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Apogee Consulting Inc

Coast Guard Learns About Segregation of Duties

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Segregation of duties is low-hanging fruit. It’s blocking and tackling. It’s fundamental and, for an entity of more than a couple of people, it’s easy to implement. One would think that the United States Coast Guard would have figured out the concept long ago. One would be wrong.

The concept of “segregation of duties” is basically having more than one person involved in a complete task. Wikipedia explains, “Companies in all sizes understand not to combine roles such as receiving checks (payment on account) and approving write-offs, depositing cash and reconciling bank statements, approving time cards and have custody of pay checks, etc.” In the procurement realm, it is axiomatic that the person who selects suppliers and/or monitors technical performance should not also approve supplier payments. Having the same person involved in all aspects of supplier management violates the principle of segregation of duties and invites fraud and abuse.

Surprisingly, the Norfolk, Virginia, Coast Guard station failed to implement appropriate segregation of duties. Unsurprisingly, a Coast Guard Officer took advantage of the control failure and tried to pocket some cash. Happily, she was caught, charged, convicted and sentenced to prison.

Would you like to know more?

According to this Department of Justice press release, Coast Guard Lieutenant Danielle Ferreira (age 36) was responsible for “recommending contractors for maintenance and repairs onboard Coast Guard cutters … and overseeing those repairs to their completion.” One supplier that Lt. Ferreira recommended for ship repairs was Strategy One, LLC—a “small corporation in Connecticut that had no expertise in ship repairs.” No problem! Lt. Ferreira “recommended Wallace Haggins, an active duty Coast Guard recruiter, to assist [Strategy One] in obtaining workers to fulfill the repair contracts.  Ferreira also recruited former Coast Guard members to complete the ship repairs awarded.” That was very nice of Lt. Ferreira to assist Strategy One with performance of its contractual duties. Very nice, but perhaps a bit puzzling. Normally, government personnel do not take such a close interest in contractor activities.

That close interest might be explained by the fact that Strategy One was owned by Ferreira’s cousin, Tracia Christian-Young. The DOJ press release reported that—

Once the ship repairs were completed and the U.S. Treasury paid Strategy One, Christian-Young and Haggins deposited approximately $83,000 into two business accounts owned by Ferreira and her spouse, Henry Ferreira.  These two business accounts bore the names Black Kai Boxing Academy and TEDD Electric, and therefore had no apparent relation to Ferreira and her spouse.

That’s not all. The DOJ also reported that—

Ferreira also obtained $15,000 from another Coast Guard contractor by adding $15,000 to the contractor’s final payment.  Ferreira told the contractor that a subcontractor on another of her Coast Guard contracts had not been paid, and the additional $15,000 was to pay that sub-contractor.  Ferreira asked the contractor to make the $15,000 check payable to TEDD Electric, which was the name of her spouse’s company and bank account.  In total, Lieutenant Ferreira and her co-defendants fraudulently obtained approximately $150,000 in less than six months. 

You know, Lt. Ferreira wasn’t dumb. Those were fairly sophisticated schemes. We would love to know how she was caught. Perhaps it was the second, unnamed subcontractor, who became suspicious when Ferreira told it to make a check out to an unknown company and invoice it as if the company was a lower-tier subcontractor. Hopefully, such a request would ring the alarm bells at any reputable Federal contractor.

Regardless, it seems that Lt. Ferreira had too much authority and not enough supervision. She should not have been performing so many parts of the supplier selection, management, and payment approval process. We hope the Coast Guard learned its lesson.

You might want to consider if there are any lessons here for you to learn, as well.

 

 

What the F-35 Should Cost Remains to be Seen

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Not so long ago, we predicted that the phrase, “should-cost” would become DOD’s FY 2012 buzz-word of choice. As we reported, in DOD’s new mindset, a program’s “should-cost” is based on the identified set of cost reduction opportunities that exists below the government’s “independent cost estimate” and which will become the basis for the government’s negotiating position.

More recently, we reported that the CEO of Lockheed Martin publicly complained that DOD’s “should-cost” initiative hindered its ability to cut overhead costs, because it “meant the company needed more people to generate thousands of pages of additional paperwork.” According to the article we quoted, Mr. Stevens said—

The Pentagon's focus on what weapons programs ‘should cost’ - as opposed to estimates focused on what they ‘would cost’ - had resulted in increasing requests for more certified cost and pricing data. Lockheed submitted 6,000 pages of data with its initial F-35 proposal, but had been required to generate an additional 7,000 pages of data for the negotiations in recent months, [Stevens] said.

