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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Gets Serious About Access to Contractor Records and Ignoring Legal Principles

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Serious
Here’s the thing, dear readers. DCAA is getting serious about forcing contractors to turn over records and other information that its auditors believe they need to perform their audits.

If you’ve been reading this blog for any length of time, you ought to have several problems with the declarative sentence above. Let’s elaborate, shall we?

First, you might take issue with the assertion that DCAA auditors actually perform audits. Indeed, it has been our experience, and the finding of other knowledgeable sources, that the average DCAA auditor spends more time “on the administrative aspects of the audit rather than on conducting the audit.” As a result, DCAA is decades behind in performing audits of contractors’ incurred costs. The only way the audit agency will ever catch up is to “risk waive” the lower dollar audits from the smaller contractors. We predict that practice will last until POGO documents the amount of costs that are not being audited, and then DCAA will try another tack.

Second, you might take issue with the concept that DCAA is just now “getting serious” about access to contractor records and information. On December 18, 2008, the audit agency reemphasized its focus on contractor responsiveness and handling “denial of access to records” situations by issuing MRD 08-PAS-042(R). So DCAA has been “serious” about this issue for at least three years—what’s changed?

Finally, you might have a problem, as we do, with DCAA’s plans to put pressure on contractors to turn over records that have been protected from audit either by judicial decision and precedent, or by the time-honored concept of attorney-client privilege. Which is what the good folks at DCAA HQ are directing the auditors to do.

We are talking about MRD 12-PPS-018(R), dated July 25, 2012. The MRD provided audit guidance for situations where the auditors are asserting a “denial of access to records” situation, solely because the contractor asserts attorney-client privilege. This is not the first time that DCAA has asserted a right to examine protected documents. We’ve discussed the issue right here, and also here, and we noted that DCAA was going to insist on auditing confidential employee hotline allegations and the resulting investigations (many performed under privilege)—and that was going to cause problems. (NOTE: the second link leads to our published article on DCAA audits of contractor codes of ethics and business conduct. You can’t access the article unless you’re a member. Sorry about that.)

The MRD stated—

… if a contractor denies access to the requested information and does not provide alternative, non-privileged information, the FAO should pursue access to records until such time as a high-level executive from the company asserts the privilege, in writing. Upon receipt of the written assertion, the issue should be elevated to the Regional office for coordination with top-level contractor management. …

If the efforts outlined in CAM 1-504.4g prove unsuccessful for obtaining the data needed to establish allowability, allocability or reasonableness, coordinate with This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it so that Policy may review the access to records issue with DCAA counsel.

So, essentially, DCAA is throwing down the gauntlet with respect to the lawful assertion of attorney-client privilege. We predict this is going to be barrels of fun for audit liaison and in-house counsel alike.

But that’s not all. We were privileged to receive an advance copy of MRD 12-PPS-019(R), dated August 14, 2012. Here’s a link to the new MRD. (Sorry, you have to be a member to access the MRD. Membership has privileges, after all.) The new MRD discusses obtaining access to contractor internal audit reports.

Look, we all knew this was coming. We wrote about a GAO report that recommended that DCAA work harder to obtain contractors’ internal audit reports. (We also noted that DCAA auditors interviewed by GAO asserted that “they did not believe that access to contractor internal audit information is critical to their own audit work and that the internal audit reports do not have enough detail to be helpful.”) We also noted that DCAA has been trying to obtain expanded subpoena power for some time.

With that in mind, let’s not be overly surprised that the new MRD had this to say—

… DCAA Contract Audit Coordinator (CAC) offices and Field Audit Offices (FAOs) at major contractor locations must establish a process and a central point of contact to obtain and monitor DCAA’s access to and use of internal audits. This process will include a method for tracking requests for internal audit reports and working papers, when needed, and the contractor’s disposition of these requests. …

When access to internal audit reports is denied by the contractor, the CAC or FAO manager will implement Access to Records procedures per DCAA Instruction 7640.17, dated December 19, 2008. If the efforts of the FAO, Administrative Contracting Officer and regional office prove unsuccessful, the Regional Director should review the matter and determine if a subpoena should be requested in accordance with DCAA Regulations No. 5500.5, Subpoenas of Contractor Records, dated October 10, 2006.

While we don’t believe that contractor internal audit reports are going to be helpful to DCAA auditors at all, we also think that contractors need to think long and hard about whether or not they provide those internal audit reports to DCAA—especially those prepared under attorney-client privilege. (See how the two MRDs link together?)

