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The Reasonableness of Subcontractor Costs—Part 3

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This article continues the story of KBR and its DFAC subcontractor, Tamimi, in support of contingency operations at Camp Anaconda, Iraq. In a recent legal decision, KBR lost out on at about $30 million in payments to Tamimi, because it was unable to show that those payments were based on prices that were fair and reasonable. This is Part 3 in a series of articles exploring that legal decision.

In the previous articles, we told you that KBR wasn’t paying Tamimi for services rendered, because of problems with the procurement file and concerns over Tamimi’s pricing for DFAC services. KBR and Tamimi entered into a series of complex negotiations that resulted in at least three retroactive price discounts. But by this point, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) had zeroed-in on Tamimi and its billings to KBR.

The auditors’ focus was on the number of “boots through the door” into the DFACs. As the Court summarized—

… the genesis of this controversy was a misunderstanding about the services to be provided at the DFACs. KBR worked from the standpoint that these were fixed-price contracts that provided the Army with a turnkey service; it would retain a subcontractor to establish a DFAC wherever the Army requested one—a fixed cost—and that subcontractor would be prepared to serve the number of troops that eventually were present at that location, regardless of the number of troops that actually utilized the facility. … DCAA, however, viewed the DFACs as variable-priced contracts where the costs were based on the number of soldiers actually coming through the DFAC doors.

In response to DCAA’s concerns, KBR modified its subcontracts to be more transparent; however—

… this contractual modification came too late to satisfy DCAA, and on February 14, 2004, DCAA issued its first Form 1 against all prior DFAC payments, claiming that KBR was owed only what was spent on meals actually served. … Other Form 1s followed, and at the height of the controversy, DCAA was withholding over $200 million from KBR for DFAC services.

The government’s position evolved and, eventually, “Ms. DeRoche explained that the accuracy of the invoicing and cost information between KBR and its subcontractors was not ‘the substantial question’—the reasonableness was.” [Emphasis added.] The Court wrote—

The [government’s team] began its mission by enlisting the services of a consultant—RCI—to provide analytical support to come up with a ‘should-cost analysis’ whereby the team would pull together the available data to attempt to devise an independent model of what the costs should have been at various DFACs. … However, the [Team] abandoned this effort given the complexity and the number of different variables involved. … One reason in particular for moving away from the should-cost analysis was that it relied on the [Team] having access to particular data for each DFAC facility, and, for some of the relevant sites and periods of performance, no records were kept on the actual number of troops that had eaten at each DFAC site. … Without knowing the exact number of troops at each DFAC site, the should-cost analysis was not going to be particularly useful.

In order to assess the reasonableness of KBR’s (and Tamimi’s) pricing, the government team eventually developed a parametric model and used the results of that model to negotiate a $55 million global settlement with KBR. However (as the Court noted), “According to the model, the site-specific reasonable amount for Camp Anaconda was calculated to be $106,565,119.00, which happened to be greater than the $105,623,149.00 that KBR had invoiced in subcontract costs at the site.” In any case, the settlement price was officially determined to be “fair and reasonable.” The Court found that, “On July 26, 2005, KBR and the Army executed Modification 38 to TO 59. Modification 38 implemented the Global DFAC Settlement and converted KBR’s DFAC subcontract effort—less the $55 million decrement—into a firm-fixed-price contract, thereby establishing the adjusted billing as a reasonable amount immune from future audits.”

But that global settlement did not ease DCAA’s continued concerns with the subcontract prices paid by KBR to Tamimi at Camp Anaconda. “On July 19, 2006, DCAA issued a preliminary findings report regarding DFAC services at Anaconda that questioned $44.8 million in KBR costs.” KBR responded to the preliminary DCAA report, pointing out several flaws with the DCAA analysis. The DCAA auditors reviewed KBR’s response and, in response, began to modify their position. The Court summarized DCAA’s evolving position on the reasonableness of Anaconda DFAC costs as follows—

DCAA did not respond to KBR for almost a year, but during that period its own internal position on the amount of costs that should be questioned varied significantly. By January 2007 David M. Fisher, a DCAA auditor … adjusted the calculation method, which lowered the amount of questioned costs to $39.2 million. … However, by January 19, 2007, Mr. Fisher had further adjusted this figure downward to $28.6 million … and by February 2, 2007, Mr. Fisher had arrived at calculations questioning only $5.1 and $1.6 million,

The Judge recited more internal DCAA maneuvering, but the official position did not change. “On January 29, 2008, DCAA issued a Form 1 suspending a total of $41.1 million—inclusive of the fee collected by KBR on the questioned amount—for amounts billed to the Government for DFAC services provided at Camp Anaconda.” KBR submitted a claim to the cognizant Contracting Officer, but he did not issue a Final Decision. And so KBR filed its appeal in the Court of Federal Claims in June, 2009, roughly two years after DCAA had issued its Form 1.

