More on DCAA’s Never-ending Backlog
As mentioned in our previous article on this topic, DCAA has dug for itself a ginormous, almost unbelievably deep, hole of a backlog. Not to pile on too much, but we have some further news and some further thoughts on this pressing topic that we believe merit another article. So here’s what’s new—
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It has been brought to our attention that Mr. Loeb’s original article (“DCAA—Is Anybody Home?”) contains some questionable math. When he wrote that DCAA’s productivity has declined by 400 percent over the past three years, he was perhaps inverting the numerator and denominator of the equation. In GFY 2008, DCAA issued 30,352 audits; while in GFY 2011, DCAA issued 7,390 audits, for a decrease of 22,962 audit reports issued. It is true that 30,352 / 7,390 = 410 percent; but we believe that’s not quite the correct way to calculate the productivity decrease. Instead, 7,390 / 30,352 = 24 percent, meaning that today’s DCAA is 76 percent less productive than it was in 2008. It doesn’t play as well in the media, but that’s probably the more correct way to express the situation.
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Similarly, when we used Mr. Loeb’s arithmetic on DCAA’s backlog of “defective pricing” audits, we reported a productivity decrease of 1,148 percent. Correcting our math, we see that DCAA’s GFY 2011 output of post-award audits was only 9 percent of its GFY 2008 output, meaning that today’s DCAA is 91 percent less productive that it was in 2008. (Thanks to “Bill O-5” for pointing out the math issues.)
In related news, Federal Times and Federal News Radio have picked up the story. Here’s a link to the Federal Times story. Key quotes from that story include:
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DCAA officials attribute the slowdown to their focus on quality and thoroughness in their audits.
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… spokeswoman Lt. Col. Elizabeth Robbins said in an e-mail [that] … few audits in the current backlog are at risk of running up against the six-year limitation … an exact number could not be immediately determined, she said.
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While DCAA is issuing fewer audit reports than in the past, the agency is questioning more costs and producing greater net savings, Robbins said. … ‘Clearly, 2011 was more effective for the taxpayer,’ Robbins said.
First, we were completely unaware that DCAA—a civilian agency within the Department of Defense—now employed a military spokesperson. Second, we believe that Lt. Col. Robbins may have been misinformed regarding the number of incurred cost proposals running up against the six-year statute of limitations contained in the Contract Disputes Act. Third, we can hardly disagree more with her assessment that DCAA’s 2011 was “clearly” more effective for the taxpayer. We wrote a whole blog article taking issue with DCAA’s assessment of its GFY 2011 as “successful.” In fact, we judged it to be “pathetic.”
Our frenemies over at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) ran the story as well. What’s interesting about the POGO blog article is the comments from self-identified current and former DCAA employees. We counted about twenty comments as of the time we wrote this article. All but one were supportive of Mr. Loeb’s article and called for significant reforms at DCAA. Here’s a smattering to give you the idea (unedited except for length).
“John” wrote –
As a manager of DCAA, I am truely embarrassed with our performance. My office has not completed an incurred cost audit or ICAPS audit since 2009. We were required to develop a plan to get current on our incurred cost by 2016 and it is a phoney plan. There is no way we will get current without approving incurred cost claims with no audit (defeats the purpose of having an audit agency). … We are worse than ever! The numbers presented in the article speak for themselves. The reality is that we spend millions of dollars on management reviews that are meaningless. We are so inefficient that it is embarrassing. My office accomplished more audits in one month in 2007 than we accomplished for 12 months in 2011. If I was eligible to retire, I would be out the door today. I am truely embarrassed to say I am a manager in DCAA. I used to be proud.
“DCAA Auditor” wrote—
… The agency is controlled by fear. A fear of being second guessed by the internal police. So what do people do? We do nothing but document files to an insane level. Managers have work piling up on their desks as they agonize over approving a risk assessment. God forbid we don't have the perfect fomat. How do these managers make the decision to get out of bed in the morning? How can they be sure they don't slip in the shower, have a car accident? Is it worth the risk? Why not just lay in bed, it's not worth the risk.