Not having heard much about “should-cost” in recent weeks, we wondered how the initiative was working out for DOD. Well, as if to answer our questions, we saw this article at Defense News. It continues Mr. Stevens’ discussion of “should-cost” and notes some interesting tactics the Pentagon seems to be planning to deploy in its negotiations with LockMart over the pricing of the next tranche of F-35 JSFs.

The article reports that, even though negotiations “began earlier this year,” LockMart has “yet to be told what the Pentagon believes the upcoming production lot should cost.” The DOD negotiators will be keeping that figure a secret. The article quotes Shay Assad as follows—

Assad said that during the contract talks, Pentagon officials will share with Lockheed elements of the department’s should-cost calculation — namely, areas where savings are expected. But the department will not share its internal should-cost figures, he said.

Lockheed’s CFO (Bruce Tanner) stated that the company does not know if its proposed price will meet the price point that the Pentagon is seeking—because the Pentagon won’t tell the company its negotiating position. The Defense News article reported—

And while DoD has said it would also find ways to improve its processes and create savings, Lockheed has not seen that effort, Tanner said. Instead, the department seems to have based its should-cost estimate on what the program would cost if everything was working under optimal conditions, which could be risky, he said.

‘It serves no purpose to either side to negotiate to a level you can’t perform and then overrun to a level that you expected when you began the contract, and call that overrun,’ Tanner said. ‘It’s frustrating to both sides.’

The article further reports that some “acquisition experts” are skeptical regarding the “should-cost” initiative. It stated—

‘It’s an interesting way to try to impose discipline on what has become an undisciplined process. But I don’t think it gets at the core problem here,’ said Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The major cost driver on weapon programs is requirements that are added over time with little regard for costs, Harrison said. ‘Until they get that process under control — and [until] they develop a rational way to understand the cost they’re imposing on the system with every additional requirement they put on it — I don’t think they’re going to be successful,’ he said. …

Should-cost estimates would be more useful as DoD decides which weapon systems to buy, Harrison said. Defense officials could compare their should-cost estimates to the proposals they receive from contractors to see if it’s worth pursuing, he said. But when programs are already in production, the should-cost is more like a ‘wish-it-would-cost,’ Harrison said.

Assad said the Pentagon has developed ways to measure any savings the should-cost initiative yields. ‘We have specific targets for program execution, very specific targets for the size of a program office or other areas that program managers will have defined,’ Assad said. ‘So we can measure that, we can examine that and we can know at the program level whether or not we accomplished it.’

Well, we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. think it’s nice that Mr. Assad and his Pricing Directorate have very specific “should-cost” targets that they are aiming for. We just think it would be a whole lot easier to hit those targets if they would be shared with the contractor. You know: the entity that is actually designing and building the plane.

We understand that the government has little appetite for sharing its negotiating position with the contractor’s guy/gal across the table. But the fact is, unless the Pentagon treats this new “should-cost” initiative in a different manner from the way it has treated past initiatives (e.g., CAIV), it will carry little weight and ultimately amount to nothing.

To be clear: it likely does not matter to LockMart how DOD negotiators generated their negotiating position. We suspect it doesn’t matter whether the government’s negotiating position was generated via sophisticated computer models using terabytes of data or via the reading of tea leaves under a full moon at midnight. The point is that LockMart has its negotiating position, based on its analysis of what the planes will likely cost (including use of certified cost or pricing data) while the government has its negotiating position (however generated). Negotiations are what happen after that point.

That’s the way it is and that’s the way it has been for decades. The “should-cost” initiative was supposed to change that paradigm. But if DOD is treating “should-cost” as if it were the government’s independent cost estimate or any other pre-negotiation analysis, then the initiative has changed nothing.

If the entire “should-cost” initiative boils down to a new analytical process to derive the government’s negotiating position—if that’s all it is—then the initiative is wasting quite a bit of time and effort, on both sides of the negotiating table. It has to be more, else it’s in essence nothing at all. We sincerely hope it is much more than a new Pentagon approach to contractor negotiations.

