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Apogee Consulting Inc

Taking Partnership to the Next Level

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From time to time we complain that the Federal government has, over the past two decades or so, moved away from a policy of “partnership” with its contractors, replacing it with a new policy of “arms-length” neutrality—or even (sometimes) treating contractors as adversaries. In this 2012 article we spent some time discussing the deteriorating relationship between Pentagon and its contractors. We predicted an increase in litigation as contractors disputed government policies and contracting officer decisions.

Now, with eight years of hindsight, it’s tough to tell if we were right or wrong. Certainly, there were some significant cases heard that resulted in contractor “wins.” (Thank you Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Sikorsky.) But was it a “tsunami” of litigation? It’s tough to tell—if only because some of the more egregious disputes were settled out of court without being heard on the merits.

Whether we were right or wrong eight years ago is left to the reader’s judgment. But we maintain that the issues we raised have persisted. We all know that contract outcomes are improved when customer and performer enter into a partnership; however, the Federal government (especially the DOD) seems (on the whole) reluctant to do so.

But sometimes – sometimes – a contracting officer and a contractor take the notion of partnership to the next level. Today, we will discuss a recent example of taking partnership to a problematic level. Our discussion comes courtesy of a recent Dept. of Justice press release. The press release announced the indictment of two individuals. An indictment is a formal charge; however, it is not a finding of guilt. All individuals are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. Therefore, in what follows you must read “allegedly” into each statement.

Two individuals were arrested in July, 2020, and charged with conspiracy and theft of government funds. In addition, one of the individuals was charged with making false declarations before a grand jury.

One of those individuals (Bouchard) was a contracting officer in charge of the U.S. Army Natick Contracting Division. The other individual (Boyd) was an employee of a government contractor (Evolution Enterprise, Inc.) In that role, Boyd acted as Bouchard’s assistant.

“In 2014, Bouchard allegedly used his long-standing relationship with Evolution Enterprise, Inc. … to have Boyd hired for a “no show” job as an assistant that specifically supported Bouchard. Boyd’s position cost the Department of Defense more than $490,000 during her time at Evolution from 2014 to 2018, during which she performed little if any useful function.”

During that period –

Bouchard and Boyd took numerous government-funded trips, ranging in duration from two to 15 days, under the guise that they were work related. This included 31 trips to Orlando, Fla., among other locations such as Clearwater Beach, Fla., and Stafford, Va., during which Boyd performed little if any work. For many of the trips, Bouchard and Boyd stayed in the same hotel room and spent time at the pool and Disney parks – all during business hours. It is alleged that in order to conceal the personal nature of the trips, Bouchard altered and created false travel expenses for Boyd, which Bouchard approved to reimburse Boyd for out-of-pocket expenses.

The conspiracy charge provides a sentence of up to five years in prison and a fine of 250,000. Each charge of theft of government funds (and there were 10 charges) provides for a sentence of up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $250,000. The charge of lying to a grand jury provides a sentence of up to five years in prison and a fine of $250,000.

Partnership. It’s a good thing. But sometimes it can be taken too far, as these two individuals demonstrated.

 

DOD Publishes Updated CARES Section 3610 Guidance

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It seems like a long time ago, but it was only March when President Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, also known as the CARES Act. Particularly relevant to government contractors was Section 3610, which threw “an immediate lifeline to qualifying firms whose workforce has been displaced by coronavirus COVID-19 shutdowns,” according to one legal summary. The statutory lifeline permits contracting officers to pay contractors to keep their workforces in a ready state by treating certain paid leave costs as allowable direct labor costs, even if the impacted contracts would not ordinarily permit direct reimbursement of those costs.

Since then, we have been reporting on issues and concerns and interesting tidbits associated Section 3610. Of special note has been the DOD’s struggles to figure out how to implement Congressional direction.

DOD has published several Class Deviations, FAQs, and other guidance intended to address the conundrum we discussed in this article—i.e., that “any [Section 3610] payments must come out of funds already appropriated for the contract’s SOW. In other words, the contracting officer has to decide which is more important: funding the work that was planned or funding the contractor employees’ stand-by time. It is fairly obvious that as the contractor employee’s stand-by time is funded, there is less money left to perform the work that was contracted-for.”

DOD keeps publishing its documents and we keep criticizing those documents, saying that they are either superfluous or else don’t address the real issues. This article will not be an exception.

