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Apogee Consulting Inc

DOD Implements Limits on Prices Paid for Contracted Services

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We have devoted several blog articles to the question as to whether or not the Federal government’s use of contracted (“outsourced”) services results in any cost savings. As we reported, opinions vary. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) had an opinion; so did the Government Accountability Office (GAO); so did the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Opinions varied and we suggested that our readers should look at the various studies and reach their own conclusions.

In the meantime, Congress has spoken. In a little-known section of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress imposed “a temporary limitation” on the amount of funds available for contracted services by Department of Defense. The Public Law reads—

Except as provided in subsection (b), the total amount obligated by the Department of Defense for contract services in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 may not exceed the total amount requested for the Department for contract services in the budget of the President for fiscal year 2010 (as submitted to Congress …) adjusted for net transfers from funding for overseas contingency operations.

In addition, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense as follows—

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue guidance to the military departments and the Defense Agencies on implementation of this section during fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The guidance shall, at a minimum—
(1) establish a negotiation objective that labor rates and overhead rates in any contract or task order for contract services with an estimated value in excess of $10,000,000 awarded to a contractor in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 shall not exceed labor rates and overhead rates paid to the contractor for contract services in fiscal year 2010;

(2) require the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of the Defense Agencies to approve in writing any contract or task order for contract services with an estimated value in excess of $10,000,000 awarded to a contractor in fiscal year 2012 or 2013 that provides for continuing services at an annual cost that exceeds the annual cost paid by the military department or Defense Agency concerned for the same or similar services in fiscal year 2010;

As contractors have been discovering this little landmine buried in the Public Law, they have become concerned that overzealous contracting officers might use the foregoing to limit any contractor increases to direct labor rates and/or to indirect cost rates. A careful reading of the language should clarify that the statute does not impose any such limits; instead, it requires that such limits be used to establish the government’s negotiation objectives.

That is not at all the same thing. The government may establish for itself any negotiation objective it wishes; that does not mean government negotiators will achieve those goals.

In order to comply with the statutory requirement, the DOD could not wait for the usual rule-making bodies to act. Instead, the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Directorate issued a Class Deviation in June, 2012. The Class Deviation essentially reiterates the statutory language quoted above, and notes that the Class Deviation will “remain in effect until incorporated in the FAR or DFARS, or rescinded.”

The thing is, why would this ever need to be in the FAR or DFARS? The statute required that “guidance” be issued, and so it was issued. Nothing more need be done. In fact, we would assert that “guidance” doesn’t belong in the FAR or DFARS. If DPAP thinks it’s necessary to codify the guidance, then the proper place for it would be in the DOD PGI (Procedures, Guidance, and Information). That may sound like a bit of a nitpick (and perhaps it is). But the folks at DPAP are supposed to be the top regulatory policy and rule-makers at DOD, and they are not supposed to make mistakes like that. (If it wasn’t a mistake and they really do think that the proper place for “guidance” is in the FAR or DFARS, then Heaven help us all.)

One might wonder why Congress felt it was necessary to implement such funding controls over outsourced DOD services. According to the Senate Conference Report (helpfully provided at the WIFCON website)—

The efficiencies initiatives announced by the Secretary of Defense on August 9, 2010, included a 3-year, 10 percent per year reduction in support contractors performing `staff augmentation services' and a 3-year freeze on DOD civilian personnel. The committee notes that `staff augmentation services' has a subjective definition, and this category of contractors is not tracked in any of the Department's business systems. Moreover, many comparable functions are performed both by civilian employees of the Department and pursuant to contracts for services. Expected savings from the reduction in staff augmentation services and the civilian workforce freeze could easily be lost if other categories of services contracts are permitted to grow without limitation so that spending can shift to these contracts.

