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Apogee Consulting Inc

Proposal Preparation Costs for Change Orders and Claims

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USPS
Astute readers may have noticed that we’ve recently spent significant verbiage discussing the Contracting Officer Final Decision and how the CoFD factors in to making claims against the Government, and they may have wondered why. We have nothing to say, and can neither confirm nor deny. (** Whistles innocently **)

Here’s more of the same.

Recently, the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, issued an opinion in the matter of Tip Top Construction v. Donahoe, Postmaster General. The opinion discussed a number of issues that are of interest and relevance, including whether change order proposal preparation costs should be treated as direct or indirect costs, whether a contract clause can create mutual agreement between the contracting parties regarding the allowability of proposal preparation costs, whether the cost of outside consultants and attorneys can be recovered in the price of a change order, and how such costs should be supported.

Here’s the story as we understand it—keeping in mind that we are not attorneys and you should obtain legal advice from competent counsel if you are dealing with these issues.

Tip Top Construction received an ID/IQ type contract from the U.S. Postal Service, in which work to be performed would be issued via Work Order. The process of issuing a Work Order included: (1) a Joint Scope Meeting, (2) preparation of a Detailed Scope of Work, (3) submission of a firm fixed-price proposal in response to the Detailed Scope of Work, (4) acceptance of the proposed price, and (5) issuance of the Work Order at the accepted price. The contract contained a clause that prohibited recovery of proposal preparation costs, stating “The contractor shall not recover any costs arising out of or related to the development of the work order including but not limited to the costs to review the Detailed Scope of Work or prepare a Price Proposal Package . . . .” In addition, the contract contained a Changes clause worded very much like the same FAR contract clause (52.243-1).

Pursuant to the foregoing, the USPS issued a Work Order (valued at $229.7K) to Tip Top to replace the air conditioning system at the Main Post Office on an island in the Virgin Islands. During performance, an issue arose regarding the type of refrigerant to be used in the replacement system. Ultimately, the USPS directed Tip Top to use the refrigerant type it wanted (with an associated change in the type of equipment) and to submit a proposal for the additional cost of the changed work. The value of Tip Top’s change order proposal was $28,838. The USPS directed Tip Top to proceed with the changed work, “for a price to be determined later but not to exceed $28,838.43.”

For the next nine months, “Tip Top and the Postal Service discussed pricing of the changed work.” That is to say, the parties spent nine months and an unknown number of hours discussing less than $30,000. And yet, after nine months, there was no agreement and nobody got fired. It’s a wonderful world, right? Now we understand why the USPS is losing so much money.

According to the Appellate decision—

The critical issue in the negotiations was whether Tip Top was entitled to recover the costs it incurred in preparing the $28,838.43 estimate that Mr. Diaz [Tip Top’s outside consultant] submitted to Mr. Morales [the USPS Construction Manager] on October 18, 2009.

During that nine month period, the USPS Contracting Officer sought guidance from his superiors on the sticking point, asking, “If one of our JOC Contractor firms hires a firm to do their cost estimating for proposals and modifications is the cost . . . considered an overhead charge or does it become a direct or indirect billable cost?” The answer received was that “The cost is an overhead charge and not a billable cost.”

By this time, Tip Top had retained outside counsel to assist in negotiations and its bills were mounting. Finally, at the end of nine months, it submitted a claim under the Contract Disputes Act for $34,553.77. As the Court noted, the claim was comprised of—

… (i) Tip Top’s subcontractor’s price for the change (in the amount of $18,757.43, plus 10% profit, 4% insurance, and 4% gross receipts tax, for a subtotal of $22,133.77); (ii) $9,655 for ‘Preparation Costs & Extended Overhead’; and (iii) $2,745 for ‘Legal Fees.’

So now we have to modify our previous statement. We can see that the parties spent nine months and an unknown number labor hours discussing less than $10,000. And there was no agreement and nobody got fired. And now there was a formal claim, to boot. And the price of your postage was just increased, and now you understand why.

