• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Boeing Sues For EELV Payments

E-mail Print PDF

Can you see the coming tsunami of litigation related to government contract cost accounting? We sure can. Contributing factors include the DCAA’s lack of productivity and its focus on questioned costs as a measure of audit quality, the lack of skills in the exercise of independent business judgment by DCMA Contracting Officers, the new approach to administrating contractors’ “Business Systems” under the DFARS, and the application of a Statute of Limitations to the Contract Disputes Act. Not to mention sequestration and what that will mean to ongoing programs. These factors—and doubtless more—have led and will continue to lead to disputes between the Federal government and its contractors.

FAR 33.204 states that—

The Government’s policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer’s level. Reasonable efforts should be made to resolve controversies prior to the submission of a claim. Agencies are encouraged to use ADR procedures to the maximum extent practicable. Certain factors, however, may make the use of ADR inappropriate (see 5 U.S.C. 572(b)). Except for arbitration conducted pursuant to the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA), (5 U.S.C. 571, et seq.) agencies have authority which is separate from that provided by the ADRA to use ADR procedures to resolve issues in controversy. Agencies may also elect to proceed under the authority and requirements of the ADRA.

Despite the official policy stated above, we cannot remember the last time we heard about a U.S. Government CO actually negotiating a dispute settlement with a contractor. Instead, our experience is that the parties bypass any negotiations and head right into court. Which makes the attorneys happy, no doubt, but does not seem to be in the best interests of the taxpayers or corporate shareholders.

So expect more stories like this one, where Boeing and the United Launch Alliance (ULA) suing the Defense Department for somewhere in the neighborhood of $385 million (plus interest) for the US Air Force’s refusal to pay certain costs.

If you are a long-time reader, you know we predicted this particular piece of litigation long ago. In January 2010, we discussed the controversy between Boeing, ULA, and the Air Force. We’re not going to repeat the details here but, all modesty aside, we think we provided more of the accounting details than anybody else did. We wrote—

So as with many government contract cost accounting matters, the truth is both complex and hard to fathom.  Will Boeing have to concede $271 million in payments to which it believes it is contractually entitled?  We’ll look forward to the final DCAA audit report(s), and hope that they ignore any political pressure and focus solely on the facts, which (apparently) even the DOD IG seems to have gotten wrong.

This is a great example of how the facts matter, and how easy it is to allege a problem, and how hard it is to refute an allegation.  Clearly, Boeing’s entitlement to the $271 million depends on its ‘Lot Accounting’ practices, why the PM&HS costs were not fully absorbed by prior launch contracts, and how Boeing intended to amortize its production costs under future programs (and whether it would be permitted to do so under FAR and CAS parameters).  As DCAA focuses on generating high-quality audits that DCMA contracting officers and buying commands can effectively utilize to make business decisions, we hope they will keep this example in mind.

About eight months later (August 2010), we told readers that DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald—in a nearly unprecedented step—had announced its audit position on the matter to the media via e-mail. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Director Fitzgerald “called on the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to notify the United Launch Alliance team (of which Boeing is one of two team members, along with Lockheed Martin) that the costs are in non-compliance ‘with federal accounting standards’ and are ‘unallowable.’ DCMA took the matter under advisement.

We wrote, “We will be surprised if this issue isn’t litigated.” And indeed, it was. Boeing and ULA filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for approximately $385 million, related to costs it allegedly had to pay back to the DOD as well as costs that DOD refused to pay in the first place.

Bloomberg (link above) reported—

Last year, United Launch repaid the Pentagon $89.2 million and lost another $199 million in prior billings because Boeing violated federal accounting standards, according to the Defense Contract Management Agency, the military’s contract management agency. Boeing lost bids to have those decisions reversed.

The Bloomberg article also reported that Boeing “claimed it sued to preserve its ability to recover the money.” We all know that refers to the Statute of Limitations under the Contract Disputes Act.

