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Apogee Consulting Inc

Another Successful Plea Bargain

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It’s been a minor theme throughout the nearly 600 blog articles on this site that we are, occasionally, puzzled by the workings of our justice system. Take, for instance, this recent press release issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of Texas. It announced that Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) David Jarvis had successfully negotiated a plea agreement deal with John Torrance Gilmore III, Larry Thomas Ballard, John Carmon Freeman, and Miguel Angel Hughes. Gilmore and Ballard were former employees of Sheppard Air Force Base (SAFB), while Freeman and Hughes were contractors at SAFB.

Gilmore was employed as the Lead Civil Engineer in the SAFB Civil Engineering Squadron engineering department, where he “supervised several engineers, including Ballard.” Hughes owned Hughes and Guzman Construction Services and Hughes Building Services, while Freeman owned Freeman Construction.

According to the press release, the four conspired together, along with others, to do various perfidies and suchlike. The press release said—

The purpose of the conspiracy … was for Gilmore and Ballard to unlawfully provide sensitive source information to their friends, Freeman and Hughes, to provide Freeman and Hughes with a competitive advantage or financial benefit in connection with several government contracts. Over several years, Freeman and Hughes gave Gilmore and Ballard personal gifts and benefits in return for their preferential treatment in connection with several government contracts. In fact, sometime in the mid to late 1990's Freeman paid large sums of cash to Gilmore, and on at least one occasion, Freeman gave $10,000 in cash to Gilmore. Freeman’s plea documents indicated that Freeman paid Gilmore in appreciation for Gilmore approving and accepting Freeman’s work on government contracts. Hughes’ plea documents stated that during the period from 2004 through 2008, Hughes paid travel expenses and took Gilmore to several gun shows in order to curry favor with Gilmore. … [and] when Gilmore became aware of this criminal investigation, he told Freeman to lie about his cash payments to him. After initially lying about them to investigators, Freeman later admitted that he had paid cash bribes to Gilmore.

So this would seem to be another tawdry story of government employees who provided bid information to contractors in return for cash and gifts. It’s not the first such story, and undoubtedly it will not be the last.

How did AUSA Jarvis characterize the conspiracy? We quote—

The indictment alleges that the four defendants conspired together to impair and obstruct the government’s ability to have a competitive and unbiased selection of contractors — depriving the government of its right to exclusive use and control over sensitive source selection information, to include contractor bid information, government pricing and cost estimates and contractor proposal information. The indictment also alleges that the defendants conspired together to knowingly disclose and obtain sensitive source selection information related to several contracts’ specifications, including those for roof and pothole repairs and the liquid oxygen maintenance facility.

According to plea documents filed in the case, the defendants conspired together and with others during the period from at least the mid 1990's through 2009, to defraud the 82nd Contracting Squadron and the Department of the Air Force by depriving the United States of the lawful right to exclusive use and control over sensitive source selection information, such as contractor bid information, government pricing and cost estimates, and contractor proposal information, on several contracts. They also conspired together and with others to disclose or obtain sensitive source selection information on several contracts.

Wow. It sounds so … trivial … the way AUSA Jarvis describes it. Note the omission of the terms “bribery,” “Procurement Integrity Act,” “gratuity,” and other similar descriptions that might lead a casual reader to think that something illegal had actually taken place.

Gilmore and Ballard each pleaded guilty to “one count of conspiring to defraud the United States and conspiring to unlawfully disclose sensitive source information.” Freeman and Hughes each pleaded guilty to “one count of conspiring to defraud the United States and conspiring to unlawfully obtain sensitive source information.”

The press release stated that “each faces a maximum statutory sentence of five years in prison, a $250,000 fine and restitution.” Which is interesting, because had any of the four been found guilty of bribery, they might have been facing 15 years in prison, and a fine equal to three times the things of value that were given/received.

And this difference, we suspect, was the foundation of the successful plea bargain.

And now we have yet another example of the mysterious machinations of the modern U.S. justice system.