The USPS Contracting Officer issued a Final Decision, granting an equitable adjustment in the amount of $22,133.77, but denied the remainder of the claim, on the grounds that (1) recovery of proposal preparation costs was prohibited by the contract clause, and (2) it was unreasonable for Tip Top to spend $6,705 to prepare a change order valued at $22,100. On appeal to the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals (PSBCA), Tip Top was granted an additional $2,565 for costs it paid to its outside consultant (Mr. Diaz) for the period ending October 15, 2009 (which is the date on which the USPS accepted Tip Top’s proposal “for a price to be determined later ….”

Notably, the PSBCA ruled that the contract clause in question did not bar recovery of change order proposal preparation fees. As the Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) wrote—

The Postal Service had urged that the provision in Contract Clause B.309 barred recovery of the costs Tip Top sought. The Board rejected this argument. The Board stated that Clause B.309 did not apply to Tip Top’s claim because the clause only barred recovery of contractor costs incurred in reviewing a Detailed Scope of Work. This, the Board stated, was ‘a process exclusive to award of the original work order.’ … The Board continued that it was the changes clause of the contract that governed Tip Top’s claim for an equitable adjustment resulting from the Postal Service’s change order. The Board ruled that Tip Top had met the requirements for recovery under this clause as far as the $2,565 in costs relating to Mr. Diaz’s work prior to October 15, 2009 were concerned. The Board stated that the costs were compensable because they represented ‘an increase in [Tip Top’s] direct cost of performance due to the change.’

Thus, the PSBCA clearly ruled that the costs of preparing the change order proposal were allowable direct costs pursuant to the contract’s Changes clause. However, the PSBCA did not grant Tip Top the remainder of its claim, which consisted of “Mr. Diaz’s fees and overhead costs after October 15, 2009 until he left the job in March of 2010 [and] legal fees … for work done during the period April 21 through June 8, 2010.” The PSBCA denied Tip Top recovery of these costs because—

… the negotiations between Tip Top and the Postal Service after October 15, 2009, relating to recovery of Tip Top’s estimating costs, which resulted in work by Mr. Diaz and outside counsel, ‘had nothing to do with performance of the changed work or genuine contract administration and were solely directed at trying to convince the contracting officer to accept [Tip Top’s] figure for the change and maximizing [Tip Top’s] monetary recovery.’ … The Board concluded: ‘[O]nce the substitute equipment was approved, nothing remained to be negotiated except the price. There is no evidence that the parties’ negotiations addressed an extended delivery schedule or any other changes to contract performance requirements.’ … The Board also found that Tip Top had not adequately documented Mr. Diaz’s charges, stating, ‘As the consultant likely was working on other project matters, it was incumbent upon [Tip Top] to identify hours, if any, spent on the equipment change issue, and it has not done so.’

Tip Top appealed the PSBCA decision to the Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit), who had this to say—

The question is whether costs arising from negotiations relating to the price of the changed work are recoverable in this case because they constituted part of the increased costs arising from the change directed by the Postal Service. … In short, both the PSBCA and the government take the position that reasonable contract administration costs arising in the setting of a change order are recoverable. We do not disagree. It seems to us proper that if a change order requires a contractor to incur contract administration costs, those costs are recoverable to the extent they are reasonable. Thus, the dispute depends on whether the costs are classified as general contract administration costs or claim preparation costs. …

In our view, both the costs of Mr. Diaz’s work between October 15, 2009, and March 8, 2010, and counsel’s fees through June 8, 2010, were incurred ‘for the genuine purpose of materially furthering the negotiation process.’ [Citing Bill Strong, 49 F.3d at 1550.] … Only on June 18, 2010, did negotiations finally end when Tip Top submitted its claim under the CDA. Simply because the negotiations related to the price of the change does not serve to remove the associated costs from the realm of negotiation and genuine contract administration costs. Consideration of price is a legitimate part of the change order process. In holding otherwise, the Board, we believe, erred.

The Appellate Court also found that there was sufficient evidence that the costs being claimed by Tip Top were incurred for the purposes stated. Tip Top was entitled to the additional $9,835 it had sought, plus interest on its claim pursuant to the CDA.

