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Apogee Consulting Inc

Adjusting Provisional Indirect Rates—Contractor Beware

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A recent discussion thread on LinkedIn concerned the timing of the adjustment of provisional billing rates on cost-reimbursement contract types. This is an important topic for a number of reasons, including managing cash flow and complying with regulatory requirements. In our experience, it’s a topic that a lot of people have trouble with, so we thought it would be a good topic for a blog article.

The LinkedIn posters generally agreed that billing rates could be adjusted after year-end (when the books closed) and again after the contractor’s final indirect rates were certified and submitted for audit (generally, six months later). These positions were consistent with our understanding of the regulations (e.g., FAR 42.7). But there was less consensus regarding the timing of adjusting provisional billing rates as the work was performed, during the contractor’s fiscal year. So that’s what we are going to focus on here.

Before we get too deep into the discussion, let’s review the requirements of the FAR contract clause 52.216-7 (“Allowable Cost and Payment”). It’s a mandatory contract clause on flexibly priced contracts, meaning that it must be included in any such contract. If you have a cost-reimbursement type contract, it’s almost 100% certain that you have the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause in it, and therefore you have a lot of requirements to comply with. It’s a critical clause to understand, and (unfortunately) it’s also a long and complex clause. But we want to deal with just one specific part of it today because it establishes the regulatory requirements regarding how to set provisional billing rates and when to adjust them during contract performance. Here’s the pertinent quote from 52.216-7:

(e) Billing rates. Until final annual indirect cost rates are established for any period, the Government shall reimburse the Contractor at billing rates established by the Contracting Officer or by an authorized representative (the cognizant auditor), subject to adjustment when the final rates are established. These billing rates—

(1) Shall be the anticipated final rates; and

(2) May be prospectively or retroactively revised by mutual agreement, at either party’s request, to prevent substantial overpayment or underpayment.

So that portion tells us that the provisional billing rates “shall be” the anticipated final rates for the year, and that either party “may” request that the provisional rates be adjusted during performance to better anticipate the final rates, in order “to prevent substantial overpayment or underpayment.” In other words, whenever the contractor knows that its provisional billing rates are varying, to a significant degree, from its currently anticipated final indirect rates for the year, it should request an appropriate adjustment. If the contracting officer declines to adjust the billing rates, then s/he needs to be able to justify why not—since the clause mandates that the provisional billing rates “shall be” the anticipated final rates. Bottom-line: while there may be some discretion with respect to notification, there is no discretion once notification has been made—the billing rates must be adjusted.

That’s how we parse the requirements, in any event.

In the case where a contractor’s provisional billing rates are running higher than it expects to see at year-end, there is usually very little discussion. If the billing rate is set at 100% and the contractor requests it be lowered to 90%, the customer is almost always happy to pay less. However, where a contractor’s billing rates are running lower than it expects to see at year end—meaning that the rates should be increased so as to avoid a substantial underpayment—then our experience has been that the customer is more than somewhat reluctant to increase the billing rates. For example, if the billing rate is set at 90% and the contractor requests it be increased to 100%, then the customer typically is loath to take action, since doing so will burn funding that much faster. In such cases, see the paragraph above and discuss with the customer the use of the word “shall” and what the imperative tense means in government contracting. (Hint: See FAR 2.101, Definitions.)

What about the situation where a contractor knows (or should know) that its provisional billing rates are set too high and that they should be lowered so as to prevent a significant overpayment from being received from its government customer—but the contractor chooses not to notify the contracting officer and request an adjustment? After all, a strict reading of 52.216-7(e), quoted above, seems to say that there is some discretion involved in choosing whether to submit a notification.

Contractors wishing to reap the increased cash flow associated with provisional billing rates that have been set higher than the contractor’s anticipated final rates need to be aware of the requirements associated with another mandatory contract clause—52.232-25 (“Prompt Payment”). Down at the bottom of the clause is this little gem—

(d) Overpayments. If the Contractor becomes aware of a duplicate contract financing or invoice payment or that the Government has otherwise overpaid on a contract financing or invoice payment, the Contractor shall—

(1) Remit the overpayment amount to the payment office cited in the contract along with a description of the overpayment including the—
(i) Circumstances of the overpayment (e.g., duplicate payment, erroneous payment, liquidation errors, date(s) of overpayment);

(ii) Affected contract number and delivery order number if applicable;

(iii) Affected contract line item or subline item, if applicable; and

(iv) Contractor point of contact.

