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Apogee Consulting Inc

Industrial Espionage? It’s More Likely Than You Might Think

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Espionage
Recently we were involved in protracted discussions with a contractor’s facility management team regarding where the centralized proposal preparation team should be located. Yes, we do get involved in some weird discussions.

Anyway the facility management team wanted to place the proposal prep team in a cubicle farm—which was fine, except the proposal prep cubicles would be adjacent to the outside IT service contractor’s cubicles. That wasn’t so great, in our view. It created the risk that any individual from the outside service contractor might come into possession of the contractor’s highly proprietary cost proposal information.

There would be meetings and conferences. There would be laptops left unattended and monitors left on showing spreadsheets. There would be conference calls. There would be draft proposals left on desktops. Nobody is perfect, we argued, and sooner or later something of proprietary value was inadvertently going to be made available to somebody from another company—who might or might not be disposed to make use of it to the detriment of the contractor.

On the other side, the facilities management team argued for space efficiency and the most economical use of the contractor’s facility. Might it be considered to be unreasonable, they wondered, not to make the best use of the facility space? What would DCAA think? In any case, they argued, it was both speculative and remote that any proprietary information would be taken. In essence, their position was that I was asking for an expensive solution to a low probability risk, and the cost outweighed the benefit.

Ultimately, we reached a compromise. The proposal prep team was housed in the cubicle farm that adjoined the outside service company—but the facilities team erected a wall between the two groups. The Apogee Consulting, Inc. team shrugged and moved on.

And then this article was published by the Denver Post.

It reported that Paragon Dynamics, of Aurora, Colorado, had agreed to settle allegations that it had violated the Procurement Integrity Act by “illegally obtaining” proposal information from The Raytheon Company. Paragon agreed to pay the Government $1.15 Million to settle the allegations. As the article notes, “liability has not been determined”—meaning that Paragon may well be on the hook to Raytheon for much more than their DOJ settlement amount.

What happened? As the Denver Post story reported it—

From February 2008 to August 2009, prosecutors say Raytheon was competing to win contracts from the National Reconnaissance Office, the federal agency that oversees U.S. intelligence satellites. During that time, a Paragon employee who had access to Raytheon's Aurora facility managed to steal drafts of Raytheon's proposals for two contracts, as well as other related information.

The employee was caught on a security camera faxing part of a proposal to Paragon's president, prosecutors said. The president then forwarded the information to another company that was working with Paragon on one of the NRO contract competitions. Investigators located the documents on another Paragon employee's computer system.

To sum up, an employee of an outside company had access to Raytheon’s facility and somehow obtained access to proprietary Raytheon proposal information, which he then took and faxed back to his company, who then provided that information to another company that was competing with Raytheon on the proposals.

We don’t know whether the Paragon employee was sent into the Raytheon facility with the mission of obtaining the proposal information, or whether he came across the information and took advantage of the opportunity. But we know the employee used the proposal information to the detriment of Raytheon’s interests.

We forwarded a copy of the Denver Post story to our client’s facilities management team, and we were (barely) able to hold-off on making any snarky comments. We don’t know whether or not our client is reconsidering the previous decision on where to place its proposal preparation team.

But we really hope that they will think hard about the likelihood of industrial espionage. As this story shows, it’s more likely than you might think.

 

Court of Federal Claims Discusses the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision

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Decisions
We have recently spent some time and several blog articles discussing the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (COFD). (See our 2-part series of articles on “Settling Disputes” – especially Part 3 of 2.)

We discussed the fundamental distinction between a “routine” request for payment and a “non-routine” request. A routine request requires a bona fide dispute between the contracting parties (relating to the contract) in order for the Courts to have jurisdiction over a claim, whereas a non-routine request does not have that same requirement. And, of course, there must be a proper COFD issued, in order for the parties to litigate pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). All that stuff is covered in our prior articles (link in the first sentence).