So, readers, it took an Appellate Court to decide a quantum of less than $10,000—a quantum that should have been quickly negotiated and settled by the USPS Contracting Officer. Instead, the $10,000 remained a matter of dispute for nine months, and was a matter of litigation for more than two years. And to our knowledge, nobody got fired.

And the Postal Service is losing money by the bucketful while cutting back service and raising the price of postage. And now you understand why.

 

DOD Adds More Reviewers to the Forward Pricing Rate Negotiation Process

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Too Many Cooks
One of the more interesting metrics that can be used to measure the effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s contract management processes revolves around implementation of Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). According to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (at 2.101), a FPRA is—

… a written agreement negotiated between a contractor and the Government to make certain rates available during a specified period for use in pricing contracts or modifications. These rates represent reasonable projections of specific costs that are not easily estimated for, identified with, or generated by a specific contract, contract end item, or task. These projections may include rates for such things as labor, indirect costs, material obsolescence and usage, spare parts provisioning, and material handling.

One can measure the length of time it takes to establish an FPRA, or the percentage of defense contractors that have successfully negotiated and executed  FPRAs, or the number of those contractors who establish executed FPRAs as a percentage of the total number of contractors who submit Forward Pricing Rate Proposals with the intention of doing so. (Ideally, 100% of those who submit should eventually receive an executed FPRA.) There’s a number of good metrics in this area, and we like to imagine that DCMA management has established (and is vigilantly monitoring) them.

FPRAs are to the government’s benefit because, once established, they act to reduce the time and effort necessary to negotiate contract prices. DCAA has less to audit when the contractor simply submits the agreed-upon forward pricing rates, and DCMA can point to the agreement as evidence that the rates are fair and reasonable. Consequently, the contractor gets put under contract faster and the work starts earlier than it otherwise would have. Deliveries can be scheduled faster and the contractor puts people to work and starts earning revenue faster. Everybody wins!

Establishing FPRAs has been a problem in recent years, for two primary reasons. One, DCAA has gotten tougher and more exacting in its audits of contractor FPR proposals. Two, DCMA has gotten more bureaucratic and less flexible in the granting of discretion to Administrative Contracting Officers. We explored the situation in this article.

DCMA has been fighting itself on the issue of negotiating and executing FPRAs. On one hand, DCMA Director Charlie Williams, Jr. told his Contract Management team that---

At contractor locations where we have determined it is in the government’s interest to establish forward pricing rates, we should be continuously evaluating the rates and the individual pool and base elements that comprise them. In other words, I expect you to be as knowledgeable if not more so than anyone else with respect to the contractor’s rate structures and methodologies so you can provide expert advice based on fact. …

And on the other hand, Mr. Williams' Contract Management team told Government Accountability Office auditors that DCMA has lost its ability to conduct cost and price analysis. DCMA personnel told GAO that—

Loss of this skill set, according to DCMA, meant that many of its pricing-related contract administration responsibilities, such as negotiating forward pricing rate agreements and establishing final indirect cost rates and billing rates, were no longer performed to the same level of discipline and consistency as in prior years.

So, other than DCAA taking forever and a day to issue audit reports (and filling those audit reports with metric tons’ worth of questioned costs), and DCMA taking forever and a day to evaluate those audit reports, obtain Review Board approval to negotiate forward pricing rates, conduct negotiations, obtain agreement, obtain Review Board approval on the agreed-upon rates, prepare a FPRA and obtain the necessary signatures, everything’s going just fine in this area.

Yes, sirree. Just fine.

Now, to assist the DCMA Contracting Officers with their evaluations, DOD Director of Pricing, Shay Assad, issued this memo calling upon the DOD buying activities and military service personnel to participate in contractor out-year business base reviews. Mr. Assad wrote—

Historically, unreliable forecasting of the [contractor’s] business base, particularly in the out-years of a contractor’s forward pricing rate proposal (typically years 3 – 5), has been the leading cause of inaccurate rate proposals, recommendations and agreements. It is also the single leading factor in our inability to reach an agreement on rates with a number of companies. It has resulted in significant dollars at risk in the out years of these rates or agreements. We can no longer afford to have this situation continue.

