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Apogee Consulting Inc

The True Cost of Fraud

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You may have noticed that, from time to time, we write articles about fraud and fraud-related litigation in the government contracting arena. We’ve discussed legal settlements, and noted inconsistencies in how the Department of Justice comes to an acceptable plea bargain with an alleged fraudster. We’ve discussed qui tam litigation under The False Claims Act, and how your disgruntled employee (and disgruntled former employee) may have the means to make your life miserable through filing a suit—even when that selfsame relator was in fact the perpetrator of the activity that is now alleged to be fraudulent. We’ve discussed how violations of export controls can lead to allegations of false claims; we’ve discussed how violations of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) can lead to allegations of false claims; and we’ve discussed how misrepresentation of one’s business size and/or socioeconomic status can lead to allegations of false claims.

You might say we’ve been into this government fraud thing like it was our professional livelihood. Which, to some extent, it is. Given that it’s just a fine line dividing intentional fraud from an honest misunderstanding of the applicable (and complex) regulations, we have developed—by necessity—a rather keen sense of which is which. (See the recent article on The Dunning-Kruger Effect, which explains the psychology of how cognitive bias and other errors creep into management decision-making.)

Throughout the myriad fraud-related articles published on this site, we’ve been consistent that organizations that choose to do business with the Federal government must invest in sufficient controls to prevent (or at least reduce) wrongdoing. It’s simply risk mitigation, if nothing else. If you tell Apogee Consulting, Inc. that you lack sufficient budget to invest in your internal controls, we are very apt to ask if you have sufficient budget to pay multi-million dollar fines and penalties, or to pay for attorneys to defend you from fraud allegations. If you tell us that you don’t have the money to do the job the right way, then we are very apt to advise you not to do the job at all.

(Why, yes. This tendency does lead to a bit of client churn. Why do you ask?)

In February, 2010, we asked the question whether the price of fraud was expensive enough to deter wrongdoers. Since then, we’ve written about a $500 million settlement at SAIC, the loss of a $20 billion follow-on TRICARE contract at TriWest, and other big-time consequences. Yet nothing seems to change. It appears that malefactors simply don’t factor-in the big-time consequences when they are deciding whether or not to engage in fraud.

We raised that very same issue once again in July, 2012, when we discussed United Technologies Corporation (UTC) and its $76 million settlement with the Department of Justice, related to violations of the Arms Export Control Act by a Canadian subsidiary of UTC. We asked—

We wonder if the UTC subsidiary (Pratt & Whitney Canada) took a $76 million fine into account, when it calculated the risks associated with its intentional export control violation? We think not.

So we’ve discussed fines and penalties, and settlements, and legal defense fees. And those certainly seemed to us that they should deter somebody with half a brain. But we haven’t really discussed another consequence of fraudulent activity—the shareholder derivative suit. This situation occurs when a shareholder sues in the name of the corporation to remedy a perceived wrongdoing, when for some reason the corporation is unwilling to do so. As the Free Dictionary writes—

The principal justification for permitting derivative suits is that they provide a means for shareholders to enforce claims of the corporation against managing officers and directors of the corporation. Officers and directors, who are in control of the corporation, are unlikely to authorize the corporation to bring suit against themselves. A derivative suit permits a shareholder to prosecute these claims in the name of the corporation.

Consequently, if one or more corporate shareholders believe that the corporate management and/or the Board of Directors have failed in their duties to prevent fraud, then they are likely to file a derivative suit in the name of the corporation against those officers and/or directors. Which can also be very expensive, from a legal expense point of view (if for no other reason).

UTC was reminded of this additional consequence recently, when a shareholder sued on behalf of the corporation, seeking to replace the company’s entire Board of Directors—according to Bloomberg. The Bloomberg article reported—

Directors of the Hartford, Connecticut-based industrial conglomerate should have exercised better oversight to avoid U.S. fines for supplying China with software used in developing attack helicopters, the Harold Grill 2 IRA contends in a lawsuit filed Nov. 5 in Delaware Chancery Court in Wilmington.

Board members violated their duties ‘by abdicating their responsibilities of supervision and oversight’ and as a result ‘sullied United Technologies’ reputation as a defense contractor, undermined its claims to good governance, and exposed it to criminal charges,’ the investor claimed. …

In the lawsuit, lawyers contend the company ‘secretly participated’ in the Chinese military helicopter development ‘in violation of a U.S. arms embargo and federal arms traffic control statutes,’ placing restricted technology in the hands of ‘the U.S.’s biggest geopolitical competitor.’ …

The investor asked a judge to remove and replace the directors, order a new election, appoint a receiver for management in the interim, and award the company damages to be paid by the directors.