As we told our readers, we were interested to see Vern Edwards publish his own blog article on a very similar topic at roughly the same time our articles came out. And we were grateful for his erudite work because it pointed out an error we had made (which necessitated the Part 3 of the 2-Part article.) We were also interested to see the Judge Sweeney of the Court of Federal Claims tackle almost the same topic at almost the same time, in the matter of Atkins North America & Mactech Engineering and Consulting v. US. (Link: here.)

In Atkins, Judge Sweeney was asked to decide cross motions for summary judgment. As such, the case is far from over. But Judge Sweeney’s decision had a lot to say about the validity of the COFD and the Contracting Officer’s exercise of independent judgment, which was some of the very same issues we touched on.

If you are getting the feeling that this is a current topic of interest, you would be correct. But let’s also note that arguments about the propriety of a COFD and a Court’s jurisdiction to hear the parties’ dispute have a long pedigree, pre-dating the passage of the CDA in 1978. That the issues continue to plague litigants today, more than 30 years after passage of the CDA, underlines the complexity of the topic—which is why we are going to spend a lot of time discussing (and quoting from ) Judge Sweeney’s decision in Atkins. Assuming the decision is not overturned on appeal, the Atkins decision will provide a good reference for those interested in the issue.

Atkins and its predecessor company provided architect-engineering services to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Five years after Atkins delivered its work product, the USACE informed the company that a design deficiency and a potential claim for errors and omissions had been identified. On March 28, 2008—roughly five years and nine months after Atkins had completed its work—the USACE Contracting Officer (Ms. Gonzalez) issued a COFD that asserted a claim against Atkins in the amount of $15.7 Million.

During her deposition, Ms. Gonzalez stated that an Architect-Engineer Responsibility Management Board (AERMB) had determined that Atkins was liable for design deficiencies. She also stated that a USACE attorney drafted the COFD and provided a preliminary draft to Ms. Gonzalez for review. She reviewed the preliminary COFD to make sure it was factually correct—by comparing it to the AERMB’s report and to correspondence. Judge Sweeney found that “These documents–the case document, correspondence, contract clauses, and regulations–were the only documents Ms. Gonzalez relied on and referred to when reviewing the draft decision.”

After her review, Ms. Gonzalez returned the draft COFD to the attorney with the comment that it contained more case law than was necessary. Eventually, Gonzalez and the attorney came to an agreement on the wording, and Gonzalez issued the COFD to Atkins. Judge Sweeney found that “Ultimately, the only changes she [Gonzalez] made to the [attorney’s] draft decision were related to punctuation and grammar.” In other words, the COFD was almost entirely the work product of the USACE attorney, and not the cognizant Contracting Officer.

Atkins (and co-appellant Mactech) argued that Ms. Gonzalez’ COFD “was invalid because it did not represent Ms. Gonzalez’ independent judgment and did not reflect that [Atkins] was afforded impartial, fair, and equitable treatment.”

Judge Sweeney first had to decide on the Government’s argument that, if the COFD was invalid, then the Court had no jurisdiction and it could not rule on the underlying matter. The Government also argued that the Court lacked the ability to invalidate a COFD, because doing so would constitute a legally impermissible declaratory judgment. Judge Sweeney didn’t buy the Government’s second argument. She wrote—

Under the CDA, the court has jurisdiction over a claim only if there is a contracting officer’s decision on, or deemed denial of, that claim. See, e.g., England v. Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officer’s decision is lacking unless . . . that officer renders a final decision on the claim”); Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 971 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“[T]o invoke the jurisdiction of this court . . . there must first be a ‘decision’ (or failure to decide) by the contracting officer.”). In issuing a decision, the contracting officer must satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements set forth in the CDA. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(a), (c)(1)-(3) (1994). A failure to satisfy these requirements may render the decision invalid. Compare Case, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A contracting officer’s final decision is invalid when the contracting officer lacked authority to issue it.”), and Sharman Co. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that a letter that did not clearly indicate that it was a final decision did not constitute a valid contracting officer’s decision), overruled on other grounds by Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), and Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 598, 698 (2010) (holding that the contracting officer’s failure to comply with the FAR rendered her decision invalid), with Alliant Techsys., Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“A letter can be a final decision under the CDA even if it lacks the standard language announcing that it constitutes a final decision.”), and Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The decision is no less final because it failed to include boilerplate language usually present for the protection of the contractor.”). If the decision is invalid, then the court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the underlying claim. See Case, Inc., 88 F.3d at 1009 (“[A]n invalid contracting officer’s decision may not serve as the basis for a CDA action.”); Daff v. United States, 78 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A valid contracting officer’s decision is a prerequisite for a suit under the CDA.”); see also N.Y. Shipbldg. Corp. v. United States, 385 F.2d 427, 437 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“No proper initial decision has been rendered administratively, there is nothing from which to appeal, and there is nothing for the appeal board to consider.”). Accordingly, the court has the authority to rule on the validity of a contracting officer’s decision as part of its jurisdictional inquiry. See also Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that a court “may declare a contracting officer’s final decision invalid–for whatever reason”).