Because DCMA and the contractor cannot agree on the contractor’s business base three to five years in the future, Mr. Assad requested the participation of “each Service in the analysis of the business base described in our contractor forward pricing rate proposals.” DCMA reviewers “will require support from the buying activities and program office(s) doing business with that contractor.”

Well, there you have it, folks. DCMA is going to improve the FPRA evaluation process by adding more reviewers to the evaluation process. That’s going to streamline things!

Seriously, this is going to be a good thing for the small-to-middlin’ contractors that work primarily with one agency or just have a few contracts. It’s probably going to improve the process for those entities. But for the Top 20 DOD contractors—the ones with hundreds of contracts performed at multiple segments for many buying activities across numerous geographic regions—we predict it’s going to bring the already too-slow process to a full stop.

 

Admiral Says Management Decisions Negatively Impacted Fleet Readiness

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CG_73
Readers, this is another of those blog articles about workforce management and employee development. If you sick and tired of reading them, then you should click your way out of here now, and avoid the tedium.

Still here? Good.

Today we are going to discuss how the Navy’s Fleet readiness was negatively impacted by management decisions that favored immediate problem solving over the long-term best interests of the Fleet. Today we are going to discuss the “unintended consequences” that have led, over roughly the past decade, to the point where “the future readiness of our surface force” is now “at risk”. Then we are going to tell you that the decisions you are making in the day-to-day operation of your business are the same as those that negatively impacted the U.S. Navy; and we are going to tell you that your myopic focus on the solving today’s problems at the expense of the long-term future of your business inevitably will lead to you to a similar position as today’s naval Fleet—i.e., your future readiness to execute your programs is now at risk.

Our source for the information on Naval decision-making is Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., who is departing his role as the most senior Surface Warfare Officer on active duty—“the Old Salt” as he is called in the Navy. He wrote a letter to his comrades in arms on his departure, and in that letter he told them some hard truths. We think those hard truths are true for any large organization, including yours.

The Old Salt told his comrades about findings about inadequacies in Fleet Readiness. The list of problems included—

  • Dramatic headcount cuts in the areas of shipboard maintenance, with dedicated billets going from 8,000 to 2,500 over the past seven years.

  • Management direction (called “the CNO availability schedule”) that mandated a 9-week maintenance schedule, which turned out to be an inadequate timeframe. Implemented in 1996-1997 timeframe, the CNO availability schedule led to a “backlog of deep maintenance requirements.”

  • The “Optimally Manned Ships” initiative (another top-down management dictate) “combined with … reducing grade levels of selected billets,” led to a “diminution of on-board level-of-knowledge, experience, and oversight of the work force across the ship.” This problem was exacerbated by an unplanned-for “perpetual” personnel attrition of 8 percent.

  • The limitations and constraints of “legacy manning and distribution processes” have negatively impacted the ability to properly fill enlisted ranks, leading to a 2009 “manning average of 61% for at-sea surface units.”

  • “Limited formal in-rate training program requirements” exist, and when training programs are in place, “there is marginal execution.”

  • “Funding limits and onboard manning [problems] hampered efforts for ships to ‘grow their own’.”

  • “The level of knowledge of newly reported officers is lacking.” Moreover, “a significant portion of the surface force is lacking in Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) completions.”

  • “The lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability have become unintentionally blurred.”

  • “Surface ship maintenance has been significantly underfunded for over ten years.” But this does not seem to be “the result of an unwillingness to fund … as much as the result of not having a properly identified [funding] requirement.” “The end result [of the situation] is an understated requirement that has been underfunded in the budgeting process.”

The “Old Salt” (Admiral Harvey) summed up the situation thusly—

  1. We shifted our primary focus away from Sailors and Ships – the fundamentals of surface warfare - to finding efficiencies/reducing costs in order to fund other important efforts such as recapitalization. We took our eyes off the ball of the main thing for which we were responsible - maintaining the wholeness and operational effectiveness of the surface force. Because readiness trends develop and evidence themselves over years and not months, shifting our primary focus to individual cost-cutting measures gave us a very myopic view of our surface force and the way ahead; institutionally, we essentially walked into the future looking at our feet. … [We focused] on efficiency measures, not OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. We certainly developed a large number of plans to achieve greater efficiencies, but we did not pay sufficient attention to rigorously evaluating the products of those plans, particularly as their effects on our surface force grew over time.