When the UTC AECA violations first came to light last June, we asked whether a $76 million fine was considered when setting out to make revenue targets. Apparently not, was our answer. And now we update that question to inquire whether the cost of defending (and perhaps settling) a shareholder derivative suit was factored-in to the risk/reward calculations. We continue to suspect not.

Fraud is expensive. Derivative suits are expensive. Consider those facts, if you will, the next time you set forth to establish your budgets for employee training, internal audits, and other internal control procedures.

 

 

The Dunning-Kruger Effect and Other Reasons People Screw Up

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The_D-K_Effect
One of the greatest challenges in being a business advisor in a complex area such as law, accounting, taxes, or government contracting is to provide advice that is both honest and actionable. Giving honest advice may be a challenge, in and of itself, but one doesn’t really get a lot of push-back. “What does this mean?” is not a particularly difficult question to answer. When one considers experience, research into court rulings, and knowledge of the regulations, “What does this mean?” usually boils down to one answer—perhaps with a couple of caveats if the situation is ambiguous.

However, providing actionable advice is a whole ‘nother thing, entirely. “What should I do?” is a difficult question to answer, and it usually has a spectrum of possible responses. Generally, there are a number of “correct” responses. In fact, there may be no wrong answers to give, only good, better, and (hopefully) best answers. The best answer usually depends on a variety of factors, including available resources, long-term strategy, and the prevailing political winds. And the best answer today may not be the same as the best answer tomorrow or next week, depending on how the variables shift.

We’ve recently discussed the travails of serveral small business that have run afoul of DCAA and DCMA. Quimba Software, Inframat, and Thomas Associates, Inc. all received adverse audit reports with questioned costs. All three received adverse Contracting Officer Final Decisions. Penalties were applied. All three appealed; all three lost (though Quimba filed another appeal at the Court of Federal Claims). Though we’ve have little to say about the merits of Quimba’s case (while the appeal is still pending), we’ve had lots to say about Inframat and TAI, much of which was less than complimentary.

Why do companies such as TAI and Inframat think they can develop compliant accounting and other business systems on their own, without the advice of business advisors? When companies do hire business advisors, why is there resistance and push-back when it comes to implementing the new systems, to changing the way in which business is being managing to adapt to the changing compliance requirements?

Well, some of that resistance is undoubtedly rooted in the general resistance to any change. People get comfortable and set in their ways. Unless there’s a DCAA audit report in the recent past, the sense of urgency just isn’t there. “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?” is the common refrain. So even the smartest and most experienced business advisor just can’t push against the cultural tide that prefers to ebb and flow in the time-honored way.

Question: “How many business advisors does it take to change a light bulb?”

Answer: “Just one. But it takes a long time, and it costs a lot of money. And in the end, that light bulb has got to want to change.”

The other reason for the resistance and push-back is The Dunning-Kruger Effect. What’s that, you may well be asking.

The Dunning-Kruger Effect is a cognitive bias hypothesis that suggests (with supporting evidence) that people with relatively little knowledge or skill in a particular area have a tendency to over assess their abilities in that area, while people with relatively more knowledge or skill have a tendency to under assess their abilities.

We used to call that phenomenon: “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.”

Candidly, we run into this situation frequently. Somebody with a little knowledge of the FAR Cost Principles thinks they know all about Cost Accounting Standards. Somebody with experience in Firm Fixed-Price contract types thinks they understand the requirements of Cost-Plus contract types. Somebody who read the DCAA Information for Contractors pamphlet thinks that they’re ready to support the next DCAA audit of the adequacy of the accounting system—or perhaps that they understand how to put together the next annual proposal to establish final billing rates. Somebody who attended a three-day seminar on something just became the local expert in it. It’s a natural human bias.

But that doesn’t keep it from being dangerous to the bottom-line of your company.

We recently came across The D-K Effect. In one case, this long-time client hired a bookkeeper, which was a smart move. Getting the bookkeeper to prepare the proposal to establish final billing rates was also a smart move, since the data came from the accounting system that the bookkeeper maintained. But then the client wanted the bookkeeper to certify as to the adequacy of the entity’s accounting system for cost-plus government contracting. That was far outside the domain of the bookkeeper’s expertise. (Pun intended.) In addition to the possible conflict of interest, the bookkeeper simply had no experience with the FAR or CAS or any other of the requirements of cost-plus government contracting.