(We printed the foregoing paragraph as an intact whole, less footnotes but including case law citations, to serve as a reference for those considering litigation.)

Judge Sweeney also discussed the CDA requirements of a COFD, as well as the FAR requirements. She wrote—

The FAR expands upon the CDA’s requirements. First, it describes the steps a contracting officer is required take when the government intends to assert a claim against a contractor: the contracting officer must review the pertinent facts, secure assistance from the appropriate advisors, coordinate with the office administering the contract, and prepare a written decision. FAR 33.211(a). Second, it sets forth what must be included in the decision: a description of the government’s claim, reference to the relevant contract terms, a description of the factual areas of agreement or disagreement, a statement of the contracting officer’s decision and rationale, a notice of the contractor’s appeal rights, and a demand for payment, if appropriate. FAR 33.211(a)(4). Third, it explicitly requires contracting officers to “[r]equest and consider the advice of specialists in audit, law, engineering, transportation, and other fields, as appropriate,” in carrying out their duties. FAR 1.602-2(c). Finally, it provides that the contracting officer must “[e]nsure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment[.]” FAR 1.602-2(b); see also Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 545, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (“[T]he contracting officer must act impartially in settling disputes. He must not act as a representative of one of the contracting parties, but as an impartial, unbiased judge.”), aff’d by an equally divided court, 340 U.S. 898 (1950).

We very much liked Judge Sweeney’s cite to the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Penner, in which SCOTUS held that the Contracting Officer “must not act as a representative of one of the contracting parties.” In our recent experience, a number of Contracting Officers suffer from an inability to act impartially and, either through personal choice or because of direction from above, seem to think they are part of a larger government team that is in an adversarial position vis-à-vis the contractor. We are going to remember that SCOTUS decision for future use!

(Yes, Charlie Williams, Jr., and Shay Assad. We are looking at you right now.)

Judge Sweeney also discussed what the Courts have held in this area, writing—

The courts and boards of contract appeals have further elucidated the requirements for contracting officer decisions and the extent of the contracting officer’s involvement in issuing those decisions. Most importantly, a decision must represent the contracting officer’s independent judgment. See Pac. Architects & Eng’rs Inc. v. United States, 491 F.2d 734, 744 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (quoting N.Y. Shipbldg. Corp., 385 F.2d at 435 (holding that a contracting officer must “put his own mind to the problems and render his own decisions”)); N. Star Alaska Hous. Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158, 209 (2007) (“[A] contracting officer may not forsake his duties, but rather must ensure that his decisions are the product of his personal and independent judgment.”); CEMS, Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 473, 479 (2005) (noting that the contracting officer “failed to take ownership of all determinations included in the final contracting officer’s opinion”); see also Air-O-Plastik Corp., GSBCA 4802 et al., 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,338 (“Usually a holding that a given decision does not represent the independent judgment of the contracting officer is reached only when the purported decision is imposed by higher authority or when the contracting officer completely abandons his decisional responsibility to another.”). To inform that judgment, contracting officers are entitled to obtain technical and legal advice. See Pac. Architects & Eng’rs Inc., 491 F.2d at 744 (noting that when a contracting officer is preparing a decision, there is “no implied prohibition against his first obtaining or even agreeing with the views of others”); Barringer & Botke, IBCA 428-3-64, 65-1 BCA ¶ 4,797 (“[A] contracting officer may, for the purpose of forming his independent judgment, obtain information and advice from his staff offices and advisors, particularly in the areas of law, accounting and engineering, in which fields he may have little or no expertise.”). However, contracting officers may not substitute the judgment of others for their own independent judgment. See N.Y. Shipbldg. Corp., 385 F.2d at 435 (holding that it is improper for a contracting officer to “merely rubber-stamp[] a subordinate’s or superior’s findings”); CEMS, Inc., 65 Fed. Cl. at 480 (“Although a contracting officer may review claims using in-house assistance, he must still understand and be persuaded by the determination made in his contracting officer’s final decision.”); Jamco Constructors, Inc., VABCA 3271, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,405 (“[A] contracting officer may not abdicate his responsibility by accepting any opinion offered without subjecting it to some analysis–particularly where he is, or should be, aware of information which calls that opinion into question.”).