 

 

WARNing Sign Part 2

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Stop_Sign
At the request of our old friend, “Cajun CPA,” we put together some thoughts on the ongoing WARN Act controversy. In Part 1, we brought readers up to speed on the Dept. of Labor opinion that contractors should not issue WARN Act notices to their employees simply based on the speculative notion that sequestration might occur and, if it did occur, that the contractor would be affected by sequestration immediately and, if the contractor was affected immediately, that it immediately would need to lay off employees and, if it did immediately need to lay off employees, then it would know (in early November) which ones it would need to lay off in early January. We also reported on the OMB Memo which offered some comfort to those contractors who were still worried about potential liability under the WARN Act, promising them that they would be covered in the event of legal entanglement.

And then we pointed out how thin that promise of coverage might really be.

Regardless of our opinion, the Dept. of Labor opinion plus the OMB liability coverage promise seemed to successfully signal to contractors that they really didn’t need to issue WARN Act notices to their employees just before the Presidential election.

Which (predictably) upset those politicians who thought it would be beneficial to their election chances to have as voters those people who had just received layoff notices from their employers. Those most upset by the lack of WARN Act notices were Republicans.

Go figure.

For example, the House of Representatives’ Education and the Workforce Committee (John Kline, R-Minnesota, Chair) sent a letter to OMB Acting Director Zients that offered concerns about both the Dept. of Labor opinion and OMB’s promise to contractors. The Committee was “greatly concerned” about the situation and “respectfully” requested lots and lots of information, documents, and internal communication to help understand how OMB reached such problematic conclusions.

Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Ayotte (R-New Hampshire) were also concerned, writing—

We are concerned about the authority of the executive branch to instruct private employers not to comply with federal law and to promise to pay the monetary judgments and litigation costs that arise out of the lawsuits that may follow … The administration’s new guidance tells employers to willfully ignore the law and stay silent about looming layoffs until after the election — and promises them a taxpayer-funded bailout for their legal expenses if they do so … The administration must explain its legal basis for this interpretation of the Warn Act that leaves taxpayers on the hook, American workers in the dark, and our national security in jeopardy.

Not being able to do much to the President or his employees, several members of Congress decided to “grill” contractor executives instead. Congressman Darrell Issa (R-California) seemed to be at the forefront of the inquisition, according to what we read, telling companies that “The guidance seems intended to invite federal contractors to flout the law, and in doing so places a large contingent financial liability on the shoulders of American taxpayers in order to indemnify those contractors who follow the administration’s direction.” As Chair of the House’s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Issa signed a letter to OMB that was very similar to the one signed by Kline.

One key difference between the Kline and Issa letters was that Issa’s Committee requested that—

… the Defense Contract Audit Agency—the agency charged with administering cost accounting standards and guidelines—intervene to examine OMB’s guidelines to ascertain whether those costs incurred by contractors who have been found to violate layoff law should be deemed to be ‘allowable costs’ for purposes of the Cost Accounting Standards.

Now that’s comedy gold, right there.

Readers, how many errors can you find in that single sentence? We found three right off the bat. But the true humor is to be found in the irony of asking DCAA to audit OMB on its compliance with Cost Accounting Standards … when OMB is the organizational home of the Cost Accounting Standards Board—the only entity authorized by law to issue Standards and interpretations thereof.

Readers, we just cannot make this stuff up.

So where are we on this?

First, we don’t think sequestration will be as devastating as many—including us!—have previously predicted. We’ve done some math and it looks like the defense budgets may take a $70 - $80 Billion hit. Yes, that’s a huge immediate reduction, but it’s not unsurvivable, either. It will mean program stretch-outs and some terminations, but it’s not like every defense worker in the United States is going to be laid-off. And the reality is that many were going to be retiring in the next couple of years, in any case. We don’t mean to trivialize this issue by any means, but we’re starting to believe that it will be ultimately manageable, if painful in the short term.

We think the real impact is going to be felt on the government side. It is likely that as many as 200,000 Executive Branch employees could be furloughed or laid-off in some sequestration scenarios—though President Obama has promised to protect military service personnel from cuts. If programs are going to be terminated, who’s going to be left to administrate the termination or to process the Termination Settlement Proposals? Who’s going to be left to audit contractors’ claimed costs? Who’s going to be exercising oversight on the remaining contract obligations?

We are mindful of this article at Federal Times, which reported that Federal employee retirements are surging just as the hiring of new employees “plummets”—and that’s the situation before sequestration is implemented. The article reported—

The long-delayed retirement wave is here. For years, experts have predicted large numbers of baby boomers would retire and take years of experience and institutional knowledge with them. … Retirements for all of 2011 were up 24 percent over 2010 levels, according to OPM statistics. And in the first nine months of 2012, OPM recorded another nearly 8 percent increase. Meanwhile, new hires in the first quarter of 2012 plunged 32 percent over the same period in 2010.