The Judge’s decision turned on whether or not KBR was able to show that its costs were “reasonable,” as that term is defined in the FAR. As the Judge wrote—

FAR 31.201-3 affords the court significant discretion in determining whether or not claimed costs are reasonable and sets forth a non-exhaustive list of circumstances to be considered. See FAR 31.201-3(b)(1)-(4). Despite this guidance, case law in which a court or the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) has exercised its discretion and evaluated the reasonableness of a claimed cost in similar circumstances is limited.

But the Judge was clear that KBR had the burden of proof. The government, as defendant, “simply” made the argument that KBR had “failed to meet its burden that Tamimi’s prices were reasonable.” KBR, for its part, argued that its decisions were prudent, when all the facts and circumstances were taken into account. The Judge agreed with KBR—to a point--writing—

Plaintiff [KBR] consistently advocates that it acted in a ‘prudent manner’ in negotiating prices with Tamimi and that, when the realities of the situation KBR faced at Anaconda are taken into consideration—the various environmental factors such as the threat to supply lines and personnel, along with the need to fulfill the demands of the Government in performing under LOGCAP III—the court should find that the outcome with Tamimi, although perhaps not ideal from a ‘conference room’ perspective, was reasonable. … (‘Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, KBR’s actions may not have been perfect but were prudent, and are not properly subject to Government second guessing . . . .”) … (“The standards the Court must apply do not, as suggested by the Government, relate to ‘conference-room’ contracting . . . but rather are those from the crucible of a war . . . .”). The court concurs with plaintiff’s point, with the following caveat: while plaintiff’s decisions must be viewed in the context in which they were made, and thus must take into account the realities that KBR personnel and its subcontractor were facing at the time, this willingness to expand ‘reasonable’ beyond the ‘conference room’ is confined to circumstances when KBR was dealing with realities over which it had no control….

… KBR cannot now point to a deficit in bargaining power and contend that its weakened state entitles it to greater latitude when the court makes a reasonableness determination on the product of those negotiations. A contractor may not itself manufacture—or in this case exacerbate—a situation that leads to higher costs for the Government and then attempt to pass the ultimate financial responsibility for that situation on to the Government. Because it was KBR, and not the Government, that contributed to its weakened negotiation position, it is KBR, and not the Government, that bears the financial risk of whatever fiscal concessions Shabbir Khan was able to wrangle out of KBR due to Tamimi’s greater bargaining power on this issue. The Government agreed to compensate KBR for costs reasonably incurred under LOGCAP III; it did not agree to be an insurer of any business decision that KBR attempted to implement and will not be held to such a standard.

[Emphasis added.]

But the Judge had more (a lot more to say). She wrote—

Plaintiff seeks costs that were incurred during the six-month period … emanating from a war initially conducted as a contingency operation beginning in March 2003 that became a sustained effort; costs that were impacted by fluctuating projections for the number of troops on the ground; costs that were driven by the singular goal of putting DFAC facilities in place to offer warm meals to the troops by July 4, 2003; costs that were the product of first-generation contracts that lacked certain formalities required by plaintiff’s customary procurement policies because the subcontractor undertook to provide DFAC services while its subcontract was being finalized; costs that flowed from fixed-price contracts with a subsidiary in a foreign contractual environment for which the record amply supports the politically infelicitous label of tolerating questionable practices for securing and maintaining business relationships; and costs that were the subject for hand-wringing and finger-pointing once those in authority became aware of the asymmetry, i.e., that the taxpayer was footing the humongous bill for DFAC services that were not utilized. … Correspondingly, the court finds that the Army did not foist upon plaintiff the fixedprice subcontract arrangement with vendors such as Tamimi. … Plaintiff wanted the work, got on the ground early, and took on the risk under its costplus contracts that it would not be able to pass on to the Government its subcontractors’ prices negotiated in a challenging environment when the prime contractor had few options. No one should be heard to play the violin tune of we-couldn’t-abandon-our-commitment-to-feeding-the-troops. Sincere as plaintiff’s commitment was to providing for the troops, this is no proxy for proof of reasonable costs.

KBR’s primary proof of the reasonableness of Tamimi’s pricing was the several negotiations it undertook, negotiations that resulted in retroactive credits and future price decreases. Unfortunately for KBR, Judge Miller found that “the weight of the evidence demonstrates that [KBR’s] negotiations were not conducted reasonably.” She wrote—

Although the court does not agree with defendant that Ms. Hayes [KBR’s negotiator] should have complied with all of KBR’s procurement policies and procedures to yield a reasonable negotiation, the dearth of any contemporaneous notes is disconcerting, not only because of the complexity of the matters dealt with in the negotiations, but also because the only record evidence available to the court is the Negotiation Memorandum with its errors and omissions and Ms. Hayes’s broad-brush testimony. Ms. Hayes did not set any particular target goals for the negotiation, other than obtaining some decrease in price, ownership of the facilities, and a contract extension. It thus becomes difficult to say how successful the negotiations were because the court is unaware of how much KBR wanted to achieve. Except for the initial request for a 45% discount across the board … which was on the order of an opening salvo, the court has no evidence as to how the negotiations actually were conducted. …

When she was selected to negotiate with Tamimi, Ms. Hayes was not particularly informed about the contractual situation concerning Anaconda. … Although she prepared herself for the negotiations over the intervening month, it does not appear that she gained much insight into the circumstances of the situation that she was tasked to negotiate. Her casual attitude in approaching the negotiations … reveals a lack of appreciation of the nuances present in this situation with which every other party to this dispute, including this court, has struggled. The issues at hand were complex and the facts surrounding the dispute went back more than a year, yet during the negotiations, Ms. Hayes did not ask a single KBR employee for analytical support. These observations and, as argued by defendant, the several serious errors reflected in the Negotiation Memorandum regarding the contractual situation at the time—the most notable being that Ms. Hayes seems to have been under the impression that the original prices at Anaconda were fair and reasonable…—do not support plaintiff’s argument for reasonableness.

