Are You Letting HR Kill Your Company?
 We’ve recently posted a couple of articles about employee development and workforce management in times of budgetary pressure. We’ve tried—perhaps too subtly—to nudge readers towards thinking about their employees and about strategies for ensuring that their organizations are positioned to survive the looming budget cuts, and perhaps even thrive.
Have we been too subtle? Heck, we came right out and begged you to take action on these issues, back in February.
While the idealist hopes you’ve invested time thinking deep thoughts about these issues, the cynic is pretty sure you’ve blown them off. We’re sure you had good reasons: focusing on program execution is always a good rationale for ignoring more long-term needs. If other excuses were needed, we expect budget planning or mid-year forecast efforts were trotted out like show horses. In other words, we bet you’ve been ignoring your workforce issues and will continue to ignore them … and then of course you’ll complain when your operations start to become negatively impacted.
We figure you need another swift kick to the keister.
So here’s yet another article on the boring, yet critical, topic of workforce management. Print it out; show it to you co-workers. Post it on the bulletin board. Send a copy anonymously to HR. We don’t care (just make sure you note it came from www.apogeeconsulting.biz). But do something about this, will you please?
Our first point is brought to you by DefenseNews, who reported that defense contractors “are struggling to keep talent” in the budgetary downturn. The DefenseNews article stated—
Cutting employees is easy. Keeping the right ones is difficult. While U.S. defense companies will likely continue to reduce staffing as part of the defense downturn already in progress, the process of sorting the critical from the expendable is a concern for many senior executives. Much of their fear stems from a glance at history: The aerospace and defense industry didn’t handle the last downturn well. Not only did a loss of critical knowledge affect efficiency, but in many cases companies were ill-prepared to support government needs when greater spending returned.
The article quoted Steve Grundman as saying—
‘In general, I think reductions in the last downturn were focused on ‘capacity’ and capital investments, not people, and what they learned was that the focus should have been on ‘capabilities’ and skills instead,’ Grundman said. ‘Compared to finding a good systems engineer, it’s comparatively easy to build a factory, an insight I’m not sure was so widely shared 20 years ago as it is today.’
One of the time-honored tactics for managing workforce cuts is to “stack rank” (sometimes called “rack and stack”) employees. Employees in each organization are ranked in comparison to each other. Often this is an annual process; but when workforce cuts are being contemplated, it is traditionally one of the first steps that management takes. We understand why. Generally speaking, you want to lay-off your low performers and retain your high performers. Thus, you first need to identify who is who. Makes sense, right?
Well, maybe not.
Recently, we have come across articles and discussions which assert that “stack ranking” is a fairly terrible approach to workforce management—especially when implemented on a routine basis and especially when a pre-selected “grading curve” is issued by upper management. The pre-selected approach was made famous by Jack Welch and the General Electric Company, where the lower 10% of the workforce is identified annually—and then fired—came in for special criticism.
The first salvo came from an article about why Microsoft is no longer the leading-edge of technology innovation. One of the primary reasons for Microsoft’s lagging performance in innovation and development, according to the author, is its preoccupation with forced rank stacking. A summary of the article stated—
Analyzing one of American corporate history’s greatest mysteries—the lost decade of Microsoft—two-time George Polk Award winner (and V.F.’s newest contributing editor) Kurt Eichenwald traces the ‘astonishingly foolish management decisions’ at the company that ‘could serve as a business-school case study on the pitfalls of success.’ Relying on dozens of interviews and internal corporate records—including e-mails between executives at the company’s highest ranks—Eichenwald offers an unprecedented view of life inside Microsoft during the reign of its current chief executive, Steve Ballmer, in the August issue. Today, a single Apple product—the iPhone—generates more revenue than all of Microsoft’s wares combined. Eichenwald’s conversations reveal that a management system known as ‘stack ranking’—a program that forces every unit to declare a certain percentage of employees as top performers, good performers, average, and poor—effectively crippled Microsoft’s ability to innovate. ‘Every current and former Microsoft employee I interviewed—every one—cited stack ranking as the most destructive process inside of Microsoft, something that drove out untold numbers of employees,’ Eichenwald writes. ‘If you were on a team of 10 people, you walked in the first day knowing that, no matter how good everyone was, 2 people were going to get a great review, 7 were going to get mediocre reviews, and 1 was going to get a terrible review,’ says a former software developer. ‘It leads to employees focusing on competing with each other rather than competing with other companies.’