As we told readers just over a year ago, contractors disclose internal audit reports at their own risk. In that article, we quoted distinguished attorney Karen Manos, who had written—

A U.S. Magistrate Judge ruled from the bench that Oracle’s disclosure of a privileged report in response to a General Services Administration Inspector General subpoena resulted in a broad subject matter waiver of all communications related to the report. … Oracle provided the IG a copy of the report of its outside counsel’s compliance review [related to compliance with the GSA Price Reductions clause]. … The Judge [found that] 'Defendants attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to all communications between defendants and [outside law firm] relating in any way to the contract in issue and/or the review performed.' ..

So this is a serious issue. DCAA is getting serious about it, and we think you should, too.

 

Small Business Must Pay Penalties and Interest on Expressly Unallowable Costs

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Astute readers may have noticed that we’ve focused this week on the “challenges” associated with small businesses that seek to sell goods and services to the Department of Defense. If you are a small business and win your first “flexibly priced” contract, the resulting euphoria may blind you to the downside risks. For example, there’s this whole accounting system “adequacy” thingee (which includes an evaluation of your indirect cost allocation structure and your calculation of indirect cost rates). And there’s a requirement to submit an annual proposal for “final billing rates” using an “Incurred Cost Electronically” format that you probably haven’t heard of before winning that golden cost-plus contract. These two areas are among the many landmines that await your business as it tries to collect the promised funds from the DOD.

So here’s the bottom-line for small businesses entering the defense marketplace: If you focus on contract execution and don’t pay attention to the back-office administrative requirements, your story will not end happily. You could easily end up paying the U.S. Government far more than it paid you (as our friends at Quimba Software learned, to their chagrin.)

Yet another potential landmine that you could trigger would be failing to deal with this “unallowable cost” thingee that’s addressed in FAR Part 31. (That’s where Quimba tripped-up.) If you are a small business, you may only have a vague idea as to what the FAR is—let alone have sufficient expertise in navigating the identification and segregation of unallowable costs (and the calculation of acceptable indirect cost rates). We suggest you had better learn more about this area—and quickly. The ability to properly account for unallowable cost implicates not only the adequacy of your accounting system, but also the adequacy (and accuracy) of your annual proposal for final billing rates. If you blow the proper accounting for unallowable costs, you are going to make DCAA very happy—because they will get to issue an audit report with lots and lots of questioned costs in it.

It may sound self-serving, but we honestly believe that if you are clueless regarding government contract cost accounting, then it would be a very good idea to hire a subject matter expert to assist you in that area. That’s not to say that hiring an outside SME is a guarantee of a successful outcome. Indeed, Quimba learned the hard way that not all government contract cost accounting advisors are cut from the same cloth. Quimba’s problems with DOD need not typify that of every small business, but if you don’t at least come close to getting the contract accounting and billing correct, you are going to have similar problems.

It is not going to be pretty.

Today’s article is about another small business, one (like Quimba) focused on innovative technology and R&D (and performer of SBIR and STTR contracts) that fell afoul of DCAA and DCMA. But before we discuss the problems of Inframat Corporation, we want to bring you up to speed about expressly unallowable costs and why they can cost your company more than mere garden-variety “unallowable” costs.

We’ve discussed the “flavors” of unallowable costs before on this blog, notably in this article. We wrote that the FAR contract clause 52-242-3 states—

If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal is expressly unallowable under a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR, that defines the allowability of specific selected costs, the Contractor shall be assessed a penalty equal to—

(1) The amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract; plus

(2) Simple interest, to be computed—
(i) On the amount the Contractor was paid (whether as a progress or billing payment) in excess of the amount to which the Contractor was entitled; and

(ii) Using the applicable rate effective for each six-month interval prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Pub. L. 92-41 (85 Stat. 97).
If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal includes a cost previously determined to be unallowable for that Contractor, then the Contractor will be assessed a penalty in an amount equal to two times the amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract.

That contract clause is not the only place that contractors are put on notice regarding the potential imposition of penalties and interest for including expressly unallowable costs in their final indirect rate proposals. For example, FAR 31.110 states—

  1. Certain contracts require certification of the indirect cost rates proposed for final payment purposes. See 42.703-2 for administrative procedures regarding the certification provisions and the related contract clause prescription.