  2. When the assumptions behind the man, train, equip and maintain decisions did not prove valid, we didn't revisit our decisions and adjust course as required. In short, we didn't routinely, rigorously and thoroughly evaluate the products of the plans we were executing. For example, we reduced manpower requirements on our ships based on technology initiatives that did not deliver as expected and then manned our ships to 90% of that lower requirement…. We shifted maintenance ashore, scaled back our shipboard 3M [Maintenance and Material Management] program and reduced our preventive maintenance requirements to fit a smaller workforce, and then failed to fully fund the shore maintenance capacity we required.

  3. The combination of our shift in focus and failure to routinely evaluate the product of the plans resulted in too many Sailors who no longer understood ‘what right looks like.’ Our day-to-day standards and expectations had become dependent variables based upon available resources; our standards dropped with every cost-cutting measure we implemented. An example of this phenomenon is when we see a very big delta between a ship's actual day-to-day standards and what is required to perform satisfactorily on INSURV [Board of Inspection and Survey], which should be a ‘come as you are’ inspection that we routinely pass.

[Emphasis in original.]

Admiral Harvey pointed out the problems inherent in focusing only on cost-savings at the expense of operational effectiveness. He wrote—

Notice I did not simply say ‘save money.’ We must certainly be good stewards of taxpayer dollars, that is an absolute given, but our … ships must be focused first and foremost on EFFECTIVENESS - if it's cheap, efficient, but doesn't work, it does us no good. If our budgets drop, we may certainly have to do less; but whatever it is we decide to do, we must do it well.

The “Old Salt” concluded his goodbye letter with words that we feel are appropriate for everybody, everywhere. He wrote—

Individuals and organizations succeed because they make the choices that lead to success. Greatness is not primarily a matter of circumstance or happenstance; greatness is first and foremost a matter of conscious choice and discipline. Officers who are accountable for the outcomes must make those choices and have the courage, energy and discipline to drive their organizations to turn those choices into reality.

Do you see the parallel between the choices facing Naval leaders and the choices you face now, with immense budgetary pressures and the looming doomsday “sequestration” scenario? Do you see it? We do.

There is tremendous pressure on government contractors—particularly DOD contractors—to reduce costs and cut their overhead and perform better with less funding. This is fact, not speculation. Early buy-outs are being offered (and accepted), people are being laid-off, companies are restructuring. Mergers and acquisitions are in the news again.

And yet, despite all the pressure to cut heads and to cut costs, we urge readers to keep in mind the lessons so painfully learned by the U.S. Navy. We urge readers to remember that too much cost-cutting, in the wrong areas, can lead to long-term unintended consequences. Remember the words of the Old Salt: “If it’s cheap, efficient, but doesn’t work, it does us no good.”

In particular, we urge readers to take to heart the findings about lack of training and inadequate supervision. Ultimately, the failure to develop staff, to “grow your own,” is essentially a decision to out-source training and development to somebody else, at a price to be paid in higher labor costs and degraded performance. Avoid that.

Avoid across-the-board budget and/or headcount reductions. Avoid near-term expediency at the cost of the long-term health of your organization. Be smart about cuts, and maintain your focus on operational effectiveness. And revisit your decisions months later, to see if the assumptions were valid and end results were those anticipated. Be courageous enough to change course when things didn’t work out as planned.

If you don’t do all that, you risk running your ship aground.

 

DCAA Helps Contracting Officers Implement Ceilings on DOD Service Contracts

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Fun Times
Readers may remember our article on the DFARS Class Deviation issued to implement the statutory requirement found in Section 808 of the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. While we took issue with the need to issue a DFARS Class Deviation when the statute only called for the issuance of “guidance,” we also noted that there wasn’t much to be done about it. We weren’t overly concerned because the direction called for the establishment of contract negotiation objectives based on 2010 ceilings.

Objectives are simply goals; they are not necessarily mandated outcomes.