Teresa Nielsen-Hayden had this opinion to offer about forced rank stacking, at her website’s blog (“Making Light”)—
[Rank stacking] strikes me as magical thinking: you make your company more competitive by making its internal departments and individual employees compete with each other. Wherever it comes from, IMO it’s profoundly dysfunctional. Business is about getting work done — unless you’re in a line of business where that work consists of figuring out who’s a star and rewarding them, which is rare. Companies and departments are by nature internally cooperative clusters of people who are working on the same projects and/or issues. Turning employee evaluations into a game of winners and losers and stars, and employees into competing gameplayers, is not a good way to get work done. … Stack ranking also fails to take into account what kind of work is being done. Sometimes fast-moving highly profitable achievements rest on an earlier foundation of slow incremental work on less-than-tractable problems. It’s not unusual for a department to do both sorts of work. Which kind gets rewarded for being productive? Which gets the bad reviews and firings? I’ll absolutely question the use of stack ranking as a motivational device. Doing good work, looking ahead, helping to create a strong, smart organization, and refraining from doing evil should be enough to get any employee a good annual review. If what it gets them is a note in their permanent record saying it wasn’t enough, and they should have done more, they might feel motivated to try harder next year, and in a few cases may try harder the year after that; but mostly not, and sooner or later they’re all going to lose heart. People want to care about their work. If you break their faith in their job, it’s hard to win it back. It’s a miserable system for managers, too. Say you’ve put together a great department — competent, well assorted, good work proprioception, with high productivity and high morale. Now impose a rating system that tells you that your department manages its people neither better nor worse than any other department. Be forced to label 20% of your people winners, without reference to the rest of the department’s work that makes theirs possible. Label 70% of them as timeservers and underachievers, no better than they should be. Label 10% of them failures, or even fire them, when you’ve spent all year trying to help them be good at their jobs.
One of the commenters on her site offered this observation—
I'll not knock evolution: blind competitive pressure has created some pretty amazing things over the past billion years. One of things it has consistently produced, however, is cooperation. Time and again, it's turned out that in a cutthroat take-no-prisoners dog-eat-dog existential battle of all against all, the most winningest strategy is working together. What these competition-inducing schemes to improve upon the inefficiency of group production constantly miss is that group production originates in the first instance by out-competing everything else. Cooperation is where competition leads. Trying to use blind evolution to improve upon cooperative systems is like noticing that great square wheel you made is getting rounded on the corners from wear and setting about sharpening them back up.
This is more than simply the opinion of one (or two) individuals. If you visit Nielsen-Hayden blog post (link above) you’ll find links to several academic and business magazine articles on the topic that share this point of view. The consensus seems to be that forced rank stacking is bad for employee morale, hurts productivity and project execution, and stifles innovation. And it’s more than simply one or two or seven peoples’ opinions—it’s also questionable on a statistical level: it’s bad math.
As Ms. Nielsen-Hayden wrote—
The ‘grading on the curve’ aspect of it is also defective. Basic management theory limits the number of employees that can report directly to a single boss. Any department that’s small enough for everyone in it to be reporting to the same boss is too small a sample for that boss to be grading them on a rigid 20-70-10 curve. Besides, as any kid who got curve-graded in school can tell you, it’s no guarantee of high-quality work. If all the students in a curve-graded class slack off, they don’t all get a D or F. Instead, it gets easier to get a B. If all but a few students slack off, it’s a good bet that the ones who don’t will get an A. Now translate that into the essentially cooperative workplace. Is it really a good idea to reward employees when their co-workers fail?