Mr. Loeb's article is spot on. The truth hurts and Mr. Loeb has pretty much told it like it is. …
“Ed” wrote—
Excellant article and blog by POGO. Time to expose DCAA. … the findings that we are counting as questioned cost are not real questioned cost. We count unsupported cost as questioned cost which we never did in prior years so we do not have an apples-to-apples comparison. Third, this approach completly misses the reason for DCAA. We are suppose to audit cost-type contracts after contract award. We have stopped auditing contract costs after award. We do not audit internal controls or compliance with CAS. There are no questioned dollars with these assignments so Fitzgerald does not want us to waste our time with these audits. But these audit are exactly why DCAA exists. Loeb is correct that we need to get back to our core mission and audit contract costs and stop the wasteful spending on proposals. We need to accomplish the internal controls, CAS, and costs incurred on cost-type contracts. … So we have a perfect forward pricing audit. In the meantime, overpayments are occuring all over the place and DCAA is no where to be found. …
“Mike” wrote—
… The battle used to be with the contractor. Now the battle is with management and the DCAA CIGIE police. We spend more time defending the risk assessment, audit steps, working paper documentation, and stat sampling, than we spend on the audit. We waste so much time on nonvalue effort that there is no time for actual audit work or the audit is so late that it is of no use. …
“Lauren” wrote—
… The entire risk assessment phase of audits has to be re-worked. You can't treat a Raytheon the same way you treat a three person company but we do. The B-02/risk assessment is make work, then we have to document what was done there in the detailed work papers. So much time killing non value added work. … We have many hard working young smart people at DCAA who are already defeated by the DCAA make work mentality. Until DCAA works for the taxpayer in mind and not some mid level bureaucrat within the DCAA bureaucracy, nothing will change.
“Gerry” wrote—
… We need to get back to the systems approach to auditing where each audit builds upon the next. We need to determine whether forward pricing needs to be completed as an audit under GAGAS or fiancial advisory services. We need to get back to having a sense of urgency and understand that customers cannot hold a procurement for 4-5 months waiting for an audit. …
Some of the POGO commenters offered insight into how DCAA might approach reducing its pile of unperformed audits.
“Roger Thornhill” wrote—
… Concerning the incurred cost workload, the plan for getting current is to sample the submissions that are less than $250M. Those that are less than $1M will likely never be audited because HQ views those audits as cost losers, which is no wonder given the amount of prepatory work (the risk assessment, increased transaction testing, and the greater number of reviews) now required. HQ is talking about more and more sampling (leaving more submissions completely unaudited), which will certainly incentivize some contractors to push the envelope when it comes to questioned costs. …
“Waiver Me and Count” wrote—
… DCAA wants to waive all possible incurred cost audits under $1 million too. And the metrics will show that we actually completed these audits. Waiving 1 low dollar incurred cost = completing 1 (only in DCAA does 0 = 1). Then there's our audit guidance - all of our audit guidance is being written for the largest contractors. Does our upper management get the risks at the nonmajors especially at a time when there is less spending and companies are going out of business or being bought out? … We can get plenty of these audits done if we had the prior audit programs that were geared towards non-major contractors. The new B2 is overkill and redundant. It's confusing. It's too much for a small contractor where an audit is performed by 1 person. Who really understands it? It's not user-friendly for auditors. Then it appears HQs wants to staff up the largest contractors with more people because that's the only places where risk exists to them. Are those contractor personnel going to be able to respond quickly to all the requests being thrown at them at one time? What are the idle auditors going to do? What are the auditors in the mobile branches going to do? Travel money seems to be going away. So what are the auditors in the mobile branches going to be doing? What is the plan? At the mobile places, the staff knows there is audit risk that shouldn't be overlooked. … The upper management is holding FAOs accountable for compleing so many incurreds each month. A very stressful situation for those in charge of issuing the most incurred cost reports - you constantly get the emails ‘how many are you going to get done? How many? Some supervisors have none and others have numerous reports. Then there's the cancelled assignments. How many audit hours were wasted on cancelled assignments this year? Might be enough to complete those ‘possible waiver’ nonmajor audits. …
There’s one more point we want to discuss before we close this out. It’s about the next generation of DCAA auditors. We have posted (more than once) our opinion that DCAA has capable, experienced auditors who should be allowed to exercise judgment in the performance of their audits. Unfortunately (as we know all too well) that’s not the case these days. Between SAQs and IRRs and multiple levels of review, there is essentially no chance for an auditor to exercise judgment. What are the implications of this top-down quality control regime?