So what did the bookkeeper do? Why, the bookkeeper called Apogee Consulting, Inc. and asked us to tell them how to conduct the audit and whether or not they should certify as to the accounting system adequacy. Not as a subconsultant, but on the Q.T. so that the bookkeeper could look like it knew what it was doing.

Our reply? Yeah, no. We pointed the bookkeeper to the SF 1408 and then washed our hands of the situation.

Note: the bookkeeper didn’t even know about the SF1408 or what it meant. The bookkeeper did not have access to the DCAA’s adequacy checklist. And this was the entity that was supposed to certify?

We also did not call up our long-time client and say, “WTF are you thinking?” We didn’t do that because it could have been seen as sour grapes. Hey, the client spends the client’s money the way the client wants to. If the client wants to hire unqualified people, then that’s the client’s decision.

But this was clearly The Dunning-Kruger Effect in action. The bookkeeper had a CPA. In the mind of the client, that meant the bookkeeper was qualified to certify the accounting system. Kind of like expecting your family doctor to perform brain surgery, but there you go. More importantly, in the mind of the bookkeeper, how hard could this be? Debits, credits, controls, reconciliations. Et voila! Certification. Both the client and the bookkeeper had a little knowledge about the requirements … and both over estimated their knowledge and expertise—which led to bad decision-making.

Another example of The D-K Effect in action was this other client who kept insisting that all indirect cost allocations had to follow the allocations already programmed into the expensive SAP accounting system. Trying to explain that what worked for financial reporting and internal metrics would not work for cost-type government contract accounting proved to be a futile task. Ultimately, we compromised on some allocation bases that would never work for a CAS-covered contractor, but which might work for a small business (one that was exempt from CAS).

Unsurprisingly, the DCAA auditor had trouble accepting the allocation methodology. But  the key point here is that, once the allocation methodology had been established, the client dismissed us and handled the DCAA audit on its own. After all, since the client knew the allocation methodology cold, what value could a business advisor add?

You will be not be shocked when we tell you that the client failed the audit. The allocation bases were acceptable—barely. But one needed to be able to cite to the regulations and audit guidance in order to sell the methodology to the auditor, and the client simply had no ability to do so. That’s The D-K Effect in action.

We could go on and on. You can’t do this consulting gig for any length of time and not see The D-K Effect in action on a frequent basis. Decisions are suboptimized because the internal expertise is over assessed while the external expertise is under assessed. This is particularly evident in the implementation phases of projects, where resistance to change is heightened.

So, dear readers, try to be aware of The Dunning-Kruger Effect (and other cognitive and social biases) and mitigate it by recognizing the limits of your own expertise. Don’t try to leave the bounds of what you know and “wing it” by guessing about what you don’t really know. Hire subject matter experts, and listen to them.

That’s not to say that all self-proclaimed subject matter experts are equal, or that they are all worthy of veneration. The fact is, you must do your due diligence on the consultants you hire, the same way you do your due diligence on the employees you hire.

If you are aware of your limitations, and think you’ve picked the right business advisor—then listen to what your advisor tells you. And do it.

 

 

Learning about FAR Cost Principles Too Late

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Accountant
Apogee Consulting, Inc. is a small business focused on providing assistance to contractors that are having trouble complying with the myriad administrative requirements of a typical government contract, especially those challenges that come with defense contracts. We help contractors deal with their first DCAA audit; or, perhaps their second DCAA audit if the first audit did not go as planned. We help contractors deal with developing (or enhancing) accounting and other business systems to better match their company’s strategic direction. We help with proposals; we help with negotiations. We help with accounts receivable, and we help with terminations.

We’re not as cheap as some, and we are certainly not as expensive as many. We think we create a fair value for our price.

But some contractors don’t call us, and they don’t call anybody else, either. They try to go it alone, relying on in-house expertise that may or may not exist, to provide assurance that they are managing their contracts adequately and executing them in a compliant manner. Some contractors get their first defense contract and think they are going to apply their time-honored management practices to it, never realizing how much more stringent the defense requirements are going to be on them.

Other contractors receive their first cost-plus contract and fail to realize that their world has just changed. We see this in the SBIR program, where successful contractors move from (fixed-price) Phase 1 contracts to (cost-type) Phase 2 contracts … never realizing that the management approach that worked out so well on Phase 1 is going to be woefully inadequate when applied to Phase 2.