Again, we quoted a length because we are going to use Judge Sweeney’s decision as a reference for future discussions with Contracting Officers. We suggest readers might want to do the same.

Ultimately, Judge Sweeney decided that Ms. Gonzalez had issued a valid COFD. She wrote (and we will quote)—

Under the CDA, the contracting officer, not some other official, is required to issue the contracting officer’s decision. However, as noted in the legislative history of the CDA, ‘practicability dictates that the extent to which the contracting officer relies on his own judgment or abides by the advice or determination of others is dependent on a variety of factors, including the officer’s personal knowledge, capability, and executive qualities, as well as the nature of the particular procurement.’ S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at 21. In an acknowledgment that contracting officers may not have the personal knowledge or capability to make certain determinations, the FAR requires them to secure assistance from the pertinent advisors; in other words, to request and consider the advice of accountants, attorneys, engineers, and other specialists. The Corps implements the requirements of the CDA and the FAR by specifying that a contracting officer’s decision must be drafted by counsel with technical assistance from appropriate staff members, and that before the contracting officer issues the decision, she should familiarize herself with the facts and proposed conclusions in the decision and either adopt the facts and conclusions as her own or make appropriate changes. If the contracting officer complies with the requirements of the FAR and the EFARS in issuing a decision, then the decision represents the contracting officer’s independent judgment.

Although it was the USACE attorney who drafted the COFD, the fact of the matter was that the EFARS required an attorney to draft it. Further, Ms. Gonzalez, the cognizant Contracting Officer, issued the decision herself. So the fact that the decision was written by the attorney and not the Contracting Officer was not dispositive. What was dispositive was whether the COFD was the product of Ms. Gonzalez’ independent business judgment. Judge Sweeney wrote—

… both the Court of Federal Claims and the boards of contract appeals have provided multiple examples of what does, and what does not, constitute familiarization with the facts and conclusions contained in a contracting officer’s decision. The Court of Federal Claims concluded in CEMS, Inc. that the contracting officer was not familiar with the facts contained in the contracting officer’s decision prepared by another individual because he (1) did not know whether the other individual had conducted a critical path analysis or interviewed potential witnesses; (2) was unaware that the decision contained information directly contradicted by information supplied by the contractor; (3) did not consider other evidence submitted by the contractor; (4) could not explain why the contractor was not interviewed regarding ambiguities; (5) was unfamiliar with back-up documentation; and (6) actually denied contractor claims in which the government had admitted error. … In North Star Alaska Housing Corp., the court concluded that one of the contracting officers had abdicated his responsibility to make an independent decision when he (1) did not personally investigate many of the contractor’s claims; (2) ruled against the contractor without reviewing all of the documentation; and (3) incorrectly presumed that the government’s explanation of its position on a particular issue had been provided to the contractor. … And … the court in Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. held that the contracting officer did not give the contracting officer’s decision sufficient attention because she (1) only discussed the decision with counsel and the administrative contracting officer for less than one hour and only to verify that they were seeking a time credit; (2) did not seek to verify the length of time that was purportedly saved and instead relied on the calculations on others; (3) did not review project schedules; (4) did not independently verify, or ask the administrative contracting officer whether he verified, the accuracy of the findings of fact; and (5) did not review the documents appended to the decision.