Over the last decade, DOD spending for contract services has more than doubled, from $72.0 billion in fiscal year 2000 to more than $150.0 billion (not including spending for overseas contingency operations), while the size of the Department's civilian employee workforce has remained essentially unchanged. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics testified in September 2010:

`I just tell you, the low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have grown faster than everything else. . . . So, there's a lot we can do. … I think great savings can be had there, across the Services' spend. It's essential that we look there, because that's half the money.' …

The committee concludes that an across-the-board freeze on DOD spending for contract services comparable to the freeze that the Secretary of Defense has imposed on the civilian workforce is warranted to ensure that the Department maintains an appropriate balance between its civilian and contractor workforces and achieves expected savings from planned reductions to both workforces.

In other words, DOD promised to cut its support contractors as well as its civilian workforce as part of its “Better Buying Power Initiative.” Congress didn’t want those promised cost savings offset by increases in other areas of service contracting. Moreover, DOD officials testified that they could find lots of cost savings in that area; Congress was simply taking them at their words.

In other words, DOD did this to itself. Now they—and defense contractors—need to live with the results.

 

 

Has USAF (Re)Learned How to Evaluate Proposals?

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reaper-targeting
Readers know that we’ve taken the US Air Force to task—more than once—for botched source evaluation and award decisions. The debacle of the KC-X aerial tanker competition was not the only screw-up. More recently, legal maneuvering with regard to the Light Air Support (LAS) competition, evaluation, and award to the team of Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) and Embraer has generated several articles on this site—the most recent here.

The LAS story involves a USAF award decision that was “inadequately documented,” a refusal to provide the losing bidder with a debrief (because of an untimely request), a denied protest at GAO, litigation at the Court of Federal Claims, a “Commander Directed Investigation” into the source selection decision, an early termination of the inadequately documented contract award, and a decision to recompete the matter. As we reported, the USAF decided not to conduct a fly-off in the recompete, a decision that Under Secretary for Defense (AT&L) Kendall termed “acquisition malpractice” when it was made with respect to the F-35 JSF program.

It is that decision not to perform flight tests that sparked SNC to file an action of its own at the Court of Federal Claims, seeking to have its terminated contract reinstated. The various stories on SNC’s action all of appear to be strangely similar in wording, almost as if they were all recapping the same SNC press release. Here’s a quote from the story linked-to above—

According to SNC the cancellation of the contract was an extreme response to what appears to be paperwork errors on the part of the USAF. Moreover, the revised Request for Proposal (RFP) issued by the USAF is tilted in favor of the competition. … SNC’s filing also raises specific concerns with the source selection process and revisions to Amendment 8 of the RFP. The new source selection process eliminates any flight demonstration/evaluation and moves the completion of First Article Test (FAT) of production aircraft out until delivery in July 2014.  … The original source selection process included flight demonstrations of training and combat mission profiles and austere field operations. The competition sought non-developmental aircraft, which by definition should be available for evaluation.

Using language that was quite reminiscent of Hawker Beechcraft’s complaints regarding the original source selection decision, SNC Vice President Taco Gilbert was quoted as saying—

‘Despite repeated written and verbal attempts, we have not received adequate explanation – much less justification – for the termination of our contract, the reopening of the LAS competition or the readmission to the LAS competition of our competitor whose submission was previously found to be technically deficient and carry unacceptable mission capability risk.’

Gilbert added—

‘What we seek is a fair and open competition – one where there is a level playing field, one that provides transparency into the decision making process, and one that selects the best value as required by the Request for Proposal. Unfortunately, based on the information we have, we are concerned that this competition will not conform to these goals.’

But while the LAS debacle continues (depriving the warfighters in Southwest Asia with needed ISR capability), the USAF seems to have figured out how to evaluate complex proposals and make protest-proof source selection decisions in other areas. We are referring to the Dismount Detection Radar (DDR) contract award to Raytheon, a decision that was protested by the losing bidder (Northrop Grumman). Northrop’s protest was denied, and the lengthy GAO decision gives us enough details so that we think the USAF evaluators may have (re)learned how to do their job.