It is common wisdom that most defense contractors and, indeed, the entire civilian workforce of the Defense Department are in the midst of a human capital crisis. The majority of employees are retirement-ready now.
Soon, the senior, experienced, auditors who are capable of exercising judgment without multiple levels of oversight will retire and the next generation of auditors will take their place. What skills and knowledge will the next generation bring to the table?
Mr. Loeb wrote in his article—
Sadly, given the direction of DCAA, it does not appear that it is training its auditors in the art of auditing and sifting through records to find overcharges. Rather, DCAA is developing a generation of auditors that understand the art of working paper documentation and having team discussions.
The time is now for DCAA to develop its next generation of auditors. And yet, rather than seek to develop auditors capable of exercising discretion and professional judgment, the agency seems to have chosen to develop auditors who are masters of risk assessments and working papers. And we think that’s a damn shame.
DCAA: time to change direction. Right now, before it’s too late.
The Missing $15 Million Incentive Fee Payment
 It’s not much as Federal funds are measured, but still. $15 million is not exactly chump change. And according to the Department of Energy’s Inspector General, that amount apparently got lost in the mail.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is in the process of spending about $12 Billion of taxpayer funds at its Hanford, Washington, site. That $12 Billion is funding the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), which is a “key element” in DOE’s efforts to remediate the site’s high-level nuclear waste. (Hanford is where plutonium was processed during the Manhattan Project and Cold War. It’s polluted as hell.)
Bechtel National Inc. is the prime contractor managing the WTP program. As part of the WTP activities, Bechtel is building “black cell” waste processing rooms. “Black cells” are sealed compartments that will contain the actual WTP processing vessels and equipment. The black cells are sealed and heavily shielded to protect plant workers “from the intense radiation that will occur during WTP operations.” Since there is no “engineered access” to the black cells, there is no practical means of performing maintenance or repair. It’s kind of like a satellite in space, if you will. If anything inside the black cell fails, then that’s it. Consequently, it is critically important that everything going inside the black cells be of the highest quality and (as is the case with spacecraft) be completely traceable in terms of quality assurance. As the DOE IG wrote—
The importance of black cells and hard-to-reach components cannot be over stated. Premature failure of these components could potentially impact safety, contaminate large portions of a multi-billion dollar facility and interrupt waste processing for an unknown period of time.
The DOE IG received allegations that not everything in the WTP black cells met quality assurance standards, and investigated. The IG substantiated the allegations, finding that the contractor could not document that it met quality assurance and/or contract requirements. Interestingly, the audit focused on vessels that were “received and installed prior to mid-2005,” because Bechtel hasn’t acquired any similar vessels in the seven years since then. Why it took seven years for the IG to get around to looking at Bechtel’s quality assurance documentation remains a mystery.
But the more interesting finding—or, at least, the one that’s getting the most play in the press—is the finding that DOE cannot account for at least $15 million in incentive fees that it had demanded Bechtel repay as a penalty for failing to meet QA requirements. The IG reported—
Bechtel was paid $30 million in incentive fee for the delivery and installation of vessels into WTP facilities. When the Department learned that one of the vessels was nonconforming, it instructed Bechtel to return $15 million in performance fee. However, neither the Department's Office of River Protection nor Bechtel could provide evidence that the fee was returned to the Department.
In the body of the audit report, the DOE IG provided some more detail surrounding the missing $15 million. It reported—
The Department did not take aggressive action to retrieve the $15 million fee payment. … the Department requested Bechtel return the $15 million fee payment by February 20, 2004. If not returned by that date, the letter stated that the Department would offset the amount against the next cost invoice submitted by Bechtel. In its response … Bechtel asserted that it didn't completely agree with many of the assertions of the Department; but concluded that a point-by-point response would not bring closure to the issue. As an alternative, Bechtel expressed its desire to discuss the issue with the Department to find a mutually acceptable resolution. Bechtel then submitted a letter to close out open issues on the vessel dated July 12, 2004. We requested the evidence of the resolution; however, there were no records of the meeting or indications that Bechtel repaid the fee. Department officials confirmed there was no documentation indicating that the fee had been repaid or offset against any subsequent invoices.