 

 

DCAA Director Defends Derelict Defense Audit Agency

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On June 10, 2012, Sarah Chacko wrote an editorial in Federal Times regarding DCAA’s problematic backlog of unperformed and uncompleted audits. Entitled “DCAA Must Balance Quality and Quantity—And Soon,” Ms. Chacko’s editorial took DCAA to task for the lack of audit productivity. She wrote—

Four years ago, lawmakers ordered Pentagon officials to overhaul how their auditors review contracts to make sure costs are reasonable. Their chief complaint: Auditors were more concerned with being speedy than thorough. … Now the problem is that DCAA auditors are being thorough to a fault. They are devoting more attention to each audit, but performing dramatically fewer audits. And that is even after the agency hired 615 additional staff members since 2008 for a total of 4,876 as of last year. … In short, a far smaller portion of transactions conducted between the Pentagon and its contractors is getting any scrutiny, despite a huge DCAA staffing increase and skyrocketing costs. …

DCAA must find a better balance between quantity and quality in its auditing operation. Quality is great, but a quest for perfection is impractical, slows the process and costs the taxpayers large sums. … And DCAA must act fast: As the backlog swells even more, billions of dollars of improper payments will be lost and unrecoverable.

Readers will recognize the issues at the heart of Ms. Chacko’s concerns. After all, we’ve devoted several articles to the topic and spent at least three articles exploring DCAA’s audit productivity metrics, as expressed in its FY 2011 Annual Report to Congress. Suffice to say that we find little in Ms. Chacko’s editorial with which to disagree.

That said, the Director of DCAA, the Honorable Patrick Fitzgerald, wrote a letter to the Federal Times editor to express his disagreement with Ms. Chacko’s concerns about current DCAA policy—a policy that seems to favor audit file working paper documentation over performance of actual audits.

Director Fitzgerald wrote—

In defense of DCAA … you neglected to consider important points that would give a more accurate picture of the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s effectiveness and productivity.

To use the number of audits completed as your basis for evaluation isn’t valid for two reasons. First, you imply that our performance standard should be the number of audits DCAA was completing at the time it was criticized by the Government Accountability Office. This just isn’t where our agency needs to be. Second, doing more audits does not automatically result in more savings. In reality, the amount of net savings is one of the most tangible benefits of our audit work. … Although we issued about 75 percent fewer audit reports and examined fewer dollars, we questioned more costs on a percentage basis. …

We know there is a sizable incurred-cost workload ahead of us, and we are executing a plan to eliminate the backlog as quickly as possible while still addressing the taxpayer’s interest. We are making good progress. …

Well, we could take issue with just about every one of Director Fitzgerald’s points. But instead, let’s approach this from a slightly different vector.

If one were to go back to the 2008/2009 GAO and DOD IG reports that formed the basis of the criticism to which DCAA (over) reacted, one would not find much (if any) criticism regarding the quantity of audits being performed. Instead, one would find two primary criticisms—(1) audit conclusions and opinions that lacked sufficient supporting evidence, and (2) supervisory changes to auditor conclusions and opinions that lacked sufficient supporting evidence. Sure, there were ancillary issues such as allegations of workforce intimidation and attempts to impede the GAO audit. There were unsupported allegations that DOD buying command and contractors improperly influenced the scope of certain audits. But the main thrust of the criticism was that DCAA was not complying with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) because its audits lacked evidentiary support for the conclusions reached. The focus was on poor audit quality, and did not speak to whether the audits were or were not performed too quickly.

The issues regarding an alleged undue focus on audit productivity metrics were raised during testimony before Congress. Then-Director April Stephenson and her Executive leadership team decided—on their own—that a management focus on productivity metrics were a cause of poor audit quality. Then-Director Stephenson and her Executive leadership team decided—on their own—that they would stop measuring audit completion cycle times. Then-Director Stephenson and her Executive leadership team decided—on their own—that they would comply with GAGAS (as they interpreted the Standards) by focusing on working paper documentation. Then-Director Stephenson and her Executive leadership team decided—on their own—to focus on reviews of contractor interim vouchers and contractor internal control “business systems.” This was a course initially charted by Then-Director Stephenson and her Executive leadership team, and subsequently continued by Director Fitzgerald and his Executive leadership team (which is essentially the same Executive leadership team he inherited from Stephenson).

Director Fitzgerald’s letter to the editor noted that “contracting officers are continuing to uphold a majority of [DCAA’s] questioned costs.” Readers should take that statement with a grain of salt, remembering that in March, 2009, DCAA HQ issued policy guidance to its auditors directing them to report uncooperative DCMA contracting officers to the DOD Inspector General. This audit guidance was characterized by one respected government contracting attorney as introducing “a new level of formality in DCAA’s unceasing quest to intimidate and control contracting officers in the exercise of their discretion.”