Judge Sweeney wrapped up his decision, denying Atkin’s request for summary judgment that would have invalidated Ms. Gonzalez’ COFD thusly—

It is readily apparent that there is no rigid test for determining how a contracting officer becomes familiar with the facts and conclusions in a contracting officer’s decision. Reflecting that there is no one-size-fits-all approach, the adjudicative bodies that have addressed the issue have reached disparate, and sometimes, contradictory, conclusions regarding what factors are dispositive in this inquiry. Thus, rather than compare what Ms. Gonzalez did and did not do with what the contracting officers did and did not do in other cases, the court focuses on whether, in the particular circumstances presented in this case, Ms. Gonzalez satisfied the CDA, FAR, and EFARS by becoming familiar with the facts and conclusions contained in the draft contracting officer’s decision, such that the decision she issued was, in fact, her product and reflected her independent judgment. …

Despite what Ms. Gonzalez did not do when reviewing the draft contracting officer’s decision, the evidence before the court reflects that what she did do is sufficient to establish that she was familiar with its facts and proposed conclusions. As explained above, familiarity is not a high standard to meet. It merely requires an acquaintance with the facts and conclusions in the decision. It does not require an investigation into the basis of the facts, particularly when the facts are prepared by others with greater knowledge than the contracting officer. Nor does it require a probing into the basis of the conclusions, especially when those conclusions are of a technical nature outside the scope of the contracting officer’s knowledge and expertise. Ms. Gonzalez reviewed the facts and proposed conclusions contained in the draft decision, compared them with the facts and conclusions contained in the case document, and discussed them with counsel and technical staff. These actions are what one would expect from someone familiarizing herself with the contents of a contracting officer’s decision. Ms. Gonzalez was not required to take any additional action; thus, her failure to do so does not render her treatment of plaintiff unfair or inequitable. Given that the facts demonstrate that she satisfied the CDA, FAR, and EFARS, Ms. Gonzalez cannot be penalized for not doing something that she was not required to do.

We would wrap-up this perhaps overly long article at this point, except for a most excellent footnote in Judge Sweeney’s decision. In the second paragraph quoted above, footnote 12 stated—

In reaching this conclusion, the court is not foreclosing Atkins and MACTEC from later alleging, and attempting to prove, that Ms. Gonzalez did not act fairly, impartially, or equitably on the grounds that ‘there is no substantial basis in the contract to support [her] ruling, or no substantial evidence to support it, or . . . [her] decision is grossly erroneous . . . .’ Penner Installation Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 547; see also id. at 548 (‘In considering whether or not the contracting officer has acted impartially it is, of course, proper to take into consideration in any case, whether or not actual bias is shown, the correctness of his findings, his relationship to the parties, the allegiance he avows, and the duties his employment by one of them casts upon him.’ (emphasis added)). This is a question that can be resolved only after consideration of the merits of Atkins’s suit.

So now we are done. Although Judge Sweeney ultimately found that Ms. Gonzalez had issued a valid COFD, she left the door open for further arguments at trial regarding the impartiality and/or correctness of her decision. And while doing so, she provided a very useful roadmap for those seeking to evaluate whether or not their Contracting Officer has rendered a “valid” COFD.

 

DCMA Issues IPC to CBS Instruction

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Change
Let us translate the headline for you: The Defense Contract Management Agency has issued an Immediate Policy Change to its January 2012 Contractor Business System Instruction.

The issue of Contract Business Systems, and reviews thereof, has a long pedigree on this website. The recent revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) have been the subject of many blog articles.

In this article, we discussed changes in DCAA’s accounting system review program (with some skepticism) and noted that DCAA was discontinuing use of “Flash Reports”—and replacing them with “Deficiency Reports.” Apparently, that change then led DCMA to conclude that it had to change its existing guidance to its Contracting Officers. In addition, DCMA policy-makers also felt the need to “clarify” the existing guidance in some areas.

Thus, the issuance of the ICP to the CBS Instruction.