Thus, when DOD published a new (undated) Class Deviation (No.2020-O0021) addressing Section 3610 contractor reimbursement requests, and when DOD revised a previous Class Deviation, and when DOD updated its FAQ, readers should not be surprised that we were unimpressed.

First, the new (undated) Class Deviation.

  • Stated that the earliest date for reimbursable Section 3610 costs is March 27, 2020, despite earlier guidance that said the earliest date was the date of the National Emergency

  • Stated that the final date for reimbursable Section 3610 costs is September 30, 2020

  • Established three tracks for reimbursement:

    • Abbreviated: individual contract reimbursement less than $2 million

    • Multipurpose: individual contract reimbursement greater than $2 million, or multiple contract reimbursements aggregated into one request

    • Global: business unit or business segment aggregation of all contracts

  • Stated that prime contractors are responsible for analyzing and including all subcontractor claims for reimbursement in their prime contract Section 3610 reimbursement request

  • Had additional requirements and certifications for the contractor seeking reimbursement to execute

Second, the revised Class Deviation.

  • Revised the earliest date for reimbursement of Section 3610 costs to March 27, 2020, despite the language in the prior version of the Class Deviation

  • Added a new paragraph to the DFARS cost principle associated with Section 3610 reimbursements (252.231-79). The new paragraph (b)(7) “clarifies” that “the allowable [Section 3610] amount is limited to the amount of funds specifically obligated on a separate line item that cites the purpose of the funds is for reimbursement under section 3610 of the CARES Act.”

Finally, the updated/revised FAQ. Basically, all changes conform the FAQs with the new and revised Class Deviations. That’s not to say that’s all there is – because there is more – but there is not much of interest to us.

Now, the criticism.

Let’s start with the new DFARS cost principle, 252.231-79. How, exactly, is that cost principle to be applied? Let’s be clear: any contract that was impacted by COVID-19 almost certainly was awarded before the National Emergency was declared. If that’s the case, then the contract was awarded with the cost principles in effect at that time—i.e., there was no 252.231-79 cost principle at the time the contract was awarded. The Allowable Cost and Payment clause requires that “The Government will make payments to the Contractor when requested as work progresses … in amounts determined to be allowable by the Contracting Officer in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 31.2 in effect on the date of this contract and the terms of this contract.” (Emphasis added.)

In other words, that’s a nice shiny new DFARS cost principle, but it’s very likely that contractors with Section 3610 reimbursement payments will not have to comply with it.

The next issue we raise is with respect to the new cost principle paragraph (b)(7). It states “the allowable [Section 3610] amount is limited to the amount of funds specifically obligated on a separate line item that cites the purpose of the funds is for reimbursement under section 3610 of the CARES Act.” Now if that were a contract term, it might make some sense. As in “allowable Section 3610 amounts to be reimbursed under this contract are limited to …” Okay. That would be saying that the contractor can seek reimbursement only for the amounts funded. That would work.

But to put that in a cost principle seems to imply that the costs are unallowable unless they are funded. That simply does not work. We don’t use funding to determine cost allowability; at least, that’s not how any of the other cost principles work. A cost is allowable or it is not. Allowable costs may be reimbursed up to, but not in amounts exceeding, the funding provided. That’s how it works. The new language sets a standard not found in the FAR cost principles and, indeed, seems to conflict with the language of FAR 31.201-2 (Determining Allowability), which establishes five criteria for determining allowable costs. None of the five criteria mention funding.

And although the new cost principle was issued via Class Deviation (which permits an agency to conflict or be inconsistent with FAR cost principles), the new cost principle was not published in the Federal Register and no public comment was solicited. This appears to violate the requirements of FAR 1.301(b) and the requirements of 41 U.S.C. §1707. Since there was no finding that the public comment requirements needed to be waived because of urgent and compelling circumstances, some might argue that the cost principle is unenforceable.

So whether you say the cost principle was promulgated illegally and is therefore unenforceable, or that the cost principle cannot apply to contracts issued prior to its creation, the DOD would seem to have a problem on its hands.

Meanwhile, contractors—including defense contractors—are getting ready to start submitting their Section 3610 reimbursement requests.

We hope the DOD and its DCMA contracting officers are ready.

 

Chinese Control Over Rare Earth Metals Continues

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Rare earth metals. Stuff that is critical to 21st century technology that most people don’t talk about. Stuff like ytterbium, dysprosium, and other exotic minerals that most people can’t even pronounce. But they don’t talk about it not because they can’t pronounce the words, but because they don’t like to admit that the Chinese control the world’s production.