  2. If unallowable costs are included in final indirect cost settlement proposals, penalties may be assessed. See 42.709 for administrative procedures regarding the penalty assessment provisions and the related contract clause prescription.

So let’s just take it as a given that when any contractor receives a “flexibly priced” contract, it is put on clear notice that inclusion of expressly unallowable costs, billed as either direct or indirect costs, may lead to imposition of penalties and interest by the U.S. Government.

Inframat apparently knew that risk, but thought its “sob story” would convince a DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO)—and later, an ASBCA Judge—that it wasn’t deserving of such a fate. Inframat’s story convinced neither the ACO nor the Judge. Here’s the Judge’s decision on the matter.

The first thing we noticed about the ASBCA decision was that Inframat was represented by Mr. Nicholas Vlahos, Inframat’s “General Manager/Controller”. Apparently, Inframat did not think it worthwhile to hire an attorney to represent its interests. In fairness, the quantum in dispute was only $26,016 plus “simple interest.” We can see Inframat’s management making the decision to forego attorney’s fees for such a small amount. On the other hand, we’ve opined before that “your choice of attorney matters one hecuva lot.” We don’t know if Inframat’s decision to forego representation affected the ultimate outcome, but we are very sure it didn’t help them any.

Inframat submitted its “certified final incurred cost rate proposal” for its Fiscal Year 2004 in August 2006. (The Judge did not discuss why Inframat’s submission was fourteen months late.) DCAA issued an audit report in November 2007, and asserted that Inframat had included expressly unallowable costs in its submission. The Judge noted that DCAA questioned “pensions, legal fees, interest, convention/ seminar, travel, consultant, audit, entertainment and advertising costs and expenses as expressly unallowable.” (We’re fairly confident that a strong attorney would have argued that not all of those items were expressly unallowable, but that’s not the point of this article.) DCAA recommended that $21,238 in “level one penalties” be assessed.

In February 2011, the cognizant DCMA ACO issued a letter to Inframat transmitting the DCAA audit report and notifying the company that he intended to impose penalties. (The Judge did not discuss why it took DCMA more than three years to send the letter, or whether DCMA had a duty to mitigate the interest damages it claimed, which had increased over those three years.)

Inframat responded to the ACO and did not dispute DCAA’s findings; instead, Inframat asked for mercy. Inframat asked the ACO to waive the penalties (as was within his authority to do) because the company felt it had taken appropriate corrective actions so as to ensure that the errors in accounting for unallowable costs would not recur. Inframat told the ACO—

During 2003 the company was using an accounting software package called DELTEK after a recommendation from DCMA. After the Deltek system was installed the company failed to make yearly maintenance payments and thus, support for the system broke down. The accounting staff was unable to use certain modules of the accounting system. The certified public accountants who reviewed their financial statements typically only used the general ledger that the controller provided them. The general ledger did not match the balance sheet and income statements. The bookkeeper was unable to make timely entries into the system because the software would close each period after each month. This compounded the problem as entries were not being made and amounts that were paid were left on the accounts payable ledgers. The Deltek system crashed during 2004. The company was able to recapture some of the lost information but [not] to recreate other information that was missing. Starting in 2006 we switched to Quickbooks accounting software to fix the problems.... The new accounting system worked better at being able to separate.. .allowable and unallowable costs by using the class tracking system. The 2004 incurred cost submissions were submitted by the former controller, Hank Taylor. He was inexperienced in the submissions required. Mr. Taylor also felt that he could submit everything and just be told by DCAA what was not acceptable, which demonstrates his lack of understanding of the FAR.

Readers, Inframat’s story is a classic attempt to appeal to the “better angels” of the ACO. Unfortunately, it was never going to work. Indeed, in only exacerbated Inframat’s problem—since it clearly demonstrated that Inframat did not deserve a waiver.

FAR 42.709-5 discusses when a contracting officer should consider waiving the penalties. It says—

(c) The contractor demonstrates, to the cognizant contracting officer’s satisfaction, that—
(1) It has established policies and personnel training and an internal control and review system that provide assurance that unallowable costs subject to penalties are precluded from being included in the contractor’s final indirect cost rate proposals (e.g., the types of controls required for satisfactory participation in the Department of Defense sponsored self-governance programs, specific accounting controls over indirect costs, compliance tests which demonstrate that the controls are effective, and Government audits which have not disclosed recurring instances of expressly unallowable costs); and <

(2) The unallowable costs subject to the penalty were inadvertently incorporated into the proposal; i.e., their inclusion resulted from an unintentional error, notwithstanding the exercise of due care.