The DOE IG also identified another $15 Million incentive fee payment for “nonconforming” vessels. But the IG noted that the Department of Energy was unable to recover that second payment, because “at the time we determined the vessel was nonconforming, a different fee criteria applied which denied the Department the ability to recover fee for a nonconforming vessel after it had been installed.” Oops!
We are not going to get into a discussion of patent vs. latent defects here. But we will note for the record that more than six years has passed since the DOE demanded that Bechtel repay the $15 million. Accordingly, we have to smile a bit at the IG recommendation that the DOE management team “Determine whether the $15 million performance fee payment for a nonconforming vessel was returned to the Department and, if not, take necessary action to recoup the fee from Bechtel.”
Perhaps the DOE IG might want to read one or two of our articles on the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations?
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A Frontal Attack on DCAA from a Long-time Supporter
The only thing that ought to surprise you about the latest attack on DCAA is its source. We predicted that the DOD’s premier audit agency should expect “scrutiny from many diverse stakeholders” and that it was “moving into the cross-hairs of a number of power parties, who may well seek to significantly restructure or even eliminate the audit agency altogether.” So the latest attack on DCAA—which has been described as “scathing” by more than one media source—should surprise nobody. But what is surprising is the source; that, and how effectively the attack was made.
Before we get into the latest broadside salvo on the sinking ship that is the Defense Contract Audit Agency, let’s pause a moment and defuse a few of the inevitable detractors who will seek to discount and/or denigrate our analysis because we don’t work for the U.S. Government. Here’s the deal on that issue: We do not hate DCAA. We do not hate DCMA. We very much respect the people who work in the Defense management and oversight functions. While we have trouble containing our disdain and contempt for policy and guidance that seems to make no sense, that angst comes from a comparison between what is and what ought to be—and not from a desire to pull accounting/billing shenanigans on the U.S. Government.
In other words—and this is just like almost every single person who works in the government contracting, accounting and/or compliance field—we are rooting for DCMA and DCAA to pull their collective heads out of their collective backsides and get back to the business of effective contract oversight. We very much want an effective contract oversight regime because it leads to a working government acquisition environment. A working government acquisition environment benefits everybody, from contractor to warfighter, from auditor to taxpayer, and from accounts payable to consultant.
Make no mistake: the current government acquisition environment is broken almost beyond repair. While the finger of blame can point in many directions and at many individuals, we cannot escape our firm conviction that the biggest slice of the blame pie should be served a la mode to the Defense Contract Audit Agency, who (as an agency) seems to be actively and with malice aforethought trying to sabotage the defense acquisition machinery.
There. We said it. Deal with it.
But we aren’t the only ones who have that thought in mind. For a recent example, let’s look at Richard Loeb’s article in the latest issue of Government Contract Cost, Pricing & Accounting Report, entitled “DCAA—Is Anybody Home?” (Hey, you know what? We’re on the Advisory Board of that publication and saw an advance copy of the article in question.) Mr. Loeb, an attorney employed by the Federal government and former Executive Secretary to the CAS Board, knows a thing or two about DCAA and audits. We haven’t always agreed with him—nor do we agree 100 percent with every point he makes in his article—but he does seem to have command of facts and figures.
Those facts and figures show that DCAA is failing.
Now, that’s not news to us. Nor is it news to you. In fact, we devoted a recent blog article to that topic, asserting that DCAA’s GFY 2011 performance was “pathetic” (in contrast to the agency’s own assessment, which is that it had a “successful” year). Mr. Loeb looked at the same data we looked at, and constructed a scathing, brutally honest, assessment of his own. He wrote “In many practical ways, DCAA has, in essence, stopped performing audits.” And that was just for starters.