As we’ve noted before, some contractor “business systems” are enterprise-wide and others are specific to an individual segment or geographic location. To address potential confusion, the IPC stated—

… the CACO is responsible for determining the acceptability of any corporate-level system. There are many instances whereby reviews are conducted on business systems that are contractor site-specific. If that site is part of a larger business segment that has an assigned DACO, the DACO is responsible for determining the acceptability of the business system. … If there is no assigned DACO, the ACO is responsible for determining the acceptability of the business system.

That bit above tells us that contractors had better start their business systems compliance efforts by identifying which systems encompass the enterprise and which ones are segment or site specific.

The ICP also identifies an internal DCMA document, called the Business Systems Analysis Summary (BSAS), which is prepared by the functional specialist to summarize his/her findings, and transmitted to the Contracting Officer. The ICP reminds DCMA folks that the BSAS “is not to be used to replace or supplement the CO’s Initial Determination letter nor shall it be used as correspondence.”

The ICP states that, if significant deficiencies are identified by the functional specialist, then the functional specialist must draft a Level III or Level IV Corrective Action Request (CAR) and attach it to the BSAS. The CAR should not be released to the contractor “at this time.”

The ICP also notes that DCAA will be issuing Deficiency Reports “when significant deficiencies are identified” and “will state the noncompliance with the DFARS systems criteria when sufficient evidence supporting the deficiency is obtained.” If significant deficiencies are found to exist by the DCMA Contracting Officer, then the CO “shall initiate an initial determination within 10 days of receiving the audit or functional specialist report.” The initial determination must be approved by the CMO Contracts Director and/or the DACO/ACO Group Director before issuance to the contractor. The initial determination should include the unsigned draft Level III or Level IV CAR as an attachment, if the business system involved is EVMS, MMAS, Property, or Purchasing.

The rest of the ICP discusses how to record a contractor’s business system status in CBAR, and also discusses how to record legacy evaluations—i.e., evaluations made before the effective date of the DFARS revisions. You can read about them if you are so inclined.

 

Master Sergeant was a FOO at Iraq FOB, Now Revealed to be a FOOL

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FOB Hammer
United States Army Master Sergeant Julio Soto, Junior, age 52, of Columbia, Georgia served his country in a tour of duty at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, located in Iraq. While at FOB Hammer, Master Sergeant Soto performed the duties of a Field Ordering Officer (FOO). The FOO orders “miscellaneous items and supplies such as paint, lumber and plywood from local vendors.” Apparently, a FOO is a “public official” for purposes of applying Section 201 of Title 18 of the Unites States Code and, accordingly, a FOO is prohibited from accepting gratuities from the suppliers from which s/he is ordering.

We thank Master Sergeant Soto for his service to his country, but we do not appreciate how he served himself while deployed—accepting at least $62,000 in illegal gratuities from local Iraqi contractors in return for awarding them construction contracts at FOB Hammer—according to this DOJ press release.

The DOJ press release stated, “Soto and his alleged co-conspirator unlawfully sought, received and accepted illegal gratuities for helping Iraqi contractors gain U.S. government contracts, and then purchased U.S. Postal money orders with the illegal proceeds and mailed them back to the United States.”

Soto pleaded guilty to “one count of conspiracy to accept illegal gratuities.” Which makes it sound like it was only an attempt to solicit bribes—a kind of a frat boy prank, really—and not at all like he committed a real crime.

Which he did, of course. While wearing the uniform of the U.S. Army.

 

Another Case Alleged of Large Business Using Small Business as a Front

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Spiderweb
Readers may remember the sad case of GTSI, who was suspended by the General Services Administration because “GTSI was an active participant in a scheme that resulted in contracts set-aside for small businesses being awarded to ineligible contractors and with contracts not being performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations and contract terms.” This resulted in (among other things) the CEO and general counsel being terminated, the departure of “many” employees, and the appointment of an “independent monitor.” GTSI was subsequently acquired by Unicom Systems, who is “seeking to move past the SBA suspension,” according to this WaPo article.