In other words, if the Chinese decide to stop exports of rare earth metals, the market for such commercial items as smart phones and digital cameras and computer disks will be negatively impacted. Not to mention LED lights and flat screen televisions. In other words, most of the current electronic “gadgets” that Americans have come to rely upon basically disappear.

And the US defense industry will be negatively impacted as well.

Defense items at risk include:

  • night-vision goggles (lanthanum)

  • laser range-finders, guidance systems, communication systems (neodymium)

  • high-temperature magnets, precision guided munitions, stealth technology (samarium)

Thus, if the Chinese decide to restrict exports (as they did in 2010) or cut them off entirely, it puts the national security posture of the United States at risk.

All of the above is not new news. It’s been known for at least a decade. For example, in 2010 we devoted an entire article to the topic, discussing a then-recent GAO report on the situation. Then, in the Summer of 2012, the American Bar Association published an article of mine in its Public Contract Law Journal, in which I took issue with the thoughts of another author in a previous PCLJ article. While I took issue with the author’s proposed strategies that might be employed by the Federal government, I had no problem agreeing with his basic thesis that the government should do something to address the unpalatable fact that China controlled (and still controls) the market for rare earth metals.

Since then, not much has changed. There was a company (called MolyCorp) that tried to develop a domestic source for rare earth metals via use of the Mountain Pass mine (located in California). After a series of management missteps (that cost me thousands of dollars), the company went bankrupt in 2015. In 2017, the mine was acquired by “MP Minerals.” According to Wikipedia, “MP Materials is majority owned by Chicago hedge fund JHL Capital Group and New York's QVT Financial LP, while China's Shenghe Resources Holding Co. Ltd. holds a 9.9% stake. They acquired Mountain Pass in July 2017 with the goal of reviving America's rare earth industry.” In July, 2020, MP Materials merged with Fortress Value Acquisition Corp. (a private equity “blank check” company with multiple investors, including at least one registered in the Cayman Islands).

Thus, the entirety of the United States’ domestic supply of rare earth metals is found in one California mine, run by a company that is at least 10% owned by a Chinese investment company.

In an interesting coincidence, in July 2020, the Pentagon announced it would fund two domestic facilities to process and produce rare earth metals. One facility is located in Texas and is run by Lynas Group1 out of Australia, and the other located in California and run by MP Materials.

One might think the Pentagon was (finally) taking the threat of Chinese dominance of the rare earth market seriously.

But there are always critics.

In an article critical of the Pentagon’s decision, James Kennedy wrote for Defense One that it was a mistake for the Department of Defense to fund MP Materials. You can read the article for yourself, but here’s the kicker (at least for me)—

But there are other reasons to question the Pentagon’s judgment. One is that MP is partially funded by a Chinese company that acts as MP’s sole off-taker. This Chinese participation should have raised serious questions within the Pentagon, as it has within the U.S. Department of Energy.

The first question anyone should ask is: Why would the Chinese commit to buying rare earth concentrates with such a high dead-weight value? More than 82 percent of the [Mountain Pass mine] concentrate is cerium and lanthanum. These elements are in oversupply and sell below their mined and processed cost.

And then: Why would China bother to haul these low-value materials across California and the Pacific Ocean for processing when it has access to much better rare earths from new producers in Asia and Africa?

Some industry analysts suspect that China’s interest in propping up MP is to use this U.S. company as a proxy to influence U.S. policy with the simple objective of protecting and extending its monopolistic advantage.

Another obvious problem is that MP, like its predecessor Molycorp, ships these materials to China to be converted into their usable form, metals, alloys or magnets, doing nothing to minimize U.S. dependence on China.

Thus, while the Pentagon may be doing something, at least one critic suspects it is the wrong thing.

What should the Pentagon be doing? Well, if you must ask…

In the 2012 PCLJ article, I suggested that the best first step towards solving the problem would be to have the Pentagon become the buyer for Mountain Pass’ output. The Department of Defense should work towards creation of a strategic stockpile of rare earth metals, with as much content as possible coming from domestic sources (such as, but not limited to, Mountain Pass mine). Then it should make those rare earth metals available to its prime contractors, so that they would not have to be responsible for sourcing the commodities on their own.

Will that suggestion ever come to pass?