According to Mr. Loeb, using DCAA’s own published statistics, it is clear that DCAA’s productivity has declined by 400 percent in the past three years. He wrote—
In fiscal year 2008, DCAA issued 30,352 audit reports and covered about $458 billion of proposed and claimed contractor costs. Going forward three years to the end of FY 2011, DCAA has completed just 7,390 audits covering $129 billion. This is a reduction of 22,962 reports or over 400 percent, and a reduction of about $330 billion or over 350 percent in dollars audited. It is almost incomprehensible how DCAA could just stop performing so many audits, especially as contracting actions and dollars awarded have not decreased in any material way.
He asserted that the root causes of the fall-off in DCAA productivity are misplaced priorities and flawed audit procedures. He asked—
Did DCAA need such a drastic overhaul that it no longer has time to complete thousands of required audits, or did the agency respond to the GAO reviews by going overboard and spending an inordinate amount of time on working paper documentation to ensure that GAO and the Department of Defense inspector general would not find fault with any working papers, all the while letting billions of contract costs go unaudited? Where has DCAA placed its priorities for ensuring proper use of taxpayer dollars? Apparently, it is on the administrative side of performing audits.
Mr. Loeb looked at recent audit guidance addressing reviews of contractors’ billing systems, and he didn’t care for what he saw. Not at all. He wrote—
Given the extensive directions to auditors for documenting nearly every discussion and every piece of paper obtained from the contractor, it is clear that DCAA’s direction is one of form over substance and it is placing much greater emphasis on the completion of audit working papers than on the completion of an actual audit. In fact, the requirement for the auditor to ‘document’ audit effort is stated over 50 times in the audit program. … It is becoming clearer why DCAA has had a 400-percent reduction in completed assignments: an inordinate amount of time is being spent on administrative aspects of the audit rather than on conducting the audit.
Mr. Loeb concluded his article with the following thoughts—
The question for policy makers and those who profess to support taxpayer interests is whether it would be a better use of resources having DCAA contract auditors spending a majority of their audit time examining and analyzing contractor accounting records, rather than documenting discussions with supervisors and managers on the risk assessment, audit steps and independent review results. … Sadly, given the direction of DCAA, it does not appear that it is training its auditors in the art of auditing and sifting through records to find overcharges. Rather, DCAA is developing a generation of auditors that understand the art of working paper documentation and having team discussions. … With the billions of taxpayer dollars that are awarded annually in Government contracts, there is a need for a DCAA that conducts both qualitatively and quantitatively outstanding audits. The current DCAA approach satisfies neither consideration. It is time for DCAA to balance these factors appropriately, rather than merely making sure that all ‘the appropriate boxes are checked.’ It is time for DCAA to concentrate on its core mission, and conduct contract audits.
Let’s be clear: We agree with Mr. Loeb in almost every respect. In many ways, he’s echoing what we’ve been writing on this site for several years. But let’s look a little more closely as those DCAA metrics from the DOD IG Semi-Annual Reports, as provided in his article.
Mr. Loeb did not have the benefit of looking at DCAA’s first Annual Report (to Congress) when he wrote his article. All he had was the general metrics (which were devastating enough on their own). But we saw the DCAA Annual Report, and we told you about it. (See the “blog article” link above.) Those more detailed metrics are damning.
As we told you in our previous blog article, at the end of its GFY 2011, it had a incurred cost backlog of 24,000 (15,000 that had been determined to be adequate but not yet audited, and 9,000 awaiting determinations of adequacy) that was worth $574 Billion. DCAA reported completing 349 incurred cost audits in its GFY 2011 (reporting that each completed audit took an average of three years to perform). So, given that performance rate, how long will it take DCAA to audit its current backlog?
Answer: 68.8 years.
Yes, that is correct. Even if no other contractor incurred cost proposal is ever received by DCAA, it currently has nearly 70 years’ worth of backlog to audit. Readers, we just can’t make this stuff up.
And if you are the CO or COTR or government PM of a major defense weapons program, then you are not going to know your final costs for another 70 years. Please make sure you keep your appropriated funds from expiring during that time, won’t you?
