Disgruntled Employees, Ineffective Subcontractor Management, and YOU
 One of our favorite things here is when several strands of issues/concerns/challenges come together and align. For example, in this article we discussed the confluence of DCAA’s push for access to contractors’ internal audit reports with the push for access to attorney-client privileged documents—both topics that we had discussed previously in multiple individual articles. Similarly, in this pithy article we linked DCAA”s push for access to attorney-client documents with Sikorsky’s ongoing CAS 418 litigation, as well as to the various Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations articles we’ve published here.
Now we get another opportunity to link disparate strands into a cohesive whole! Today’s article links our recent article on the False Claim Act risks posed by disgruntled employees with our long-time (and multiple article) concerns about the importance of effective subcontractor management. Today is truly a special day!
So, to the point:
First, let us note the recent Department of Justice press release announcing that El Paso-based ReadyOne Industries (formerly known as the National Center for the Employment of the Disabled, or NCED)—a not-for-profit AbilityOne® entity—had settled allegations that it had violated the FCA, for the reasonable sum of $5 million. (Well, it seems reasonable to us. But let’s all remember that’s $5 million that is now not going to be available for ReadyOne’s programs.)
According to the DOJ, a former NCED employee, Michael Ahumada, had filed a qui tam suit as a relator under the FCA. (If any of those terms or acronyms seems unfamiliar, you may want to review our article on the risks posed by disgruntled employees, link above.) Mr. Ahumada alleged that NCED/ReadyOne failed to accurately report its ratio of disabled labor hours to appropriate AbilityOne® authorities.
The press release stated—
The [AbilityOne®] program uses the purchasing power of the federal government to buy approved products and services from participating, community-based nonprofit agencies nationwide. These community-based nonprofit agencies, like NCED, must ensure that 75 percent of all annual direct labor hours on certain government contracts are performed by employees who are blind or severely disabled. The program is managed by the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, which is a federal agency. The United States alleges that, between 2000 and 2006, NCED employed a large number of non-disabled employees to work on contracts for the manufacture of archival boxes, apparel and other items, and did not appropriately account for their hours as part of the overall ratios it certified and submitted to the committee.
We have worked with AbilityOne® entities before, and this is not the first time we’ve heard of troubles in calculating the NISH ratios. But this is a nice example of the point we made in our earlier article, which is that companies are much better off listening to their employees’ concerns, investigating them, and reporting back to the employee the results of those investigations, when compared to the legal and settlement costs associated with settlements under the FCA.
The next strand concerns another qui tam action under the FCA, this time brought by an employee of a subcontractor against both the subcontractor and the prime contractor. We were tipped to a nice summary of the court decision, penned by two wily government contracts attorneys at Wiley Rein. Their summary focused on FCA liability associated with the Davis-Bacon Act, but what caught our eye was the following—
After finding that it had primary jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs’ FCA claim, the court concluded that the contractor acted with reckless disregard concerning the falsity of the payroll certifications, and thus violated the FCA. The prime contractor conceded that it understood the Davis-Bacon requirements, and yet did not supervise the subcontractor’s payment of its employees, and did not verify the payroll certifications for accuracy and completeness. This lack of supervision and verification resulted in payroll certifications that did not account for the subcontractor’s electrical workers and falsely certified that they received Davis-Bacon wages.
[Emphasis added.]
We followed the article’s link to the full Sixth Circuit Appellate decision. We were interested in the following bits—
Circle C’s contract explicitly incorporated the Davis-Bacon requirements and included an hourly wage determination for electrical workers…. Circle C, as a frequent contractor with the government, admitted its familiarity with these requirements…. Circle C conceded that it should submit payroll certifications for all employees on the project, but did not include Phase Tech employees on the original certifications, although it did submit separate payroll certifications for the other subcontractors. Circle C acknowledged that it never paid or supervised the payment of any Phase Tech employees and had no first-hand knowledge regarding Phase Tech’s payments to its employees. It was only in 2006 that Circle C finally informed Phase Tech of the need to submit payroll certifications to Fort Campbell. Once the records were provided by Phase Tech, Circle C never verified their accuracy. In fact … there were 62 inaccurate submissions, 53 of which pertained to 2004 and 2005 and failed to list any Phase Tech workers. The 62 certifications also were false because they wrongly certified that the prevailing wages were paid. … For the reasons stated by the district court, the totality of the circumstances show that Circle C, an experienced contractor, made false statements, acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and that the false statements were “material” to the government’s decision to make the payment sought in Circle C’s claim. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their FCA claim.