[Emphasis added.]

So the question becomes, if the provisional billing rates have been set higher than they should be, is the contractor generating an improper billing and thus receiving an overpayment for which it must refund the money and provide a description of the “circumstances of the overpayment”? The answer, provided by the FAR Councils, appears to be yes.

In October, 2003, Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 2001-16 implemented as a Final Rule FAR Case 2001-005 (“Notification of Overpayment, Contract Financing Payments”). In the promulgating comments, the FAR Council discussed overpayments and a commenter’s concerns that certain routine contractual actions might be “misconstrued as overpayments because they may result in a need for the contractor to pay a sum back to the Government as a result of the normal and expected operation of contractual terms and conditions.” The commenter recommended that the term “overpayment” be defined in the regulations, so as to prevent any misunderstandings between the contracting parties. The FAR Councils did not agree. Here’s the comment and their response—

Comment: There is concern that credit invoices, due to a revision of indirect billing rates, contractual actions impacting negotiated price, adjustments to progress payments as a result of change in the contract's estimated cost at completion, and authorized borrow-payback transfers will all be potentially misconstrued as overpayments because they may result in a need for the contractor to pay a sum back to the Government as a result of the normal and expected operation of contractual terms and conditions. Therefore, the following definition should be added at the beginning of each of the proposed paragraphs imposing a notification requirement:

An overpayment is a payment of an amount greater than the value the contractor is entitled to receive at the time of the payment.

Councils' response: Do not concur. The intent of the rule is to require contractors to notify the Government when they become aware that an incorrect payment has been made. The Councils do not believe there is a demonstrated need for such a definition. First, the term ‘overpayment’ is used in Government contracting in a variety of contexts, and we are concerned that establishing a definition in the payment clauses could have unintended consequences. Second, when a contract is modified to reflect the incorporation of new billing rates, or some other contract administration action, the contract modification should identify whether a credit is due the Government. The Councils do not anticipate that a contracting officer would issue a notification of overpayment in these instances. If, in the future, it becomes apparent that, in practice, contracting officers are taking an overly broad and needlessly burdensome interpretation of what constitutes an overpayment for the purposes of this notification requirement, then the Councils will revisit this issue.

[Emphasis added.]

So, based on the foregoing, the FAR Councils appeared to link provisional billing rate adjustments to making proper payments; thus, they may well have intended to link a failure to adjust billing rates (when required to make an adjustment) to “incorrect” or “improper” payments that would generate overpayments. It may well be the case that, any discretion found in 52.216-7(e) would be trumped by the mandatory language of 52.232-25(d).

While our interpretation is admittedly tenuous and based on some speculation, do you really want to take a chance that some auditor or contracting officer is going to accuse your company of making improper payments because you intentionally let the provisional billing rate be set too high, thus generating excess cash for your company?

The point is far from academic. Recently, the Department of Justice announced that Calnet, Inc. agreed to pay $18.1 million in order to resolve allegations that it had submitted false claims to the Defense Department. Calnet’s issue was that it allegedly “overstated its provisional overhead or indirect rates” on each of its three contracts to provide translation services for the DOD. The Government alleged that the overstated indirect rates created “inflated claims for payment”—i.e., false claims.

The litigation was the result of a qui tam suit filed under the False Claims Act by a former Calnet employee (who will receive $2.7 million from the settlement). While we don’t know many details of the allegation, we do know that the DOJ press release included the following statement—

‘Contractors are expected to comply with their statutory obligations and act in good faith when dealing with the United States government,’ said Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s Civil Division. ‘We will not tolerate false statements and failure to disclose information that is important to the government’s contracting processes.’

Again, we don’t have the facts of the situation. But the quote above makes us think that Calnet was alleged to have knowingly failed to notify its contracting officer that its provisional billing rates needed to be adjusted downwards. That failure created incorrect invoices that allegedly amounted to false claims.

So this is an issue that can and will be taken seriously by Federal law enforcement officials. So we ask you again—is this an issue you want to take a chance on? We think not. Our advice is to periodically monitor indirect rates and compare year-to-date actuals and at-year-end forecasts with provisional billing rates; promptly notify the cognizant contracting officer if provisional rates should be adjusted downward (or upward).

