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Apogee Consulting Inc

Having Solved Its Audit Backlog Problems, DCAA Takes on Additional Work

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Quite recently, we told you about the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General’s concerns with DOD’s new approach to performing audits on “priced proposals” submitted by contractors seeking a contract award. Essentially, the DOD IG had two concerns with the notion that DCAA should no longer audit certain low dollar value, low risk, proposals: (1) it calculated that the lack of audits resulted in lost taxpayer savings (from questioned proposal costs) of nearly $250 million each year, and (2) it asserted that the change simply shifted the workload from DCAA to DCMA—and that DCMA was “not prepared to perform” its new responsibilities.

The rationale for making the change was simple and obvious, as was made plain by DOD IG interviews of Shay Assad (former Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, who approved the policy change while heading DPAP). Mr. Assad “advised the OIG that the decision to approve the [policy change] was a ‘resources decision’. He reasoned that DCAA does not have unlimited resources and the issue he confronted was how to reduce the number of audits DCAA was performing.” That, as they say, was that.

Because DCAA did not have sufficient resources to perform the audits it needed to perform, DOD Leadership decided to reduce the backlog by shifting the workload to DCMA Contracting Officers. That workload shift would, in Mr. Assad’s words, permit DCAA management to redirect “DCAA’s limited resources” into what was judged to be more important audit assignments, which included “large dollar value contractor proposals, incurred cost audits relating to the backlog of DoD contracts awaiting final close-out, and defective pricing audits.”

Perhaps surprising nobody who has followed the sniping between DOD oversight agencies over the past four years, DOD IG expressed some serious concerns with the audit policy change. We thought (and still think) those concerns have some merit.

In any case, DOD Leadership has found a new area in which DCAA can perform audits. No, the new area does not include working down the unbelievably large backlog of audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “contractor incurred cost audits”). No, the new area does not include performing any defective pricing audits. It may include performing audits of “large dollar value contractor proposals”—but we can’t even be sure of that.

No. The new area of DCAA audit responsibility is that DCAA auditors will now perform audits on U.S. DOD contracts that are awarded directly to Canadian companies, and they will now perform audits on Canadian companies that have received subcontracts under U.S. DOD Prime contracts. Subject to the contract type/dollar value thresholds of the new audit policy, of course. This is work that used to be performed by auditors of the Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC). Now, DCAA will be performing audit work that used to be performed by auditors of the Canadian government.

We’re not kidding.

On one hand, we have DOD Leadership telling the DOD IG that it needed to reduce the amount of audits performed by DCAA so as to be able to redirect scarce audit resources towards “more important audit assignments.” On the other hand, we have DOD Leadership issuing a Policy Memo that directs DCAA to assume additional audit responsibilities pretty much unrelated to those “more important audit assignments.” On one hand, we have the former DPAP Director telling the DOD IG that DCAA has to push its workload towards an unprepared DCMA Contracting Officer workforce, because it can’t perform the audits already on its plate. On the other hand, we have the current DPAP Director telling DOD that DCAA will be adding additional audit assignments to its plate—no doubt freeing up the auditors of PWGSC to focus on what PWGSC may consider more important audit assignments. (We have no idea what those more important Canadian audit assignments might be.)

DCAA will not only be performing pre-award audits of priced proposals from Canadian companies. According to the DPAP Policy Memo, “DCAA will perform the same pre-award and post-award range of audit services [on Canadian companies] that DCAA conducts for U.S. Government contractors.”

Yeah, sure. Because DCAA didn’t already have enough to do.

 

New DOD Audit Approach Concerns DOD Inspector General

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Mismanagement
You know (because we’ve told you) that in September, 2010, DOD changed its approach to auditing cost proposals received from bidders. Formerly, nearly every proposal for which the contracting officer requested “field pricing assistance” was audited by DCAA. Now, the expected dollar value and the anticipated contract type determine whether or not DCAA will perform an audit. Generally speaking, DCAA only audits proposals for firm, fixed-price contracts if the value is expected to be more than $10 million, and it only audits proposals for cost-reimbursement contracts if the value is expected to be more than $100 million. For other (smaller, assumed-to-be-less-risky) proposals, the DCMA contracting officer is on his or her own.

If you are DCAA, the benefit of this new approach is that your pipeline of to-be-audited proposals—which are deemed to be high-priority “demand” assignments that pull auditors off other, more long-term assignments—has shrunk significantly, leaving you free to focus your resources where you want them. If you are DCMA, the benefit of this new approach is that you can now bypass the lengthy and sometimes not-so-helpful DCAA audit, and award contracts to your winning bidders more quickly—a situation that ought to please Frank Kendall.

You might be thinking that DOD’s new approach is a “win/win” and everybody should be happy. But not quite everybody is sporting a Cheshire cat-like grin. There’s a least one stakeholder who’s concerned that the new approach might be less than optimal.