And if you are a contractor waiting for the DCAA audit that never starts—and never ends after it starts—make sure to retain all documentation for that 70 year period, so that DCAA auditors will have something to audit. After all, you don’t want your costs to be questioned because they were unsupported! So make sure to retain all that documentation in your leased warehouses, or at Iron Mountain. Sure, it will cost you hundreds of thousands of dollars a year. But don’t worry about that—you can just pass those additional costs back to the Government through your indirect rates!
What’s that you say? The Government has some Initiative that focuses on pressuring contractors to reduce their overhead rates. Really? Well, this is one area that can’t be reduced. Sorry about that.
But of course, come June 30 another 5,000 or so new incurred cost proposals will be received by the agency, just like every other year. Thus, that’s another 14 years’ worth of auditing that needs to be performed. So next year, we expect DCAA to report that it has more than 80 years’ worth of incurred cost audit backlog. And so on, forever.
But that’s not all. Let’s look at performance related to post-award “defective pricing” audits. In GFY 2011, DCAA issued just 31 audit reports related to defective pricing, compared to 356 in GFY 2008—for a productivity drop of 1,148 percent. So if you think one important mission of DCAA is to prevent defective pricing, well. That’s not really going to happen anytime soon.
Clearly, something has got to change at DCAA.
We have some clues as to what DCAA may be planning to do, and we hope we are wrong. (Stay tuned.) But in the meantime, Mr. Loeb, former Executive Secretary of the CAS Board and current employee of the Federal government, has just fired a devastatingly accurate shot directly at DCAA. His article is getting play in several media sources.
We hope somebody in Congress is listening and thinking about ginormous hole that DCAA has dug for itself. We hope somebody is thinking that this situation has gotten out of hand
Because we want DCAA to be an effective audit agency. We really do.
Budget Issues and Workforce Impacts
 If you’ve been reading blog articles on this site for any length of time, you know we’ve been interested in the health of the defense industrial base, and have written several articles discussing how defense contractors are reacting to budgetary pressures stemming from Congress’ inability to pass a budget (as well as from several other factors, including but not limited to Dr. Carter’s “Better Buying Power Initiative” and Shay Assad’s attack on contractors’ indirect expenses and profits). We could post several links to those blog articles, but the site has a search feature, so you can do your own homework on that, if you’re so inclined.
The Aerospace Industry Associations (AIA) has published many upon many articles of its own, issuing dire warnings of the impact of “sequestration” Defense Department funding cuts on the defense industrial base workforce. In fact, the AIA has estimated job losses in the potential aerospace/defense sector at one million heads.
And while the devasting impact of “sequestration” is undeniable, what is less obvious is the immediate impact on the defense contractor workforce from the current budgetary uncertainty and current DOD cost reduction measures (as noted above). We want to discuss one particular story that came to our attention.
In 2005, UK-based BAE Systems acquired United Defense Industries for $4 Billion and created BAE Systems Land & Armaments, which is reportedly the largest land systems defense contractor in the world (or at least it was, until its recent losses of the M-ATV and FMTV bids). As part of its acquisition of United Defense, BAE Systems acquired the legacy manufacturing operations of Bowen McLaughlin York (BMY), which later became the BMY Combat Systems Division of the Harsco Corporation, based in Pennsylvania.
Today, as it has for nearly 75 years, BAE Systems’ York, Pennsylvania, plant manufactures a number of mature ground combat and land defense systems products—including various types of Bradley Fighting Vehicles. Nearly 1,300 employees work on defense products, as perhaps their fathers and grand-fathers did before them. (And women, too! We didn’t forget.) Reportedly, 80 percent of the Army’s fleet of Bradley FVs has passed through the York plant at one time or another.
But times have been tough recently. As noted, a couple of very large “must-win” bids were lost, and (as we’ve reported) the Army seems to have fumbled its Next Generation Ground Combat Vehicle program. With large-scale ground combat operations winding-down in Southwest Asia, and the US Army planning to halt Bradley FV production (perhaps for several years) starting in 2014, management is looking at a backlog burn-down without much in the way of new orders to replace it.
Which inevitably means workforce reductions.