Another article, over at Space News, had a few more details. It reported—

The lawsuit, filed June 14 with the United States Court of Federal Claims, says the Air Force reneged on its contractual commitment to reimburse Boeing ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ incurred under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.

‘The Air Force agreed to reimburse these costs in a set of interrelated agreements designed to secure Boeing’s continued participation in the EELV program after the Air Force decided to restructure it,’ the lawsuit says. The costs were incurred between 1998 and 2006, the companies said.

The article continued—

‘Boeing clearly and repeatedly conditioned its willingness to participate in the restructured program on the government’s agreement to contract terms ensuring Boeing’s recovery of its inventoried costs, including DSC,’ the lawsuit states. DSC refers deferred support costs on the Delta 4 program.

In late 2006, the lawsuit alleges, the Air Force, following reviews by auditors with the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, agreed to Boeing’s terms, the lawsuit alleges. The agreement specifically approved the methodology Boeing used to account for these costs, the lawsuit states.

But the Air Force has refused to pay any such costs since 2008 and in 2011 demanded that Boeing repay $72 million, plus interest, that the service had paid the company for costs incurred on the Delta 4 program, the lawsuit states. ULA ‘promptly’ complied to avoid paying the interest and penalties, the lawsuit states.

The lawsuit alleges that the Air Force never said the costs in question were improperly billed or that the companies failed to meet their obligations under the EELV contract. Rather, the lawsuit says, the government maintains that the previous agreements to reimburse Boeing and ULA for the deferred Delta 4 costs are ‘nonbinding and unenforceable.’ In making that case, the Air Force has reversed an earlier judgment that Boeing’s claim was consistent with federal cost accounting regulations, the lawsuit states.

So we’ll just have to wait and see what the COFC Judge has to say about the situation. And while we all wait, we can pass the time by tallying the number of cases filed, and decisions issued, by the Courts that should have been negotiated by the parties instead of litigated.

 

What Hath DCAA Wrought?

E-mail Print PDF

We have wondered aloud what DCAA has been doing with its time, since the agency doesn’t appear to be performing any audits—or, at least, issuing any completed audits. Since the auditors haven’t been auditing, we’ve been wondering what they’ve been doing. And now we think we have an answer.

They’ve been revising policies, procedures, and audit programs.

We visited the DCAA website recently, and found lots and lots of new stuff, most of it dated June 2012. So much new content doesn’t happen overnight; we expect DCAA HQ has been very busy typing away, developing new guidance and new audit procedures to help auditors perform more efficient and more effective audits.

First, the DCAA Publication, “Information for Contractors” (DCAAP 7641.9) has been updated and reissued, effective June 26, 2012. That’s a good thing, since the last time the document was updated was January 2005. It’s an important document, especially for smaller contractors that are relatively new to this whole government contracting thingee. In the words of the Introduction—

The manual is designed to assist contractors in understanding applicable requirements and to help ease the contract audit process. It describes what contractors should expect when doing business with the U.S. Government and interacting with DCAA auditors.

We skimmed through the new publication and did not see much that merited comment. (Readers, if you see something we missed, then send us an e-mail!)

Another new item at the DCAA website is a new and improved Incurred Cost Electronically (“ICE”) Excel workbook that allegedly complies with the requirements of the Allowable Cost and Payment contract clause (52.216-7, June 2011). But as the DCAA noted in the ICE Model—

Please note that while the ICE model is intended to aid the contractor in providing an adequate submission to DCAA, its use does not guarantee that the submission will be judged adequate. It is the purview of your cognizant DCAA Office to determine, in the judgment of the auditor reviewing your submission, whether or not it is adequate, regardless of what model is used.

That’s kind of irksome, really. That note tells users that the ICE Model is designed to comply with contractual requirements, but not necessarily to lead to a submission that would be deemed “adequate” by a DCAA auditor. We are somewhat irked by an audit agency that would posit that a submission that complied, in all material respects, with contract requirements might still be deemed inadequate in some other—non-contractual—respects. Guess what, DCAA? A contractor’s duty is to comply with contract requirements. Period.