If you’re DCAA, then you’re golden. If you’re DCMA, you see a small, yet distinct, silver lining in the new situation. But if you are the DOD Inspector General, you might see a downside to the new approach. You might notice what Apogee Consulting, Inc. predicted—there is now a rather largish amount of proposed costs that are not being audited by DCAA under the new approach.

If you are the DOD IG, you might notice that, despite reports at the time that stated “defense officials believe the change will focus resources on high-risk areas and increase savings to the department,” the fact of the matter is that the change in audit approach did not reduce DCAA audit hours as much as initially predicted, did not help DCAA reprioritize the workload as much as initially promised and, as a result, the new approach actually led to a reduction in taxpayer savings. If you are the DOD Inspector General, you might well conclude that the entire initiative was poorly thought out and was, in essence, a mistake.

Indeed, that’s exactly what the DOD IG concluded, in a new audit report published this month.

The DOD IG’s audit objective was “to review factors leading to the functional changes between DCAA and DCMA … to ensure that the interests of the Department were adequately protected.” Along the way, the DOD IG provided a fascinating insight into DCAA audit management, as practiced by DOD Leadership.

The first thing that the DOD IG found was that the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Directorate failed “to perform a business case to support the decision” to change the cost proposal audit thresholds. The audit report stated—

A business case analysis would have considered total risks to the Department, including the potential rates of return across the DCAA audit portfolio. Such an analysis would have identified that the DCAA proposal to increase the thresholds for requesting a DCAA audit will decrease the potential return on investment to the Department and taxpayer. The DPAP decision to revise DFARS PGI 215.404-2(c) halted DCAA audits of low dollar proposals and may result in a potential loss of $249.1 million per annum in return on investment from such audits … DPAP performing a review could also have identified that DCMA was not prepared to perform cost analysis of low-dollar proposals, … could not report performance statistics related to their cost analysis, … and was not positioned to replace the potential return on investment identified by DCAA prior to the revision … Additionally, in reviewing and approving the revision DPAP did not (i) perform a cost/benefit analysis, (ii) determine a payback period, or (iii) determine a potential return on investment that would result from the proposed change.

The DOD IG asserted that, had a proper business case been performed, it would have identified a significant reduction in DCAA-identified taxpayer savings. The DOD IG stated—

… low-dollar proposal audits returned substantially more questioned cost per audit hour (both fixed price, cost-type and combined) than other areas in the DCAA audit portfolio, including incurred cost audits and defective pricing audits. … Reducing the questioned cost per audit hour by the estimated cost per audit hour, DCAA was achieving a potential return on investment of $1,885 per audit hour when performing low-dollar proposal audits.

At this point, we must confess that the math does not work out as DOD IG, DCAA, DCMA, and DPAP would have it. As we’ve told readers before, the “taxpayer savings” game uses grossly inflated numbers. To explain what we mean: if there are three bidders and DCAA questions $1 million per bid, DOD gets to tell Congress that DCAA just saved $3 million. Which is bullshit, of course. Assuming DCMA picks one of the three bidders for a contract award, then DCAA just saved $1 million, not $3 million. Questioning costs on proposals which never result in a contract award saves taxpayers nothing, since no costs will ever be incurred. So let’s all keep that dirty little secret in mind as we continue.

The Honorable Shay Assad, former DPAP Director (and now Director of DOD Pricing), told the DOD IG that he made the decision to agree to DCAA’s request to change the audit thresholds in order to focus the audit agency’s limited resources on high-impact audit areas. According to the DOD IG—

The former Director, DPAP advised the OIG that the decision to approve the revision to DFARS PGI 215.404-2(c) was a ‘resources decision’. He reasoned that DCAA does not have unlimited resources and the issue he confronted was how to reduce the number of audits DCAA was performing. In making this decision, he indicated that he was looking for ways to direct DCAA’s limited resources to what he considers DCAA’s most important work: large dollar value contractor proposals, incurred cost audits relating to the backlog of DoD contracts awaiting final close-out, and defective pricing audits. He advised the OIG that senior procurement executives in the Department continue to seek more timely responses from DCAA on contractor high-dollar proposal audits and that contractors have voiced concerns about unpaid contract withholding fees caught up by the DCAA backlog of incurred cost audits.

Mr. Assad acceded to DCAA’s request based on DCAA’s estimate that it would save 211,191 audit hours annually, which would then be available to support audits in more important areas, including “incurred cost audits … and defective pricing audits.” However, as soon as the change was approved, DCAA changed its ground rules, according to the DOD IG, who stated—

DCAA decided to continue performing audits on under-threshold subcontract proposals where the subcontract is included in an over-threshold prime contract proposal that DCAA is also auditing [which] reduce[d] the estimated savings from 211,191 hours to 132,133 hours.