Let’s posit for a moment that the “rack and stack” practice is bad. So why do you let your HR Department make you do it? And that is the critical question, isn’t it? Why do you let your HR folks and senior leadership perpetuate a practice that hurts your company?
We might speculate that the reason for the perpetuation of the practice is that it’s “traditional”—i.e., it’s the way it’s always been done. Nobody who makes the decisions in this area knows any other way.
But we all know that the worst reason to do anything is “because it’s always been done that way.” (The second worst reason is “because we don’t have enough budget to do it any other way.”) If that’s all they’ve got for a rationale, then they’ve got nothing at all. And we think you should call them on it.
One more point apropos to this issue, again offered by Ms. Nielsen-Hayden—
If you know in advance that 10% of the employees in your department are going to get fired, one logical answer is to always keep a few redshirts around. This frees up the rest of you to stop worrying, and work on the stuff you were hired to do. Any good work you get out of the redshirts is pure profit.
Perhaps that’s a bit cynical, but it’s also the logical answer to the problem of forced rank stacking.
So as you ponder the current and future budgetary pressures imposed on your organization by customers and the general marketplace, we ask you to remember that you need to plan for survival. You need to plan for the long-term future. And that means managing your current workforce, developing employees to become the next generation of leaders, and keeping your HR Department from getting in the way.
Problems with the T&M Contract Type – Part 2
Okay, we promised to discuss issues associated with subcontracts under T&M prime contracts in this Part of the analysis of the T&M contract type. Instead, we want to talk about this recent decision at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Trust us, it will fit in to the Part 1 discussion on the Government’s problems administering and managing this contract type.
The ASBCA decision addressed an appeal by the GaN Corporation. GaN held a sole source contract (awarded pursuant to the SBA’s 8(a) program) to provide “interior design support for office and barracks furnishings” for the U.S. Army Engineering Support Center, Huntsville (USACEH). The contract called for orders to be issued on either a firm, fixed-price (FFP) basis or Labor Hour (LH) basis, based on “firm fixed price rates” established for individual labor categories.
GaN accounted for labor hours under the “total time” method. Thus, GaN employees recorded all hours worked, whether compensated or uncompensated. For salaried employees—whose hourly rate was calculated based on 2,080 labor hours in a year—this created “uncompensated overtime” (UCOT) hours, where more than 2,080 hours were recorded in a single year. In its proposal to USACEH, GaN stated—
Our accounting and timesheet procedures will require the recording of uncompensated overtime and its allocation to all charge numbers worked throughout the pay period. As such, because ofthe contract type, all hours worked, whether compensated or uncompensated, will be charged and billed to the contract.
The Contracting Officer (CO) notified GaN that its billings under the LH orders awarded to it included hours for which its employees were not being paid. This finding was based on an “internal review of the contract” performed (we assume) by auditors of the Army Audit Agency. In addition, the CO asserted that GaN’s invoices did not include required documentation to substantiate labor expenses, as required by the contract’s payment clause (52.232-7). The CO stated, “The contractor never states that it actually paid the employee for those hours [billed].”
GaN and its CO continued to correspond, with GaN asserting that it was permitted to bill the Government for all direct labor hours recorded by its employees to the order, regardless of whether or not those labor hours were compensated. The CO continued to assert that “If your firm does not incur certain costs for your employees, pursuant to FAR 52.232-7, these costs are not billable to the Government under the labor hours provisions of the contract.” Eventually, the CO issued a final decision demanding some $72,000 in alleged “overpayments,” which GaN appealed to the ASBCA.