In addition to the foregoing, it is DOD policy that significant disagreements between DCMA contracting officers and DCAA auditors will be elevated for review and adjudication. No employee wants that level of management scrutiny. So it should be unsurprising that DCMA contracting officers are very, very reluctant to disagree with anything DCAA may have to say, regardless of their personal feelings and regardless of the FAR mandate that they exercise independent business judgment and discretion.

In sum, Director Fitzgerald may think he has the audit agency on the right path. But if so, he may be alone in that regard. We think that most observers are more closely aligned with Ms. Chacko’s concerns about a growing backlog and a seemingly fanatical focus on administrative minutiae at the expense of audit performance. Most observers we know think that DCAA is on the wrong path, has misinterpreted GAGAS, and has focused on the wrong things, at the expense of its fundamental mission.

 

 

Truth is Stranger than Fiction, or: A Conversation with a DCAA Auditor

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Truth

Warning: The following conversation did not take place as written. Instead, what follows is a “reality-based” conversation that mashes-up several conversations and e-mail discussions that really, really, really did take place in real life. Details have been changed to protect client confidentiality. But seriously, this is as accurate as we could make it.

DCAA Auditor: Hi there! We are performing an audit of your client’s FY 2002 incurred cost proposal, submitted in June, 2003. We have a few questions; please see the attached Request for Information (RFI) which contains our initial data request. In addition, we would like to have an entrance conference with your client’s accounting management in order to discuss the go-forward plan.

Apogee Consulting, Inc.: Wait, what? Is this a typo? Do you really mean FY 2002 and not some other year? That was a decade ago! Plus, our client says that DCAA already performed the FY 2002 incurred cost audit several years ago. In fact, our client says that the work was performed and a draft audit report was generated (see attached draft audit report). There was an exit conference! In addition, our client provided comments, disagreeing with several of the findings (see attached client response to draft audit report). Our client has been waiting for six years for the final audit report to be issued and for negotiations with the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) to begin. Further, my client sent the Supervisory Auditor several emails over the past six years, inquiring as to the status of the final report. Each reply said the audit report was in “management review”. The last email from DCAA was dated two years ago (see attached email). What’s going on?

DCAA: Yes, well. DCAA discontinued working on incurred cost audits a few years ago, due to other priority assignments. We are now starting the process again for certain incurred cost audits, and your client’s FY 2002 assignment has been selected for audit (or, in this case, continuation of the audit). Though the audit was essentially completed by another auditor in 2006, it was never officially completed. So now I have to go back through the working papers and determine if additional work needs to be performed, based on our current Agency guidance.

Apogee: So you are going to evaluate the work done six or more years ago in light of your current HQ guidance regarding working paper documentation, sampling size, and other matters? Really? You do realize that a decade has passed, right? Most of the people who prepared the submission, or processed the accounting transactions, retired a while ago. What is the likelihood we are going to have the supporting documentation you now consider to be required, with a decade of hindsight? This makes no sense! Is this really what you are being told to do? Really?

DCAA: Yes, really. And my first question is: Where is your client located? I can’t find that in the working papers. And once I know where your client is located, we’ll schedule the entrance conference.

Apogee: Oh, this is so not going to go well.

*****

[Entrance Conference]

DCAA Audit Supervisor: So, as you can see, we have classified your client as “high risk” because this will be the first in-depth incurred cost audit performed by the Agency. As such, we will sample the maximum amount of transactions.

Apogee: What about the prior year’s costs? You audited those, didn’t you?

DCAA: Yes, but that was a desk audit. It doesn’t count.

Apogee: So you are saying that you will re-perform the work you’ve already performed, only more so?

DCAA: Yes, well. Not every account will be retested. We are only going to look at the accounts where we previously had findings.

Apogee: So if you didn’t have any findings, you will not re-perform the testing on those accounts?

DCAA: Yes, that’s correct.

Apogee (thinks to self, does NOT say out loud): Well, that’s just stupid. If the past procedures were inadequate, you should look where you didn’t find anything. Looking where you already had findings—and projected to the universe from those findings—shouldn’t generate very much more in questioned costs. This approach is flawed, but it makes us very happy.