Vern Edwards calls these companies “clueless would-be contractors” and has dedicated a blog article of his own about the phenomenon. He wrote—

Many small to medium sized companies go into government contracting without any idea of what they are getting themselves into. That might be okay with very small sales, but, otherwise, contracting with the U.S. government is the most complex business in the world. It’s right up there with trading derivatives. There are countless rules and contract clauses, many of which are exceedingly hard to understand.

In that blog article (link above), Vern offered “14 tips for the Truly Clueless Would-Be Government Contractors who think that winning a government contract is the yellow brick road to riches.” You really ought to read those fourteen tips, because following them could save you a lot of money downstream.

We touched on this notion, in this blog article about the recent ASBCA decision on the Inframat appeal. Inframat appealed a Contracting Officer’s decision disallowing costs questioned by DCAA as being unallowable, and which imposed some $21,000 in “level one penalties” associated with submitting those “expressly unallowable” costs in its certified proposal to establish final billing rates.

(Note: If you are unclear what an “expressly unallowable” cost might be, or what a “level one penalty” might be, or what a “certified proposal to establish final billing rates” might be, then you might just be one of those contractors Vern was talking about. Which is fine. Ignorance is not a crime! But your failure to comply with your contractual requirements just might be a crime. Something to think about, perhaps?)

What we said at the time about Inframat and similar contractors bears repeating, we think. We wrote—

… here’s the bottom-line for small businesses entering the defense marketplace: If you focus on contract execution and don’t pay attention to the back-office administrative requirements, your story will not end happily. You could easily end up paying the U.S. Government far more than it paid you …

Yet another potential landmine that you could trigger would be failing to deal with this ‘unallowable cost’ thingee that’s addressed in FAR Part 31. … If you are a small business, you may only have a vague idea as to what the FAR is—let alone have sufficient expertise in navigating the identification and segregation of unallowable costs (and the calculation of acceptable indirect cost rates). We suggest you had better learn more about this area—and quickly. The ability to properly account for unallowable cost implicates not only the adequacy of your accounting system, but also the adequacy (and accuracy) of your annual proposal for final billing rates. If you blow the proper accounting for unallowable costs, you are going to make DCAA very happy—because they will get to issue an audit report with lots and lots of questioned costs in it.

It may sound self-serving, but we honestly believe that if you are clueless regarding government contract cost accounting, then it would be a very good idea to hire a subject matter expert to assist you in that area. … Quimba’s problems with DOD need not typify that of every small business, but if you don’t at least come close to getting the contract accounting and billing correct, you are going to have similar problems.

It is not going to be pretty.

With those Cassandra-like warnings setting the stage, let us now turn our attention to the recent ASBCA decision in the appeal of Thomas Associates, Inc. The ASBCA’s decision in Thomas Associates, Inc. (TAI) was quite reminiscent of its decision on the Inframat appeal. Indeed, the ASBCA Judge cited to Inframat in the decision.

Like Inframat, TAI was not represented by outside counsel. Like Inframat, TAI was a small business (TAI was an 8(a) contractor). Like Inframat, TAI had a cost-type contract. Like Inframat, TAI was audited by DCAA, who questioned $33,890 in “expressly unallowable overhead costs” and $4,498 in “expressly unallowable G&A costs.” Like Inframat, DCAA recommended level one penalties—roughly $13,000 in TAI’s case.

TAI included the following in its certified proposal to establish final billing rates:

  • $9,908 “for a Pintail Point corporate deluxe membership,” which included such activities as “sporting clay instruction, shooting, tournaments, a full-day fishing trip, a night at "Manor House Bed & Breakfast," a one-time use of a banquet room and five rounds of golf.” DCAA questioned those costs as being unallowable entertainment costs, but TAI thought they should be allowable as a “wellness/fitness center to improve employee morale, fitness, and teamwork under FAR 31.205-13.”

  • $9,848 for an employee party at the Chesapeake Bay Beach Club, plus $700 for a limousine to carry employees to the party. TAI thought these costs should be allowable employee morale expenses under FAR 31.205-13, because it was an employee recognition event.

  • $1,500 for the U.S. Naval Academy’s “Unified Jazz Ensemble,” who performed at the aforementioned Christmas party.

  • $139 for providing flowers to employees to acknowledge “significant events.”