We weren’t even unduly concerned by written letters of protest, aimed at Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, charging that DOD is misinterpreting and misapplying the statutory requirements, to the detriment of defense contractors. Sure, there were some omissions in the DOD guidance. As the Professional Services Council wrote—

The guidance fails to provide allowable exemptions, such as for commercial items, firm-fixed price contracts, and contracts with priced options or instances where contractors have pre-negotiated forward pricing rate agreements. The guidance does not adequately clarify instances when it is acceptable to negotiate contractor labor or overhead rates that are higher than 2010 levels. Although the guidance states that negotiation objectives should seek to hold rates to 2010 levels, unless the rates are otherwise established by law, the guidance fails to provide meaningful examples that would clarify such instances. The Service Contract Act and the Davis-Bacon Act are two such examples where the government’s actions dictate escalations in contractor’s labor rates. In addition, recent Cost Accounting Standards changes, particularly related to pension harmonization that were a result of the Pension Protection Act (P.L. 109-280), did not go into effect for most contractors until 2011. As a result of these changes, many contractors’ overhead rates necessarily increased. The deviation issued on July 31 does not account for this dynamic and would effectively punish contractors for actions taken in response to government mandates.

We were not overly concerned because we thought (and still do) that this is more a matter of negotiation tactics than anything else. One side is going to point to the statutory requirements, and associated DOD policy guidance, as the basis for demanding lower prices. The other side is going to point out the exceptions and demand the right to charge higher prices. Ultimately, the side that’s better at negotiating should prevail.

But now the DOD Contracting Officers will have the additional assistance of DCAA to help implement the statutory requirements. Recent DCAA audit guidance (MRD 12-PSP-022(R), dated August 24, 2012) was issued that emphasized how DCAA auditors should assist the COs. (As if the auditors didn’t have anything else to do.)

DCAA auditors should assist COs by providing information, including such information as: “contractor Fiscal Year 2010 final rates, the contractor’s proposed incurred cost rates (accompanied with historical decrements for unallowable, unallocable, and unreasonable expenses), or other information that is available in the files.”

But there’s more! The audit guidance also stated—

Auditors should be alert for accounting changes, subsequent to 2010, that may impact the use of 2010 actual rates. Auditors should explain these changes, and if practical, furnish calculations to make the rate information comparable. All non-audited rate information (i.e., factual information from the permanent files) should be provided by memorandum following the guidance at CAM 9-107. Contracting officers do not require audited 2010 incurred cost rates to establish a negotiation objective

Actually, we think the guidance is pretty good. Among other nice things, it said—

If the contracting officer requests a proposal audit and the scope includes rates, auditors should plan and perform the audit procedures as they would do on any proposal examination (i.e. independently determine if the proposed rates comply with FAR Parts 15 and 31, CAS, etc.). Auditors should not view the directive as a rate cap nor as audit criteria (i.e. should not be used as a basis to question proposed rates). Any unaudited rate information previously furnished should not be included in the audit report.

However, we did notice one bit of ominous foreshowing, found at the end of the MRD. It stated—

It should be noted, that the DPAP memorandum does not impose requirements on the prime contractor’s negotiation objectives with its subcontractors. However, pursuant to FAR 15.404-3, the contracting officer is responsible for the determination of a fair and reasonable price for the prime contract, including subcontract costs. Therefore, the contracting officer may request rate information related to significant subcontractors.

So contractors attempting to provide services to DOD will not only have to contend with Contracting Officers seeking to implement problematic guidance, they will also have to contend with DCAA requesting information in order to assist those Contracting Officers.

Fun times!

 

DOD Approves DCAA Implementation of Risk-Based Incurred Cost Audits

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Readers of this blog should not be surprised by the news that DCAA is going to stop auditing all the final indirect cost billing rate (“incurred cost”) proposals submitted by contractors and, instead, will adopt a “risk-based” approach that will involve waiving audits on a subset of those proposals. There have been many signs foreshadowing this new approach and it’s a fairly predictable tactic when one realizes just how ginormous of a backlog is crushing the file cabinets of DOD’s premier audit agency. So let’s not waste energy getting too upset about it; instead, let’s look at the new approach, which was spelled out in a July 6, 2012 memorandum from Pat Fitzgerald’s office to Richard Ginman (Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy). Mr. Ginman transmitted that memo along with an official DFARS Class Deviation marking his official approval of DCAA’s new approach and implementation within the DAR System.