And let’s be very, very clear here: It is NOT DCAA that determines whether or not the submission is adequate, it is the cognizant Contracting Officer. The note quoted above is indicative of the arrogance of the modern DCAA—on one hand reserving for itself the right to tell contractors that their indirect rate submissions are inadequate, even though fully compliant with contract requirements—while on the other hand usurping the Contracting Officer’s official responsibility in making the determination of submission adequacy in the first place.

So that’s enough ranting. Let’s keep going, looking at other changes made by DCAA.

We noted that many audit programs have been updated, some significantly, in the past month or two. Here’s a list of the audit programs that DCAA updated just in June 2012—

  • 10100 – Incurred Costs, Concurrent, Major and Non-Major

  • 10100 – Non-major Desk Review

  • 10100 – Incurred Costs, Post Year-end Audit

  • 10100 – Incurred Costs, Corporate Shell

  • 10110 – A-133 Audit

  • 10160 – Consultant and Professional Services

  • 10310 – Non-Major Contractors, Labor Floorchecks

  • 10320 – MAAR 13, Purchase Existence and Consumption

  • 10501 – Operations Audit, Management Systems

  • 10502 – Operations Audit, Materials and Other Costs

  • 11010 – Billing Audit

  • 11015 – Annual Testing of Contractor Eligibility for Direct Bill Program

  • 11020 – Audit Program for Budget and Planning System and Related Internal Controls

  • 11060 – Audit Program for Control Environment

  • 11090 – Audit Program for Deficiency Report

  • 11510 – Audit Program for EDP General Controls

  • 12030 – Audit Program for Purchasing Controls

  • 12500 – Audit Program for MMAS Controls

  • 13020 – Audit Program for Compensation Controls

  • 13500 – Audit Program for Major Contractors, Labor Floorchecks/Interviews

  • 15400 – Evaluation of Final Vouchers

  • 15600 – Audit Program for QLOP Statements

  • 17100 – Audit Program for Termination, Cost Contracts

  • 17100 – Audit Program for Termination, Fixed Inventory Basis

  • 17100 – Audit Program for Termination, Total Cost Basis

  • 17200 – Audit Program for Claims, Delay/Disruption

  • 17200 – Audit Program for Claims, Other

  • 17310 – Audit of Contract Overpayments

  • 17330 – Audit Program for Reconciliation of Contracts

  • 17390 – Contractor Compliance with Billing Instructions

  • 17500 – Audit Program for Progress Payments Based on Costs Incurred

  • 17500 – Audit Program for Progress Payments Based on Percentage or Stage of Completion

  • 17600 – DFAS Financial Capability Audit

  • 17741 -- Post Award Accounting System Audit at Contractors with DoD Commercial Time-and-Materials (T&M) or Labor-Hour (LH) Contracts

  • 17741 – Post Contract Award Accounting System Audit at Non-Major Contractors

  • 17850 – CPRs, C/SSRs, and CFSRs

  • 17860 – Other Program Management System Effort

  • 17870 – CCDR

  • 17900 – Other

  • 17900 – Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

  • 17910 -- Contract Audit Closing Statements for DoD Commercial Time-and-Materials (T&M)/Labor-Hour (LH) Contracts

  • 19100 – Audit Program for Adequacy of Initial Disclosure Statement

  • 19100 – Audit Program for Compliance of Initial Disclosure Statement

  • 19100 – Audit Program for Revised Disclosure Statement Adequacy and Compliance

  • 19403 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 403, Allocation of Home Office Expenses to Segments

  • 19404 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 404, Capitalization of Tangible Assets

  • 19407 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 407, Use of Standard Costs For Direct Material and Direct Labor

  • 19408 – Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard 408

  • 19409 – Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard 409

  • 19410 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 410, Allocation of Business Unit General and Administrative Expenses to Final Cost Objectives

  • 19410 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 410, Allocation of Business Unit General and Administrative Expenses to Final Cost Objectives for Offsite Locations