KBR also attacked the DCAA analysis of price reasonableness. The Court found that DCAA’s position did evolve substantially as the result of its internal discussions. Judge Miller wrote—

Plaintiff [KBR] points out that, after receiving Mr. Bishop’s response a mere month after DCAA issued its preliminary findings, DCAA took approximately a year before responding to KBR. … During that time frame, DCAA’s internal position on how much of KBR’s costs to question varied wildly, from as low $1.6 million to as high as $39.9 million, the amount questioned in the final audit. … Plaintiff cites the testimony of Mr. Moskal to demonstrate that, even as a DCAA supervisor, he could not explain the numerous positions that DCAA occupied. … Illustrative of what plaintiff characterized as DCAA’s ‘moving target,’ … Mr. Moskal could not explain the path from the initial $44.8 million in 2006 to Mr. Fisher’s questioned costs ranging from $39.2 million to $28.7 million, to $5.1 million, to $1.6 million, to Mr. Duggan’s $37.1 million in questioned costs (as well as his $12.2 million and $13.9 million), culminating in November 2007 in the Form 1 that questioned $39.9 million. … Mr. Moskal found no need to support intermediate steps: ‘We’re supporting the final conclusion which is $39.9 million.’ … Plaintiff concludes that ‘DCAA was simply unable to justify the unjustifiable . . . [and that] [i]ts process . . . was corrupted by a drive for results over reasonableness.’ … Further, plaintiff notes that ‘[t]he Government in litigation has abandoned the DCAA’s flawed audit, which is the best evidence of its lack of merit.’ …

[But] defendant [the Government] dismisses plaintiff’s focus on the DCAA audit analysis as ‘primarily a distraction because the Government case does not rely upon the DCAA audit report to defeat KBR’s claim, but rather upon KBR’s failure to meet its burden of proof in response to the costs challenged by the audit report.’ … Defendant contends that the DCAA audit report ‘is just not relevant at this point in the case, having already served its purpose of raising questions to the contracting officer regarding the Camp Anaconda prices.’ … Thus, defendant concludes that, ‘[w]hatever flaws there might have been in the audit report, they do not advance KBR’s case.’

Unfortunately for KBR’s arguments—

While the court understands that circumstances forced plaintiff to disagree with DCAA’s approach, and DCAA’s approach was to question, not establish, the reasonableness of KBR’s costs, it is less than persuasive to present a rebuttal to an approach argued to be unreasonable as proof itself of reasonableness. By plaintiff’s logic, successfully rebutting DCAA’s unreasonable approach, to be detailed further, would establish the reasonableness of KBR’s costs. Successfully rebutting DCAA’s approach could warrant only a finding that plaintiff has fended off that particular avenue of attack, not that it has presented evidence for reasonableness. Given that the precise issue is not the reasonableness of DCAA’s audit, the court concurs with plaintiff that DCAA’s approach was deficient by failing to take into account, and appropriately adjust for, some of the factors that made Anaconda unique among DFACs in Iraq. …

However, rather than illustrate that DCAA was unreasonable in questioning KBR’s costs, the finding that the court can derive from the erratic audit process is that, because of the facts on the ground, it is a difficult task to attempt to unravel and quantify the costs that KBR incurred at Anaconda. The court agrees with defendant that ‘the final [audit] opinion . . . reflected DCAA’s best estimate of the overcharging by KBR.’

[Emphasis added.]

This next part of the decision is critical for those contractors who are having difficulties with DCAA right now. (Okay, that’s everybody.) The Judge wrote—

Regardless of how DCAA arrived at its final amount, the issuance of the Form 1 charged plaintiff with the burden to prove the reasonableness of its costs and establish its entitlement to the sum that the Government was questioning. As a matter of logic, plaintiff’s showing that the Government entertained higher and lower amounts in arriving at the questioned amount does not lead to a finding that KBR’s costs were, in fact, reasonable. That finding becomes sound only if one adds the additional premise that, in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness, a contractor’s costs are reasonable. This substituted default presumption, however, is not the law; plaintiff is not entitled to claim a presumption of reasonableness simply because the Government has not demonstrated persuasively why the questioned costs are unreasonable.

[Emphasis added.]