Circle C did not effectively manage the administrative details of its subcontract with Phase Tech. The Court didn’t dwell on it, but it appeared that Circle C was not aware for some months—perhaps as long as two years—that Phase Tech was actually its subcontractor, performing work in the field. Certainly, the normal administrative procedures and controls that a government construction contractor would impose, as a matter of routine, seemed to be largely lacking. Consequently, the Circle C’s failure to properly manage its subcontractor led to a finding of liability under the FCA, a liability that will likely cost Circle C millions to settle.
The Circle C litigation started out as a qui tam suit, filed by relator Brian Wall, a Phase Tech employee who worked at the construction site. We didn’t see how Mr. Wall learned that Circle C and Phase Tech were failing in their Davis-Bacon Act-imposed duties, or how Mr. Wall came to the realization that there might be some FCA liability associated with those lapses. We like to imagine that Mr. Wall became disgruntled and decided to get even for some slight, but the truth is, we have no idea.
The fact of the matter is that Mr. Wall’s emotional state is irrelevant. For whatever reason, Circle C failed to properly manage its subcontractor, Phase Tech, as required by its contract with the U.S. Army, and that failure created liability under the FCA. Just like ReadyOne failed in its own labor-related administrative requirements.
Clearly, the False Claims Act is not only about accurate invoices and properly claiming allowable costs. It encompasses such back-office administrivia as payroll certifications and direct labor hour ratio reporting. So perhaps the moral here is not to stint on systems, policies and procedures, because sometimes that stuff is as important as project execution and delivery.
Ineffective Subcontractor Management Costs KBR Millions
 We could write several thousand words about the importance of effective subcontractor management, because we consider it to be the number one most important factor that determines whether or not a program executes on time, on schedule, and within the contractual quality envelope. Indeed, we have already written thousands of words on this topic, having previously posted several articles bearing on it. (If you are interested in those articles, the site has a keyword search feature.)
We have also written several thousand words about the importance of documenting why the prices paid to subcontractors were reasonable in amount. We dedicated a series of four articles to the obstacles facing Kellogg Brown & Root Services (KBR) as it attempted to prove the price it had paid one of its largest LOGCAP subcontractors, Tamimi, for dining support services at Camp Anaconda, Iraq, was reasonable in amount—and thus reimbursable under its cost-type prime contract with the U.S. Army. It cost KBR about $30 million (by our reckoning) for its failure to prove the prices it had negotiated with Tamimi were reasonable. We discussed some lessons learned from Judge Miller’s decision. Among those lessons learned we asserted that—
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KBR had the ability to determine the best subcontract type, to conduct (and document) negotiations and, thus, to be prepared to demonstrate why Tamimi’s prices were fair and reasonable. Ultimately, KBR was not able convince Judge Miller that it had done a good job in those areas.
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… acquisition personnel need to own subcontractor source selection and award decisions. In this case, KBR’s Operations personnel ran roughshod over KBR’s Purchasing System policies and procedures in the name of expediency and troop support. … KBR personnel obviously did not work as a coherent team, and let organizational silos get in the way….
We mention the foregoing because KBR recently lost another case at the Court of Federal Claims, for similar reasons.
We are not going to spend a lot of time discussing the facts that led to the dispute over subcontractor pricing. As was the case with Tamimi, KBR was supporting the Army in Southwest Asia by providing dining services. In the words of Judge Miller, resolving the dispute between KBR and the Army “calls for reconciliation of the prime contractor’s burden to provide reasonable justification—years after the fact—for claimed costs that were passed through to the prime contractor under fixed-price contracts with the reality that the costs were incurred during the exigencies of war.”