Here’s a link to the various documents we’ll be discussing.

Let’s start with DCAA’s new approach. As detailed in the DCAA memo to Mr. Ginman, the new audit approach starts with an assessment of the adequacy of the contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates. Unfortunately, the memo continues the usurpation of official Contracting Officer authority by blithely declaring, “if the incurred cost proposal is not adequate and the deficiencies cannot be remedied with minor effort, the proposal will be returned to the contractor with written instructions on required corrective actions, in accordance with CAM Chapter 6.”

Notice, readers, that no mention is made of the language found at FAR 42.705-1(b) that states—

The required content of the proposal and supporting data will vary depending on such factors as business type, size, and accounting system capabilities. The contractor, contracting officer, and auditor must work together to make the proposal, audit, and negotiation process as efficient as possible. … The cognizant auditor will review the adequacy of the contractor’s proposal for audit in support of negotiating final indirect cost rates and will provide a written description of any inadequacies to the contractor and contracting officer. If the auditor and contractor are unable to resolve the proposal’s inadequacies identified by the auditor, the auditor will elevate the issue to the contracting office to resolve the inadequacies.

We’ve ranted before about DCAA’s policy that effectively writes the Contracting Officer out of the picture, by making the adequacy determination on its own, despite the clear regulatory authority granted to the CO. This is more of the same, only this time Mr. Ginman appears to be endorsing DCAA’s claim of authority. We wonder what Mr. Williams has to say about that?

Anyway, once the DCAA auditor has determined that the contractor’s proposal is adequate, the next step is to look at the “auditable dollar value” (or “ADV”) being proposed. The term “auditable dollar value” has never (to our knowledge) been officially defined, but our understanding is that it means the value of all flexibly priced contract activity. In other words, if you add up the value of the cost-reimbursement and Time & Material type contracts (burdened at the proposed final billing rates), then that’s the ADV number. If the ADV is $250 million or more, then the contractor’s proposal definitely will be audited. If the ADV is less than $250 million, then the proposal will be “assessed for risk.” Some of those submissions will not be selected for audit. Ever.

The risk assessment is (apparently) primarily based on the amount of “exceptions” found in the audit of the contractor’s previous year’s submission. The term “risk assessment” is itself perhaps a bit misleading, since DCAA only classifies the submissions as either “high” or “low” risk. It’s a binary determination with no gradations of scale. So the “assessment” is simply putting the submission into one bucket or the other.

Being assessed as a “low risk” proposal is a good thing, because that will allow DCAA to treat the submission differently than it will be treating “high risk” submissions. Being assessed as “low risk” means that there’s a decent chance the contractor’s submission will not be audited, whereas all “high risk” submissions will be audited.

In order to be classified as a “low risk” proposal, the submission must meet all of the following criteria:

  • DCAA must have performed at least one previous incurred cost audit on the contractor.

  • DCAA must have no identified “significant audit leads” or “other significant risks” such as inadequate business systems whose identified deficiencies “would have a significant impact on the final indirect rate proposal” for the Fiscal Year being submitted.

  • In the previous incurred cost audit(s), DCAA must not have questioned a “significant total exception” amount. The guidance includes a table that defines “significant total exception” amounts in terms of ADV. For example, for an ADV between $50 and $250 million, any questioned costs in excess of $100,000 would be considered to be a significant amount.

All submissions that do not meet the criteria for being assessed as “low risk” will be assessed as being “high risk”. As noted above, the key difference between “high risk” and “low risk” submissions is that not every low risk submission will be selected for audit. The lower the ADV, the less chance a “low risk” submission has of being audited by DCAA. For example, only one out of 5 low risk submissions with an ADV of between $50 and $250 million will be audited by DCAA. The other 4 submissions will not be audited. Ever.