According to the GAO decision—

The DDR system is intended to provide a ground moving target indicator capability to detect and track vehicles and dismounts. The system, operating as a pod on the MQ-9 Block 5 Reaper, will allow combatant commanders and their forces to identify and eliminate threats before adversaries engage in harmful activities against the United States and Coalition Forces. … According to the agency, the DDR system is an urgent and compelling need of the warfighter.

The Air Force sought bids from only two companies, Raytheon and Northrop. The decision to limit competition was properly justified, according to the GAO. RFP evaluation factors were clearly articulated, as follows—

Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the best value to the government based on an integrated assessment of three evaluation factors: (1) schedule; (2) technical capability (comprised of two subfactors, technical performance, and engineering and management integrated processes--technical performance was considered more important); and (3) cost/price. … The schedule factor was more important than the technical capability factor; when combined, these factors were approximately equal to the cost/price factor. Each offeror’s technical solution would be assessed both technical and risk ratings for the schedule factor and for each technical capability subfactor. … For the technical ratings, the Air Force was to evaluate the quality of the technical solutions as outstanding, good, acceptable, and so on. In assessing the risk associated with each approach, which was to be evaluated as low, moderate, or high, the Air Force was to consider such things as the potential for disruption of schedule and the need for increased government oversight.

The bidders submitted proposals and made an oral presentation. The Source Selection Evaluation Team (SSET) made an initial evaluation and briefed the Source Selection Authority (SSA). Written and oral discussions were held with both bidders, and both bidders submitted final proposal revisions in response to those discussions. The final proposal revisions were evaluated by the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), briefed the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) on its findings, and prepared a Proposal Analysis Report (PAR). The SSAC prepared a Comparative Analysis Report (CAR) and briefed the SSA on its award recommendation. The GAO decision stated—

In making his source selection decision, the SSA conducted an integrated assessment and found that Raytheon’s proposal presented a lower evaluated cost, less risk in the schedule factor, and a higher performing and more capable DDR system in the technical performance factor. He considered Raytheon’s proposal to be the best value for the government.

The GAO decision also reported that—

… the SSA first found that Raytheon had the stronger proposal under the schedule factor based on differences in the maturity of the offerors’ antenna array design/built/test efforts. … Second, under the technical performance subfactor, the SSA explained that Raytheon’s one weakness was based on its proposal of [DELETED] flight tests, an insufficient number. The SSA concurred with the technical team’s conclusion that four additional flight tests would be required; given Raytheon’s approach, [DELETED] flight tests would be adequate. Raytheon’s GEMPC [Government Estimate of Most Probable Cost] was adjusted upward to account for the additional flight tests. Overall, the SSA concluded that Raytheon’s proposal, and its combined performance in the areas of radar performance, non-developmental items reuse, scalability and upgradeability, and information assurance, offered significantly more benefit to the government than did Northrop Grumman’s proposal…. Although Northrop Grumman distinguished itself in certain areas, it was not enough to overcome Raytheon’s overall superior DDR system performance and capabilities. … The SSA also noted that Raytheon’s proposal had the lowest evaluated cost.

We won’t go into all the issues raised by Northrop. We’ll simply summarize the issues as the GAO did. To wit—

Northrop Grumman primarily challenges numerous aspects of the Air Force’s evaluation of the proposals and alleges that they were disparately evaluated.

The evaluation of technical proposals is a matter within the agency’s discretion, since the agency is responsible for defining its needs and for identifying the best methods of accommodating those needs. … Our Office will not reevaluate technical proposals; rather, we will review a challenge to an agency’s evaluation only to determine whether it was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations. … A protester's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment regarding the relative merits of competing proposals does not establish that the evaluation was unreasonable. … Our decision does not specifically address all of Northrop Grumman’s arguments, but we have fully considered each of them and conclude that they do not provide a basis to sustain the protests.

Readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of government source selection and evaluation requirements may be put-off by the number of acronyms and the obviously bureaucratic processes involved. (We could have described even more bureaucratic processes and used even more acronyms, had we wished. They are certainly present in the GAO protest decision.) But readers need to understand that such seemingly bureaucratic processes are designed to (1) provide documentation, (2) support transparency, (3) facilitate oversight (including judicial review, if necessary), and (4) provide assurance that taxpayer funds are being wisely spent.

Contrast the robust documentation trail in the DDR source evaluation and selection decision with the “inadequate” documentation trail in the LAS competition. In the former case, a protest was denied and the winner could get back to performing the contract. In the latter case, a contract was terminated, an investigation was launched, and the parties are flailing about in court. In the former case, the warfighters will get their technical support on time; in the latter case, they will not.

Which do you think is the better outcome?

 

 

DCAA Takes on Firm Full of Statisticians, with Statistically Predictable Results

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Recently, DCAA has had its troubles supporting cost disallowances associated with executive compensation. In February, we wrote about the appeal of J.F. Taylor, Inc. before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). More recently, the ASBCA heard another executive compensation appeal. Slightly different facts and issues; same result. As was the case with the first claim, DCAA’s audit methodology was sharply criticized and found lacking, and the contractor’s appeal was sustained.

In J.F. Taylor, Inc., we reported that testimony from the Government’s expert witness was given “little or no weight” by the ASBCA Judges. In contrast, the contractor’s expert witness was able to convince the Judges that DCAA’s methodology for evaluating the reasonableness of the contractor’s executive compensation suffered from nine separate errors. The presiding Judge wrote that DCAA’s methodology was “fatally flawed.” The majority of the costs questioned and disallowed by the Government were found to be reasonable and, hence, allowable.

In the current case, Metron, Inc., DCAA had not only found some of the company’s executive compensation to be unreasonably high, but it had issued Form 1 cost disallowances in the amount of roughly $1.1 Million. The cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) issued demand letters for about $700,000 representing the DOD portion of Metron’s “unallowable” compensation costs.

As readers know, when a contractor’s cost is challenged as being unreasonable, the contractor bears the burden to show that the cost is, in fact, reasonable in amount. It is not enough to show that DCAA’s methodology was flawed; the contractor must convince the Judges that the costs in question meet the FAR 31.2 definition of “reasonableness”. That was Metron’s challenge. Fortunately for Metron, it had a number of statisticians and mathematicians on staff who could not only show where DCAA erred, but also show why the company’s position was correct. Metron met its burden of proof and its appeal was sustained.

It is fairly axiomatic that independent salary surveys are used to support the reasonableness of contractor salaries. Metron only used one survey (the “Radford Survey”) to benchmark its executive salaries. In contrast, DCAA used other surveys in addition to the Radford Survey. Metron provided DCAA with an extensive justification regarding why use of the single Radford Survey was appropriate. That justification was written by two Metron executives: one of whom had a B.S in Mathematics, a M.S. in Statistics, and a Ph.D. in Statistics, while the other had a B.S, M.S., and Ph.D. in Mathematics. In contrast to Metron’s well-justified methodology, the ASBCA Judges found that the addition survey data used by DCAA “were not sufficiently comprehensive, reliable, relevant to Metron’s industry, and/or the job matches were not sufficiently similar and representative to warrant material reduction of the results obtained from the use of the Radford Survey data alone …”

DCAA auditors also adjusted the Radford Survey results for various reasons, with the result that the allowable Metron incentive compensation was lower than it otherwise would have been. Metron’s expert witness took issue with DCAA’s adjustments, but so did the Government’s expert witness. Both experts “rejected” DCAA’s adjustments. In addition, Metron’s executives also performed statistical analyses that “persuasively demonstrated” to the Judges that the Radford Survey data would not support the kind of regression analysis used by the Government expert to support DCAA’s findings.

