Plan to Reduce Employee Travel Costs
Hey! In case you’ve not been following the news, you may not be aware that both Congress and the Executive Branch Departments and agencies agree on something! They both agree that Executive Branch Departments and agencies spend too much taxpayer funds on travel-related costs.
It all started with the GSA “conference” spending spree, and then in May 2012, the Office of Management and Budget issued a Memorandum called “Promoting Efficient Spending to Support Agency Operations.” The OMB Memo required that, in Government Fiscal Year (GFY) 2013, each agency must spend 30 percent less on travel expenses then it did in GFY 2010. The travel expense reductions must continue through GFY 2016. The Memo stated—
In addition, agencies shall include in their FY 2014 budget submission to OMB a description of how they will make these travel reductions sustainable, including the specific process changes and technology investments necessary to reduce their reliance on travel.
The Memo also stated—
In addition, to assist agencies in achieving these reductions in travel expenses, no later than 180 days from the date of this memorandum, the Department of Defense and the General Services Administration (GSA), in consultation with OMB, shall review the Joint Federal Travel Regulations and the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) to ensure that the policies reduce travel costs without impairing the effective accomplishment of agency missions.
Suggested policy changes included:
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Have employees share vehicles
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Ensure per diem payments are reduced when a third party provides meals
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Ensure that employees capture lower airfares by “appropriately timing the purchase of airfare”
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Ensure that refunds for unused or partially used airline tickets are collected
Next, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton Carter issued his own Memo, directing the DOD Comptroller “to reduce spending on travel, conferences, and other agency operations,” according to this story. The directed spending reductions align exactly with those called-for by the OMB Memo.
Finally, Federal Times reported that the GSA is “considering” lowering existing per diem rates by up to 30 percent. The Federal Times story said, “GSA recently discussed with travel industry officials the possibility that it will revise how it calculates average per diems by removing more costly hotels from its averages — lowering the resulting per diem.” The story quotes a knowledgeable person as stating that, if the cuts go into effect, then about 85 percent of hotels in Washington, D.C., would exceed the lodging limits within the per diem rates. The story quoted the spokesperson as follows—
McBurney said Marriott and Sheraton would be among hotel chains most affected. Feds could be priced out of many hotels in more expensive markets, such as New York, San Francisco, Chicago and Baltimore, in addition to Washington, he said.
This story contained a call for action by the hotel industry, to try to stop GSA’s per diem cuts. We were interested in the mechanics of the GSA lodging rate-setting process found in the story. It said—
Currently, GSA solicits room rate data and then determines hotel average daily rates (ADR) by including rates from hotels in the ‘mid-price range.’ Those rates are gathered from independent, midscale, upscale, upper upscale properties. GSA omits rates from economy and luxury hotels from the data as it considers them outside the mid-price range (too low and too high, respectively). After determining ADR for locations throughout the US, GSA then reduces those rates by 5 percent and establishes per diem rates at that discounted level. Under the proposed new system, GSA may include only lower hotel rates in the mid-price range when calculating ADR. If GSA does so, it will be intentionally reducing room rates rather than reflecting average room rates, according to the American Hotel & Lodging Association.
This story at Hotel News Now reported that “In a presentation to members of the hotel industry prepared by the GSA, an example of the new methodology showed the federal standard per-diem rate decreasing from $136 to $107.”
So what does this all mean?
Well, you should know that the GSA per diem limits (lodging plus meals/incidentals) are also, generally, the limits on the amount of allowable travel costs that you can bid and bill to your Federal customers. (See the Travel Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-46.) Thus, if GSA does cut its per diem reimbursement rates, the amount of your allowable per diem will be reduced as well. If you do nothing, the additional unallowable travel costs will come out of your profit dollars.
So you should do something. Now. Be proactive for once, will you?
It’s time to reexamine and reevaluate your existing travel policies in light of the (probable) per diem reductions. Take a look at the bulleted points from OMB and consider weaving those strategies into your travel policies and procedures. Consider specifying less “swanky” hotels—i.e., moving away from Westin, Sheraton and Marriott, and toward Holiday Inn and the like. Put pressure on your preferred hotel partners to give you rates commensurate with what they offer GSA, and make sure your rates scale down if GSA gets lower rates.