(For the record, we noted that the memo states that every contractor submitting a proposal to establish final billing rates, where the ADV is between $50 and $250 million, must have a proposal selected for audit at least once every three years. That direction will tend to compensate for the otherwise 20% chance of being audited in any particular year.)

To continue, only one percent of submissions with an ADV of $1 million or less will be selected for audit. Yes, you read that correctly. Of all contractor submissions with an ADV of $1 million or less, only one out of a hundred will be audited. The other 99 will not be audited. Ever.

And for those particular low-value ADV submissions, that percentage is to be applied to contractor proposals received after 9/30/2011. Any proposals in that ADV range that were received by DCAA before that date, and for which field procedures have not yet started, will not be audited. At all.

None of them.

We encourage readers to review the DCAA risk sampling table found on Page 2 of the DCAA Process Description to determine the likelihood of your incurred cost submission being audited, based on ADV value (assuming you believe it might qualify as being “low risk”.)

If your submission is not selected for audit, how will your cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer negotiate final billing rates with your organization? How will you close-out your completed contracts? The DCAA Process Description includes a section covering “closure methods” to be used in such circumstances. There are two parts to the new DCAA closure method.

  1. DCAA will issue a Memorandum to the cognizant Contracting Officer, listing the audit steps taken to assure that the contractor’s submission was “adequate”. (As if this had anything to do with the propriety of the claimed costs.)

  2. DCAA’s internal records will record the ADV as “dollars examined” with a code that states “Assignment completed but no report issued.” Questioned costs and total exception dollars will be reported as zero.

And that’s it.

How DCAA will get from “was not selected for audit” to “dollars examined, assignment completed, but no report issued” is a bureaucratic mystery too impenetrable for us to fathom.

But we should note that we think the number of contractor final indirect billing rate proposals that will actually be classified as “low risk” is likely to be relatively low. The criteria DCAA has established for assessing a submission as “low risk” are actually going to be tough for many companies to meet. For example, former DCAA Director Stephenson once testified that as many as two-thirds of contractor business systems were inadequate. If that testimony was accurate, then none of those contractors will have their final billing rate proposals assessed as being “low risk” by DCAA. Thus, we expect that many contractors will see their submissions targeted for audit, regardless of the size of their ADV.

What is DCMA going to do with DCAA Memoranda it receives, the ones that have no questioned costs or total exception dollars? How is DCMA going to negotiate final billing rates with no DCAA audit report on which to rely?

Our sources tell us that DCMA is preparing guidance to its Contracting Officers even as we type these words. In the meantime, Mr. Ginman issued a DFARS Class Deviation that permits DCMA Contracting Officers to use the DCAA Memoranda “for purposes of satisfying the audit requirements at FAR 4.804-5(a)(12), 42.705-1(b)(2), and 42.705-2(b)(2)(i).” We’re not quite sure how a Contracting Officer will actually use the DCAA Memoranda as the basis to negotiate rates—since it will not be expressing any opinion on those rates—but, again, that’s a bureaucratic mystery too impenetrable for us to fathom.

Consequently, it seems that DCMA Contracting Officers are being directed to proceed with negotiating final billing rates whether or not they actually have an audit report to use. That ought to speed things up! The buying Commands might be able to finally close some ancient contracts. (And let’s be clear that this is direction with which we are in complete agreement. DCMA should stop relying on DCAA like a crutch and start negotiating regardless of what DCAA has said or not said.)

While DCMA is trying to figure out how to negotiate indirect rates with its contractors, DCAA has figured out how to reduce its incredible backlog in one fell swoop, and without performing any audits. That would seem to be a doubleplusgood outcome from a bureaucratic point of view, and no doubt many contractors will like the new approach as well. But we wonder what POGO and Congress and GAO will make of it?

Finally, we noted that Mr. Ginman stated in his Class Deviation that DCAA’s new approach was not really a change from DCAA’s past audit practices. He stated that “this DCAA policy represents a continuation of a risk-based sampling process in use since 1994.” Well, if that’s true, we wonder why his Directorate felt that a Class Deviation was necessary in order to implement it. Perhaps, like Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Ginman also believes that Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.