discounts that the government failed to include in its review, McIntyre said during a conference call with reporters today.
The Bloomberg article reported that UnitedHealth has had its own problems with allegations of fraud. According to the story—
UnitedHealth’s legal issues include an American Medical Association lawsuit against the company, McIntyre said. The lawsuit filed in 2000 alleged the insurer manipulated payments to out-of-network doctors. UnitedHealth announced in January 2009 it would pay $350 million to settle the suit, which sought damages for the physicians.
Apparently, TriWest is arguing that the DOD should have considered UnitedHealth’s settlement in its evaluation of past performance. Bloomberg reported—
The Pentagon only consulted five references provided by UnitedHealth in its review of the company’s track record, McIntyre said. Tricare officials should have done more to examine the company’s prior performance, such as contacting insurance commissions in states where UnitedHealth operates and reviewing the insurer’s public financial documents, he said. ‘It’s a little like buying a house without an inspection,’ McIntyre said.
It seems that TriWest is arguing that, if its own recent fraud settlement affected perceptions of the company’s performance, then UnitedHealth’s 2009 fraud settlement should have counted against it, as well—kind of like offsetting penalties in football.
We’re not going to delve into the rules of evaluating past performance here. But it is not at all clear that the Pentagon evaluators had to impute a 2009 UnitedHealth fraud settlement to the entity (UHMV) that was the legal entity submitting the official bid.
This was a “must-win” bid for TriCare. According to Bloomberg—
Closely held TriWest, based in Phoenix, risks losing what founder McIntyre has called its ‘only business.’ The company has helped manage the military’s health services for the past 16 years. The work has generated more than $20 billion in contracts for the company since fiscal 2000, according to data compiled by Bloomberg Government. ‘It is likely if we weren’t doing this work anymore, we would shut down the corporation,’ McIntyre said in today’s conference call.
For its part, the Pentagon is playing its cards close to its vest—as one would expect. This Washington Post article noted that TriCare asserted that it was told by the debriefers that “the decision to award the contract to UnitedHealth was based on ‘technical proficiency, past performances and price.’”
But the fraud allegations—and settlement—may have figured into the award decision, as well. We’ll wait for the GAO decision to learn more of the details. But in the meantime, readers should consider this to be a reminder that the price of fraud may be more expensive than it seems at first glance.
DCAA Issues Audit Guidance Concerning Proper Charging of B&P and IR&D Costs
On March 22, 2012, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) issued audit guidance concerning the proper charging of Bids & Proposals (B&P) and Independent Research & Development (IR&D) costs. This topic is not new to readers of this blog. Indeed, in December, 2011, we told you about the policy memo from Shay Assad (Director, Defense Pricing) that addressed this very topic. In fact, the bulk of this particular DCAA Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD) is essentially a letter of transmittal of that Assad policy memo. (Why it took DCAA four months to pass the memo to its auditors remains a mystery.)
We already reported on the Assad memo (link above) but DCAA has added some additional pointers to assist its auditors. (When do they not?) The MRD states—
Auditors should examine disclosed practices and report a noncompliance with CAS 402 and CAS 420 if disclosed practices allow the contractor to charge proposal costs directly, absent a specific contractual provision for the effort. Auditors should be alert for vague and misleading wording in the disclosure statement that could lead to direct charging proposal costs that are not specifically required by an existing contract. If the examination is not within the scope of a current assignment, a focused audit of the specific cost accounting practice should be initiated under the 19100 activity code. Identified noncompliances should be reported immediately under the 19200 activity code. In addition, auditors should test proposal preparation costs identified in forward pricing and incurred cost audits for compliance with CAS 402 and 420.
Why do we take issue with the foregoing audit guidance?
First of all, our experience with this issue (and we have lots of experience with this issue) tells us that the “specific contractual provision” is not a clear as the audit guidance would presuppose. By way of explanation, let’s discuss a hypothetical example. Suppose you have a contract and the contract is silent regarding submission of a follow-on proposal. Then one day you receive a phone call from your authorized Contracting Officer, telling you to prepare a follow-on proposal and charge proposal preparation costs to the existing contract. What do you do?
In our view, if you have explicit direction from a Government representative with authority to direct you, then you follow that direction. (Unless, of course, if following the direction would lead you into a cost accounting practice that would be inconsistent with your disclosed or established cost accounting practices. Contracting Officers do not have authority to direct a contractor to violate a statute.) In this case, the CO’s direction essentially added the follow-on proposal to the list of contract deliverables (CDRLs). Since the proposal was a contract deliverable, the costs of preparing that proposal should be treated as direct costs of the benefiting contract.
So that’s what the DCAA audit guidance missed.
Second, we are apprehensive that DCAA auditors will have little if any idea exactly what “vague and misleading wording in the disclosure statement” might look like. In our experience, Disclosure Statement language is, by necessity, general and somewhat vague regarding specifics, since the language has to cover all situations. So we think that bit of direction will lead nowhere good.
Finally, readers of this blog may have familiarity with our views on DCAA audit quality and timeliness. (How could you not? We cram it down your throat every week.) This guidance directs auditor to “test proposal preparation costs” in contractors’ new business cost proposals, as well as in Final Incurred Cost Proposals (FICP) for compliance with CAS 402 and 420. (Add to that also testing within Forward Pricing Rate Agreements.) It’s not that we object to CAS compliance testing within those assignments—we have no problem with that, assuming that DCAA can perform its work timely. But the problem is that the audit agency cannot perform its work timely right now. Adding to the workload will only add to the duration of the audits. And that serves nobody.
If DCAA wants to evaluate contractors’ compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards, then have at it. But don’t try to cram in yet another tasking within the already high priority and high stress forward pricing and FICP audits.
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