We don’t agree that GSA’s methodology results in fair lodging rates, but that’s not our call to make. The fact is, if GSA lowers the lodging limits, you need to be ready—unless you are willing to see your unallowable travel costs increase by a relatively significant amount.
Remember, you heard it here first.
United Technologies Settles Criminal Arms Export Charges for $76 Million
 First, we’d like to thank the Justice Department for an unusually detailed press release, in which it announced that several subsidiaries of the United Technologies Corporation (UTC) had agreed to plead guilty to (1) violating the Arms Export Control Act, (2) making false statements in connection with “belated” disclosures of making illegal exports to China, and (3) failing to make timely disclosure of defense related exports to China. As part of the deferred prosecution agreement worked out with the DOJ, the UTC companies agreed to pay $75.7 million and to retain an Independent Monitor for the next two years (who will watch over UTC’s compliance with export control laws and regulations).
Ouch.
The settlement concerned the actions of two UTC subsidiaries, Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (PWC) and Hamilton Sunstrand Corporation (HSC). The matter involved illegal sales of defense equipment to China in connection with China’s development of a modern attack helicopter, the Z-10. As the DOJ press release reminded readers—
Since 1989, the United States has imposed a prohibition upon the export to China of all U.S. defense articles and associated technical data as a result of the conduct in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square by the military of the People’s Republic of China. In February 1990, the U.S. Congress imposed a prohibition upon licenses or approvals for the export of defense articles to the People’s Republic of China. In codifying the embargo, Congress specifically named helicopters for inclusion in the ban. Dating back to the 1980s, China sought to develop a military attack helicopter. Beginning in the 1990s, after Congress had imposed the prohibition on exports to China, China sought to develop its attack helicopter under the guise of a civilian medium helicopter program in order to secure Western assistance. The Z-10, developed with assistance from Western suppliers, is China’s first modern military attack helicopter.
PWC sold China engines for the Z-10. But according to the DOJ, “PWC determined on its own that these development engines for the Z-10 did not constitute ‘defense articles,’ requiring a U.S. export license, because they were identical to those engines PWC was already supplying China for a commercial helicopter.” That sounds somewhat legit, but (as the DOJ reported), “because the Electronic Engine Control software, made by HSC in the United States to test and operate the PWC engines, was modified for a military helicopter application, it was a defense article and required a U.S. export license.”
So because the software that controlled the engines was modified for military applications, that made the (otherwise commercial) engines into military articles, subject not only to export control but also to a flat-out export prohibition by Congress. DOJ reported, “PWC knowingly and willfully caused this software to be exported to China for the Z-10 without any U.S. export license. In 2002 and 2003, PWC caused six versions of the military software to be illegally exported from HSC in the United States to PWC in Canada, and then to China, where it was used in the PWC engines for the Z-10.”
Notice the use of the phrase “knowingly and willfully.” The Justice Department was convinced that this export control violation was more than an “oopsie.” It told readers—
PWC knew from the start of the Z-10 project in 2000 that the Chinese were developing an attack helicopter and that supplying it with U.S.-origin components would be illegal. When the Chinese claimed that a civil version of the helicopter would be developed in parallel, PWC marketing personnel expressed skepticism internally about the ‘sudden appearance’ of the civil program, the timing of which they questioned as ‘real or imagined.’ PWC nevertheless saw an opening for PWC ‘to insist on exclusivity in [the] civil version of this helicopter,’ and stated that the Chinese would ‘no longer make reference to the military program.’ PWC failed to notify UTC or HSC about the attack helicopter until years later and purposely turned a blind eye to the helicopter’s military application.
Apparently, PWC was not a good corporate citizen and kept any doubts about the ultimate use of its engines (and software) to itself, and pulled the wool over HSC’s eyes. DOJ stated, “HSC in the United States had believed it was providing its software to PWC for a civilian helicopter in China, based on claims from PWC.” One wonders whether PWC felt pressure to make its sales numbers, or whether there was another reason it felt compelled to lie to its sister UTC subsidiary and make the China engine deal happen. The Justice Department thinks it knows the answer to that question. It reported—
According to court documents, PWC’s illegal conduct was driven by profit. PWC anticipated that its work on the Z-10 military attack helicopter in China would open the door to a far more lucrative civilian helicopter market in China, which according to PWC estimates, was potentially worth as much as $2 billion to PWC.