Apogee (says out loud): We understand.

*****

[Field Work Commences]

DCAA Auditor: Hi, here is an RFI that requests all your policies and procedures related to accounting, billing, timekeeping, purchasing, estimating, and property control. In addition, please provide detailed information regarding the compensation of your top 5 most highly compensated executives, including a break-out of corporate revenue showing how much revenue each executive was responsible for. Plus, tell me if you had a Defined-Benefit pension plan.

Apogee Consulting, Inc.: Hi! No problem! Here are all the policies and procedures you requested. Here is the compensation information you requested. Our client did not have a Defined-Benefit pension plan.

DCAA: No, this won’t do. It won’t do at all. You provided current policies and procedures. We need to see policies and procedures from FY 2002. Plus you didn’t provide the revenue break-out we requested.

Apogee: We are trying to find the policies and procedures that were in effect a decade ago. Our client didn’t retain them. Plus nobody here knows or remembers how to apportion the revenue amongst the top 5 executives. That wasn’t how the company was managed at the time.

DCAA: What do you mean you don’t have FY 2002 policies and procedures? Doesn’t your client understand the FAR record retention requirements? What do you mean you can’t break-out the revenue the way we requested?

Apogee: Yes, our client understands the requirements of FAR 4.7. But you have to understand that our client thought the audit work on that year had already been completed. Our client thought that was the case because there was a draft audit report and an exit conference. So nobody thought there was any reason to keep the old policies and procedures. We are trying to see if somebody kept a set by accident. If we find them, we’ll provide them to you.

DCAA: This is going to be a problem. I need those policies and procedures to complete my risk assessment.

Apogee: Risk assessment? Didn’t your Supervisory Auditor say our client had been assessed as “high risk”? Doesn’t that mean you’ve already completed the risk assessment? Are you saying you are still working on the risk assessment even after you’ve concluded on the risk level?

DCAA: Well, our new audit procedures now include a new working paper entitled “Gain an Understanding of the Contractor’s Internal Controls.” We need to document our understanding so that we can show compliance with GAGAS 6.10. If you don’t have the policies and procedures, how am I supposed to document that I understand the applicable internal controls?

Apogee: Well, didn’t DCAA perform a full-scope post-award accounting system review in FY 2003, and found the client’s overall control environment and the accounting system to be “adequate”? Can’t you rely on that audit to document compliance with GAGAS 6.10?

DCAA: No, we can’t do that. The audit was in the wrong year. We are auditing FY 2002 and not FY 2003.

Apogee: You’re kidding us, right? You can’t rely on your own Agency’s work?

DCAA: No. I thought that if your client could document that there were no changes to the internal control systems between FY 2002 and FY 2003 that might work. But then I reviewed the working papers of the accounting system review and, unfortunately, they are not compliant with current working paper standards. So we can’t rely on that audit work, not even for the FY 2003 incurred cost audit—which we will be starting as soon as we wrap-up the details for FY 2002. In fact, our FAO told the Region that we would have both FY 2002 and FY 2003 finished by the end of September.

Apogee (thinks to self): Yeah, good luck with that. We’re not even sure we can find the transaction support once you identify what you want to see. Everything’s in storage. Everything, that is, that wasn’t purged years ago.

Apogee (says out loud): Well, our client will do the best it can.

DCAA: Let me discuss this with my Supervisor. We’re supposed to wrap-up 2002 and 2003 by September, and then start on FY 2004 and FY 2005.

Apogee: FY 2005?

DCAA: Yes. That’s the plan.

Apogee: There is no FY 2005. Our client was acquired by Mega-Defense Corp. in late 2004 and was consolidated into Mega’s accounting system effective FY 2005. There’s nothing to audit.

DCAA (quietly): Oh.

Apogee: In fact, Mega-Defense Corp. has already negotiated final costs on the majority of the flexibly priced contracts you are auditing.

DCAA: How could that have happened? Your client doesn’t have final indirect rates for those years!

Apogee: True. But the customers got tired of waiting and they didn’t like having obligations open … something about expiring funds. So they simply negotiated and closed the contracts. We think they may have used your draft audit report from FY 2002, but we’re not really sure. It was a long time ago and most of the negotiators retired last year.

DCAA (quietly): Oh. I need to let my Supervisor know this. It will definitely affect our risk assessment.