As you can see, Inframat admitted that it failed to properly maintain its Deltek accounting system and that the former Controller was intentionally negligent in preparing the company’s certified final indirect rate submission. Unsurprisingly, the ACO declined to waive the imposition of penalties and interest.

Inframat appealed the ACO’s decision to the ASBCA. As previously noted, the company did not invest in the cost of an experienced government contracts attorney. Instead, the company essentially reiterated its “sob story” to the Judge, writing—

While penalties such as the one imposed may act as incentives for ‘bad’ companies to take appropriate action to correct their behavior, in this situation, as corrective action had already taken place well before Mr. Galvagni's decision, we question the need for the Government to implement a significant (for us) financial penalty.

Like the ACO, the Judge was not moved by Inframat’s plea. Judge James wrote—

Inframat failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, however, that it met the requirements of FAR 42.709-5(c)(2). On 31 August 2006 it submitted its 2004 final incurred indirect cost rate proposal …. Prior thereto, it failed to exercise due care because its system support broke down for failure to make yearly maintenance payments, its Deltek system crashed, it lost cost information, its bookkeeper could not make timely cost entries, and its inexperienced controller included expressly unallowable costs in its 2004 final indirect cost rate proposal on the misunderstanding that DCAA later would tell him what costs were not acceptable …. Therefore, ACO Galvagni properly determined that Inframat failed to exercise due care in preparing its 2004 indirect cost rate proposal and properly denied its request to waive the penalties.

The Government’s motion for summary judgment was granted as a matter of law, and Inframat’s appeal was denied.

As we wrap-up this week of articles, the majority of which focused on the challenges of small business contracting, we need to remind contractors (large and small) that they ignore the administrative and accounting requirements of their flexibly priced contracts at their peril.

 

How DOD Exploits and Abuses Its Small-Business Contractors

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USA Tech
In our last post, we discussed the problems faced by Quimba Software, a small business that was awarded a Phase 2 Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract by the Department of Defense—and who ran into problems with DCAA audit findings, a DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) Final Decision, and an appeal before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) that was rejected without a hearing on the merits because it was filed one day too late. We understand that Quimba is currently pursuing its case at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

What makes Quimba different from most small businesses is that they know how to publish a blog and get their story out on the internet. The Quimba blog is well-written and clearly explains the problems that the company has experienced. More importantly (as we reported) the blog is chock-full of “lessons learned” that should be a “must-read” for any other small business that is seeking to do business with the DOD. We published some of those hard-won pearls of wisdom in the last post (link in the first sentence of this article).

Quimba’s experience with DCAA and DCMA is not unique. In fact, Apogee Consulting, Inc. has recently advised two other small businesses that have had difficulties with Phase 2 SBIR contracts. In one case, the company---involved in innovative medical technology that could ultimately save lives of injured warfighters—was able to get us into the picture before any pre-award SF 1408-related activities were undertaken by the government. We informed the company that it had undercalculated its indirect cost rates, and the company had to decide whether or not to bring that fact to the attention of its Contracting Officer. (It could have made a perfectly legitimate business decision to “eat” the rate overrun.)

In the other engagement, the company was told by DCAA that its accounting system was inadequate because it didn’t structure and allocate its indirect costs in the manner that DCAA thought it should. (Note that the SF 1408 requirement is that indirect costs must be pooled and allocated in a “logical and consistent” manner—which provides the contractor with considerable latitude to choose its own methodology, so long as that methodology is not actually prohibited by any other applicable regulation.) The DCAA auditor (and the Supervisory Auditor) did not care at all about what the SF 1408 form actually required of the contractor; instead, they were very concerned about imposing a full CAS-compliant methodology on this contractor that was expressly exempt from CAS. Any push-back from the company would lead to a DCAA recommendation that its accounting system be determined to be inadequate, regardless of the facts and merits of the contractor’s actual practices. If the accounting system was found to be inadequate—regardless of the lack of regulatory support for that finding—then the company would lose its Phase 2 SBIR contract award.

Such is the life of a small business contractor that seeks to do business with the Defense Department.