Despite numerous problems, however, KBR was able to persuade Judge Miller that some of Tamimi’s prices were reasonable. After all, Tamimi did provide DFAC services and soldiers did eat. The Judge spent some time looking at comparable prices and concluded that KBR was entitled to $11.5 Million in direct costs, plus applicable indirect costs and base fee, for a total of about $12 Million. The remainder of DCAA’s Form 1 suspended costs was deemed to be unreasonable.

In the concluding article of this series, we’ll explore some lessons that can be learned from this complex story.

End of Part 3

 

The Reasonableness of Subcontractor Costs—Part 2

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This article continues the story of KBR and its DFAC subcontractor, Tamimi, in support of contingency operations at Camp Anaconda, Iraq. In a recent legal decision, KBR lost out on roughly $30 million in payments to Tamimi, because it was unable to show that those payments were based on prices that were fair and reasonable. This is Part 2 in a series of articles exploring that legal decision.

In the previous article, we told you that KBR and Tamimi had a complex and tempestuous relationship. Tamimi reimbursed travel expenses for certain KBR employees, and even offered some extra funds on the side to help with recreational activities ancillary to the ostensible purpose for the business-related travel. At least one KBR employee bribed several Army contracting officer personnel to help ensure that work kept going to certain contractors. But the KBR/Tamimi relationship had its difficulties, as we will relate today.

Tamimi was one of several “master subcontract” holders that received subcontracted work from KBR. KBR decided to award work to an individual subcontractor based on various factors, which included more than simply the bid price. Thus, the subcontractor that was awarded work was not always the low bidder. Judge Miller, writing for the Court of Federal Claims, found that—

… while pricing for specific contracts was a factor to be considered, it was not the only criterion governing the decisions. … Not uncommonly, work release awards were made to the master agreement holders that were not actually the lowest bidders for the work. In those cases the rationale was that geographic and other logistical considerations weighed in favor of the higher-priced vendor thereby making it the ‘best value’ to the Army.

After a multiplicity of changed requirements and in somewhat murky circumstances, Tamimi began supporting DFAC services at Camp Anaconda. The Court noted that, “in the rush to stand up DFACs … at the time Tamimi began operating the DFACs at Anaconda under KBR supervision, it did so despite the fact that KBR officials had yet to approve the payment of any money to Tamimi for its efforts.” KBR officials had concerns with Tamimi’s pricing and did not sign-off on the necessary procurement approvals that would permit Tamimi to have its invoices processed by KBR Accounts Payable. Tamimi’s problems getting KBR to pay its invoices in full, on time, would continue to trouble the relationship between the two entities. And yet the two continued to work together, trying to make their partnership work out.

When the Army directed KBR to increase DFAC operations and to construct more permanent facilities at Camp Anaconda, KBR and Tamimi turned to another subcontractor (PPI), who began construction “without a contract or a SOW.” But the notion that KBR would undertake construction of permanent facilities under a contract scoped for support services (and not, we assume, construction) caused problems. The cognizant ACO objected to KBRs plans. In response to the contract scope issues raised by the ACO, KBR personnel “devised a solution whereby … Tamimi would take on PPI as Tamimi’s subcontractor and pay PPI for the new DFAC facilities and then work the costs of the buildings into the PPPD rates that Tamimi was charging KBR at Anaconda.”

Despite payment problems, Tamimi agreed to KBR’s “solution” and further agreed to undertake construction and management of PPI. And PPI, you may remember, had neither a contract nor a SOW. This situation later would prove problematic for KBR in terms of analyzing the reasonableness of Tamimi’s pricing.

In the more immediate near-term, KBR’s decision to have Tamimi construct the permanent facilities would prove to be unwise because, subsequently, the Army changed its “corporate mind” and directed KBR to acquire the facilities from Tamimi. In other words, after everything was said and done, the Army decided to hell with the LOCAP contract scope issues: its support contractor should provide required support. But that decision came too late. Tamimi (quite reasonably) figured that it owned the facilities it had “contracted” with PPI to construct, and expected to make a profit on any sale to KBR. (We assume KBR’s notions of performing cost analysis on Tamimi’s and PPI’s actual costs of construction struck Tamimi as sadly naïve.) Suffice to say, when KBR tried to unwind the complex “solution” it had worked out with Tamimi and PPI, its negotiations with Tamimi proved to be a challenge. In the meantime, Tamimi continued to support DFAC operations at Anaconda.

As these two strings of events unwound, internal KBR procurement personnel had identified “serious violations” of KBR’s procurement system, with respect to subcontracting with Tamimi. As the Court found, “Although Tamimi had been operating as a KBR subcontractor since September 1, 2003, at Anaconda, the Operations personnel still had not generated a [purchase] requisition for the DFAC services by the end of October 2003.” No Purchase Requisition, no contract. No contract, no invoice approval. Accordingly, KBR continued to have Tamimi perform services for which the subcontractor was not receiving payment. As you might imagine, this situation created some friction and made negotiating the sale of the permanent DFAC facilities more difficult than they otherwise might have been.

(Note to contractors: If you want your subcontractor to work with you and support your changing needs, it’s usually a good idea to pay them.)