One subcontract (called the “SK 465 subcontract”) was awarded pursuant to competition. That is to say, a Request for Proposals was issued, multiple proposals were received from potential subcontractors, the proposals were evaluated, and a winner was selected. Normally—and when properly documented—those circumstances are considered sufficient to demonstrate that the price paid to the winner is fair and reasonable. ABC International Group (“ABC”) was the winner of the SK 465 subcontract.
Unfortunately for KBR, although its evaluation of the bidders showed that ABC was the low bidder (which is why it was selected), there was an error in the evaluation spreadsheet prepared by the KBR Subcontract Administration team. Instead of being $100,000 lower than the next lower competitor (Eurest), the reality was that ABC’s proposed price was $1 million higher than Eurest’s bid. The error was not discovered during the “green sheet” management review and, indeed, was not discovered until after the subcontract had been awarded to ABC. In addition, the KBR Pre-Negotiation Memorandum (PNM) was acknowledged (by both parties to the litigation) to be “inadequate” and poorly documented/supported.
Oops!
Because the Army kept changing its projected personnel counts, the SK 465 subcontract was based on bands of headcounts (“headbands”), with a fixed price per head based on what headband the headcount fell in. Indeed, the Army changed its personnel count, the type of dining facility to be constructed, and the location of the dining facility itself. The Army’s changes in its direction to KBR led KBR to change its direction to ABC, resulting in change orders to the SK 465 subcontract. ABC’s change order prices formed a significant basis for the Army’s assertion that the subcontract pricing was unreasonable.
One of the problems was that ABC’s change order pricing was determined by KBR to be reasonable, based on a comparison to ABC’s original pricing (which had been determined to be fair and reasonable based on the competition). This would normally be an acceptable practice—assuming that the original proposal price analysis had been done well. But in this case, since the original proposal evaluation had been flawed, the comparison to it in order to determine the reasonableness of the proposed change order pricing was invalid.
In addition, the KBR Subcontract Administration team’s change order analysis suffered from other problems. As Judge Miller wrote, “Essentially, Mr. Nasery’s methodology justified a quadrupling of the total price because he doubled not only the number of troops to be served, multiplied by the rate per person, but also the per-person rate.”
Oops!
In November, 2007, DCAA issued a “Form 1” suspending payment of “certain costs that KBR paid to ABC pursuant to [Change Order 1] such as costs for dining equipment, the facility lease, reefers, generators, labor, and consumables”—for a total of $11.3 million. A year later (December, 2008), DCAA supplemented its original Form 1 and increased the amount of the suspended costs to $12.5 million. The revised Form 1 was received by KBR in July 2009. (No reason was provided for the seven month delay.)
The DCAA told KBR that its subcontractor payments were considered unreasonable—
… because KBR[] performed an inadequate analysis related to (i) the prices for higher headcount bands, and (ii) the costs of building a new DFAC facility. In addition, KBR[] billed costs using a headband that was significantly higher than the actual headcount served.
In January, 2008, DCAA issued another Form 1, suspending “$783,342 of KBR’s direct costs, indirect costs, and fee.” KBR remitted this amount to the U.S. Treasury. However, in May, 2010, DCAA revised its Form 1, lowering the amount of suspended costs to $698,779. The U.S. Government did not refund to KBR the difference (i.e., the excess amount of suspended costs).
(As an aside, this is a good example of why giving DCAA the authority to suspend contractor costs at its discretion often leads to an abuse of that authority, since DCAA auditors are not held accountable for injuries to the contractor from their errors.)
In deciding the appeal, Judge Miller wrote the following regarding cost reasonableness—
While the court considers the violence in Iraq as a circumstance bearing on the reasonableness of the agreed-upon prices, the court emphasizes that the determination is not what the court considers to be reasonable; rather, the court will examine whether plaintiff’s evidence supports the claimed amounts as reasonable.
[Emphasis added.]