One more thing before we leave this topic. What about making Disclosures in accordance with the requirements of the contract clause 52.203-13 (“Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct”)? That clause states (in part)—

(b)(3)(i) The Contractor shall timely disclose, in writing, to the agency Office of the Inspector General (OIG), with a copy to the Contracting Officer, whenever, in connection with the award, performance, or closeout of this contract or any subcontract thereunder, the Contractor has credible evidence that a principal, employee, agent, or subcontractor of the Contractor has committed—

(A) A violation of Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in Title 18 of the United States Code; or

(B) A violation of the civil False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 3729-3733).

In the LinkedIn discussion thread one poster wrote that, “One of my clients was recently threatened by DCAA with the sanctions of 52.203-13 saying that failure to revise rates that would result in over-recovery of indirect costs would constitute a ‘knowing failure to timely disclose’ an overpayment.”

There are a couple of things wrong with DCAA’s assertion. As the poster noted, the situation is not as black-and-white as DCAA would assert. The FAR regulations discussing the 52.203-13 clause state—

3.1003  Requirements.

(a) Contractor requirements.

*****

(2) Whether or not the clause at 52.203-13 is applicable, a contractor may be suspended and/or debarred for knowing failure by a principal to timely disclose to the Government, in connection with the award, performance, or closeout of a Government contract performed by the contractor or a subcontract awarded thereunder, credible evidence of a violation of Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in Title 18 of the United States Code or a violation of the civil False Claims Act. Knowing failure to timely disclose credible evidence of any of the above violations remains a cause for suspension and/or debarment until 3 years after final payment on a contract (see 9.406-2(b)(1)(vi) and 9.407-2(a)(8)).

(3) The Payment clauses at FAR 52.212-4(i)(5), 52.232-25(d), 52.232-26(c), and 52.232-27(l) require that, if the contractor becomes aware that the Government has overpaid on a contract financing or invoice payment, the contractor shall remit the overpayment amount to the Government. A contractor may be suspended and/or debarred for knowing failure by a principal to timely disclose credible evidence of a significant overpayment, other than overpayments resulting from contract financing payments as defined in 32.001 (see 9.406-2(b)(1)(vi) and 9.407-2(a)(8)).

[Emphasis added.]

Looking at FAR 32.001, we see the following definition of “contract financing payments”—

“Contract financing payment” means an authorized Government disbursement of monies to a contractor prior to acceptance of supplies or services by the Government.

(1) Contract financing payments include—
(i) Advance payments;

(ii) Performance-based payments;

(iii) Commercial advance and interim payments;

(iv) Progress payments based on cost under the clause at 52.232-16, Progress Payments;

(v) Progress payments based on a percentage or stage of completion (see 32.102(e)), except those made under the clause at 52.232-5, Payments Under Fixed-Price Construction Contracts, or the clause at 52.232-10, Payments Under Fixed-Price Architect-Engineer Contracts; and

(vi) Interim payments under a cost reimbursement contract, except for a cost reimbursement contract for services when Alternate I of the clause at 52.232-25, Prompt Payment, is used.
(2) Contract financing payments do not include—
(i) Invoice payments;

(ii) Payments for partial deliveries; or

(iii) Lease and rental payments.

[Emphasis added.]

Based on the foregoing, it seems fairly clear that interim payments under cost reimbursement contract types cannot generate overpayments, as that term is used by the 52.203-13 clause (except for cost reimbursement contracts for services that use Alternate I of the 52.232-25 clause). Accordingly, it’s unlikely that a contractor would be subject to suspension or debarment for submitting interim vouchers that included too-high provisional billing rates.

But remember that the FAR Councils deliberately avoided defining the term “overpayment,” because that term was used “in a variety of contexts.” So while it seems clear (to us) that such interim payments using provisional billing rates under cost reimbursement contracts cannot create overpayments for purposes of complying (or not complying) with the 52.203-13 requirements—and thus cannot create a situation where a contractor could be suspended or debarred—that’s as far as we can go. As Calnet learned, such interim payments might create overpayments/false claims for purposes of complying with the False Claims Act.

As we noted twice before, is this something you really want to take a chance on?

 

 

Another Way to Assess DCAA Productivity Metrics

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Dogpile
We write this with more than a bit of trepidation. This will be the third article discussing DCAA productivity metrics—the fourth if you count our piece of original reportage on DCAA’s GFY 2011 Report to Congress. That’s kind of overkill, even though our website stats indicate that this is a very popular topic.

