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Apogee Consulting Inc

Government Actions Lead to Increased Litigation Activity

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Look, we could link to article after article on this site, predicting an increase in litigation activity stemming from government initiatives, actions, inactions, and general incompetency. Trust us; we have the support at hand. But we’re not going to do it.

Instead, allow us a brief moment to say “Told you so.”

The chickens are coming home to roost for the U.S. Government and its multitude of trial attorneys, agency attorneys, and legal advisers. Quite honestly, the litigation tsunami is manifesting a bit earlier than we thought. But with just as much candor, let us also predict that this is but the tip of the iceberg.

Readers, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.



The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) recently reported an increase in its docket of 114 appeals—which is an increase of about 20 percent over last year’s docket. Our understanding is that the increased workload for government attorneys is leading to an increase in motions for extensions—though of course that’s anecdotal and unsupported by statistical evidence.

Over at the GAO, the FY 2012 bid protest statistics were just released. The very respected government contract attorneys at the firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge described the statistics and noted that the number of protests filed was up by five percent and the sustention rate increased from 16 percent to 18.6 percent. (Note that 2.6 point increase is a relative increase of more than 16 percent.) Interestingly, the McKenna Long attorneys wrote—

… the number of decisions on the merits, 570, is almost double the number of decisions issued in 2008, a remarkable jump in only four years. Moreover, the Report shows a decrease in the amount of protests that utilize the GAO’s alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) procedures. For fiscal year 2012, the number of ADR cases is down by about 25 percent from fiscal year 2011, and down by 33 percent from fiscal year 2010.

So what’s happening at the GAO is consistent with our prediction: bid protests are up, the sustention rate is up, and the use of ADR has dropped significantly. This situation is, in our view, not good. Bid protests occur (generally) because one party thinks it’s been treated inequitably. Protests are sustained when the GAO attorneys agree with that party. ADR is used when the government wants to settle the matter quickly, without a lot of formalities. The statistics seem to say that acquisition competency is down but the agencies don’t want to admit to their employees’ lack of acumen.

We can’t find similar stats for the Court of Federal Claims, but we’re willing to stick with our prediction that the tide of litigation is rising there, as well.

And you ain’t seen nothing yet.

 

 

DCAA Targeted in Better Buying Power 2.0

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BBP
Honestly, we cannot think of a better non-governmental resource on the Pentagon’s Better Buying Power initiative than this blog site. It’s all here, from the original SECDEF Gates 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library to the establishment of the Better Buying Power initiative website at the Defense Acquisition University. Along the way we’ve written numerous articles on various aspects of the “affordability and efficiency” initiative now known as Better Buying Power (BBP), copied slide sets into our knowledge resources library, and added links to our Link Reference Page. From supply chain management to “should-cost” analysis, and from cost affordability to attacks on contractor profit, we think we’ve got this particular issue covered.

And now we announce that the Pentagon has unveiled BBP 2.0 like Ford unveils the next year’s Mustang model: with pomp, self-congratulations, and a press conference.

Readers, please recall that BBP 1.0 focused on five attack vectors. BBP 2.0 adds two more to the list, for a total of seven focus areas. The new attack vectors include “Increase effective use of Performance-Based Logistics" and “Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce.” As was the case with BBP 1.0, the devil is in the BBP 2.0 details.

Here are the BBP 2.0 details.

Here are some more BBP 2.0 details.

Here are some snippets of policy details from those links:

BBP 2.0 introduces a new focus area to support and recognize members of the acquisition workforce. Our acquisition professionals are essential to changing the way we provide critical capabilities to the Warfighter. Within this area, we are introducing four new initiatives:

  • Establish higher standards for key leadership positions

  • Establish stronger professional qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties

  • Increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition management

  • Continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce – change the culture
Additionally, BBP 2.0 includes new initiatives focused on: enforcing affordability caps; controlling costs through cost performance measurement, stronger partnerships with the requirements community, and increasing the incorporation of defense exportability features in initial designs; incentivizing industry by aligning profitability more tightly with Department goals and employing appropriate contract types; increasing the effective use of performance-based logistics; reducing cycle times while ensuring sound investment decisions; using the technology development phase for true risk reduction; and strengthening contract management through the expanded use of requirements review boards and tripwires, among others.