The parties also disputed whether Metron’s Senior Engineers were executives, or whether they were mid-level project managers. Apparently, because the Senior Engineers lacked the title of Vice President, DCAA believed they were not executives—but Metron’s expert noted that DCAA auditors “conducted no substantive interviews of any of the executives … and failed to understand Metron’s needs for executive talent or how it accomplished its business mission.” The Judges found that, based on their duties and responsibilities, the Senior Engineers were, in fact, executives—even though they lacked an executive-like title.

When evaluating Metron’s financial performance, DCAA auditors ignored a $950,000 “voluntary contribution” to its profit-sharing plan. (The contribution was treated as an unallowable cost by Metron.) Had Metron not made the payment, its corporate profits would have been that much higher. However, DCAA auditors refused to increase corporate profits by the contribution, which had the effect of lowering the company’s financial performance. This was an error on DCAA”s part, according to both Metron’s and the Government’s expert witnesses.

The Judges also found that DCAA’s “fragmenting” of the contractor’s total revenue in order to apportion it to various organizational “divisions” (which allegedly would help assess the reasonableness of the compensation of the executive in charge of the division) was unsupportable.

The ASBCA Judges found that Metron had supported the reasonableness of the compensation of its executives, even though the compensation was above the 50 percentile in the Radford Survey. It rejected nearly every aspect of DCAA’s comparison methodology.

To conclude, many contractors have suffered over the years at the hands of DCAA’s compensation analysts. Bu it is the rare contractor who has both the backbone and expertise to litigate the matter. Metron was in the enviable position of having several high-powered mathematicians and statisticians on staff, which helped the contractor immensely in its battle with the Government.

As the two recent ASBCA cases show, DCAA’s compensation evaluation methodology is generally flawed and does not lead to correct assessments of compensation reasonableness. However, as we noted above, it is not enough to show the flaws in DCAA’s methodology; contractors must also have strong support to demonstrate why their compensation is reasonable. For those contractors who feel strongly that their position is in the right, the battle is difficult, but it can be won.

 

 

Want to Know How to Fix DCAA? Ask Everyone!

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Telephone
The current DCAA narrative is that the audit agency can focus on both quality and productivity, and catch back up to where it needs to be. Sarah Chacko recently wrote on Federal Times that DCAA has such a catch-up plan. She wrote—

DCAA officials say … DCAA has a plan to pick up speed and eliminate the backlog by October 2014. The agency will:
• Expand the auditing staff. It has already added 615 employees since 2008 and plans to add another 1,000 by 2015 to bring its auditor workforce to more than 5,000.

• Dedicate teams of auditors entirely to the backlog of incurred cost audits, which are audits of contracts that have already been paid.

• Conduct less stringent audits on low-risk contractors.

• Farm out some work to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Specifically, it is asking DCMA to conduct more forward-pricing audits, which are audits performed on contractors' proposed prices and terms of service prior to the award of a contract. Doing this should free up more DCAA auditors to work on the backlog of incurred-cost audits.

But, as Ms. Chacko wrote, “Contract lawyers and former DCAA auditors say that won't be enough.”

Meanwhile, over at the POGO blog, self-identified current and former DCAA auditors continue to post comments regarding problems faced by the audit agency. We’ve quoted a few of those in a past article, but new posts keep coming. One of the new commenters, posting as “Bill Reed,” posted (perhaps with tongue in cheek?)—

I have copy/pasted several of the comments on this blog to the anonymous feedback page of the DCAA intranet site. Their silence has been deafening. So I assume that they think all this media buzz is not worth their attention. Fitzgerald told me personally that he could not manager an agency on the basis of blog comments. I'm note sure what the answer is, but I encourage all of you with an interest in this problem to continue commenting. I'm pretty sure the management elite is monitoring the POGO cimments. Maybe we can make a difference. Let's hear from you!!!

That comment got us thinking about the use of blog comments (anonymous or not) to guide organizational strategy.