Before we move on to other topics, though, we want to bring to your attention a very interesting take on the issue—this one sent to us via e-mail from “Cajun CPA.” Our Southern friend is a longtime reader of the site. Cajun CPA is not a current employee of the Federal government, but let’s just say Cajun CPA is no stranger to the bureaucracy of the Executive Branch.

Before we get into Cajun CPA’s take on the issue of DCAA audit productivity, let’s recap a bit. Originally, we looked at DCAA’s productivity metrics in its GFY 2011 Report to Congress. Despite the agency’s view that it had a “successful” year, and despite DOD’s official view that DCAA’s GFY 2011 activity was “clearly more effective for the taxpayer,” we judged GFY 2011 to be a dismal year for DCAA—calling the agency’s performance “pathetic”.

Almost simultaneously, Professor Loeb published his article assessing DCAA’s audit productivity over time—an article that we and many other commenters called “scathing” but which more than a handful of self-identified current and former DCAA auditors called “spot-on”. In a follow-up article, we discussed the viewpoint of “Bill O-5,” who opined that Professor Loeb’s math was somewhat misleading. “Bill O-5” noted that any percentage in excess of 100% is suspect. So when Professor Loeb talked about a 400% decrease in productivity related to issuance of audit reports on contractor’s final indirect rate proposals, and when we noted a 1,148% decrease in productivity related to post-award “defective pricing” audit report output, “Bill O-5” thought we were both off-base. And he was right. (Note that our understanding is that Professor Loeb did not intend to mislead anybody; indeed, his calculations were vetted by several people before publication.)

When we corrected the calculations along the lines that “Bill O-5” had suggested, we told readers that comparing DCAA’s audit report output in GFY 2008 to its GFY 2011 audit report output revealed a 76 percent decrease in productivity related to final indirect cost rate proposals and a 91 percent decrease in productivity related to “defective pricing” audits. And we were satisfied that was the end of the analysis.

And then we received the e-mail from “Cajun CPA” and we were forced to rethink our analysis.

“Cajun CPA’s” view is that the best way to assess auditor productivity is to look at the number of hours spent producing an audit report. Simply looking at the total number of audit reports issued doesn’t tell the whole story because, as Professor Loeb noted, DCAA has actually increased its audit workforce over the past three years. One needs to “normalize” the output to account for the increased audit hours available to the agency, and “Cajun CPA” did so, and sent us the results.

In GFY 2008, DCAA had 4,200 employees and roughly 8,064,000 work hours available (assuming that each auditor had 1,920 audit hours available per year (which may be overstating the situation, but not materially.) That year, DCAA issued 30,352 reports. So DCAA spent an average of 265.7 hours per report and issued about 7.23 reports per employee.

In GFY 2011, DCAA had 4,777 employees, and thus roughly 9,171,840 work hours available. That year, DCAA issued 7,390 reports. So DCAA spent an average of 1,241.1 hours per report and issued about 1.5 reports per employee.

Comparing GFYs 2008 and 2011, DCAA had 577 more staff, but spent nearly 1,000 more hours on every completed audit report (975 more hours per report, to be exact). In GFY 2011, DCAA was only 21 percent as productive as it was in GFY 2008—meaning that the audit agency was 89 percent less efficient.

Or, to use Professor Loeb’s approach to the analysis, DCAA’s productivity dropped by 467 percent.

We can go on picking apart these numbers. (For example, nobody has commented yet on DCAA’s implementation of electronic working papers and the resulting efficiencies that step was supposed to create.) But it doesn’t matter; the end result is the same. Whether you approach things from Professor Loeb’s perspective, or from “Bill O-5’s” perspective—or from “Cajun CPA’s” perspective—the inescapable fact of the matter is that DCAA’s productivity dropped astoundingly between GFY 2008 and GFY 2011.

The numbers speak for themselves, to those who are willing to listen.

 

 

Lockheed Martin Links Government Requirements to Overhead Costs

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Our thanks to “Cadillac Cowboy” who brought this article to our attention. As he noted, “This ties in with some of your recent blog posts.” Indeed it does.

The article was straight-forward. It reported that Lockheed Martin CEO Bob Stevens told an investor conference that the company’s ability to cut its overhead costs was hindered by increased government demands for data.