We were very interested to see that DCAA made the list of areas in which the drive for affordability and efficiency might significantly impact the DOD budgetary landscape. Under “Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government,” one finds:

Reduce backlog of DCAA Audits without compromising effectiveness: The Department has a significant backlog in both closeout and pre-award audits. DCAA, with the assistance DCMA and DPAP, is increasing audit resources and developing a risk-based process for reducing the audit backlog. We expect to make major gains in reducing audit-associated delays in both contract closeouts and pre-award audits in 2013.

In the press conference (link above), USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall commented as follows—

There's been a problem for some time now, and this is about productivity.  Today, it takes almost a year-and-a-half to award a contract -- a competitive contract.  When I was starting out in this business, we could do it routinely in about nine months.  And one of the reasons for those delays is the auditing that's required. 

Now, DCAA, the contract audit administration -- agency has a long backlog of both closeout audits at the end of contracts, which our industry doesn’t get paid fully until they close out the contract; and also pre-award audits.  So, we're working closely with the DCAA to put a number of techniques in place to try to reduce that backlog and improve our efficiency and productivity there.  It's taking far too long to get people on contract today. 

Candidly, we’re not sure what the Honorable USD (AT&L) was actually saying in the above comments. He seemed to be focusing on “priced proposal” audits—an area in which DCAA and DOD have already made significant strides in reducing audit workload. They reduced the workload by arbitrarily deciding that cost proposals under a certain value would no longer be audited; they would no longer count as part of the audit backlog. So if there’s a backlog, it’s not over at DCAA. In fairness, we agree that DCAA still takes too long to perform those audits (when they choose to perform them), but again, we don’t see that as a backlog situation.

The USD (AT&L) also mentioned “closeout audits,” which is an area that most government contract cost accounting and acquisition practitioners haven’t had a lot of experience with. The reason they haven’t had a lot of experience is that almost nobody is actually doing them anymore. You need final billing rates—audited and negotiated and signed-off in accordance with FAR Part 42.7 and contract clause 52.216-7—before you get to the point of actually submitting final vouchers and having a contract close out audit. Since DCAA has such an unbelievably large backlog of “incurred cost audits” on its collective desk, most contractors can’t get to the stage of actually having final billing rates … so DCAA never gets a chance to actually perform contract closeout audits.

If the Honorable Frank Kendall was actually trying to note that the lack of productivity with respect to performing audits of the annual contractor proposal for final billing rates has impacted DOD’s ability to actually close out its whiskered contracts, then we absolutely agree. And we have posted blog articles on that particular issue. Repeatedly.

We’ve also published an article covering DCAA’s brand-new approach to reducing its incurred cost audit backlog. The audit agency’s approach (as approved by DOD leadership) is very similar to its approach to reducing the backlog of priced proposal audits: just stop performing audits on “low-risk” contractor proposals.

That this new approach will inevitably lead to many millions of contract dollars going unaudited hardly needs to be said—but we say it for the record, so that one day we’ll link to this article (and other similar ones) and go “We told you so. Neener neener.” (And we’ll feel superior about our perspicacity for a minute or two.)

Yet, in fairness, we are forced to concede that the risk-based approach will lead to a reduced audit backlog. So we expect that DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald, and the Honorable USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will have lots of opportunity for back-patting in a year or so, when they proudly announce the successful strides made under Better Buying Power 2.0.

Yeah, there are other aspects or BBP 2.0 that are probably worth discussing. Some interesting stuff, particularly with respect to enhancing the competency of acquisition folks. But somehow we just don’t have the heart for it right now. Why don’t you click a link or two and read for yourself.

 

 

The Truth Emerges about LAS Contract Award

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In January, 2012, we first inquired as to whether Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company (HBDC) had been improperly excluded from the competitive range of the $355 million Light Air Support contract award, leaving Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) as the only remaining source and automatic winner.

Mystery surrounded the procurement, as we noted. A key question concerned why the Air Force’s notice of exclusion lay on the contract manager’s desk for two weeks, unopened, so that HBDC’s request for a contracting officer debriefing was made untimely. Not only that, but its protest at the GAO was ruled untimely as well. We were also interested in how HBDC could submit a proposal so flawed that it was judged by the Source Selection Team to be irredeemable, and thus excluded from the competitive range.