The ASBCA Judge found for GaN, writing—
The government contends that under the plain meaning of the Payments clause and the contract billing procedures, appellant overbilled the government regarding the labor for ‘unexpensed hours’ worked by the above-mentioned GaN employees. As such, its withholding was justified. … It argues that, except for the labor rates being fixed, the contract is a variant of a Time and Materials (T&M) contract and is tantamount to a cost reimbursement contract …. The government states that the central issue is whether appellant, under a labor hour task order, is entitled to charge the government for the employees ‘unexpensed and uncompensated’ overtime when the contract in effect made them all hourly workers …. Because appellant's ‘novel and unsupportable interpretation allows the contractor to pocket undue windfall profits at taxpayer expense,’ the government avers that we ‘should not countenance such a 'weird and whimsical result'’. …
The government appears to think that the various references to actual payment and cost mean that the contractor cannot recover for hours unless the employees were paid on an hourly basis. We disagree.
Because the Government misinterpreted the contract type as “tantamount to a cost reimbursement contract,” it mistakenly thought that GaN had to incur a labor cost in order to invoice it. In fact, the contract type was closer to an FFP type, in that the price for labor hours was fixed and the contractor’s labor costs were simply irrelevant to the established price. But as we have seen, the real answer is that the contract type was Labor Hour, which (like T&M) is its own unique type and should not be analyzed by looking at the rules for other contract types.
The GaN decision did not reference what DCAA has to say about uncompensated overtime, but it well might have. Section 6-410 of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) discusses UCOT. It starts out by stating, “The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to compensate hourly workers for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, but the FLSA does not require employers to pay overtime to salaried employees. Salaried or exempt employees are paid a salary to provide a service.”
The CAM lists three UCOT accounting methods that are considered “acceptable” for use. These three methods include:
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Compute a separate average labor rate for each labor period, based on the salary paid divided by the total hours worked during the period, and distribute the salary cost to all cost objectives worked on during the period based on this rate.
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Determine a pro rata allocation of total hours worked during the period and distribute the salary cost using the pro rata allocation. For example, if an employee was paid on a weekly basis and worked 25 hours on one cost objective and 25 hours on another cost objective, each cost objective would be charged with one-half of the employee's weekly salary.
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Compute an estimated hourly rate for each employee for the entire year based on the total hours the employee is expected to work during the year and distribute salary costs to all cost objectives worked on at the estimated hourly rate. Any variance between actual salary costs and the amount distributed is charged/credited to overhead.
In addition, the CAM discussed two other methods that “require further evaluation” in order to determine whether or not the method use is acceptable. The two additional methods are:
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Distribute the salary cost to all cost objectives based on a labor rate predicated on an 8-hour day/40-hour week and credit the excess amount distributed to overhead.
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Determine a pro rata allocation of hours worked each day and distribute the daily salary cost using the pro rata allocation …
So it is clear that—contrary to the Government’s argument that GaN’s position was “novel and unsupportable,” and resulted in an “undue windfall”—the fact of the matter is that GaN had several UCOT cost accounting methodologies from which to choose, and not all of them required salaried employees to receive actual payment for hours worked in excess of 40 per week or 2,080 per year. It’s too bad that the USACE Contracting Officer allowed him/herself to be intimidated by internal auditors into creating this dispute with the USACE’s 8(a) contractor, since the Government’s position contrary to the plain reading of the appropriate regulatory framework.
In the next article in this series, we’ll take the promised look at subcontracting under T&M contracts.
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Problems with the T&M Contract Type – Part 3
Previously we discussed problems with the T&M (and Labor Hour) contract type at the Prime Contract level. In this article, we want to discuss problems at the subcontract level—i.e., why in the world would you ever issue a T&M type subcontract?