This is a phenomenon that we’ve pondered for a while, and even mentioned a time or two in these blog articles. We’ve discussed some of the following points—

  • Creation by DCMA and DOD’s new Pricing Directorate of databases intended to give DOD pricing analysts and contracting officers the ability to negotiate forward pricing rate agreements without reliance on a DCAA audit report. You know the data going into those new databases have to come from somewhere, right? The databases don’t just populate themselves. Since the government (by and large) doesn’t have the data, guess who they ask to provide it?

  • Recent DOD emphasis on “should-cost” analysis, where government analysts assess how their contractors can reduce costs, based on review of lots of detailed contractor cost information. Where do you think all that cost information comes from? Guess who they ask to provide it?

  • Recent DOD and DCAA emphasis on strict adherence to the proposal format of FAR Table 15-2, even when common sense would tell a reasonable negotiator that after two decades or so of production, more cost information was not going to be significantly different from what had transpired. Making the contractor submit a full-up TINA-compliant cost proposal in such circumstances struck us as being essentially “make work” that added little value but added a lot of costs. And then—to add insult to injury—the government found the contractor’s proposal to be “inadequate” and stalled negotiations as a result, leading to workforce impacts.

  • DCAA’s impossible backlog and how delays in audit performance lead to contractors having to retain documents to support those audits. Guess who pays for storage costs?

Anyway, the point is that CEO Stevens is saying what’s been on our mind for some time. And he’s saying it in public. Here is how the article quoted Mr. Stevens—

Lockheed Chief Executive Bob Stevens said his company was working hard to drive down overhead, but the government's ‘should cost’ initiative meant the company needed more people to generate thousands of pages of additional paperwork.

‘The more the government asks us to do, the more pressure that puts on having the overheads … What won't work in my mind is an ever increasing set of demands by the government for more and more and more information and responsiveness, and an increasing expectation that the facilities that are available to meet those increasing demands ought to be reduced and reduced and reduced.’ …

Stevens said Lockheed took the Pentagon's concerns about overhead costs very seriously and … it … remained focused ‘on every expense account, every capital request, every individual ...job that we have in the company, how to reduce and how to streamline.’

But he said Lockheed was telling U.S. defense officials to be more focused in their requests for additional data.

‘It falls a little bit into the domain of help us help you. If you want us to continue to focus on overhead reduction, then maybe we ought to look at how we work together with one another and exactly what is needed and be more specific and more tailored and more focused,’ he said. …

Stevens said the Pentagon's focus on what weapons programs ‘should cost’ - as opposed to estimates focused on what they ‘would cost’ - had resulted in increasing requests for more certified cost and pricing data.

Lockheed submitted 6,000 pages of data with its initial F-35 proposal, but had been required to generate an additional 7,000 pages of data for the negotiations in recent months, he said.

Part of the “Better Buying Power” initiative is to assist contractors in reducing their indirect costs through cutting “non-productive processes and bureaucracy.” Dr. Carter wrote—

Industry has its own internal unproductive processes which add to project costs, but these are in some part a reflection of the requirements which the government imposes. A great number of the inputs I received from industry were directed at what was viewed as excessive overhead expenses based solely on non-value-added mandates and reporting requirements which may have been relevant at some point in time, but have little relevance in the world in which we now find ourselves. In order to identify and reduce these costly requirements, I am directing the Director of Industrial Policy, with support from DPAP, to more fully survey our industrial base to identify, prioritize, and recommend a path forward to unwind duplicative and overly rigorous requirements that add to costs, but do not add to quality of product or timeliness of delivery. As we remove these requirements, I will expect a decline in the overhead charged to the Department by our industrial base that reflects these reduced costs.

(Emphasis in original.)

President Obama has ordered reviews that aim to weed-out “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome” regulations so as to reduce burdens on those being regulated.

According to Lockheed’s CEO, none of these top-down directions are working. Instead, he sees a growing and insatiable demand for data—while at the same time contractors are being told to cut costs associated with the functions that provide the government with the data they demand. He sees a fundamental contradiction—and we see it as well.

We as an industry have known for decades that compliance with regulatory requirements carries with it a cost, and that DOD’s insistence on certain requirements means that they (and the taxpayers) pay more for goods and services than they otherwise would, had their requirements not been imposed. Now for the first time in memory, we are experiencing increased regulatory burdens and data demands while that price premium is being attacked. It’s not logical, but it’s real nonetheless.