When a requisition was finally generated, Tamimi submitted an official proposal in response to KBR’s request. The Tamimi proposed price was “almost identical to the amount stated in the requisition form from [KBR] Operations.” That fact raised suspicions.

The Court related the subsequent chain of events as follows—

On November 26, 2003, the Food Service personnel … signed a Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition justifying the sole source-selection of Tamimi for the Anaconda work. … By December 6, 2003, Mr. Petsche had completed the … paperwork—superseding the [work order] issued on August 25—awarding Tamimi the work at all four DFACs at Anaconda. … By this date WR 3 contemplated a period of performance backdated from September 1, 2003, through March 1, 2004, and it had been signed by Shabbir Khan of Tamimi. However, Mr. Petsche refused to sign WR 3 without the proper authorization from his superiors. … In a December 8, 2003 e-mail to various KBR personnel, Mr. Petsche stated that, aside from WR 3's being beyond his signature authority, even at this date no SOW existed for WR 3—a responsibility of Food Service—thereby making the finalization of a contract impossible. … Mr. Petsche later expressed uncertainty about his ability to justify the high cost of this contract at the time, opining that he ‘could not present it with the data and support [he] had,’ … and foreshadowed the inevitable examination of this chaotic effort by the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (“DCAA”).

The Court spent many pages relating KBR’s internal efforts to justify the reasonableness of Tamimi’s subcontract price. Among the many issues, the Court found that, “Regarding the new DFACs … while KBR had instructed Tamimi to pay PPI for the structures, it had not instructed Tamimi to manage the PPI SOW, effectively meaning that there was no SOW for PPI. … The result was that neither KBR nor Tamimi could justify the $5 million cost of the new DFAC structures at Anaconda.” The procurement files were incomplete in this regard—a not uncommon occurrence for contingency contractors operating in a war zone. Nonetheless, since the files were lacking, KBR tried to develop an “after the fact” price justification for Tamimi. Eventually, the pricing was approved by KBR executives, who accepted the after the fact determination that Tamimi’s pricing was fair and reasonable.

The Court reported—

Despite the … approval for WR 3, the prices that Tamimi were invoicing to KBR for DFAC services throughout Iraq came under scrutiny due in large part to the Army’s and DCAA’s growing objections to the costs. … DCAA had taken particular interest in the Tamimi subcontracts because Tamimi was billing on a PPPD based on either projected or actual headcount, whichever was higher. … When informed by KBR that the Government was questioning the amounts being billed, rather than attempt to work toward a resolution, Tamimi indicated that it would not sign any new [Change Orders] or submit new pricing to KBR, instead preferring to continue billing under the old pricing structure, which was highly favorable to Tamimi.

Eventually KBR and Tamimi were able to negotiate new, lower, pricing. However, the Court noted that KBR’s “attempt to justify the [new] prices, however, was, at best, confused.” Within KBR, certain executives were unsatisfied that Tamimi had offered reasonable pricing; Tamimi invoices continued to not be paid because it was felt their prices were still unreasonable. Eventually, KBR relented and began to pay roughly 50 cents on the Tamimi invoiced dollar. The Judge found that—

These partial payments were computed using the actual headcounts at the site and the average [PPPD] rate paid by KBR to its subcontractors.’ [Sic] However, KBR recognized that ‘[o]n average, these partial payment[s] represent about half of what the subcontractor has requested in payment for the invoices covered.’ … In other words, KBR was still holding a substantial amount of money that Tamimi had billed for its services. According to Mr. Jonas, these ‘slow rolling payments’ were effected in order to give KBR leverage over Tamimi in future negotiations for price reductions.

(Note to contractors: Issuing partial payments to legitimate subcontractor invoices, simply to gain negotiating leverage, is not a best practice, in our view.)

Meanwhile, negotiations continued on DFAC facility ownership and a “host of disputed issues” between KBR and Tamimi. Unfortunately, KBR’s lead negotiator (at this point in time) did not impress the Judge, who wrote—

The court found that the enthusiastic endorsement of Ms. Hayes by Mr. Jonas and plaintiff’s counsel was borne out by neither her testimony nor the record of her negotiations that she included in her Negotiation Memorandum dated March 29, 2005. … Her testimony was in the nature of summations on the topics, flavored with anecdotes. Ms. Hayes’s considerable experience with Air Force procurements before her retirement in 2001 at the rank of Master Sergeant after twenty-three-and-one-half years of service, coupled with a decade in contract-management positions with plaintiff, did not inform her testimony. This was a witness in whom plaintiff reposed enormous confidence and upon whose shoulders plaintiff laid one of its core arguments—that the CO 9 settlement would support the reasonableness of the costs passed on to the Army. As will be examined further, Ms. Hayes was more general than specific, did not appreciate or use KBR’s leverage, fundamentally misunderstood some important facts, and stood up to Shabbir Khan’s posturing, but could not explain what she accomplished other than in overall monetary terms. The court was impressed with this witness as a person, but Ms. Hayes did not convey that she was informed about the history of KBR-Tamimi-Anaconda or savvy about the parties’ respective negotiating leverage. Her Negotiation Memorandum was discounted by defendant’s surgical cross-examination, as well as by the key DCAA auditor, George W. Duggan (“the most senior working level auditor in Iraq” … who testified by deposition. …