Well, we know one answer to that semi-rhetorical question. You issue a T&M subcontract when you have a T&M prime contract, and you need separate subcontractor billing rates. Prior to 2007, prime contractors could plausibly argue that, if a subcontractor was performing the same work as the prime contractor, the subcontractor’s labor hours could be billed at the same fixed hourly rates as the prime contractor. (There was even a somewhat-on-point legal precedent that stood for the proposition that it was the work that counted, and not who performed it.) But in 2007, everything changed. Federal Acquisition Circular 2005-15 and DFARS Change Notice 2006-1212 amended the regulations applicable to T&M (and Labor Hour) type contracts in several areas, and thus most contracts subsequently were required to have three sets of billing rates: (1) for the prime’s employees, (2) for each subcontractor’s employees, and (3) for any work performed by a subsidiary or separate division of the prime contractor. (Note that competitively awarded non-DOD contracts are subject to different, more lenient, requirements.) Subcontractor efforts that don’t qualify as required labor hour work (i.e., subcontract efforts that don’t constitute delivered labor hours) cannot be billed under the “T” portion of the contract, and must be billed under the “M” portion at actual costs paid (plus applicable indirect costs, less fee).
So if you have a T&M contract that requires separate billing rates, you would want to put your subcontractor under a T&M contract. If you didn’t, then you would have to bill the subcontractor’s efforts at actual costs with no profit component. So that’s one answer to the question we posed; but now we are running out of answers.
If you intend to award a T&M subcontract, you are entering into a world of hurt. First, you may be dealing with a small business entity that may not have an “adequate” accounting system, as defined by the SF 1408 or DCAA. That’s fine from a technical standpoint—there is no requirement in the FAR or DFARS that T&M contractors must have an “adequate” accounting system, as there is for cost-reimbursement contractors. But the problem there (as we saw in Part 2) is that too many Government people think that a T&M contract is “flexibly priced”—and hence cost-reimbursement—and so an “adequate” accounting system must be required to be in place before contract award. They’re wrong, of course. But setting them straight will be a challenge.
Similarly, there is no requirement to find that “no other contract type is suitable” with respect to entering into a subcontract; yet Contracting Officers may think that the requirement should apply to a prime’s subcontracting. If the prime contractor is submitting a proposed T&M subcontract package for consent, it may prove problematic to convince the CO that consent should be given, absent such a document in the file.
If you enter into a T&M subcontract, and the subcontractor applies indirect costs to the reimbursable “M” portion of the subcontract, then the requirements of the Allowable Cost & Payment clause (52.216-7) apply. That clause requires, among other things, that the parties need to establish a reasonable provisional billing rate, which will be finalized after the subcontractor (a) submits its annual final indirect cost rate proposal, (b) that proposal is audited by a government audit agency, and (c) the rates are negotiated and finalized. That’s going to take years—and your subcontract will remain open during that timeframe.
We should also note that the billed labor hours under the “T” part of the subcontract are to be billed in accordance with the T&M Payment clause 52.232-7. This will require (among other things) that the subcontractor must submit documents supporting its monthly billing, including individual daily job timekeeping records and records that substantiate the employee’s billing rate category qualifications. That’s going to be a bit burdensome, especially if your subcontractor is a small business that lacks a sophisticated timekeeping system. (We see no regulatory reason that “individual daily job timekeeping records” can’t consist of several 3x5 cards, but still.)
Is there any way around these bureaucratic and burdensome billing requirements?
Well for one thing you can think about using quick-closeout rates if the subcontract qualifies. Revisions made to the FAR in June 2011 made it much more difficult to use quick-closeout procedures, but smaller value subcontracts may still qualify. (See FAR 42.708.)
Another possible approach may be to avoid the protracted indirect cost rate settlement issue by agreeing, upfront, to a firm, fixed-price for allocated indirect rates. That creates a risk for the contracting parties: if the actual (audited) rates are lower than the rates used to negotiate the FFP value, then the subcontractor will earn additional margin; but if the actual (audited) rates are higher, then the subcontractor will experience margin erosion. (Creating a FP-EPA or FP with reopener clause defeats the purpose, since the parties will still have to wait for the indirect rates to be audited and finalized.) And, in any case, the “M” portion of the contract will still be based on actual costs incurred, so those costs will need to be audited and finalized as part of contract close-out activities (if for no other reason).