Who knows?

But in the meantime, if you believe in the national security of the United States and the vibrancy of its technology in both commercial and defense applications, then you better start watching what’s going on with rare earth metals.


1 Interestingly, Lynas Group didn’t much like my 2012 PCLJ article in which I asserted that the company essentially was exporting pollution by doing its ore processing in countries with lax environmental standards (e.g., Malaysia)—which led to artificially low prices for their rare earth products. In response to my article, I received a two-page single-spaced letter of disagreement typed on corporate letterhead.

 

Quick Close-Outs

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Currently, DCAA must perform its audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates and issue the associated audit report to a contracting officer for action within one year of receiving the contractor’s proposal. That’s the law.

It didn’t use to be that way, though.

Back in the old days of, say, about three years ago, DCAA would take years and years to get around to performing those audits. And the audits would go on for years and years. At last measurement point, it was taking DCAA an average of three years to audit one year’s worth of incurred costs. (See, for example, this blog post from 2015.)

But that was then and this is now.

Now, things move more swiftly—or, at least, they are supposed to. And mostly, they do. So that’s good.

Back in the slow ol’ days, contractors that didn’t have final audited and negotiated and settled indirect cost rates had a FAR-approved work around. FAR 42.708 provided that certain prime contracts could be “quick-closed” under certain conditions. For example, if the amount of “unsettled” direct and indirect costs associated with the contract was valued at less than $1,000,000 or less than 10% of the total contract value, then contracting officers and contractors could negotiate the final contract costs and close-out that contract, removing it from everybody’s books. And that final negotiated value was final—which is to say that it was no longer subject to DCAA audit. It was a win-win!

Unfortunately, the circumstances in which the quick-close methodology could be applied were limited. If you were dealing with one of the bigger contractors, especially if there was a big backlog of unsettled final rate proposals (as there almost always was), then the FAR circumstances in which quick-close procedures could be used would almost never be met. For instance, let’s say Contractor A had a billion dollars of indirect costs annually, and let’s say that Contractor A had five open years for which DCAA had not yet completed its required audits. That would mean that Contractor A had $5 billion of unsettled indirect costs that were allocated to its contracts. Thus, the average contract would have far more than $1 million in “unsettled” indirect costs allocated to it (not to mention who knows how much “unsettled” direct costs), and a contracting officer would be prohibited from using the FAR 42.708 quick-close procedures. It was simply not applicable to Contractor A’s situation.

But DCMA found a way to get around that FAR limitation. It did so by issuing a series of Class Deviations that waived the FAR requirements and, instead, permitted contracting officers to use their business judgment to determine when to use quick-close procedures. We reported on the DCMA Class Deviations when they came to our attention. (See, for example, this blog post from 2017.)

Okay, now you have the context for the announcement that on May 3, 2019, the Defense Pricing & Contracting Directorate issued its own Class Deviation (2019-00009).The DPC Class Deviation:

  • Authorizes DoD contracting officers to deviate from the FAR 42.708 requirements and states that the contracting officers may use the quick-close procedures when the total unsettled direct and indirect costs to be allocated to any one contract, task order, or delivery order do not exceed $2 million (in lieu of the 42.708 thresholds

  • Incorporates DCMA Quick-Closeout Procedure Class Deviation (DCMA Memo 17-142, dated 15 Aug 2017), stating that DCMA ACOs are further authorized to deviate from FAR 42.708(a)(2) and negotiate the settlement of direct and indirect costs for a specific contract, task order, or delivery order to be closed in advance of the determination of final direct costs and indirect rates set forth in FAR 42.705 regardless of the dollar value or percent of unsettled direct or indirect costs allocable to the contract.

Thus, as of May, 2019, contracting officers using the discretion provided by the DCMA Memo should, instead, cite to the new DPC Class Deviation. Why are we writing about it now? Because it was just brought to our attention.

Here’s a link to the 2019 DPC Class Deviation.

 

Concurrent Changes to Cost Accounting Practice – Back at Court of Federal Claims

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We’ve written three articles on the topic of concurrent changes to cost accounting practice; the latest was published in August 2015—five years ago. If you type “concurrent” into the search feature on our home page (at the top on the right) you can find all of them. Those articles focused on litigation at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) involving Boeing and Raytheon.