  • 19411 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 411, Accounting for Acquisition Costs of Material

  • 19412 -- Audit Program for Incurred Pension Cost and CAS 412 and 413 Compliance

  • 19413 -- Joint Review Program for Segment Closing Adjustments

  • 19414 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 414, Cost of Money as an Element of the Cost of Facilities Capital

  • 19415 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 415, Accounting for the Cost of Deferred Compensation

  • 19416 -- Audit Program for Incurred Insurance Costs and CAS 416 and FAR Compliance

  • 19417 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 417, Cost of Money as an Element of the Cost of Capital Assets Under Construction

  • 19418 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 418, Allocation of Direct and Indirect Costs

  • 19420 -- Audit Program for Cost Accounting Standard No. 420, Accounting for Independent Research and Development Costs and Bid and Proposal Costs

  • 19500 -- Audit Program for CAS Impact Proposal Evaluations

  • 21000 -- Audit Program for Price Proposal

  • 23000 -- Audit Program for Audit of Forward Pricing Rate Agreement

  • 24010 -- Audit Program for Estimating System Controls

  • 27000 -- Audit Program for Cost Element Review

  • 27010 -- Audit Program for Evaluation of Cost Realism in Price Proposals

  • 28500 -- Program for Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures - Single Process Initiative (SPI) Cost-Benefit Analysis

  • 42000 -- Audit Program for Post Award Audits

Whew!

We want to emphasize that the list of audit programs, above, includes only those that were modified and reissued in the month of June 2012. That’s quite a few, isn’t it? And it explains what HQ has been up to in the past months.

Obviously, we didn’t have time to review each audit program to see what DCAA revised. As always, if you are interested in the details of a particular audit program, you should visit the DCAA website and click on “Standard Audit Programs.” Then find the one you want and open the associated .pdf file.

 

Sequestration Equals Doomsday Scenario

E-mail Print PDF

Doomsday
Whether you call it CASE NIGHTMARE GREEN or Mutually Assured Destruction, the upcoming “sequestration” looks like a doomsday scenario for defense contractors—and perhaps for all government contractors.

The law firm Wiley Rein has a good synopsis of the danger posed by sequestration, right over here. The Wiley Rein attorneys wrote—

Under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (the Act), sequestration is the automatic reduction of spending triggered if Congress approves spending levels that exceed certain ‘caps’ set out by the Act.  Although certain programs-Social Security, Medicaid, federal retirement programs and Medicare-are protected from the full impact of sequestration, spending reductions would occur largely across the board under the Act.  The Budget Control Act calls for sequestration of spending from FY 2013 through 2021 and, unless Congress otherwise acts to limit spending, it takes effect January 1, 2013.

If sequestration occurs, $1.2 trillion in spending reductions are required from FY 2013 through 2021.  Approximately $1.1 trillion of these reductions will come from reductions in both Department of Defense (DoD) and non-DoD program expenditures.  Sequestration can be avoided under the Act if Congress otherwise acts to implement spending limitations deep enough to avoid the Act's triggers.  On February 14, 2012, President Obama proposed a FY 2013 budget that, according to the Office of Management and Budget, avoids the statutory trigger.  It does so by, among other things, proposing cuts that will reduce or eliminate altogether spending on a number of well-known federal programs, including numerous DoD contracts.

Thus, in the current economic climate, federal contractors must prepare for budget cuts-whether those cuts are imposed by sequestration or by the reduced spending necessary to avoid it.

The Wiley Rein folks predicted dire consequences if sequestration comes to pass—or even if deep budget cuts are made. Among the consequences they predicted are reduced government personnel and reduced customer responsiveness to contractor needs. But according to the Wiley Rein attorneys, the “most concerning issue” for Federal contractors is the “downsizing or elimination of key programs.” They wrote—

This prospect is not purely hypothetical.  In November 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta outlined some of these potential impacts in a letter … Among other potential effects, Secretary Panetta cites short-term effects on such programs as Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the long-term prospect of multiple program cancellations.