  • $16,215 for office rental costs in excess of what ownership costs would have been. TAI thought these costs should be allowable because the overall rent per square foot was in line with comparable offices in the area.

Do we need to tell you that TAI failed to persuade the ASBCA Judges on any aspect of its arguments? To put it bluntly, TAI’s arguments were absurd and it should have been embarrassed to make them. (Perhaps that’s why it had to represent itself? Perhaps TAI couldn’t find an outside attorney who could maintain a straight face while arguing those positions in court?)

With respect to the requested waiver of FAR-imposed penalties, TAI (like Inframat) did not prevail on that point either. TAI sought waiver of the penalties based on “financial hardship” as well as the fact that the DCAA audit findings was “a learning experience for us”—and that TAI subsequently improved its policies and procedures “to preclude these types of costs from being included in our incurred cost submissions.”

The ASBCA Judges wrote that TAI’s argument ignored the FAR and that the basis of its argument was “unpersuasive.” The Judges wrote—

There is no evidence that TAI submitted the five expressly unallowable costs in 2004 ‘inadvertently’ or due to ‘unintentional error, notwithstanding the exercise of due care,’ as prescribed by FAR 42.709-5(c)(2). Thus, the ACO properly denied TAI's 29 April 2010 waiver request.

TAI’s appeal was denied in all particulars. As well it should have been.

Look, here’s the deal. When you sign a contract with the U.S. Government, you are responsible for complying with all aspects of your contract—even those pesky “clauses incorporated by reference” found in Schedule I. This is especially true when you’re contracting with the Department of Defense. If you do not understand those clauses, don’t be embarrassed. It takes years of experience (and trial and error) to gain any appreciation of the requirements that those clauses mandate. If you are new to government contracting, there’s no reason you should be expected to understand them or to know how to comply with them. There’s no shame in ignorance when you’re at the bottom of the learning curve.

But government contracting is not very forgiving. There’s really no time to learn on the job or to make mistakes. Your company’s bottom-line—and perhaps its future—is at stake. Maybe you’re an excellent contracts manager but not so deep in accounting or property control or EVMS. Maybe you’re a great accountant, but purchasing and contract administration are skillsets that are out of your league. That’s the way it is, and you need to accept it. You need to get over the notion that your authority and/or subject matter expertise is somehow undermined because you don’t know everything about everything having to do with government contracting. The fact that your subject matter expertise has limits does not impact at all on the areas in which you do have that expertise. It just means you have some learning ahead of you.

So if you are facing new or challenging requirements, pick up the phone and call in a trusted business advisor who can help you out. And this is not about Apogee Consulting, Inc. There are many other advisors out there, and you should contact one of them as soon as you identify your needs.

It’s going to be a very wise investment, we assure you.

 

Huntsville Small Business Indicted on 14 Fraud-Related Counts

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Fraud_dictionary
Recently we railed against a couple of clueless government contractors who thought they would learn about FAR and contract compliance “on the job,” so to speak, by failing DCAA audits and then promising to do better next time. Sure. As we reported, both Thomas Associates, Inc. (TAI) and Inframat learned some lessons while performing their government contracts, but those lessons were expensive. You might say they learned their lessons the hard way.

We opined that contractors such as TAI and Inframat would be better served by hiring business advisors with the requisite subject matter expertise. We asserted that the investment in policies, procedures, and practices—the compliance “systems” of being a government contractor—would generate returns, if only from reduced DCAA audit findings, Contracting Officer disallowances, and penalties applied to expressly unallowable costs.

That position seemed fairly straightforward to us. But then we came across a Department of Justice press release which announced that Government Technical Services and its owner Joe Terry (age 39) had been indicted on 14 counts related to an alleged $7 million scheme to defraud the U.S. Government. As we read the press release, it occurred to us that there might be a very good reason for not hiring anybody with the requisite subject matter expertise. You would not want anybody who knew anything about FAR or DFARS or government regulations looking over your shoulder and asking unsettling questions while you were in the midst of intentionally violating those very same government regulations.

Joe Terry was the sole owner of Government Technical Services, which was an 8(a) contractor based in Huntsville, Alabama. In order to be an 8(a) contractor a small business must meet certain very explicit eligibility requirements. For example, majority owners of the entity must meet the Small Business Administration’s definitions of a socially or economically disadvantaged category. Suffice to say, as an 8(a) program participant, Government Technical Services was classified as a small disadvantaged business, and Joe Terry had to be in one of the disadvantaged categories.