Now, there are many who consider the foregoing bit of news to be happy tidings. They argue that the Federal government is already too large and it’s past time to downsize it. But if we’ve learned anything over the past couple of decades, it’s that workforce cuts need to be handled with a scalpel and not with a meat-axe. If you cut heads to the point where services can no longer be provided, then you’ve gone too far. Government contractors are very much reliant on their government contracting officers and quality assurance inspectors. If the Government can’t inspect, then it can’t accept. And if it can’t accept, you can’t get paid. If there is no Contracting Officer to obligate funds in MOCAS (or whatever system they’re using these days), then DFAS isn’t going to issue any payments. And if there are no DFAS payment clerks, there will be nobody to process contractor invoices and issue payments. So you may have a contractor with authorized funding, even after sequestration—but you still may not get paid.

How do you like those Federal cutbacks now?

Contractor executives and politicians are (perhaps rightly) concerned with the effects of sequestration on contractor workforces. But perhaps we all ought to be thinking about trying to be a government contractor when there’s not enough Federal employees to keep up the Government’s side of the contracting bargain.

 

 

DOD Offers Update on DFARS Business Systems Administration Impacts

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As you may know, we have been following the still-new DFARS Business Systems oversight regime with some interest. We last discussed the matter right here. But we’re not the only ones following this topic with great interest.

On October 4, 2012, the Federal Times published an article on how DOD has implemented the new regime over the past year at various contractors. Authored by Sarah Chacko, the article revealed that, to date, DOD has withheld at least $42 million from at least five contractors because of deficient business systems. The total dollar amount is a bit murky, because, according to the article, “DoD could not confirm that these five contractors were the only ones subjected to payment withholdings since the department put a new contracting rule allowing the withholdings into effect in February.”

Who are the notorious five?

Well, Huntington Ingalls is one. It had $2.6 million in payments withheld “because of a faulty Earned Value Management System.” We told you about that situation nearly a year ago. The Federal Times story reported that the Navy recently reduced the shipyard’s payment withholds from 5 percent to 2 percent” after about a year of payment withholds, indicating (to us) that an acceptable corrective action plan had been submitted.

Another of the five is Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, located in Forth Worth, Texas. Home of the F-25 Lightning II program, we’ve reporting on its EVMS problems several times, the most recent here. There’s not much more to add to what we’ve already reported.

So those two should not be news to our readers. But the other three malefactors may be new information to many of you. According to the article they were—

  • BAE Systems Land and Armaments in Arlington, Va.: $400,000 in payments was withheld because of a faulty accounting system.

  • Lockheed Martin Space Systems in Denver: $8.7 million in payments was withheld because of a faulty Earned Value Management system.

  • United Launch Alliance, a joint venture between Lockheed Martin Corp. and Boeing Co., in Denver: $2.8 million in payments was withheld because of a faulty accounting system.

In addition, the article reported that—

The department made a preliminary decision to withhold money against at least one other contractor, CACI of Arlington, Va., because of problems with its labor accounting system, department spokeswoman Army Lt. Col. Elizabeth Robbins said in an email. But it is unclear how much, if any, money was withheld before the company submitted a corrective-action plan that satisfied DoD’s concerns.

The article also touched on contractor concerns about the subjective definition of “adequate” and the costs of coming into perfect compliance versus the benefits of doing so. We recommend you check it out.

 

WARNing Sign of Things to Come …

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Our old friend “Cajun CPA” requests that we update readers on the controversy regarding whether or not government contractors must issue potential layoff notices to employees as required by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, given that Sequestration is nearing and program funding is likely to be endangered starting in January (the same way that the carrier pigeon might be said to be “endangered”). When we last addressed this topic, we told readers that “we are not going to breathlessly issue alert bulletins about the progress—or lack thereof—of the looming doomsday scenario known as ‘sequestration’.” But what can we do? Our readers have spoken.

And in truth, there are some legitimate issues buried in the muck of the political B.S. that in the modern election cycle in the United States. So, securely cloaked in the foregoing rationale, let us begin.