About two months later, we wrote that the Air Force had terminated SNC’s contract award and was launching an investigation into the original source selection decision. We opined as follows—

Anytime you’ve got the Secretary of the Air Force commenting on the deficiencies of a contract award, you can be fairly sure there are going to be career-limiting consequences for some body, or bodies.

And it was more than that, of course. USAF General Norton Schwartz called the LAS contract award situation “an embarrassment” and “a profound disappointment.” The four-star general warned of “drastic disciplinary action” if there was wrongdoing on the part of the Source Selection Team.

Ultimately, as we told our readers, the Air Force decided to reopen the competition—but without flying the two competing aircraft. This prompted SNC to file suit at the Court of Federal Claims, claiming the revised evaluation methodology impermissibly favored HBDC.

On November 1, 2012, Judge Christine Miller issued her opinion, ruling against SNC. Her opinion offered new light on this mysterious procurement. Rather than reviewing her opinion, we want to share with you the facts that have emerged.

  • The Government was divided. The Air Force Program Manager and the Department of Justice attorney had a dysfunctional relationship. (“The record reflects an uphill battle by DOJ and agency counsel in working with Air Force personnel to assemble the administrative record.”) The PM told Agency Counsel that he did not trust the DOJ attorney.

  • The record revealed “potential bias” by the Program Contracting Officer (PCO). (“After submission of SNC’s Final Proposal Revision (“FPR”), the PCO stated that she needed to reopen discussions with SNC for administrative purposes. … Despite being instructed that she must prepare a formal letter to reopen discussions, the PCO did not do so, contributing to an appearance of favoritism toward SNC.”)

  • The Air Force investigation confirmed HBDC’s suspicious that SNC had received favorable treatment by the Source Selection Team. (“After marshaling all of the evidence, Brig. Gen. Dennis arrived at several conclusions, including finding issues with documentation of the procurement, inconsistencies in evaluation of the offerors’ proposals, and bias exhibited in favor of SNC. … The CDI Report revealed evidence of bias in favor of SNC.”)

  • HBDC’s inability to timely request a debrief stemmed from the PCO’s transmission of the downselect letter by mail—to the wrong address. (“… despite an agreed plan to notify the offerors of elimination and FPR requests by mail, the PCO also sent an FPR notification to SNC by e-mail, whereas the PCO sent notice of elimination to HBDC by mail to the wrong address, resulting in a delay that prevented HBDC from timely requesting a debrief.”)

  • The Air Force PCO was not competent to participate in this complex procurement. (“In response to comments from agency counsel that the PCO’s proposed Competitive Range Determination (the ‘CRD’), which eliminated HBDC, was unsatisfactory, the PCO stated that she was not qualified to write it.”)

So the LAS competition continues. SNC and HBDC are locked in a battle for nearly $400 million worth of aircraft. The Air Force needs to pick a winner. In the meantime, the war fighters don’t have the planes they supposedly require.

From our point of view, the story that emerges is one in which the Program Contracting Officer—who is responsible for policing the acquisition from a compliance perspective—was far out of her comfort zone. As a result of the leadership vacuum from the PCO, the technical and program management personnel ran amuck.

We trust that DCMA Leadership is thinking very hard about its evaluation of its Contracting Officers, and the criteria used to determine who is ready to support a large, complex, contentious procurement. Because this is something that absolutely needs to be gotten right, every time.

 

 

Update on Corruption at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

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Corruption
You know, in the history of services provided by Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s Principal Consultant, we have briefed Department of Justice attorneys on damages suffered by the Government. We’ve worked with Army CID and Navy NCIS investigators. We’ve worked with many different attorneys, hired to advise and/or defend contractors accused of wrongdoing. We’ve performed forensic accounting investigations and internal audits. We’ve reviewed the expense reports of executives where the Board of Directors was concerned about improper reimbursements. We’ve seen a Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) stripped of his pension, 18 months before retirement, because of wrongdoing so perfidious that it can’t be discussed to this day.

We thought we’d seen it all. And then we came across reports of the cornucopia of contracting corruption at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

We first wrote about Camp Arifjan here. At that point, fourteen contracting folks were suspected of bribery and corruption. We subsequently updated that story at the bottom of this catch-up article, where we noted sentencing of one malefactor. We updated the story again over here, and noted that the fourteen had become sixteen.

And now it’s time to update the story once again. At this point, the count is now 19. Nineteen individuals who have “pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial” in the “ongoing investigation of corrupt contracting at Camp Arifjan.”