Ms. Hayes had only a general sense of Ms. Pettibone’s analysis…. Ms. Hayes could not explain the information that was in her negotiating arsenal other than generalized comments about the type of document she consulted. … (‘Well, the problem was I didn’t know how change order 6 was even allocated, how they came about with the numbers that they allocated.’). She did not relate that she drew on her experience with the Anaconda DFACs. In these circumstances it was unfortunate for the record and in contravention of KBR’s procurement policies … that Ms. Hayes did not prepare a pre-negotiation memorandum, although she was sure about her objectives going into the negotiation. … Ms. Hayes explained that her objectives were to lower the overall price of the Tamimi Seven, with particular emphasis on lowering the price for the work at Anaconda and to resolve the DFAC ownership issue at Anaconda.

[Footnote: As a further inconvenience, Ms. Hayes kept only limited notes from her negotiations with Mr. Khan. … Thus, the following account of the negotiations, at which she was the only KBR member present, is based on her recollection. Her later Negotiation Memorandum contained erroneous information about the history of the contract, although the court credits its recitation of her involvement in the negotiations. But see Tr. at 751 … (testifying that her Negotiation Memorandum does not reflect the actual progress of negotiations, such as from where she started).]

Though KBR and Tamimi eventually reached (a third) agreement on the contentious issues that included another retroactive price discount, DCAA was getting more and more suspicious regarding DFAC billings.

In Part 3 of this series, we’ll look at DCAA’s allegations and what the Judge decided.

End of Part 2

 

Business System Deficiencies Continue to Distract Lockheed Martin

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F-35
Poor LockMart. It’s almost like the company’s Fort Worth, Texas, plant is cursed or something.

It’s not enough that the company has been in a prolonged strike with about 3,600 employees who are members of Machinists’ Union. It’s not enough that DoD is playing protracted games with its analysis of how much the next production order of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters “should cost.” It’s not enough that the plant’s largest program is suffering from operational challenges and delayed/withdrawn orders from its customers. Nope, those aren’t enough pain points for the largest defense contractor. No sirree.

Now, to add on to the contractor’s pile of pain, DCMA has decided to increase the amount of payment withholds on the F-35 program, from 2 percent to 5 percent. As we have previously reported to our readers, the Pentagon has had long-standing concerns about LockMart’s implementation of its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) at the Fort Worth plant. Let’s be clear: this has been an on-going problem for LockMart since 2007. In October, 2010, DCMA found that LockMart had made inadequate progress on its corrective action plan and “decertified” the Fort Worth EVMS. (We think “withdrew approval” or “found to be inadequate” would be more accurate descriptors, but we can only quote our sources.) DCMA was quoted as stating that the “decertification” would “help ensure that Lockheed Martin devotes the needed attention to complete the corrective action plan in a timely manner. It also reinforces the responsibility the company has to deliver to the government what it agreed to.”

But that strategy didn’t lead to the results that DCMA wanted, and in March, 2012, payment withholds of 2 percent were implemented (as authorized by the new DFARS “business system” clause that was included in LockMart’s latest F-35 contract award.) Now, a bare three months later, the payment withhold has been increased to the maximum amount of 5 percent. What happened during those three months?

As Aviation Week & Space Technology reported (link above)—

Between January and May, officials from DCMA, the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the F-35 joint program office visited Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth facility to check on Lockheed’s plan to fix the cost-tracking system, not just for the F-35 but also for the F-22 and the F-16. And while DCMA noted that Lockheed has made progress, ‘EVMS implementation for F-35 System Development and Demonstration and production contracts remains a major concern,’ according to a Pentagon summary statement.

The corrections were expected to be complete by June, but the DCMA suspended the review because it was unlikely that the problems could be corrected by the deadline.

Bloomberg Business week reported some more details on LockMart’s EVMS problems. It said—

The review that began in March had been delayed by a year ‘to allow sufficient time for Lockheed to fully execute’ the [corrective action] plan, the agency said. Lockheed, the world’s largest defense contractor, said it was 99 percent finished implementing improvements before the review began, according to the contract agency.

Even so, the agency said in its letter that it found recurring concerns about ‘data ‘discrepancies.’

Among the deficiencies were ‘poor quality,’ unreliable estimates about how much contracts will cost on completion, ‘inadequate recording’ of direct costs and ‘data inconsistencies,’ according to the letter.

Okay, we have two thoughts about LockMart’s latest payment predicament.

First, we are concerned about the use of the term “discrepancy” when the DFARS clause clearly uses the phrase “significant deficiency.” We don’t want to be nitpickingly pedantic, but not all discrepancies are system deficiencies, and not all system deficiencies are “significant”. This is important stuff. Cash flow is involved. We need DCMA and its functional specialists to adhere to the letter of the law here, and not play petty power games that seem suspiciously timed to impact LockMart during protracted and potentially contentious price negotiations. The language used indicates that somebody doesn’t understand how the business system clause(s) are to be implemented; the government may be leaving itself vulnerable to a successful LockMart claim.