In our last post, we told you that the Department of Labor had issued its opinion that the WARN Act would not require defense contractors to issue employee layoff notices in November (just one week before the election). According to the Dept. of Labor, providing WARN Act notices “would be inconsistent with the purpose” of the legislation, and would result in an “inefficient use of resources”.

The Dept. of Labor opinion had this to say about WARN Act requirements:

‘The purpose of [the] WARN Act [is] to provide notice to workers so alternative employment or necessary training can be obtained on a timely basis.’ … Generally, the WARN Act requires employers with at least 100 employees to provide written notice at least 60 days before ordering a plant closing or mass layoff to: ‘affected employees’ – either through notice to their representative, or to each affected employee if the employees are not represented; to the state entity designated to provide rapid response activities under the Workforce Investment Act; and to the local government. … A ‘plant closing’ or a ‘mass layoff’ is defined in terms of numbers of workers at a single site of employment who suffer an ‘employment loss.’ … ‘Affected employees’ are employees ‘who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their employer.’ … An ‘employment loss’ is defined as a termination from employment other than a termination for cause, voluntary departure, or retirement; a layoff for more than 6 months; or a reduction in hours of more than 50 percent in each month of a 6-month period. …

Based on the foregoing recital, the Dept. of Labor concluded that—

These statutory provisions demonstrate that the WARN Act is designed to require employers to provide notice to those workers who are reasonably likely to lose their jobs or suffer other serious employment consequences, but not to those workers who will suffer no such consequences or who have only a speculative chance of suffering them.

The Obama Administration took additional action in addition to issuing the Dept. of Labor opinion. On September 28, 2012, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—which is an organizational entity within the Executive Office of the President—issued a Memo entitled “Guidance on Allowable Contracting Costs Associated with the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notice (WARN) Act.” The OMB Memo was issued with the expressed intent of “minimize[ing] the potential for waste and disruption associated with the issuance of unwarranted layoff notices.” It stated—

Specifically, if (1) sequestration occurs and an agency terminates or modifies a contract that necessitates that the contractor order a plant closing or mass layoff of a type subject to WARN Act requirements, and (2) that contractor has followed a course of action consistent with DOL guidance; then any resulting employee· compensation costs for WARN Act liability as determined by a court, as well as attorneys' fees and other litigation costs (irrespective of litigation outcome), would qualify as allowable costs and be covered by the contracting agency, if otherwise reasonable and allocable.

Well, then. According to the OMB, contractors that follow the Dept. of Labor guidance and do not issue WARN Act notices in early November—and who are required to pay damages to affected employees for failing to do so—will be able to pass those damages (and associated legal fees and other costs) back to their customers as allowable costs. That would seem to settle that.

But let’s notice the next paragraph in the OMB Memo, which stated—

This guidance does not alter existing rights, responsibilities, obligations, or limitations under individual contract provisions or the governing cost principles set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other applicable law. Thus, agencies may treat as allowable other costs potentially associated with sequestration, including WARN Act-related costs arising under .circumstances not specified .in this guidance, based on the usual cost principles of allocability, al!owability, and reasonableness as set forth in the FAR.

So the OMB promise to cover contractors’ WARN Act liabilities is not all-encompassing. It simply covers the exact circumstances it covers. And it begs the question as to exactly how covered costs are to be reimbursed.

Follow us through a thought experiment, if you would.

Contractor A has two firm, fixed-priced contracts with the DOD. Those two contracts constitute 95% of its total annual revenue and 90% of its workforce is busy executing one of those two contracts. On January 3, 2013, it receives notice that both contracts are to be Terminated for Convenience, effective immediately. Consistent with the FAR Termination for Convenience contract clause, the contractor stops work and issues layoff notices to its employees. The employees get severance pay, but they are laid-off the same week they receive notice. One or more employees file suit, alleging that the contractor knew Sequestration was looming and yet failed to issue required WARN Act notices. The contractor incurs $1,000,000 in legal fees and related costs, and settles with each of the 100 affected employees for individual payments of $50,000—for a total of $6,000,000 in additional costs incurred by following the Dept. of Labor opinion and guidance. It desires reimbursement from its government customers, but how?

Its two contracts were firm, fixed-price. By definition, the price is fixed and does not change regardless of the contractor’s actual costs, whether direct or indirect. The price is the same no matter how much ostensibly allowable costs are incurred. So that ain’t happening.