How do we know? The Department of Justice told us. It told us in the announcement that a former Army major had been sentenced to 18 months in prison “for his participation in bribery scheme related to his activities as a contracting official” at Camp Arifjan. Former Major James Momon, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of bribery and one count of conspiracy. The DOJ reported that Momon had accepted approximately $5.8 million in bribes, “including $1.6 million in cash and luxury items.” (No word on what the other $4.2 million consisted of, if it was nether cash nor luxury items.)

Momon is the second U.S. Army Major who violated his officer’s oath, by breaking the trust and faith placed in him by the country. According to the DOJ press release—

… Momon took over contracting duties at Camp Arifjan from former U.S. Army Major John C. Cockerham, who served as a contracting official in Kuwait in 2004 and 2005. Cockerham, who solicited and received bribes from DoD contractors in exchange for contracts and BPAs for bottled water and other goods and services, pleaded guilty for his role in the conspiracy in February 2008 and was sentenced to serve 210 months in prison and ordered to pay $9 million in restitution.

As we write this article, the press is in a feeding frenzy regarding wrongdoing that may have led to the resignation of a highly respected retired General, and may well implicate another who is currently serving in Southwest Asia. We have to ask, where is the similar outrage regarding the commanding officer(s) of Camp Arifjan, who seem to have let their contracting staff run amuck? Where is the accountability for those in command?

We understand the allure of a story of hidden infidelity by a respected public figure. But we have to ask, did the corrupt actions of those officers at Camp Arifjan damage national security even more? If so, where is the media feeding frenzy?

 

 

More Fraud (Allegedly)

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Yesterday we probed the true cost of fraud, and wondered why more allegedly smart folks don’t see it the way we do—which is that investments in internal controls that reduce the probability of fraud-related suits, fines and penalties (and shareholder derivative suits) pay for themselves. The ROI is measurable. But we sighed, as we do in such cases, and moved on.

To today, in which we have two more fraud-related suits to tell you about.

Our old friends at Fluor are back in the news, with an announcement from the Department of Justice that it has decided to intervene in a qui tam suit brought under The False Claims Act by Loydene Rambo, a former Fluor employee. Ms. Rambo alleged that Fluor violated the restrictions on using Federal funds to conduct lobbying efforts, which would be a violation of the Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-20, as well as DEAR 970.5204-17, The Byrd Amendment, and various riders put on appropriated funds. For instance, here is a Department of Energy site that discusses the issue.

Ms. Rambo alleges that Fluor ignored the restrictions on use of Federal funds for lobbying, and specifies that it was Fluor’s Department of Energy contract(s) at Hanford that allegedly paid for the lobbying by two firms.

We don't know the position of Fluor’s DCAA auditors on the matter, or why (if the auditors were aware of the costs) they were not handled as expressly unallowable costs included in the proposal to establish final billing rates, as they would be under normal, routine, administrative procedures.

What we do know is that, once again, a former employee has filed a suit alleging false claims and fraud-related behavior, and that (once again) a corporation must defend itself.

The second story is both more and less interesting. It concerns the owner of a construction company located in Missouri—Silver Star Construction—who was recently sentenced to 87 months in federal prison for falsely claiming that he was a service-disabled veteran owner of a small business. The owner, Warren Parker, was 70 years old. You do the math.

Mr. Parker was indeed a veteran. He served in the Missouri National Guard from 1963 to 1968 and saw six months’ of active duty. He was honorably discharged with a rank of E-5 and, while serving, he received an Expert Rifle Badge. Contrary to his “fraudulent resume,” Parker did not receive three Silver Stars, three Purple Hearts, and other citations. He was never injured during his service; indeed, he never left the State of Missouri during his military career (in contrast to his claim that he served in Vietnam). He never served as a sniper and his “Book of Kills” was completely fabricated.

Mr. Parker (and perhaps other family members) used his fantasy tale of military service and military disability to fraudulently obtain $6.7 million worth of contracts from the Veterans Administration and roughly $750,000 in contracts from the Department of Defense, under their Service-Disabled Veteran Small Business set-aside programs.

Would better controls have prevented Silver Star Construction from fraudulently obtaining government contracts? Probably not. But we bet Fluor wishes it had spent a little more in “scrubbing” its costs, to ensure that unallowable lobbying expenses weren’t claimed.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.