Illegitimi non carborundum

 

 

Army Captain Steals $48,000 Through Secret “Illegal Mechanism”

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Theft
We almost decided to pass this one over because there’s not a lot of meat on the bone to chew on. But then we thought, “Why don’t we know more? Where are the lessons to be learned?” The answer to those questions is that the Department of Justice did not see fit to share details of the crime, even though knowing how the crime was committed might aid others in preventing future occurrences.

In that vein, remember “Captain Mike”? Sure you do, because we wrote about him more than once. In our first article, we told you that Captain Mike stole at least $690,000 in emergency response program funds from a safe from his battalion’s station in Iraq. We don’t know exactly how much Captain Mike stole because—even though he was the only person who had access to the funds stored in the battalion’s safe—nobody ever detected his crime. Not his replacement, not his commanding officer—nobody. It was only when he returned to the USA in 2008 and began displaying a lavish lifestyle in his Oregon hometown that somebody noticed and wondered where an Army Captain got the funds to purchase a brand-new Hummer and a brand-new BMW. That somebody was the IRS.

The story of “Captain Mike” led us to note a couple of troubling trends related to crimes committed by (former) active military service personnel. Things that bugged us included—

  • The apparent lack of internal controls at military bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, where nobody apparently thought to actually conduct an inventory of government property such as “bundles of uncirculated $100 bills.” Captain Mike was one individual, but there were very likely dozens if not scores of similar personnel who had access to large amounts of money without any controls addressing how it was spent. We bet there were better controls in effect on Kevlar helmets than there were on millions of dollars.

  • The apparent break that the Department of Justice cuts for (former) active military service personnel. For example, “Captain Mike” was charged with “theft of government property” and received a sentence of 30 months in prison. Similarly, “Sergeant Bob” was allowed to plead guilty to one count of “conspiring to steal public property” for his role in helping to steal eight generators from Forward Operating Base Diamondback in Iraq. Looking at these cases and comparing them to civilian government contractors who commit offenses such as timekeeping fraud, we’re not seeing a lot of parity.

  • The lack of details provided by the DOJ in its press releases. Apparently, nobody at DOJ thinks that we in the compliance, risk, and internal controls fields needs to understand what went wrong so that we can determine whether or not we have the same vulnerabilities. So we’re left guessing and hoping we’re doing a good job.

The latest case that came to our attention seems to continue those trends. It concerns another (former) Army Captain who was stationed in Iraq, and who used her position and the lax internal controls to steal $48,000. According to the DOJ press release, Captain Nichole Luvera, age 29, pleaded guilty to one count of “theft of government property” for her crime. She faces up to 10 years in prison but no doubt will receive a considerably lighter sentence from the Judge. The DOJ reported that—

… from July 2007 to September 2008, Luvera was the deputy disbursing officer on Camp Speicher in Iraq.  Luvera was responsible for daily financial management and accounting of all money kept at Camp Speicher for the payment of obligations of the United States.  In this capacity, Luvera had access to the vault and safes inside the vault in which all the money at Camp Speicher was kept.  According to statements made at the plea hearing, Luvera admitted she knowingly and unlawfully stole and converted to her use and the use of others $8,000 not reflected in the official accounting record.  Luvera also admitted that on a subsequent occasion, she devised an illegal mechanism to steal and convert another approximately $40,000 from the safe at Camp Speicher by fraudulently creating records to explain the absence of the money.

Now admittedly, Luvera’s crime pales in comparison to Captain Mike’s audacity. She stole an amount that was less than 10 percent of Captain Mike’s take. And she was caught, apparently by some means other than the IRS. Which is all good.

But notice that we still don’t know the details of her crime. What, exactly, is this “illegal mechanism” that she devised to “steal and convert” the bulk of the stolen funds? We know it involved creation of false records of some kind—but which ones? And how was she caught?

Also notice that Luvera’s creation of false records might have subjected her to prosecution under the False Statements Act. Prosecutors declined to go there; perhaps it was a part of the plea bargain.

So we are left with the feeling that there’s more to this story than the press release tells us. Which is kind of frustrating, right?

 

 

We Do NOT Have Paranormal Abilities—But GSA Might Think We Do

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Crystal_Ball
Well, it was not the best feeling in the world to learn that we’d made a mistake at the very moment we were on a larger stage with the spotlight shining on us. Not a good feeling at all.