Well, maybe the contractor can seek reimbursement as part of its Termination Settlement Proposal. Frankly, we see that as the contractor’s best hope in this scenario. But a successful outcome is far from guaranteed. It is going to have to convince its Termination Contracting Officer (TCO) that its legal costs were allowable under the applicable Cost Principle and that its settlement costs were reasonable. Then it will have to address with the costs in question were direct or indirect—and whether allocation of them to the two terminated contracts resulted in a loss at completion (which would have to be factored into the settlement amount). It may have to argue with auditors whether the settlement payments were allowable employee compensation, or perhaps they were unallowable legal fees (since there was a settlement) or unallowable penalties. The auditors (and perhaps the TCO) will be pointing to the second paragraph we quoted from the OMB Memo—the part about “This guidance does not alter existing rights, responsibilities, obligations, or limitations under individual contract provisions or the governing cost principles set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and other applicable law.”—and they are going to say that some or all of that $6,000,000 is unallowable by operation of those Cost Principles. It’s not going to be a fun exercise, in our view.

So, as you can see, although OMB may have offered some comfort to government contractors, it was certainly not a warm blanket of comfort. Instead, it’s more of a gauzy veil of comfort—thin and easily penetrated.

And the OMB Memo sure seemed to upset Republican legislators.

We will continue with this ongoing saga in the next article.

 

 

What Is a Subcontract?

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We have been meaning to write a serious article for publication on this topic, but the time has never seemed right. So you get this blog article intead. The topic really deserves more; it matters because how you define your subcontracts impacts many things, from content to how they are reviewed by government auditors. For example, you will include the mandatory flow-down clauses from your higher-tier contract in your subcontracts, but you won’t do that in your general supplier agreements if you don’t consider them to be subcontracts. When the DCMA Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) team finally comes to visit, they will have different expectations for your subcontracts than they will for your general supplier agreements (though likely they will look at both). So the definition of subcontract matters.

The problem is, there’s no definition of subcontract in the FAR. Or, rather, there’s far too many and they vary significantly, depending on where you’re looking.

Let’s start here: Go to FAR 2.101 (Definitions) and look for “subcontract.” You won’t find it. Sure, you’ll find a definition for “contract” and for “delivery order” and for “task order”—but you won’t find a definition for subcontractor. And that’s the problem.

Vern Edwards, a demi-god in the pantheon of government contracting experts, tackled this topic in the April 2012 edition of the Nash & Cibinic Report, in his article entitled, “What is a Subcontract? Who is a Subcontractor?” He compared the FAR 44.101 definition of “subcontract” to the definition of subcontractor found in that same Subpart. Here’s what the definitions say—

“Subcontract” means any contract as defined in Subpart 2.1 entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or services for performance of a prime contract or a subcontract. It includes but is not limited to purchase orders, and changes and modifications to purchase orders.

“Subcontractor” means any supplier, distributor, vendor, or firm that furnishes supplies or services to or for a prime contractor or another subcontractor.

So according to the definitions above, a subcontract is a contract entered into “for performance of a prime contract or subcontract,” but a subcontractor is an entity that furnishes any supplies or services “to or for a prime contractor or to another subcontractor.” That’s confusing, at least to us. And apparently to others as well, since comments submitted to the DAR Council in relation to the promulgation of the DFARS Business Systems administration regime pointed out that same confusion.

What did the DAR Council say in response to the public comments regarding the confusing definitions? It said, “Because the Government reimburses contractors for its applicable share of indirect expenses, it would be inappropriate to revise the definitions of subcontracts and purchase orders to exclude agreements with vendors that would normally be applied to a contractor’s G&A expenses or indirect costs.”

So according to the DAR Council, every prime contractor should be flowing-down its prime contract clauses into every single purchase order and contract it enters into with every single one of its suppliers. They don’t address what happens if any of those prime contract mandatory flow-down clauses contradicts the mandatory flow-down clauses of another prime contract. They don’t mention how to handle different DPAS ratings. It doesn’t address the implication that, by its definition, every single supplier agreement valued in excess of $100,000 should be submitted to a Contracting Officer for consent.

In other words, they got it wrong.