But eventually, HSC realized that it was being lied to. DOJ stated, “By early 2004, HSC learned there might an export problem and stopped working on the Z-10 project.” But that didn’t stop PWC from its determination to make the sale. DOJ stated, “Regardless, PWC on its own modified the software and continued to export it to China through June 2005.”
According to the DOJ, it took pointed “queries” by an outside “investor group” to make UTC realize it had an export control problem on its hands. In July 2006, UTC made an initial disclosure to the State Department and followed up with subsequent disclosures over the next few months. The problem was—according to DOJ—UTC made “numerous false statements” in its disclosures. DOJ reported—
Among other things, the companies falsely asserted that they were unaware until 2003 or 2004 that the Z-10 program involved a military helicopter. In fact, by the time of the disclosures, all three companies were aware that PWC officials knew at the project’s inception in 2000 that the Z-10 program involved an attack helicopter.
The U.S. Attorney summarized the case thusly—
PWC exported controlled U.S. technology to China, knowing it would be used in the development of a military attack helicopter in violation of the U.S. arms embargo with China. PWC took what it described internally as a ‘calculated risk,’ because it wanted to become the exclusive supplier for a civil helicopter market in China with projected revenues of up to two billion dollars. Several years after the violations were known, UTC, HSC and PWC disclosed the violations to the government and made false statements in doing so.
We wonder if the UTC subsidiary (Pratt & Whitney Canada) took a $76 million fine into account, when it calculated the risks associated with its intentional export control violation? We think not.
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DFARS Revised to Enhance Competition by Making It Harder to Achieve Competition
On June 26, 2012, the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) was revised “to address acquisitions using competitive procedures in which only one offer is received.” Readers of this blog should not be surprised. After all, we told you it was coming more than a year ago.
At that time, we took DOD officials to task for prohibiting DOD Contracting Officers from using the flexibilities provided by the FAR to determine whether or not they had achieved “adequate competition” in their acquisitions. To be specific, the FAR provided three means by which adequate competition could be achieved (see 15.403-1(c)(1)(i) through 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii). DOD told its Contracting Officers that only one of the three methods was acceptable.
We refer you back to our 2010 article (link above) for details on the DOD policy guidance, and our issues with it. For purposes of this article, suffice to say that DOD’s policy reduced the ability of Contracting Officers to determine that their acquisitions had achieved adequate price competition, and thus forced them into using “cost analysis” (instead of “price analysis”) in order to determine that the bidders’ prices were “fair and reasonable.” We opined that this reduction in authorized regulatory was a mistake.
Using understated language typical of our academic, disinterested, approach to analysis, we wrote—
There is nothing about this memo—from the bureaucratic maneuvering to avoid the transparency of the public rule-making process, to the willful blindness to existing regulatory flexibility within a regulatory schema not known for flexibility—that we think has any merit.
We’ll note for the record that, more than a year ago, we linked the DOD policy position to recent DCAA findings that certain subcontract awards were problematic because only one offer was received. (You can find details in our original article.) We just spent a week discussing the reasonableness of subcontractor pricing when challenged by DCAA. It is clear to us (as we told our readers) that DCAA and DOD’s recently created Pricing Directorate are driving this issue. And so now we have a final DFARS rule, making the policy position formal regulatory guidance for DOD Contracting Officers. (You’ll note that the formalization of the policy position addresses one of our complaints, quoted above.)
According to the promulgating comments, the final rule clarifies that the policy revision is aimed to emphasize the need for increased competition and, in the case where only one offer is received, provide direction to DOD Contracting Officers regarding next steps. Before we delve into the details, let’s clarify that the issue that the DAR Council was trying to address was this: Competition was expected (thus the use of competitive procedures), but only one offer was received. Regardless of what the FAR says, the receipt of only one offer indicates a problem: (1) acquisition and market planning were poorly done, (2) the solicitation was poorly drafted, or (3) the incumbent was so strongly positioned that no other bidder could effectively compete. So that’s the issue; let us now delve into the details of the new rule.