As you know (because we told you), when we thought that Jeff Neely’s spending spree at GSA was connected with excess Industrial Funding Fee (IFF) receipts from contractors, we were wrong. That article got picked up in a blog with a larger readership than this one has … and then it got picked up at Forbes.com. And then several people—some of them with official GSA connections—pointed out that Neely was part of GSA’s Public Buildings Service while the MAS contracts that generated the excess IFF receipts were part of GSA’s Federal Acquisition Service. PBS handles management duties related to Federal buildings while FAS handles MAS contracts and other procurements. Two independent silos, one agency. We got that wrong.

Both silos receive funds from the public at large that offset a large part of the agency’s operating costs—PBS receives rent payments and FAS receives IFF payments. Because of those receipts, GSA requires relatively small amounts of taxpayer funds. Had we known better, we could have linked Neely’s lavish spending to the general agency culture. After all, an agency that has a documented history of retaining excess funds in its reserves and not giving those funds back to the taxpayers (or to the U.S. Treasury) has a serious cultural problem, and it would not be terribly surprising to see certain individuals within the agency develop an idea that the funds were theirs to use as they wished, rather than being treated as taxpayer-provided Congressionally appropriated funds—which in large part they were not.

We could have written the article around that theme, but we didn’t—because we didn’t understand GSA’s organization well enough to see that there were two independent silos.

When our error was pointed out, we spent a fair amount of time on the GSA website. One thing we noticed was that the agency had a very complex organizational structure—it looked to us like a matrix, with operations organized by Region as well as by the independent silos. We were getting a bit defensive at that point, and we were tempted to write about the potential redundancies in the structure that we saw, and the lack of clarity (on the website) regarding why GSA needed to structure its management along both Regional and Product Line axes. But the better angels of our nature took over and we simply apologized as sincerely as we could, and then moved on as quickly as we could.

And that should have been the end of it.

But then Federal Times ran a story on May 16, 2012—exactly one week after we published our red-faced apology over mistakes in our original article (published April 23, 2012)—in which it was reported that “the agency will likely merge portions of its two main divisions — the Public Buildings Service, which manages federal buildings and building leases, and the Federal Acquisition Service, which oversees many federal contracting programs.”

The article reported recent interview remarks from acting GSA Administrator Dan Tangherlini as follows—

‘I think just integrating GSA better is one of the things we are particularly interested in,’ [Tangherlini] said. ‘As we looked at what took place at the Western Regions Conference … we saw that we hadn't struck the right balance between autonomy and accountability. Can we maintain the benefits of autonomy and innovation and different approaches that reflect the needs of customer agencies and regions while we enhance and improve the accountability? I think integration is a part of that.’

Merging portions of GSA's buildings division and contracts division — such as the information technology, finance and contracting operations — also will bring efficiencies and cut costs, he said.

Well, that was weird, right? Just one week earlier, we were being taken out to the woodshed for not getting the distinctions between PBS and FAS, and now GSA was announcing that “portions” of the two silos were going to be merged together—erasing some of those distinctions. Is that not eerie?

On May 17, Federal Times ran a follow-up story providing some more details from the Tangherlini interview. Tangherlini was quoted as saying—

Not having multiple organizations within our organization doing the same thing is going to allow us to be more efficient ourselves, deliver our services more effectively and reduce costs. I think they are closely tied together right now, but I think there are opportunities for them to work more closely together.

When we move in together into 1800 F Street … and the renovations are completed, the two sides will be together for the first time in modern history, and there will be real opportunities for best practices across the organization and to make sure we do things once, and do it well and do it more cost effectively. …

Are there places where we duplicate services that are being provided within the organization itself? One of the ideas we have already looked at is consolidating our internal finance shop and having one finance shop. We are looking at issues around [information technology] services within GSA and acquisition services within GSA, [and] PBS and [the Federal Acquisition Service] coming closer together and doing it once and doing it right as a way of reducing the cost of the services that we provide.

Look, we don’t want you to take this the wrong way. We were wrong. Wrong, wrong, wrong. PBS was not FAS and FAS was not PBS. Nobody in FAS (that we know of) was tainted by the 2010 Las Vegas “conference”. But still … we are seriously considering claiming that our original article was impacted by visions of the future state of the GSA organization. We are trying to muster the gumption to claim (with a straight face) that we are truly psychic and we saw this coming and that’s what we wrote.

Do you think anybody is gonna buy that?

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.