Apogee (thinks to self): Yeah, you mean the risk assessment that you already concluded was “high risk” because you didn’t have an audit history. An audit history that you couldn’t rely on in any case, because the working papers didn’t meet your current standards. That risk assessment?

Apogee (says out loud): Well, let us know if you need any more information.

*****

THE STORY CONTINUES

 

DCAA Implements Major Changes to Incurred Cost Audit Program

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DCAA
On May 2, 2012, the Defense Contract Audit Agency issued MRD 12-PPD-014(R), announcing that the audit agency had eliminated the standard audit program for auditing the “incurred costs” of “non-major” contractors. Instead of having two audit programs—one focused on the larger “major” contractors and the other focused on the smaller, less risky, “non-major” contractors—the audit agency will henceforth have only one audit program for performing “incurred cost” audits.

The agency offered no substantive explanation for the change, reporting only that—

As part of Policy’s ongoing assessment of current audit programs supported by the Strategic Plan Ad Hoc on Incurred Cost, an in-depth review of the major and non-major incurred cost audit programs was performed. Based on this assessment, a decision was made to eliminate the non-major incurred cost audit program.

As readers know, we (and others) have opined that DCAA’s policy choices regarding GAGAS compliance and audit prioritization (as well as other choices we could list) have led the audit agency to an untenable place where its backlog of unperformed/uncompleted audits is too large to reduce in any meaningful way. A recent Federal Times editorial suggested that the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations would soon render much of the backlog unauditable. That’s not necessarily true, but it’s very possible that the CDA SoL would make any Government action to collect money (allegedly) owed from DCAA audit findings unenforceable in court, should a contractor choose to contest them. So there would be little point to performing the audits.

Some might suggest that DCAA is undertaking this significant reform in order to speed the audits. We don’t know. We did notice that the MRD emphasized (for the first time in recent memory) the use of auditor “professional judgment” in order to “tailor the audit program to efficiently and effectively accomplish the audit objectives.” In fact, the MRD states—

In tailoring the audit program steps, the auditor, in consultation with his or her supervisor, should apply professional judgment, considering the significance of the claimed amounts and known risk factors. Auditors are reminded that the standard audit program provides the overall framework for performing the audit in compliance with GAGAS and it is expected that the program will be tailored for the specific contract audit based on the risk assessment.

So now there is one approach to performing “incurred cost” audits, and it is based on every contractor being as risky as the larger contractors. The funny thing is, DCAA did not extend the logic into other areas. For example, the 10310 audit program, entitled “Audit Program for Non-Major Contractors Labor Floorchecks,” still maintains the distinction between major and non-major contractors. Hmmm….

We have seen it suggested, by self-identified current and former DCAA employees, that the agency intends to reduce its enormous backlog by “risking-away” the smaller dollar value audits. As we told you, one commenter wrote—

Concerning the incurred cost workload, the plan for getting current is to sample the submissions that are less than $250M. Those that are less than $1M will likely never be audited because HQ views those audits as cost losers, which is no wonder given the amount of prepatory work (the risk assessment, increased transaction testing, and the greater number of reviews) now required. HQ is talking about more and more sampling (leaving more submissions completely unaudited), which will certainly incentivize some contractors to push the envelope when it comes to questioned costs. …

Another commenter asserted—

… DCAA wants to waive all possible incurred cost audits under $1 million too. And the metrics will show that we actually completed these audits. Waiving 1 low dollar incurred cost = completing 1 (only in DCAA does 0 = 1). Then there's our audit guidance - all of our audit guidance is being written for the largest contractors. Does our upper management get the risks at the nonmajors especially at a time when there is less spending and companies are going out of business or being bought out? … We can get plenty of these audits done if we had the prior audit programs that were geared towards non-major contractors. The new B2 is overkill and redundant. It's confusing. It's too much for a small contractor where an audit is performed by 1 person. Who really understands it? It's not user-friendly for auditors. Then it appears HQs wants to staff up the largest contractors with more people because that's the only places where risk exists to them. …

Well, we certainly don’t know what’s in the minds of DCAA leadership. Quite possibly the intention is to re-emphasize auditor judgment—a move that we would heartily endorse. Or perhaps, as the commenters quoted above implied, there is an ulterior motive behind the elimination of the “non-major” contractor category with respect to incurred cost audits. Again, we do not know.

But we know that the smaller, formerly “non-major” contractors should prepare themselves for a rough ride.

 

 


Page 177 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.