This is not a particularly new concern for us. We have published several blog articles about DOD’s cavalier (and, in some cases, adversarial) treatment of its contractors, both large and small. For example, in this article, we discussed a mash-up of DCMA and DCAA policy positions that seemed problematic—especially if you were a DOD contractor. In a more recent article, we noted that the number of DOD suppliers had fallen by 14 percent, even as the Obama Administration implemented efforts to increase competition. In that article, we reported on discussions between senior DOD acquisition leadership and industry, in which the DOD leaders clearly stated that they did not consider themselves to be in a partnership with their suppliers—which was a 180 degree reversal from the express description of the Pentagon’s relationship with its suppliers during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.

What changed? We assert that nothing changed except the attitudes of the Defense Department’s acquisition senior leadership.

But it’s not just Quimba or Apogee Consulting, Inc. discussing the problematic business environment fostered by the acquisition leaders at the Pentagon. No, this is not just “sour grapes” by some disappointed contractor and an outside consultancy. It’s also the opinion of House Armed Services Committee (HASC), who told the Pentagon to “improve the Defense business environment.” We quoted extensively from the HASC Report, including this bit—

The Panel also found that a number of hurdles make it challenging for companies to compete for defense contracts. The plethora of regulations specific to government and defense contracting dissuades many companies from competing for government contracts. The acquisition process is often bureaucratic and rigid, with insufficient flexibility to allow appropriate application of management, oversight, and monitoring of small businesses. The defense business environment is also complicated, and some argue hindered, by current export control requirements. The high rate of personnel turnover in government acquisition personnel, from program managers to Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditors affects the quality and consistency of policies. Oversight and management agencies such as DCAA are under-resourced and lack consistently trained, skilled personnel, hampering the ability of these agencies to provide appropriate contract oversight and management. In addition, a backlog of audits has caused DCAA to prioritize work on high dollar contracts, leaving unresolved many of the open audits of small businesses who are holding small dollar contracts.

There were many anecdotes offered as support for the HASC Panel’s findings and recommendations. We published many of them. For this article, we note this one—

Several participants expressed frustration with DCAA’s failure to close out incurred cost audits in a timely manner. One company was last audited in 2005 and the audit was still open, costing the company an estimated $3-4 million in lost business over the last six years. The participant noted that the contracting officers requested indirect rate audits but DCAA was non-responsive and the company was prohibited from moving forward from a successful SBIR Phase II contract because the audit was still open. It was suggested that the Panel should consider mandating maximum turn-around times for audits such as 60 days for rate audits, and 6 months for incurred cost audits. It was also suggested that contracting officers should be allowed to issue letter contracts so that they can proceed with a contracting action while an audit is still open and make adjustments, if necessary, after the audit is closed. Another participant felt that turnover and inexperience with DCAA auditors was part of the problem. It was stated that every year they get a new auditor and they have to start all over because the new auditor uses different processes and has different audit requirements. In order to address this issue, it was suggested that DCAA should be required to report performance metrics in order to highlight regional shortcomings and more uniform [military member] involvement at DCAA was needed to balance the inexperienced civilian workforce.

(Emphasis added.)

Among the many recommendations given to the Secretary of Defense from the HASC Panel, we noted the following—

  • Congress should direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a small business advocacy office and a contract close out unit in DCAA and DCMA to ensure that the needs of small businesses are safeguarded and that all contracts are closed out in a timely fashion. Closing out contracts in a timely fashion is a key element in having auditable financial statements.

  • The Directors of DCMA and DCAA should ensure coordination between their agencies and the SBA when conducting audits that include factors of interest to or duplicative of reviews conducted by SBA. For example, SBA’s Commercial Market Representatives visit large contractors with subcontracting plans to assess compliance with the subcontracting plan. However, DCAA also looks at subcontracting as part of its cost audits, especially when subcontracting performance is related to a company’s award fee. Furthermore, DCMA also reviews subcontracting performance and processes. These three entities should coordinate their reviews to more efficiently conduct audits and to potential reduce the number of audits performed.

So, clearly, it’s not just us and it’s not just Quimba. The Pentagon has an attitude problem at its senior leadership level, and that bad attitude has infected the ranks of auditors and Contracting Officers who execute oversight on the thousands of DOD contractors, both large and small. The attitude is driving away suppliers—especially small business who pursue SBIR funding in the hope of developing innovative products.

What might be done to address the problem?

Well, we can’t change the attitudes of Messrs. Assad, Williams, and Fitzgerald. But we can offer some potential regulatory solutions, including—

  1. Exempt contract awards to small businesses from the requirements of FAR 16.303-1(a)(3). In other words, permit small businesses to receive cost-type contracts without the need to have “adequate” accounting systems.