What if you negotiate an FFP price for both the (otherwise reimbursable) “M” portion, as well as any indirect costs allocated to that portion? Will that avoid the flexible price issue? Well, yes. And in that case, you can probably throw-out all requirements associated with the 52.216-7 clause, as well. But you might notice that the contract you have ended up negotiating looks very much like a FFP (or perhaps FFP-LOE) contract type, where everything is firm, fixed-price and the only variable is the actual number of labor hours delivered by the subcontractor. At that point, maybe you might want to consider moving toward an honest-to-goodness FFP (or FFP-LOE) contract, and in that manner simply avoid all the hassle and problems associated with the T&M subcontract?
Problems with the T&M Contract Type – Part 1
The Time and Materials (T&M) contract type is the “least preferred” type of contract awarded by the Federal government. To emphasize how few T&M contract awards the Federal government wants to see, before making any T&M contract award the Contracting Officer must make a determination and finding (D&F) that no other contract type (including cost-plus) is suitable for the contract award. (See FAR 16.601(d).) T&M contracts are tough to work with (and tough to write about) because applicable requirements differ by the award circumstances. For example, whether the award is made for a commercial item or a noncommercial item, or whether or not the award is made pursuant to competition, affect the applicable FAR/DFARS provisions and clauses—and thus also dictate the contract payment terms.
The T&M contract type is the least preferred because it is the hardest to manage for both Government and contractor. That assertion may be counter-intuitive for some readers. How can something so simple that’s used every day (i.e., number of hours x fixed billing rate = amount billed) be so hard to manage? But indeed, readers, such is the case. We will be exploring some of the problems with the T&M contract type in this article.
The first question to be addressed is, “What is a T&M contract type?” Many individuals can’t accurately answer that question. In fact, the FAR has different answers to that question, depending on which Part you’re looking at.
Some individuals (including DCAA auditors) categorize T&M contracts under “flexibly priced” contract types, along with cost-reimbursement types, because the final price isn’t known until all hours have been billed and any indirect costs allocated to the Materials portion have been finalized. Other individuals lean more toward categorizing T&M contracts under “fixed-price” arrangements, because the cost per billed labor hour is fixed and not subject to change if the contractor’s labor or labor overhead costs change.
FAR Part 16 states that T&M contract types are neither cost-plus nor fixed-price. Instead, they are a third category of contract types called “Time-and-Materials,” and they have their own FAR section at 16.6. Yet, FAR 30.6 (and the related 52.230-6 CAS Administration contract clause) requires that, when a T&M contract is included in a cost impact proposal, it must be broken into its constituent components, such that the “T” portion is included in the fixed-price section of the analysis while the “M” portion is included in the flexibly priced section.
The fact of the matter is that a T&M contract type is neither flexibly priced nor is it firm-priced. It’s not a hybrid type, either. Instead, it is its own type. The folks who feel compelled to look at the world in terms of black and white have a problem with this; but they are clearly wrong. While in some cases it may be helpful to think of the contract in terms of a fixed-price per labor hour plus cost-reimbursable non-labor costs, that’s about as far as it should go. Knowing management of fixed-price contracts won’t get you where you need to go on T&M types, nor will knowing management of cost-plus types. Instead, you need to develop an expertise in managing T&M contracts—and subcontracts, too.