On the other hand, we would be concerned—very concerned—if a government official told our client that it was having difficulties recording direct costs. Proper recording of direct costs (such as labor, materials, subcontractor billings, and travel) is the blocking and tackling of government contract cost accounting, and LockMart should be have that down pat, as should all serious government contractors. We don’t have any details regarding the (alleged) issue, but it may hint that the government has an ace up its sleeve with respect to LockMart—a hidden trump card that it can play if the company chooses to pick a fight in court.

Second, we remain unconvinced that LockMart is receiving fair treatment by the Pentagon. We noted the suspicious timing of the cash flow hit, and we noted the improper use of the term “discrepancy” instead of the correct phrase “significant deficiency”. In addition (as we told readers in a previous article on this subject), there is a question in our minds as to whether DCMA’s EVMS functional specialists were being independent and objective in the performance of their reviews of LockMart’s EVMS. We noted a GAO review of 14 Missile Defense Agency programs where seven of the programs were being performed by contractors whose EVM systems had been assessed by DCMA as being “noncompliant.” Despite the inadequate EVM systems, GAO reported that, “We reviewed the basis for the noncompliance and unassessed ratings and determined that [the EVM data was reliable enough] “for our purposes.” 

GAO reported problematic EVM assessments by DCMA. It said—

For example, the EVM system of the STSS contractor Northrop Grumman was deemed noncompliant because of two low-level corrective action requests related to issues with other contracts that did not materially affect the performance baseline for the STSS contract we assessed. Also, the C2BMC’s contractor Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Global Services received a rating of noncompliant during 2009 because of a corrective action request that stated that major subcontractor efforts were not specifically identified, assigned, or tracked in the organizational breakdown structure. However, after the noncompliant rating was given, DCMA reversed its decision and decided to close the corrective action without requiring the contractor to change its methods.

That approach to evaluating a contractor’s EVM system seems problematic to us. When we think that the same reviewers might be the ones evaluating LockMart’s EVM system—and recommending payment withholds based on “discrepancies”—it makes our blood pressure shoot up a bit.

We also noted an article published in National Defense Magazine in which DCMA’s EVMS competencies were questioned. We quoted the article as follows—

‘There is enough blame to go around in industry and government,’ said one industry source. … Contractors for years have complained to the Defense Department that the government’s in-house EVMS skills base has degraded. Over the past several decades, the popularity of EVMS has ebbed and flowed, and so has the level of top management attention it has received both in the public and private sectors, experts said. The Defense Department’s newly created ‘PARCA’ office (Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses) within the office of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition is supposed to have an EVMS ‘policy czar’ on the staff, but that position remains unfilled. … The ‘executive agent’ in charge of overseeing EVMS since 1996 has been the Defense Contract Management Agency. Several senior jobs in that shop also remain vacant, sources said. … Well planned out, EVMS tells you ‘where your problems are going to be. … But if you let the skills deteriorate, you get surprises.’

We also reported to our readers GAO’s concerns with a deterioration of skill sets at DCMA. We quoted from the GAO report as follows—

Loss of this skill set, according to DCMA, meant that many of its pricing-related contract administration responsibilities, such as negotiating forward pricing rate agreements and establishing final indirect cost rates and billing rates, were no longer performed to the same level of discipline and consistency as in prior years. As a result, DCMA reported that DOD’s acquisitions were subjected to unacceptable levels of cost risks.

So what does all this mean? In our view, it means that DCMA needs to work very hard to show taxpayers that LockMart’s EVM system does, in fact, have significant deficiencies that compel it to implement payment withholds in order to protect taxpayer funds. It means that DCMA needs to be more transparent in its administration of the new DFARS business system clause(s) and ensure that the public knows it is acting reasonably and not capriciously—or to gain leverage in negotiations.

In the meantime, Lockheed Martin needs to evaluate why it cannot, after five freaking years, satisfy its DCMA reviewers. It the company doing something wrong? Or has DCMA set the bar so high that the company will never, ever, meet it? If the latter is the case, then is the company willing to take the matter to court?

Readers, Lockheed Martin is first in line. But the line of contractors who will feel the pain of the DFARS business system clauses will be very long. You need to watch what LockMart does very closely, and tailor your strategy accordingly.

Lockheed Martin, we feel your pain.



 

The Reasonableness of Subcontractor Costs—Part 1

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We reported two years ago that DCAA had taken a new tack with respect to evaluating the allowability of subcontractor costs. In his 2010 testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, DCAA Director Fitzgerald stated that LOGCAP contractors had millions of dollars’ worth of unsupported and unreasonable subcontractor costs—costs that he asserted were unallowable even though actually paid to subcontractors in response to actual invoices for services actually rendered and/or for goods actually provided.