In early May, 2012, BAE Systems announced that 210 workers at the York, Pennsylvania, plant would be furloughed for about 30 days this summer. That’s about 20 percent of the plant’s workforce. Although management commented that the furlough (which applies to both salaried management and hourly union workers) stemmed from “the normal ebbs and flows of the business,” it was clear that the move was made in response to more than the general business climate.
According to the Reuters article (link above), BAE Systems stated that the root cause of the furlough was “a delay in a Fiscal 2012 contract award for upgrades to the Army’s M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.” The delays in awarding the contract led to slips in delivery schedules of long-lead materials from suppliers. No materials, no upgrades. Thus: temporary lay-offs.
But as usual, the story behind the story is more interesting.
According to Inside Defense and Inside the Army (subscription required), the Army put the blame for the contract award delay on BAE Systems itself. Reportedly, the Army has asserted that the delay occurred because “BAE did not submit a compliant bid proposal.” Ms. Heidi Shyu (acting Army Acquisition Executive) wrote in an email to Congress that (reportedly), “BAE omitted the fact that they submitted an inadequate cost proposal … which significantly contributed to the delay in contract award.”
To be very clear, we do not have any insight into BAE Systems’ proposal. We don’t know whether or not it was “adequate.” But we do know this much: The Bradley FV program has been around for thirty years, entering service in 1981. We know that the contract in question is for an award of Fiscal Year funding. Putting all that together, we have to ask how much data the Army actually needed to see in order to determine the BAE Systems’ price was fair and reasonable. They had years and years of actual cost data; what was going to be new information?
Sure, it was a single-source award and likely subject to TINA. But so what? The purpose of TINA is to place the negotiating parties on an equal footing, not to burden the contractor with providing unnecessary and costly information that confirms with the DCMA Contracting Officer and the Buying Command already knew.
What is more likely, we think, is that DCAA used its infamous Cost Proposal Adequacy Checklist, and kicked-back the proposal because it didn’t meet all the check-boxes. Again: so what? If our guess is correct, then the real question is why did the CO think s/he needed field pricing assistance to perform cost analysis on one of the Army’s most mature production programs?
And so, contract award was delayed (for whatever reason) and now more than two hundred people are facing a month without a paycheck.
But that’s not the end of the story. Demonstrating an almost unbelievable naïveté, the Army complained to Congress that (a) BAE Systems did not tell them about the consequences of the delay, and (b) BAE Systems could avoid the furlough if it only “accelerated” material deliveries from suppliers. Yes, that’s what the Inside Defense and Inside the Army stories reported.
BAE told the Army that program supply chains don’t just accelerate themselves—at least, not without a cost impact or two. The story reported that the Army told Congress that BAE Systems told them that—
BAE stated that production schedules are already locked in accounting for the furlough and even if material deliveries could be accelerated, it may be too late to make this change as the program is already in progress. Multiple program activities would require acceleration at this time, not just material lead times and those accelerations are not possible.
Next the Army tied a different approach (according to the article’s reporting of the Army letter). The Army asked BAE Systems to slow down production rates and stretch out the program to avoid the furlough. (“Such a strategy would not require a material delivery acceleration.”) BAE nixed that suggestion as well. BAE told the Army that if it cut its production rate in half (as the Army had requested) then it would still have to furlough half of the 210 employees. BAE Systems told the Army that slowing production would lead to a “more significant impact than [having] all BAE Bradley Production Union employees being furloughed for 30 days.”
We don’t know. The Army comes out of this looking pretty clueless, in our opinion. One would think that the contractor’s workforce management would be left to the contractor, especially if (as the Army asserted) all the problems stemmed from the contractor’s inadequate proposal. The Army’s (over)reaction seems to us to have a bit of guilt associated with it.
We return to our initial question. How does the Army justify requiring a full-up, fully expensive, TINA-compliant proposal for an annual funding request? If you want to pile-on, then let’s ask why this program isn’t being funding with mult-year money, which would permit more robust long-term planning?
Who’s running this show? We aren’t really sure, but one thing is certain. It’s the local workforce that’s paying the price for this apparent mismanagement.
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