The confusion over T&M contract type has been exacerbated by regulatory revisions. Historically, T&M contracts have been treated as delivery contracts, with the deliverable being labor hours. In other words, the contractor was required to deliver labor hours (and ancillary material) and there was no specified contractual outcome associated with those hours. Accordingly, payments of T&M contract billings were delivery payments, not interim payments. A payment meant that the Government had inspected and accepted the hours billed, and had no recourse when it turned out that not all billed hours were of equal productivity. This situation led to problems (particularly in the IT system implementation realm) where contractors had delivered 100% of the specified labor hours without completing the contemplated work. That was a problem for the Government, since it didn’t obtain what it wanted, but need to pay the contractor regardless. Consequently, the FAR was revised in the mid-2000’s to clarify that T&M payments were interim payments, not payments for partial deliveries. That revision was ill-advised, because it required revisions to a host of other provisions and clauses
For a good example of what we mean, take a look at this recent final FAR revision (issued July 26, 2012). It attempted to “harmonize” differing requirements for submitting final invoices with respect to T&M contract types. As the FAR Councils wrote—
FAR clause 52.232-7 provides for monthly invoicing and submission of the completion voucher no later than one year from the date of work completion. These provisions are in conflict with the corresponding provisions of FAR clause 52.216-7, which is invoked under a time-and-materials contract. FAR clause 52.216-7 provides for invoicing on a bi-weekly basis for large businesses, and more frequent invoicing for small businesses, and the submission of the completion voucher no later than 120 days after completion of work.
Thus, the final rule clarifies that the invoicing requirements of 52.232-7 apply to the fixed-price-per-hour “T” portion of the contract, but not to the reimbursable “M” portion, which is covered by the requirements of 52.216-7. (Readers should recall that, among other things, 52.216-7 requires submission of a final annual indirect cost rate proposal for audit and subsequent negotiation of final indirect rates. If you are a smaller business and only have one or two T&M contracts—with all others being FFP—then it seems absurd to go through this process. It seems even more absurd to be subject to the requirements of 52.216-7 if the amount of reimbursable “M” costs is immaterial in comparison to the “T” amounts.)
The foregoing example is just one of the myriad issues and inconsistencies created by the rule-makers, when they decided to make T&M contract payments interim payments, instead of payments for partial deliveries.
Another problem with the T&M contract type is increasing the hours being acquired, when it turns out the original amount ordered was insufficient to meet the Government’s needs. This is a problem because FAR 16.601(d)(2) requires that every T&M contract must include “a ceiling price that the contractor exceeds at its own risk”—and the CO must “document the contract file to justify the reasons for and amount of any subsequent change.” In contrast, while a cost-reimbursement type contract contains an estimated cost and fee, the estimated cost amount can (and frequently is) increased for changes that are within the originally contemplated contract scope of work.
On July 26, 2012, a proposed rule was published for public comment that would make it harder for COs to justify any increases to the original amount of ordered labor hours. If implemented as drafted, then any increase to ordered hours would need to be justified (by the CO) as “non-competitive new work.” In other words, instead of increasing the contract price to permit the contractor to deliver (and bill) additional labor hours, the correct approach is to recompete the additional work.
In another admission that their previous rule-making was ill-advised, the FAR Councils wrote—
FAR 16.601(d) has also been amended to make it clear that a D&F is required for T&M orders. This FAR change will clarify that a T&M D&F is required for each non-commercial item T&M order under a part 16 indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. This change is necessary both to keep part 16 parallel with part 8 (which requires a D&F for each part 8 T&M order) and to clarify an unintended lack of clarity in the 2006 FAR changes that rewrote much of the T&M policies in the FAR (see FAC 2005-15, published in the Federal Register at 71 FR 74656 on December 12, 2006). Currently, only part 12 includes a direct requirement for T&M orders to be authorized by a T&M D&F, but this applies only to commercial items. This FAR case is adding a clarification to part 8 to repeat that policy to ensure that part 8 T&M orders are also each authorized by a T&M D&F. With this case, part 16 is also being changed to explicitly require T&M D&Fs for orders.
It should be clear that the T&M contract type is a difficult one for both the Government and the Prime Contractor. In the next Part of this analysis, we’ll take a look at subcontracts under T&M prime contracts. Readers, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.
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