Using that standard, Judge Miller found that KBR did not meet its burden, writing—
KBR has not shown that it employed sound business practices and acted as a reasonably prudent business in accepting ABC’s proposed prices for CO 1. The court accepts KBR’s decision not to hold a competition [for the changed work] as reasonable, given the sense of urgency conveyed by Major Hunter and the Army. That urgency, however, is insufficient to justify the acceptance of unreasonable prices. Moreover, while it does appear that KBR—whether pursuant to its request or not—received additional information from ABC supporting the prices in the latter’s proposal, this, too, is insufficient to establish reasonableness. This information did not illuminate the costs of the components that ABC would provide; rather, the documents that Mr. Al-Awadi submitted to Mr. Nasery in July 2004 merely identified the numbers of each component that would be provided, the number of laborers for each job title that would be necessary, the layout of the new DFAC, and a schedule of materials to be used.
[Emphasis added.]
However, KBR did win on some items. It was awarded $4.2 million for erroneously suspended costs that were never refunded (as well as for some undisputed cost items), and it was awarded the disputed dining facility costs (because Judge Miller found KBR’s price justification to be persuasive for that element). It also prevailed on the second Form 1 issue, which turned on an interpretation of subcontract payment terms. That said, by our reckoning ineffective subcontractor management cost KBR more than $8 million.
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Your Disgruntled Employee Has the Means to Make Your Life Miserable
 It’s a popular myth among those contractors who’ve been the subject of a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act that those filing such suits on behalf of the U.S. Government are simply disgruntled employees with an axe to grind for some perceived wrong that was done to them. That myth is wrong, of course. If the only people who filed qui tam suits under the FCA were disgruntled employees trying to get back at their (former) employers, then there would be no findings of liability and only the smallest of settlements. But that’s not the case.
While many qui tam “relators” are, in fact, disgruntled, there is often some basis to their suits. We see this when the DOJ intervenes and the ensuing litigation leads to an enormous settlement. So the fact of the matter is that the emotional state of the relator is irrelevant to whether or not the Courts will find a sufficient factual basis to support a finding that the contractor violated its duty to submit accurate invoices to the U.S. Government.
All that being said, your company risks a qui tam suit every day. Every disgruntled employee is a potential relator. If you make your employees disgruntled, through your management actions (or inactions), then you increase the risk that one or more of them are going to file suit.
(By the way, if there are “disgruntled” employees, might there also be “gruntled” employees? Can a disgruntled employee get “regruntled” and transform from being disgruntled to “gruntled”? We’re just asking.)
When you fire employees, even for wrongdoing, you better make sure that your house is in order, because they may fire back. The DOE contractor, CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc., recently learned this lesson the hard way. The DOJ announced that it had intervened in a qui tam suit filed by one Mr. Carl Schroeder, a former CH2M Hill employee at the Department of Energy’s Hanford site. CH2M Hill ran the Hanford clean-up contract for nine years (from 1999 through 2008). It was a big, big, contract; and CH2M Hill made a big, big profit on the backs of its employees there.
We don’t know all the details but, according to the DOJ press release, Schroeder was one of eight former CH2M Hill employees who pleaded guilty to felony charges “stemming from time card fraud.” Apparently, Schroeder knew a lot about time card fraud, because he turned around and filed a qui tam suit against CH2M Hill, alleging “that numerous CH2M Hill hourly employees regularly and substantially overstated the number of hours that they worked [and that] CH2M Hill management knowingly condoned this practice and submitted inflated claims to the Department of Energy that included the fraudulently claimed hours.”
We did a little research, and found this article from November 2011 that provided some more details regarding the Schroeder situation. The article reported that—
Based on documents filed in court, Mr. Schroeder began working at CH2M Hill in 2002 and quickly learned that a scheme and conspiracy to submit false time cards was widespread. According to Mr. Schroeder’s plea agreement, although the time card fraud scheme and conspiracy was contrary to CH2M Hill’s written procedures, submitting false time cards for unearned pay was an accepted practice, which Mr. Schroeder learned of through a variety of means including through certain direct supervisors. Mr. Schroeder, in his plea agreement, admitted to participating in and profiting from the time card fraud scheme and conspiracy. Based on court filings, the time card fraud conspirators also engaged in patterns designed to avoid detection by law enforcement. Additionally, the court documents reveal that certain CH2M Hill supervisory personnel, despite being aware of the time card fraud conspiracy in general and Mr. Schroeder’s participation in particular, did not reprimand or admonish Mr. Schroeder in any way until the discovery of the conspiracy by law enforcement was brought to their attention.