Today’s article discusses Health Net, Inc. Health Net “is among the United States of America’s largest publicly traded managed health care company” (according to Wikipedia). Among its operating divisions, Health Net Federal Services (HNFS) manages the TRICARE North Region for the Department of Defense. Health Net provided “claims re-pricing” services for the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA).

We are not experts in this area, but the Veterans’ Affairs Office of the Inspector General (VAOIG) defined “claims re-pricing” as follows—

Claims repricing is the process of comparing VA allowable rates based on fees charged by non-VA health care providers to rates that the contractor may have established with health care providers who are a part of their network. If the network rates are lower than the VA allowable rates, the contractor re-prices the claim and calculates the potential savings. The re-pricing contractor, ETS, then receives a percentage of the potential savings as a fee under the contract.

Health Net and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had a re-pricing contract in place from 1999 to about 2007/2008, at which time the VA awarded five re-pricing contracts under a set-aside program for Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSBs). Enterprise Technology Solutions, LLC (ETS) eventually performed (as prime contractor) all five of those SDVOSB re-pricing contracts. As the VAOIG wrote—

To be eligible for award as an SDVOSB, an offeror must represent in good faith that it is an SDVOSB at the time of its written representation. After the contract was awarded, the contractor must continue to represent that it is compliant with the size limitations established by the SBA for the assigned NAICS code.

In addition, ETS’ contracts contained the typical Limitation on Subcontracting language that required that the SDVOSB prime contractor must perform at least 51 percent of the work. That language ostensibly prevents a Small Business (or, in this case, a SDVOSB) from acting as a sham “front” for a large business. According to this VAOIG report, that intent did not come to fruition in this particular case. The VAOIG found that ETS used Health Net as a subcontractor in both of its re-pricing contracts and (more to the point) ETS was not performing any of the re-pricing work and was, instead, subcontracting 100 percent of the work to Health Net. With the full knowledge of the VA personnel responsible for administering the contracts.

The VAOIG also concluded that the VA had never performed sufficient market research to determine whether or not there were any SDVOSBs that could perform the re-pricing work, before establishing SDVOSB set-asides. Instead, “Health Net encouraged the owner of ETS (Mr. Donald Neilson, a former VA employee) to start ETS as an SDVOSB concern, which allowed Health Net to increase business by subcontracting with an SDVOSB that obtained the contract through a small business set-aside. … ETS’s sole function was to use its SDVOSB status to obtain the contract on behalf of Health Net.”

In addition to the foregoing, the VAOIG also reported—

During our review we attempted to determine if VA actually received any cost savings as a result of the re-pricing work by ETS. As stated earlier, the COTR had no information whether the potential savings identified by ETS were actually realized by VA. We visited the fee office in Perry Point, MD and reviewed selected individual claims to determine if VA realized any savings due to the ETS re-pricing. Under the current regulations, when no contract is present with the provider, VA pays the lower of the Medicare rate, the rate from the re-pricer (Health Net), or billed charges. The only time VA would recognize savings by a re-pricer like Health Net would be when their rate is lower than the Medicare or actual billed rate. Our review of fee claims for four patients for a one month period at Perry Point, MD found no instances where ETS’s rate was less than the Medicare rate; in fact, it was substantially higher than the Medicare rate….

Unsurprisingly, the VAOIG recommended that ETS’ re-pricing contracts be terminated for default.

Some folks think Health Net should be suspended or debarred for its role in this matter. Over at POGO, they explore why that’s not likely to happen any time soon. To sum up POGO’s position, Health Net gains advantage from its position as a large DOD contractor, makes large contributions to campaigns and spends lots of money on lobbyists, and has the habit of hiring former Government employees—all of which POGO alleges insulates Health Net from facing the full consequences of its misbehavior.

Well, the same could be said for many upon many large Government contractors. And while it is rare that a large defense contractor is fully penalized for its misbehavior, in our experience that has less to do with the factors POGO recites, and more to do with spending lots of money on really good attorneys. But maybe that’s just us.

For its part, according to NextGov, Health Net released a statement that stated it believed that the VAOIG findings were “inaccurate.” We shall see.

 


Page 169 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.