In the more recent (2015) article, we discussed how the Board was not persuaded by Raytheon’s arguments that the rules currently at FAR 30.606—rules that were issued in 2005—were an illegal usurpation of the CAS Board’s statutory authority. Judge O’Connell, writing for the Board, stated that “Due to the lack of any guidance from Congress or the CAS Board that addresses offsetting multiple changes, we are unwilling to disturb the actions of the FAR Councils.” In other words, the CAS Board’s lack of action created a legal vacuum that the FAR Councils used to their advantage. As a result of that interpretation, today the government is able to chose which changes it wants to calculate a cost impact for—resulting in the government recovering more costs than the actual net impact of all the changes taken together as a whole. Or, as we wrote in 2015—

… as DCAA saw things, the FAR rules permitted the government to cherry-pick which changes would result in a contract adjustment and which changes would be ignored. Naturally, any changes that were favorable to the government and resulted in cost savings would be ignored (i.e., the price of FFP contracts would not be increased if the contractor shifted costs to its FFP contracts). In contrast, changes that were unfavorable to the government and resulted in cost increases, no matter how minute, would result in demands for payment with interest calculated from the date of the change (even if the government intentionally delayed its audit so as to increase interest payable).

Indeed, that’s exactly how concurrent changes to cost accounting practice are interpreted by DCAA, DCMA, and other Federal agencies today, five years later.

But maybe not.

In 2019, Boeing tried to litigate similar arguments at the Court of Federal Claims. They never got the chance to argue their case. The suit was dismissed based on the Government’s motions, before it ever got to trial. The court held that Boeing had “waived its breach of contract claim by failing to object to FAR 30.606” before entering into contracts that were subject to the post-2005 rules. In addition, the court also found that it could not hear Boeing’s other arguments because it did not have jurisdiction over them.

We were so disappointed at that dismissal that we couldn’t bring ourselves to write about it at the time.

But wait.

Boeing appealed and the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, reversed the dismissal and remanded the suit back to the Court of Federal Claims.

Let’s quote some of the Appellate decision, just for the record. As usual, internal footnotes and legal citations are omitted.

Boeing contends that the trial court incorrectly ruled that Boeing waived its challenge to the lawfulness of FAR 30.606. We agree. … A pre-award objection by Boeing to the Defense Department would have been futile, as the government concededly could not lawfully have declared FAR 30.606 inapplicable in entering into the contract…. We therefore reverse the trial court’s waiver ruling

***

Boeing’s challenge appears on its face to involve a matter of contract administration: it objects to the government following FAR 30.606 to determine the amount of a price adjustment when Boeing chose to adopt changes in cost accounting practices during the performance of the contract. The government has not explained why this particular dispute could have been brought to court under the bid protest statute before the contract was formed, rather than under the CDA if and when FAR 30.606 was applied in a way adverse to Boeing during contract performance.

But wait. There’s more.

Boeing also contends that the trial court, in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the ‘illegal exaction’ claim, mistakenly required that the asserted basis of illegality be a ‘money-mandating’ statute. We agree with Boeing.

***

… to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction for an illegal exaction claim, a party that has paid money over to the government and seeks its return must make a non-frivolous allegation that the government, in obtaining the money, has violated the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation. Under this standard, Boeing has established jurisdiction for its illegal exaction claim. Boeing alleged that the government ‘demanded that Boeing pay it . . . $940,007’ to cover the ‘increased costs caused by two of the changes,’ that the government ‘also demanded $124,766 in compound interest,’ and that Boeing had already ‘paid $71,276 to the Government.’ And Boeing alleged that the government’s ‘demand for payment of $1,064,773 [$940,007 plus $124,766] is in direct violation of 41 U.S.C. § 1503(b), which requires that the Government ‘may not recover costs greater than the aggregate increased cost to the Federal Government.’’ In short, Boeing alleged that the government has demanded and taken Boeing’s money in violation of a statute. Whatever its ultimate merits, this allegation suffices for jurisdiction to adjudicate the illegal exaction claim.

Readers must understand that Boeing did not win a victory for CAS-covered contractors. Instead, the Federal Circuit directed the Court of Federal Claims to hear the case on its merits, to allow Boeing to make its arguments. We don’t know whether or not those arguments will be sufficiently persuasive to lead the Court to overturn the allegedly illegal 2005 revisions for FAR 30.606.

Thus, we must stay patient and wait for the case to proceed.

However, this is certainly the best CAS-related news we’ve had in a long time.

 
 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.