Joe Terry may or may not have been a member of one of the SBA’s disadvantaged categories. But in filing his paperwork with the SBA and in making proposals to the Department of Defense, he (how shall we phrase this?) may have stretched the truth a little. Allegedly.

According to the DOJ press release, Terry was charged with “wire fraud, false statements to the Small Business Administration, false statements on loan applications, and money laundering.” The press release stated—

From 2003 through 2008, Terry submitted fraudulent tax returns to the SBA in order to obtain and maintain certification for his company as a small disadvantaged business, according to the indictment. … Terry submitted personal and corporate returns to the SBA for the tax years 2002 through 2007 to show he was current on filing his taxes, but he had never filed the returns with the Internal Revenue Service, according to the indictment.

But that’s not all. The press release added—

To obtain one $961,551 contract in September 2006 to install metal roofing on three buildings at Fort Polk, La., Terry submitted forged performance and payment bonds and a power of attorney from a Mississippi bond company and its parent surety company in Louisiana, the indictment states. GTS was awarded the contract, but was terminated in April 2008 for failing to perform the work and for providing fraudulent bonds.

Terry and GTS were not indicted for violations of the False Claim Act. But Terry was indicted on five counts of wire fraud, related to payments made by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to GTS for the company’s work at Fort Polk.

Terry was also indicted on one count of money laundering, according to the DOJ press release, which stated—

[The money laundering charge] is related to one of the charges for making a false statement on a loan application. According to the indictment, Terry induced an individual to apply for a loan and he supplied documents falsely claiming that the individual was employed by GTS. The money laundering count stems from Terry's use of the fraudulently obtained loan proceeds for his own purpose.

So, yeah. If you set out to take advantage of the government by intentionally making false statements, forging documents, and inducing payments, we agree that you probably don’t want a knowledgeable individual around who might get suspicious … or who might end up testifying against you.

But for all the rest of you, we stand by our earlier assertions.

 

 

Mitsubishi Electric Proves Timecard Fraud is International

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Mitsubishi_Strategy
In January, 2012, Mitsubishi Electric Company—Japan’s second largest defense contractor—was indefinitely suspended from contracting with the Japanese Defense Ministry, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and the Japanese Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center for allegedly “artificially increasing the number of workers and hours billed” on invoices submitted to those government entities. A detailed investigation was launched to quantify the amount of the (alleged) overbillings, according to this story at Defense Procurement News.

It’s not clear that Mitsubishi ever denied the allegations. According to this report from a Japanese news source—

A Mitsubishi Electric spokesman said, ‘It's a fact that the costs of other projects were added to the contracts in question to pad the bills, but we can't comment further as we are still investigating the case.’

More recently, the Defense Industrial Daily reported that the Board of Audit of Japan had release the results of its months-long investigation. According to the Board of Audit, Mitsubishi’s practice of “padding the bills” has been in place since 1970. It was reported that—

For most of [Mitsubishi’s] orders, comparable market prices were not available, so Mitsubishi Electric calculated material costs and working hours necessary for fulfilling the orders, and the contracts prices were set using this calculation as a reference.

Under the agreement, Mitsubishi Electric was to repay the ministries if its staff worked fewer hours than planned. But the Board of Audit of Japan has found that Mitsubishi Electric senior officials have overstated its employees' working hours for decades, using special terminals for manipulation.

So it seems that the workers were entering the correct number of work hours into the labor reporting system, but then their supervisors and/or managers used “special terminals” to increase those reported labor hours, so as to mask any underruns that would have prompted contract price adjustments. Unfortunately, the Board of Audit was unable to calculate the value of the fraud, because the company “has already destroyed the data on working hours and material costs for the contracts in question.”

How fortuitous.

You may be wondering how has the de facto debarment affected Mitsubishi Electric? Surely, its top-line revenue significantly suffered from the loss of such a large customer?

Nope.

As the article reported—

… since there are no other companies that can repair and manufacture such products, [Mitsubishi] received more than 111.8 billion yen worth of orders from the Defense Ministry on the basis of free [sole-source] contracts in the first half of this year, representing more than 90 percent of the orders it received from the ministry last year.

In other words, like some U.S.-based defense contractors, Mitsubishi Electric was too big to be debarred. But unlike some U.S.-based defense contractors, Mitsubishi felt remorse for its wrongful actions, saying “We apologize that we have caused trouble by breaching contracts.”

So there you go. All better now?

 

 


Page 163 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.