(One more caveat: As always, we are going to discuss the points that we find interesting. We are not going to recite the entirety of the rule. You should click on the link we provided and read the rule for yourself.)
Many parts of the DFARS were revised. In particular, a new Subsection (215.371 “Only One Offer”) was created. 215.371-1 (Policy) states—
It is DoD policy, if only one offer is received in response to a competitive solicitation—
(a) To take the required actions to promote competition (see 215.371–2); and
(b) To ensure that the price is fair and reasonable (see 215.371–3) and to comply with the statutory requirement for certified cost or pricing data (see FAR 15.403–4).
The policy statement illustrates the shift between the initial draft and the final rule, which seemed to be driven by some excellent comments from the public. The DAR Council stated—
The policy statement is completely rewritten to shift the emphasis away from whether the circumstances described at FAR 15.403–1(c)(1)(ii) constitute adequate price competition, to an emphasis on the objectives of the rule, i.e., to increase competition and, if only one offer is received nevertheless, to make sure that the price is fair and reasonable and that the statutory requirements for obtaining certified cost or pricing data are met.
Indeed, the revised rule expressly states that if only one offer was received, despite the “reasonable expectation” that more than one would be received, then that situation may constitute adequate price competition—but only if an official at one level above the contracting officer approves the contracting officer’s determination that the offered price is reasonable. Otherwise—
Obtain from the offeror cost or pricing data necessary to determine a fair and reasonable price and comply with the requirement for certified cost or pricing data at FAR 15.403–4, in accordance with FAR provision 52.215–20. For acquisitions that exceed the cost or pricing data threshold, if no exception at FAR 15.403–1(c) applies, the cost or pricing data shall be certified; and [the contracting officer will proceed with negotiations on the basis of the certified cost or pricing data].
The revised DFARS subsection under “adequate price competition” now reads (in part)—
Adequate price competition normally exists when—
(i) Prices are solicited across a full range of step quantities, normally including a 0–100 percent split, from at least two offerors that are individually capable of producing the full quantity; and
(ii) The reasonableness of all prices awarded is clearly established on the basis of price analysis (see FAR 15.404–1(b)).
In addition to the foregoing, much verbiage was written discussing whether or not this policy revision applies to acquisitions of commercial items, or to DOD acquisitions from the GSA Federal Supply Schedules. The answer? Yes, it does.
So there you have it. The DAR Council is doing what it is doing, and neither your kvetching nor our kvetching will not stop the policy change. We’ll let the DAR Council have the final word on the matter.
The purpose of this rule is not just to save money but to ensure the integrity of the process. More competition benefits all parties, including small businesses. Although it is possible to demonstrate that increased competition strengthens the industrial base and has a beneficial impact on pricing, the benefits are not readily quantifiable. DoD is tracking improvement in the percentage of effective competition (more than one offer). DoD has always had a fiduciary responsibility to determine that prices are fair and reasonable. The most basic pricing policy at FAR 15.402 is that the contracting officer shall purchase supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices. Unless certified cost or pricing data is required by law (see FAR 15.403–4), the contracting officer is required to obtain data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary to establish a fair and reasonable price. This rule provides a mechanism to accomplish that goal when a competitive solicitation does not result in more than one offer. As revised, the final rule does not impose unnecessary burdens.
The Reasonableness of Subcontractor Costs—Part 4
This article concludes the long and complex story involving LOGCAP contractor KBR and its DFAC subcontractor, Tamimi, in support of contingency operations at Camp Anaconda, Iraq. In a recent legal decision, KBR lost out on at about $30 million in payments to Tamimi, because it was unable to show that those payments were based on prices that were fair and reasonable.
In Part 1, we discussed DCAA’s relatively new contention that subcontractor payments are unallowable when the prime (or higher-tier) subcontractor is unable to demonstrate that the price it’s paying is fair and reasonable, as the FAR requires.
In Part 2, we discussed the stormy marriage between KBR and Tamimi, and how that marriage suffered from several problems (such as noncompliances with the requirements of KBR’s Purchasing System and a lack of payment of Tamimi invoices). Among the bigger problems was a “solution” devised by KBR and Tamimi to construct permanent dining facilities at Anaconda despite initial Contracting Officer objections. As a result of these problems, KBR had significant difficulties demonstrating Tamimi’s price reasonableness, even when attempting to do so after the subcontract had already been awarded.