At first glance it seems obvious that any organization’s leadership has to hold its course and thus cannot be swayed by anonymous blog comments—or even entire blog articles—that purport to point out problems and to proffer possible solutions. But then we thought—why not?

Why can’t Director Fitzgerald and his Senior Executives reach out to the rank-and-file auditors, or to academia, or to the contractors, or even to the public at large? Why can’t any organization’s leadership seek feedback and suggestions for course corrections from a wide group of opinion-holders? Why can’t it be done? What’s stopping it from happening?

We want to let you know that it’s already being done. Just not by DCAA or by DCMA or by any other DOD entity that we know of (with the possible exception of DARPA). It’s being done by companies in diverse industries in locations around the world.

Folks, it’s called “crowdsourcing.”

According to Wikipedia, crowdsourcing “is a process that involves outsourcing tasks to a distributed group of people.” The Wikipedia article continues—

In the classic use of the term, problems are broadcast to an unknown group of solvers in the form of an open call for solutions. Users—also known as the crowd—submit solutions. Solutions are then owned by the entity that broadcast the problem in the first place—the crowdsourcer. The contributor of the solution is, in some cases, compensated either monetarily, with prizes, or with recognition. In other cases, the only rewards may be kudos or intellectual satisfaction. Crowdsourcing may produce solutions from amateurs or volunteers working in their spare time, or from experts or small businesses which were unknown to the initiating organization.

Wondering whether the concept of crowdsourcing had ever been applied to management problems, we did a quick Google search and came up with this article at the Management Innovation EXchange (the MIX).

In an article entitled, “Should You Crowdsource Your Strategy?” MIX author Polly LaBarre wrote—

All too often, direction setting happens in an ivory tower—cut off from valuable in-the-trenches insight and expertise and out of tune with shifts in the broader environment. What’s more, when strategy is cooked up in an elite enclave, the process of ‘selling’ it to the very people expected to implement it becomes an arduous and uncertain chore.

Sounds like what we’ve been saying about Fort Belovoir for quite some time, doesn’t it? But there’s more.

Ms. LaBarre gives a positive review to an article at McKinsey Quarterly (registration required), and she even quoted from it. The article was called, “The Social Side of Strategy” and it discussed whether, and how, to crowdsource organizational strategy. It started as follows—

In 2009, Wikimedia launched a special wiki—one dedicated to the organization’s own strategy. Over the next two years, more than 1,000 volunteers generated some 900 proposals for the company’s future direction and then categorized, rationalized, and formed task forces to elaborate on them. The result was a coherent strategic plan detailing a set of beliefs, priorities, and related commitments that together engendered among participants a deep sense of dedication to Wikimedia’s future. Through the launch of several special projects and the continued work of self-organizing teams dedicated to specific proposals, the vision laid out in the strategic plan is now unfolding.

The article was rife with examples of how companies in diverse industries are experimenting with innovative ways of developing their organization’s strategy. It noted—

… executives at organizations that are experimenting with more participatory modes of strategy development cite two major benefits. One is improving the quality of strategy by pulling in diverse and detailed frontline perspectives that are typically overlooked but can make the resulting plans more insightful and actionable. The second is building enthusiasm and alignment behind a company’s strategic direction—a critical component of long-term organizational health, effective execution, and strong financial performance that is all too rare …

The article pointed out that making a break from the status quo requires a certain level of courage. It stated—

It takes courage to bring more people and ideas into strategic direction setting. Senior executives who launch such initiatives are essentially using their positional authority to distribute power. They’re also embracing the underlying principles—transparency, radical inclusion, egalitarianism, and peer review—of the Web-based social technologies that make it possible to open up direction setting.