Mr. Edwards was much more diplomatic when he wrote –

It is reasonable to interpret the definition of ‘subcontract’ in FAR 44.101 to encompass purchases charged to contractor indirect cost accounts? Such purchases include materials, parts, equipment, and services that are to be used in operations but that will not be incorporated into any deliverable item. We think the answer is no, but to the best of our knowledge that question has never been answered authoritatively by any policy body, board, or court. We have been told and believe that different COs and contractors interpret the definition of ‘subcontract’ in FAR 44.101 differently in that regard, some to include purchases charged to indirect cost pools and some not.

Mr. Edwards’ article notes that the term “subcontract” is officially defined 15 different times throughout the FAR. Suffice to say, while some of the definitions overlap, many others are contradictory. This situation naturally leads to problems when trying to define exactly what a subcontract is and what it is not. The best that can be said is that the official definition of a subcontract is the one that applies, based on the part of the FAR that one is working with.

We have lightly touched on this issue before, notably here, when we wrote—

So now we have the FAR Councils asserting that the term “contract” definitely encompasses a task or delivery order—but only with respect to evaluating whether a TINA exemption is applicable. We have the DAR Council clearly stating that the term ‘contract’ definitely encompasses a task or delivery order with respect to mandatory arbitration. But so far nobody has taken the next logical step—which would be to find that the term ‘contract’ encompasses a task or delivery order for purposes of applying CAS.

We also addressed, more directly, the disparate definitions of “subcontract” in this article. We noted that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) expressly defined “subcontractor” as encompassing both agreements under prime or higher-tier subcontracts, and agreements for provision of “general supplies” unrelated to any particular contract. (We later noted that the DOD policy-makers undercut the problematic OMB definition, by making the clause in question a mandatory flow-down provision. In other words, according to the DOD, if you don’t have a prime contract or higher-tier subcontract that includes the clause, you don’t need to comply with it—which is not at all what we thought OMB was directing.)

Another related area of contention is whether a Teaming Agreement is an enforceable contract. Courts have been divided on the issue, from what we (non-lawyers) can tell. A current lawsuit against a Top 10 defense contractor may create another opportunity for the Courts to offer an opinion on the matter.

Right now, a small business, L’Garde, is suing The Raytheon Company in a California Court. Though we are not privy to the details, from the late July decision by the California District Court (Central Region) we gather that Raytheon issued to L’Garde a Letter Subcontract, which (allegedly) included a promise to negotiate, in good faith, “a future definitive subcontract.” Thus, apparently a Letter Subcontract is analogous to a Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA)—which has also proved to be problematic for the Department of Defense when used. L’Garde sued Raytheon, claiming that Raytheon issued the Letter Subcontract solely in order to win a subcontract from Lockheed Martin and, once the LockMart award was received, failed to definitize the Letter Subcontract. Raytheon, quite naturally, disagreed with L’Garde’s characterization of the situation.

Raytheon advanced a number of arguments in its defense, including trying to persuade the Court that Federal common law should replace state law in the case. The Court was not persuaded, and wrote—

This Case is factually analogous to Northrop Corp. v. AIL Systems, Inc., 959 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the plaintiff sued the defendant for an alleged breach of a ‘teaming agreement.’ There, the parties successfully ‘teamed’ up to win a bid for an Air Force contract and while they initially worked together, defendant eventually refused to subcontract out the work to plaintiff in order to realize a cost-reduction. … The Seventh Circuit held the teaming agreement did not rise to the level of a unique federal interest sufficient to warrant the imposition of federal law because ‘[t]he federal government is not liable for any damages [Defendant] may owe [Plaintiff] for the alleged breaches of the teaming agreement. Nor is there any indication that the government will pay a higher price for the [contract] if [Defendant] is found liable to [Plaintiff].’

Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit held the New SD and Northrop decisions to be in harmony because the source of the Northrop dispute arose from the ‘teaming agreement,’ not the actual ‘subcontracts which govern actual work being performed on federal projects that implicate federal interests much more directly.’ New SD, 79 F.3d at 955 (quoting Northrop, 959 F.2d at 1428).

Accordingly, we see in the case above that the Courts have been readily able to distinguish between Teaming Agreements and subcontracts. We wonder if they would have the same perspicacity when asked to distinguish between a subcontract and a general supplier agreement?

Isn't it time for the FAR Councils to address this issue in Part 2.101?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.