The Wiley Rein attorneys offered some good advice for contractors concerned about the upcoming doomsday scenario. Among the pieces of advice:

  • Check contract status now and submit Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REAs) if appropriate before sequestration kicks-in.

  • If your fixed-price contracts are impacted by sequestration (either from “Stop Work” notices or other government-imposed changes) then be prepared to quantify impacts from the changes and submit REAs.

  • If you have cost-type contracts, be ready to respond to impact caused by deductive changes and/or partial terminations.

  • For all contracts, be ready to handle terminations for convenience. Have good people standing by, ready to advise and manage the situation. Consider contingency planning.

This recent article by Sarah Chacko at Federal Times forecasts “costly legal disputes [and] contractor payouts” from sequestration impacts. The article quotes William Roberts, an attorney at Wiley Rein, as follows: “There’s no planning going on to speak of within the government. They’re going to get caught flat-footed and have to deal with what programs to cut, what contracts to partially terminate.”

Another thing predicted by Roberts is that the government will hold contractors to the strict letter of the contract. For example, contractors that fail to strictly comply with Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds clause requirements may see their entitlement to additional funding be lost. Roberts was quoted as saying: “if you give the customer any legal way of saying, ‘You failed to provide proper notice, we’re not going to pay you,’ I think you can reasonably expect much stricter enforcement.”

The article also contained predictions by Alan Chovtkin, of the Professional Services Council, that the Obama Administration’s emphasis on use of fixed-price contracts was going to backfire, and end up costing taxpayers more than if cost-plus types had been used. The article quoted Chovtkin as saying—

Under fixed-price contracts, the government pays a set cost for a product or service. Because the contractor bears more risk if there are cost overruns, these contracts often provide sizeable payouts to companies if the contract is ended early.

Cost-reimbursement contracts — where the government pays the contractor for costs incurred — can be more easily adjusted because the scope of work can be changed without rewriting contract terms.

‘The irony is the public policy support for greater use of fixed price contracts may end up reducing the agencies’ flexibilities should there be a sequestration,’ Chvotkin said.

So here’s the thing. We are about five months away from sequestration hitting contractors the way that Fat Boy hit Hiroshima. A lot could happen between now and then. Certainly recent history leads us to expect a last-minute deal that would avoid the worst of the doomsday impacts. But we can’t count on that happening and neither should you. Sticking your head in the sand and crossing your fingers, hoping for the best, is no way to engage in contingency planning.

In this article, we’ve pointed to some reasonable steps one might take to prepare for sequestration, courtesy of Wiley Rein, Federal Times, and the Professional Services Council. We’re quite sure that there are other things you ought to be doing. For starters, why not create an ExCom team consisting of HR, Ops/Program Management, Finance, and other management functions to start thinking—and discussing—the unthinkable?

Note that the Wiley Rein attorneys didn’t think much of the Federal government’s proactive stance on the matter. So the bar has been set extremely low. Why not go ahead and beat it?

 

 

DOD Can Save 20 Percent Simply by Being a Better Customer

E-mail Print PDF

Those of us who’ve been around the block once or twice remember the 1994 Coopers & Lybrand study (entitled “The DOD Regulatory Cost Premium: A Quantitative Assessment”). The C&L study identified 10 regulatory cost drivers that, together, “increase[d] the price DOD pays for goods and services by18 percent.” That study was one of the drivers that pushed Clinton-era “acquisition reform” and led to ground-breaking pieces of legislation such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA).

There is some irony in the fact that the Obama administration has spent significant efforts in moving away from the flexibilities granted by FASA and other Clinton-era reforms. In other words, our view is that the Obama administration’s “acquisition reform” efforts consist largely of undoing the Clinton administration’s acquisition reform efforts, by reducing flexibility and facilitating a bureaucratic oversight regime that is seemingly designed to inhibit efficient acquisition of goods and services. The back-and-forth “reform” efforts of the two Democratic Presidents seem to embody the swings of the “pendulum” that everybody says describes the regulatory burdens of the defense acquisition environment.