Taking these principles to their logical conclusion suggests a shift in the strategic-leadership role of the CEO and other members of the C-suite: from ‘all-knowing decision makers,’ who are expected to know everything and tell others what to do, to ‘social architects,’ who spend a lot of time thinking about how to create the processes and incentives that unearth the best thinking and unleash the full potential of all who work at a company. Making this shift doesn’t imply an abdication of strategic leadership. The CEO and other top executives still have the right—indeed, the responsibility—to step in if things go awry, and of course they continue to be responsible for making the difficult trade-offs that are the essence of good strategy.

Doesn’t the above sound like how one might describe certain aspects of DCAA leaders? As others have pointed out, recent leadership position descriptions don’t require any in-depth knowledge of FAR or CAS. Instead, classic leadership “soft skills” have been emphasized. So why not keep going in that direction? Put in such a fashion, does it really seem like that large of a step to go from actively ignoring input to actively soliciting it?

The bottom-line is this: DOD and DCAA leadership have (allegedly) stated that they must ignore blog comments (such as those found at POGO) and steer their ship by the stars as they see them. That’s a great management philosophy from 30 or 40 years ago, but ignores the many benefits to be gained from a more participatory discussion of strategy and policy—one involving not only front-line auditors and audit supervisors, but also contractors, POGO, and other members of the public at large.

The thing is, we aren’t living in 1965: this is the twenty-first century. This is the golden age of information. This is the age of social networking. We have Facebook and LinkedIn and Plaxo and Twitter and Tumblr and Heaven knows what other social media to connect us to each other. We have Kickstarter and Survey Monkey and lots of other avenues that would let people with opinions connect with those who might benefit from those opinions. We already have the technology; it can be done, if the desire and will are there.

More fundamentally, what does DCAA leadership have to lose by opening the doors to the opinionated crowd? At worst, they create an opportunity for folks to vent and to let out their frustrations. At best, they might learn something new, something that sparks them to take action in a new direction.

Obviously, the only thing stopping DCAA (and DCMA) leadership from opening-up a participatory dialog with interested stakeholders is an unreasonably firm grasp on past management approaches and practices—and, perhaps, a fear of embracing twenty-first century networking modalities.

 

 

More Government Employee Misconduct

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From time to time we like to write about the misconduct of Federal employees. We do this because we want to remind readers—especially readers who work for the Federal government—that not all contractors are crooks and there is probably no more contractor misconduct than there is Federal civilian service employee misconduct or military serviceperson misconduct. Wherever you find lax internal controls and people with lax consciences, you’ll find corruption and self-dealing.

Today’s story starts with Michael Strayer and his wife, Karen Earle, both of Lovettsville, Virginia. Mr. Strayer was a member of the Senior Executive Service at the Department of Energy (DoE). According to this DOJ press release, Mr. Strayer and his wife were indicted by a Federal grand jury on 13 counts “arising from a conspiracy to defraud the government of $1,263,330 by causing government contracts to be awarded which secretly benefitted the defendants personally.”

Allegedly, in 2004 Mr. Strayer “used program funds he controlled” to start publication of a magazine (“SciDAC Review”), which was intended “to promote his division’s advanced computing work with the DoE and academic communities.” We’ll let the DoJ tell the rest of the story—

Strayer used a foreign publishing company to put issues of the Review together on a no-bid, non-competitive contract, whereby the publisher was reimbursed for all its costs in producing the Review by the DoE. In mid-2006, Strayer directed the Review’s publisher to hire Earle as a consultant for $60,000 per year, despite the fact that she had no scientific computing or publishing background and lived in Tennessee, ostensibly to obtain articles for the SciDAC Review to publish. Shortly thereafter, Strayer began a romantic relationship with her, and directed that the publisher later increase her consulting fees.