Director Fitzgerald testified—

During our review of prime contractor billings and incurred cost audits, DCAA has identified situations where the prime contractor has not awarded its fixed-price subcontracts based on fair and reasonable prices leading to unreasonable or unallowable costs being paid by the Government. For example, DCAA has identified several cases where the prime contractor asserted the [reasonableness of a] subcontract price was based on adequate competition; however, our audit disclosed that adequate competition did not exist. Although the prime contractor is required to pay its fixed price subcontract amount, FAR 52.216-7 and the FAR 31.2 principles state the Government only makes payments of amounts determined to be allowable and reasonable. Therefore, where DCAA has determined that the subcontract price is not fair and reasonable DCAA has attempted to calculate a reasonable amount for reimbursement of the contractor’s billings attributed to subcontractor costs. However, in those cases where the subcontract is sole source, it is often difficult to obtain cost data to ascertain the reasonable costs without access to the subcontractor’s books and records. DCAA access to subcontractor books and records is generally limited and dependent on the flow down by prime contractor to the subcontractor of the appropriate FAR clauses, and in instances of fixed price subcontracts, virtually nonexistent.

As we told our readers—

It is one of the few unavoidable requirements placed on Government contractors that, prior to making a subcontract award, the prime must first make a written determination that the price it proposes to pay is fair and reasonable. (See FAR 15.404-3(b), which requires a prime contractor (or higher-tier subcontractor) to ‘conduct appropriate cost or price analyses to establish the reasonableness of proposed subcontract prices.’)  So when Director Fitzgerald says the LOGCAP IV prime contractors are failing in their duty to perform the requisite analyses, that statement gets our attention. …

Proper management of subcontractors is absolutely crucial to assuring adequate program execution.  Part of that task is to put subcontractors under contract—to identify sources, to evaluate bids, and to negotiate (and document) why the resulting subcontract prices are fair and reasonable. In fact, in November 2008, we told a small gathering at the local NCMA Chapter that, “Acquisition professionals must own all pre-award activities … Don’t be afraid of cost analysis. Dig deep into supplier bids. Take whatever time is necessary to gain the proper understanding.’ So when DCAA tells the CWC that this is an area that needs to be addressed, we have to agree.

Yes, well. About that whole subcontractor pricing issue. We need to talk. And this is going to be a long talk encompassing several articles. So have a seat, if you will.

One LOGCAP contractor (Kellogg Brown & Root Services, or KBR) recently learned a very painful and expensive lesson about what happens when DCAA questions your subcontractor costs on price reasonableness grounds, and you cannot support price reasonableness. It cost KBR about $30 million to learn the lesson.

(You can learn the lesson for a much less than KBR’s paid, simply by reading the Judge’s decision, and this series of articles. Or you can skip both and simply ensure you can justify your subcontractors’ price reasonableness. But if you think that avoiding KBR’s expensive lesson for free is valued-added, then please do not hesitate to send a check for the value you received to Apogee Consulting, Inc.)

(We see you smirking, thinking you will read these articles and print-out the Judge’s decision, and never pull out your checkbook. Did you notice that Judge Miller’s decision was more than 90 pages long? You really gonna read it? All of it? You sure you don’t want to send us a check? Really? Oh, well. Let’s get on with the recap, then.)

Under its LOGCAP cost-plus-award-fee Task Orders, KBR provided various support services to the US Army, including Dining Facility (DFAC) services at various locations in Kuwait and Iraq. KBR supported hundreds of thousands of troops at nearly fifty DFAC sites in Southwest Asia. It was a daunting task; one that not very many companies could have performed. One of the DFAC sites was Camp Anaconda, located just north of Baghdad.

One of KBR’s LOGCAP subcontractors was Tamimi. Tamimi supported KBR at various locations, including Camp Anaconda. Tamimi was one of five subcontractors selected by KBR to receive a master subcontract agreement that established terms and conditions for the rapidly growing Army DFAC and support services requirements. So far, so good.

But problems began to arise. As the entities performed their support services together, Tamimi and KBR personnel grew closer and, eventually, Tamimi began to pay for KBR employees’ travel expenses. Other gifts soon followed. At least one KBR employee bribed several Army contracting officer personnel to ensure that the work kept going to the team. These issues created downstream problems for KBR as it strove to show the government that prices paid to Tamimi were fair and reasonable. But hold on to that thought for a while. We have more story to tell.

End of Part 1

 

Technology Birthday

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We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. would like to wish Happy Birthday to Mark Sewall, our Technologist, Web Master, and publisher of more than 500 individual blog articles on this site.

Mark’s birthday is June 28. He was born in 1966, making him 46 years old.

He was born in South Pasadena, California. That’s where he’s lived his life, except for a brief stint in Northern Virginia. As a South Pas native, he’s been exposed to the “old money” influences of the city and its surrounding environs. This has given him a certain panache and élan that, quite honestly, we envy.

Other notable folks who are linked with Mark’s birthplace include:

  • Alison Brie, who can be seen on the TV shows Mad Men and Community

  • David Lee Roth, one-time lead singer of the rock band Van Halen

Mark has spent years developing his eclectic skill set, which he employs to great advantage for Apogee Consulting, Inc. We wish him many more years of learning!

Happy Birthday, Mr. Sewall.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.