Thus, we felt a distinct frisson of déjà vu when we saw a recent article in Federal Computer Week, telling readers that “trust may be the key to cost savings” for the Defense Department. It was like the C&L study had been reborn 18 years later. Perhaps some lessons need to be relearned every generation.

What lessons? Well, it’s simple, really. The DOD can save money by being a better customer, by being less adversarial and more trusting. The Pentagon’s distrust of its suppliers is not only inefficient, but it’s expensive as well.

The FCW article asserted that—

DOD currently spends $400 billion each year acquiring products and services from its contractors. About $100 billion of the money is spent on administrative costs, according to the study, based on interviews with 80 defense contractor executives.

By cutting what the report's authors consider to be unneeded bureaucracy, defense officials could reduce the department's costs by 20 percent. That could save roughly $20 billion each year, according to the report.

What’s driving the inefficient, expensive Pentagon buying practices? The FCW story stated—

… the adversarial relationships between buyers and suppliers have introduced costs in bidding and negotiations in contracts and slowed down the process of coming to acceptable terms and agreements. Think: standoff.

‘What’s more, high turnover in the core buying or supplying team can fuel dissent in relationships that are already on shaky ground, or reboot solid relationships and turn them adversarial,’ the researchers wrote.

In addition, vague contract requirements raise costs. Defense officials and contractors spend time ironing out differences in a changing interpretation of the requirements that could have been spelled out clearly sooner.

But the main villain is the Defense contractor oversight regime, which generates too much non-value-added documentation at the expense of efficient contractor practices. The FCW article stated—

‘The main villains are the development, collection, and generation of unneeded reports, documenting, and maintaining compliance processes, as well as educating and training staff on compliance processes,’ the researchers determined, according to the report.

‘From the contractors’ perspective, the Department of Defense requires too many reports, and it micromanages how contractors do their jobs,’ Ketchen said.

FCW linked to the report in question, which seemed to be more of an article from the May 2012 edition of Contract Management magazine. It had more to say on the topics we summarized above. We want to restate, clearly, the authors’ findings regarding the “adversarial” relationships between DOD and its suppliers. They wrote—

The nature of supply relationships can introduce unnecessary costs into the contract management process. Adversarial relationships raise costs related to bidding and negotiations in contracts (think standoff) and slow down the process of coming to acceptable terms and conditions.

As we stated at the beginning of this blog article, there’s nothing really new here. This is 1995 all over again. At that time, Dr. Gansler wrote about reducing non-value-added oversight activities and treating defense suppliers like trusted business partners, instead of like adversaries. The thing is, in this era of budget pressures, spending cuts, and possible sequestration, it’s important to remember that the DOD drives up costs in the name of “compliance” and “oversight”. Lockheed Martin CEO Stevens noted his company’s ability to reduce overhead costs was hindered by DOD data requirements. That’s a statement borne out by the evidence, and is consistent with the findings of the article reported on by FCW.

Many compliance requirements are driven by statute/public law. Others are driven by regulation. But many others are driven by bureaucrats, who are more focused on complying with GAGAS and avoiding CIGIE “gigs” than they are on truly protecting the interests of taxpayers.

This taxpayer wants some moderation, some balance, in the Pentagon’s approach to contractor oversight.

 

Paying Small Business Subcontractors More Quickly

E-mail Print PDF

The best companies focus on managing cash flow. They work hard on making sure they generate accurate and “adequate” invoices to their government paying office. They work hard on making sure that the cognizant Contracting Officer has updated the payment system to have funds available to pay the invoices. They work hard to stretch out payment terms to subcontractors and suppliers. The goal is simple: get the money in the door (from customers) before the money goes out the door (to suppliers). To the extent they are successful in accomplishing that goal, the need to borrow money (and to pay unallowable interest on loans) is minimized.