  2. If you don’t like that one, then perhaps the SF 1408 should be revised, such that there are two Standard Forms for documenting the adequacy of a contractor’s accounting system—one for large businesses and one Form for small businesses. The small business SF 1408 should have relaxed requirements.

  3. Require DCAA to revise its 17740 Assignment (Pre-Award Survey of Prospective Contractor Accounting System). Direct auditors that if they are going to challenge a contractor’s indirect cost allocation, they must provide a regulatory citation to support their position. If there is no regulation that prohibits an allocation methodology, it should be accepted.

  4. DCMA and DCAA should offer an avenue of appeal for contractors who believe they have been wronged—particularly with respect to the results of a pre-award accounting system survey. There should be an SF 1408 “center of excellence” and it should be staffed by personnel well-versed in the SF 1408 requirements. The center of excellence should review disputed findings, just as a DCMA Review Board reviews disputed findings in other areas.

With respect to that last recommendation, we note that DCMA has created a portal for contractors to elevate concerns. It’s right here. That’s a good start. We wonder where DCAA’s equivalent “customer complaint” portal is located? But the fact of the matter is that many contractors (especially small businesses) will be intimidated and too worried about potential retaliation to use the function provided. (Which is a shame, actually.) So we question the ultimate utility of the portal while we applaud its existence.

To wrap this up, after decades of dealing with DCAA and DCMA as they provide oversight over both large and small contractors in just about every industry you can imagine, we are convinced that the current oversight environment is by far the worst and most adversarial that we have ever experienced. That adversarial environment is exacerbated by far too many inexperienced and poorly trained oversight officials, as well as the increasingly adversarial attitudes of those in senior civilian leadership positions.

It’s bad. And for small businesses like Quimba, it’s almost unimaginably bad. The companies that need assistance the most, either don’t know from where to obtain it, or can’t afford to pay top-notch advisers. The result is a tsunami of litigation and the flight of innovative suppliers from the defense industrial base.

 

False Socioeconomic Business Certification Lands Leads to Plea Bargain

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Mr. Tyrone Jones, age 48, of Sterling, Massachusetts, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, as part of a plea bargain deal that avoided any potential violations of the False Statements Act, according to this Department of Justice press release. The DOJ asserted that—

Had the case proceeded to trial, the Government’s evidence would have proven that Jones and his co-conspirators submitted statements to the Small Business Administration and other government agencies falsely representing that a minority and service-disabled veteran owned and managed the daily operations of the business. Jones and his conspirators arranged the charade in order to get federal government contract awards that were set aside for, or preferentially awarded to, disadvantaged minority and service-disabled veteran-owned and operated businesses.

The Telegram & Gazette news organization provided a few more details. It reported—

The conviction stems from the awarding of federal contracts from the Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Army, and the Small Business Association for nearly $800,000 in 2009 to B&J Multi Service Corp. The construction company, with a post office box address in Fitchburg, was supposedly owned and operated by Brian Bauman, a Korean-born disabled veteran living in Woodstock, Conn.

Allegedly, Mr. Jones met Mr. Bauman while building a house for him, and shortly thereafter founded “B&J Multi Service Corp.” Mr. Jones allegedly submitted false affidavits to the Small Business Administration (SBA) that stated that Mr. Bauman owned at least 51 percent of the business, and managed it on a day-to-day basis. According to the news story, “It was later discovered that Mr. Bauman worked and lived in Connecticut, and had no role in Mr. Jones’ company.”

In other words, Mr. Bauman was a dupe, an unknowing front for Mr. Jones’ business. (Allegedly.)

Mr. Jones was apparently no stranger to controversy and litigation. The Telegram & Gazette story stated that the local Commission had denied him a license to run a rooming house “because of questions about his character and previous business dealings.” Mr. Jones appealed the denial, and the local Superior Court ordered the license granted because the allegations were “arbitrary and capricious.”

According to the Telegram & Gazette story, “Documents on file with the state list Mr. Bauman’s address as 18 Allen St., Leominster”—which is the same rooming house for which Mr. Jones battled to win licensure.

Yeah, we wonder how that Worcester Superior Court Judge feels now about the whole “arbitrary and capricious” allegations of bad character thingee. Maybe those local Commission members knew something, after all?

 

Plea Bargain Converts Multiple False Claims Into A Single False Statement

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Article removed by request.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.