In late 2006, Strayer reorganized the publication’s editorial board and notified the board members that Earle was assuming charge of the SciDAC Review’s editorial duties. Unbeknownst to the publisher, Strayer allegedly imposed a new requirement that board members, computing directors at DoE’s national laboratories who received substantial funding from Strayer’s office, provide Earle articles for publication in the SciDAC Review at no cost to the publication. In the summer of 2007, Strayer directed the publisher to contract with Earle’s company, KJE Science Consultants, to pay her nearly $100,000 for each quarterly issue to obtain articles for the magazine and to gain his approval for each issue, knowing that he had arranged that she be provided those articles at no cost by laboratory employees he exercised funding authority over. The indictment alleges that in September 2008, Strayer threatened to terminate Corporation A’s contract to publish SciDAC Review if it did not renew Earle’s contract for a second full year.

In July 2008, Strayer and Earle purchased a $740,000 home together in Lovettsville, Virginia, on which Earle made the entire $120,000 downpayment, in part from funds she obtained on the SciDAC Review contract. Earle also paid over $57,000 in renovations expenses and several mortgage payments on the home while Strayer lived there alone and Earle remained in Tennessee until the couple married in August 2009.

In June 2009, shortly before their marriage, Strayer signed a document with DoE’s Office of the General Counsel recusing himself from participating in ‘any Departmental matter in which Karen Jean Earle or KJE Consultants is a party.’ The indictment alleges that despite this recusal, Strayer continued his involvement with Earle and KJE and concealed this fact from relevant DoE officials who contracted with the publishing company, while falsely leading officials at the publishing company to believe that DoE officials knew of his relationship with Earle and nevertheless had approved the subcontracting arrangement with KJE. It also alleges that despite his formal recusal, Strayer met personally with Earle and officials from the Review’s publisher in August 2009 to plan a significant expansion of SciDAC Review and KJE’s role. As a result of those discussions, Earle and the publisher executed three contracts on September 1, 2009 that would have provided for payments to KJE of over $950,000 over the following 15 months.

On July 20, 2010, DoE investigators met with Strayer and told him that they were investigating allegations of impropriety surrounding the publication of SciDAC Review. The indictment alleges that Strayer stated that he had no part in drafting the subcontract between the publisher and Earle, whereas in fact employees of the publisher and Earle had repeatedly sent draft subcontracts to him for his review and approval. Additionally, Strayer is alleged to have maintained a file folder on his DoE computer named ‘KJE’ that contained multiple draft subcontracts between the publishing company and Earle. Strayer also allegedly told investigators that although he and Earle jointly owned their Virginia home, he alone paid the mortgage. In fact, however, Earle had made at least $23,516.60 in mortgage payments by that date, in addition to the $120,000 down payment on the home and $57,443 in home renovations expenses, primarily paid for from funds derived from her SciDAC Review subcontract.

As a result of the scheme, Strayer caused the publisher to pay Earle consulting fees and subcontract payments totaling more than $1,263,330 from DoE program funds that paid for the SciDAC Review.

We note that Mr. Strayer is now a “former” employee of DoE. If DoJ prosecutors achieve their objectives, he may soon become a member of the SES at a Federal prison.

The second story concerns Dr. Shih Chi Liu, of Silver Spring, Maryland, who was employed by the National Science Foundation (NSF) from 1981 until 2011, as a Program Director. Liu recently pleaded guilty to filing a false financial disclosure report that concealed payments and gifts he had received, according to this DoJ press release. Let’s let DoJ fill in the details—

Liu was required in his official position to submit a yearly financial disclosure report detailing travel-related reimbursements and gifts totaling more than a particular amount that he received during the reporting period.  In the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, Liu filed false reports that failed to report payments and gifts he had received.  In doing so, he concealed that he had arranged for an accredited university to pay false invoices for services that the university did not receive, pocketing the fraudulently obtained money himself.  He also concealed that he had received money for international travel from an accredited university, at times simultaneously requesting and receiving reimbursements from NSF for that same travel.

So Liu was a senior, 30-year NSF employee who generated invoices for services he did not perform and who double-billed his travel expenses. Now he’s looking at up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000 for his duplicitous behavior. That’s 30 years down the drain. We doubt it was worth it.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.