We hope you are one of those companies who focuses on cash flow. But if you are one of those companies, then you need to be aware of a recent Memo from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that impacts your cash management activities.

On July 11, 2012, the OMB issued a Memo entitled, “Providing Prompt Payment to Small Business Subcontractors.” The July 11 Memo followed-up on a similar September 14, 2011 Memo, that established as policy the objective that, “to the full extent permitted by law, agencies shall make their payments to small business contractors as soon as practicable, with the goal of making payments within 15 days of receipt of relevant documents.” (“Relevant documents” include a proper invoice and receiving documents indicating acceptances of goods/services.)

The July 11 Memo addresses paying Prime Contractors more quickly, so as to enable them to pay their small business subcontractors more quickly. The Memo states, “agencies should, to the full extent permitted by law, temporarily accelerate payments to all prime contractors, in order to allow them to provide prompt payments to small business subcontractors.”

The “temporary” goal established by the Memo is 15 days. In other words, Executive Branch agencies should pay their Prime Contractors within 15 days, so that the Primes can pay their small business subcontractors within 15 days.

That’s the good news.

The Memo also directs agencies to “encourage” Prime Contractors to—

… consider modifying their existing contracts with small business subcontractors without consideration or fees to include a clause providing that the prime contractor will pay the small business subcontractor along an accelerated timetable to the maximum extent practicable; and insert a similar clause in their future contracts with small businesses subcontractors.

The foregoing would mean significant work on the part of the Primes. It might also impact the “accepted” way that cash flow has been managed for many years. In particular, it puts in peril the disreputable “pay when paid” contract term that leads to subcontractors financing the Prime Contractors’ cash flow.

The OMB Memo also requests that the FAR Councils create a new contract clause to be inserted into future contracts, so that the accelerated subcontractor payments will be required by regulation (and contract), and Prime Contractors will have more than “encouragement” in order to make accelerated payments.

Naturally, some Prime Contractors will game this. They will accept the accelerated payments from their customers but delay payments to their subcontractors. That’s probably not going to lead to happy past performance ratings.

The OMB had this to say about their appeal to the honor of the Primes—

The acceleration of payments to all prime contractors is a one year, temporary, transitional policy that provides for immediate assistance to small businesses, while affording agencies and prime contractors time to insert contract clauses as described above, or take other appropriate steps, to ensure that prime contractors provide prompt payment to their small business subcontractors. On a date one year after the date of this memorandum, the policy of automatically accelerating all payments to prime contractors shall terminate. … OMB will then provide further guidance on the appropriate steps that agencies should consider to ensure that small business subcontractors continue to be paid promptly by their prime contractors. Such steps may include continuing to provide accelerated payment to prime contractors that have inserted contract clauses as described above, exercising flexibility that is being considered as part of the implementing regulations of the Small Business Jobs Act that enables agency contracting officers to consider a prime contractor's commitment to paying small business subcontractors in a prompt manner as part of a contract award determination, or other measures as OMB deems appropriate.

If you read the foregoing paragraph, you will see at least one carrot and at least one stick. We think you ought to consider what you will do over the next year with the accelerated payments you will be receiving. The wrong step might lead to problems.

One more thing we noticed in the OMB Memo.

The term “subcontractor” is difficult to define. Or, rather, it has many definitions sprinkled throughout the FAR, the DFARS, and the various solicitation provisions and contract clauses. For purposes of complying with the Memo, the OMB has defined “subcontractor” as the term is used in FAR Part 3.5. I.e., a subcontractor "(1) means any person, other than the prime contractor, who offers to furnish or furnishes any supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind under a prime contract or a subcontract entered into in connection with such prime contract; and (2) includes any person who offers to furnish or furnishes general supplies to the prime contractor or a higher tier subcontractor."

So by “small business subcontractor,” the OMB means any supplier or vendor your business may use. Remember that definition when you contemplate how your company is going to comply with this new emphasis on paying small business subcontractors faster.

 


Page 174 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.