In Part 3, we discussed DCAA’s concerns with Tamimi’s pricing and issuance of a “Form 1” suspending payments to KBR. We quoted extensively from the Judge’s decision regarding “reasonableness” as an element of cost allowability, and also told readers how simply attacking DCAA’s methodology was insufficient to demonstrate reasonableness when challenged. Judge Miller found that KBR’s deal with Tamimi—especially the pricing structure—was unreasonable. However, she was able to find that some amount of KBR’s payments to Tamimi was reasonable. Hence, KBR recovered about $12 million of the $41 Million initially suspended by DCAA.
In this final article, we want to explore some lessons that might be learned from KBR’s travails.
The first lesson is that Judge Miller was willing to cut KBR some slack. She agreed that what was “reasonable” depended on the context in which the questioned costs were incurred. In particular, she understood that life in a war-zone was different from life in a conference room. However, that slack was given only for those circumstances over which KBR had no control. Where KBR had control of circumstances, she gave the contractor no slack at all. She wrote—
The Government agreed to compensate KBR for costs reasonably incurred under LOGCAP III; it did not agree to be an insurer of any business decision that KBR attempted to implement and will not be held to such a standard.
She also noted that the Army did not “foist” a fixed-price subcontract arrangement with Tamimi; that was KBR’s doing. KBR had the ability to determine the best subcontract type, to conduct (and document) negotiations and, thus, to be prepared to demonstrate why Tamimi’s prices were fair and reasonable. Ultimately, KBR was not able convince Judge Miller that it had done a good job in those areas.
The second lesson is that attacking a flawed DCAA audit methodology will not result in a finding that your costs were, in fact, reasonable. In other words, showing that DCAA acted unreasonably is irrelevant to cost allowability. The contractor bears the burden of proof once the costs are challenged; it is irrelevant whether or not the costs were properly challenged. In this case, there were serious flaws with DCAA’s audit methodology and its conclusions were largely wrong. But once the Contracting Officer agreed with DCAA, it then fell to KBR to demonstrate why its costs (and Tamimi’s prices) were reasonable. This they could not do to the Judge’s satisfaction.
However, the Judge did write that there was more than one way to demonstrate the reasonableness of subcontractor prices. Competition was not always a requirement. In this case, she agreed that a comparison of Tamimi’s current (non-competed) pricing to its previous competitive bid pricing could form an acceptable basis of showing reasonableness. And so KBR was able to recover about a quarter of its DCAA-suspended costs.
The third lesson is that acquisition personnel need to own subcontractor source selection and award decisions. In this case, KBR’s Operations personnel ran roughshod over KBR’s Purchasing System policies and procedures in the name of expediency and troop support. The Judge was not impressed with that rationale and stated that—
Plaintiff wanted the work, got on the ground early, and took on the risk under its costplus contracts that it would not be able to pass on to the Government its subcontractors’ prices negotiated in a challenging environment when the prime contractor had few options. No one should be heard to play the violin tune of we-couldn’t-abandon-our-commitment-to-feeding-the-troops.
KBR deployed its back-office support personnel after the fact, and without tremendous effect. In particular, its key negotiator failed to impress the Judge, and the errors and omissions in the negotiator’s files did not help KBR’s cause. KBR personnel obviously did not work as a coherent team, and let organizational silos get in the way—which cost shareholders quite a bit of earnings.
We think the final lesson is this: contractors need to invest in themselves. Contractors need to have robust business systems (such as Purchasing) with strong command media. Contractors need to train employees in the requirements those systems, and then they need to hold those employees accountable for compliance. In this case, KBR can play a nice “what if?” game. What if it had invested $10 million in enhancing its Purchasing System to meet the challenges of contingency contracting? What if it had invested $10 million in employee training and in internal reviews? What if it had invested $5 million in make sure the Tamimi subcontract met all requirements?
If KBR had done all those things, it would still have $5 million more than it does right now, not counting unallowable legal fees.
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