It was noted in the DOJ release that the U.S. will move to have Schroeder dismissed from the action on the basis of his criminal conduct. So, apparently, he will not profit from filing his suit.
But that’s cold comfort to CH2M Hill, who must once again defend itself from allegations that it violated the False Claims Act. And that’s not even counting the litigation initiated by the LA County Department of Water and Power in 2006 under the State of California’s own False Claims Act.
Certainly, CH2M Hill must have learned by now that its operations, which generally take place in remote locations far from its Corporate Headquarters in Denver, Colorado, are subject to risks that a reasonable person might think would be worth some largish internal control and awareness training investments, in order to mitigate.
Recently, we came across some excellent employee awareness training that we want to bring to our readers attention. The training was designed to reduce the chances that a disgruntled employee might file a lawsuit against its employer (or former employer). The takeaway was this: disgruntled employees don’t start out disgruntled. They become disgruntled because their concerns are not adequately addressed by management. When an employee brings concerns to your attention, the proper response is to take those concerns seriously, investigate them thoroughly, and then report back to the employee. Doing so not only militates against employee resentment, but it also creates an opportunity for a real process improvement that could generate positive benefits for the company.
Failing to adequately address employee concerns leads to employee cynicism at best, and disgruntlement at worst. Employees who don’t think their concerns are being heard by management are very likely to turn elsewhere, such as the Inspector General or external counsel—whom, we assure you, will be very happy to take those concerns seriously.
GAO Report Wins Literature Prize
 Occasionally, we take issue with the quality of audit reports issued by the various oversight agencies. For instance, we once wrote that an audit report from the NASA Inspector General’s office included a paragraph filled with “a bunch of nonsensical gobbledygook,” and called the IG auditors “apparently clueless.” We took another opportunity to criticize an audit report from the Department of Energy’s Inspector General, writing that it unquestioningly relied on the work of Los Alamos’ internal audit function, while overlooking an apparently fundamental conflict of interest in the personnel performing the internal audits. And don’t even get us started listing the number of times we’ve criticized DCAA! (Okay, here’s a good one.)
But we are not the only ones looking at the output of government oversight agencies. Not at all. And recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was awarded a literature prize of the quality of one of its audits. It was awarded the 2012 Ig® Nobel Prize for literature.
The Ig® Nobel Prizes are awarded for those research projects (or audit reports) “that first make people laugh, and then make them think.” According to the website of the Improbable Research organization, the IG® Nobel Prizes are awarded annually, and actually handed out by “bemused genuine Nobel laureates.”
The GAO was among distinguished company. Other winners included a fluid dynamics analysis of what happens when a person carries a cup of coffee while walking, and a psychological paper discussing why the fact that the Eiffel Tower leans to the left makes it look smaller. Past winners have included papers carrying such titles as “No Evidence of Contagious Yawning in the Red-Footed Tortoise,” How to Procrastinate and Still Get Things Done,” and “Swearing as a Response to Pain.” Just to mention a few.
The GAO report that won the literature prize was entitled, “Actions Needed to Evaluate the Impact of Efforts to Estimate Costs of Reports and Studies”—GAO-12-480R, dated May 10, 2012. The report criticizes DOD’s methodology for calculating the cost of providing reports and studies (which was undertaken pursuant to DOD’s “Better Buying Power Initiative”). The GAO report recommended that the Secretary of Defense evaluate the methodology being used and take steps to improve the calculation of the cost of providing reports and studies.
The IG® Nobel Literature Prize award described the GAO report as being “a report about reports about reports that recommends the preparation of a report about the report about reports about reports.”
The Defense Industrial Daily commented that the IG® Prize description was “close enough” to the actual report content.
Clearly, the Better Buying Power Initiative is working out just about as we predicted.
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