So not only did the new audit approach reduce reported “taxpayer savings,” but it also did not free up nearly as many hours as had been initially estimated. And speaking of lost “taxpayer savings,” the DOD IG found that the new proposal audit thresholds resulted in a loss of $249,070,705 in potential savings—that’s just about a quarter billion dollars in lost savings (using DOD’s B.S. approach to calculating “taxpayer savings”).

The DOD IG also ranked DCAA’s audit activity by questioned costs per audit hour. Now, we don’t agree that that’s the right metric to use—but it’s clearly the one that DCAA itself is currently using to assess its own performance. Based solely on the single metric of questioned costs per audit hour, the DOD IG found that Mr. Assad’s “most important” audit areas did not have the same bang for the buck (or return per audit hour, if you will) as the proposal audits that DCAA no longer performs. We found the following information to be very interesting. (Note: all information is DCAA FY 2009.)

  • Defective Pricing audits returned $633 in questioned costs per audit hour expended.

  • Incurred Cost audits returned $196 in questioned costs per audit hour expended.

  • CAS compliance audits returned $375 in questioned costs per audit hour expended.

DCAA, DPAP, and DCMA did not concur with the DOD IG audit findings, as might have been expected. For example, DCAA told the DOD IG that—

… using questioned cost per hour as the sole basis for allocating audit resources ignores areas of risk. DCAA provided that certain audits are required by law or regulation DCAA identified its incurred cost backlog which has quadrupled to $573 billion in the last 10 years as an important area of risk. DCAA responded that postponing these incurred cost audits any longer puts the Department at risk for canceling funds and may allow any overpayments made to contractors to go undetected. DCAA also responded that it must perform defective pricing audits before the statute of limitations runs out.

DCAA also non-concurred with the DOD IG estimate of lost taxpayer savings. It told the DOD IG—

… DCAA responded that this amount is significantly overstated. According to DCAA, contracting officers do not always sustain DCAA questioned cost and not every proposal that DCAA audits results in a contract award. DCAA provided that the average net savings rate for audits of fixed price contracts for the fiscal years 2009 through 2011 is approximately 41.8 percent. DCAA responded that ‘using essentially the same DoDIG methodology, combined with this average net savings rate, yields a much more modest potential loss of $122.4 million.’

In response, the DOD IG wrote—

We find that the alternative measure of ‘net savings’ that DCAA used to calculate a ‘much more modest’ potential loss of $122.4 million to the taxpayer is as a good measure of contracting officer performance in settling DCAA questioned costs as it is a measure of DCAA performance. DCAA in its response stated that contracting officers have sustained an average of 41.8 percent of DCAA questioned cost during the fiscal period 2009 through 2011, which indicates that in contract negotiations contracting officers are sustaining just over $4 for every $10 in DCAA questioned cost. DCAA did not indicate whether it considers a 41.8 percent sustention rate as a good indicator of the viability of its reported questioned cost. This area will be considered for future study.

Finally, the DOD IG questioned the entire strategy of eliminating DCAA audits of an entire stratum of low-dollar value proposals. It asserted that the strategy simply shifted the workload to DCMA Contracting Officers, who were already overworked and not prepared to perform the additional cost analysis work. The DOD IG pointed out that nobody in DOD Leadership chose to address that particular finding, writing—

Lastly, we find that DP and DPAP did not demonstrate why they chose to direct Department and taxpayer resources to DCMA to perform a job DCMA was not prepared to perform when DCAA had the existing infrastructure in place to get the job the done. A formal business case analysis could have identified that it was advantageous and more economical to direct any increase in DoD resources to the organization that already had the existing infrastructure to adequately perform proposal evaluations and track the questioned costs.

We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. have previously reported on GAO findings that implicated DCMA management. Now we have a report from the DOD Inspector General that implicates DOD and DCAA leadership. We’re not saying that these reports are so damning that the people called out by them should be fired. But we do believe that these reports are so damning that the people called out by them should consider resigning their positions, and letting more effective leaders take their turns in the batter’s box.

 

Executive Compensation: Aiming at the Wrong Target

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Exec_Comp
We’ve recently reported on several misfires by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), as its auditors have tried to question the allowability of contractors’ executive compensation costs using a “fatally flawed” statistical methodology. While nobody has expressed any specific concerns with DCAA’s general methodology, the devil (as they say) is in the details.

DCAA’s general approach recognizes the current OMB-issued executive compensation ceiling as the upper limit on allowable compensation, but then puts the burden on contractors to justify the reasonableness of their compensation levels—even when the compensation is below the OMB ceiling. (We noted that the executive compensation ceiling was extended to all contractor employees in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. However, implementing regulations have not yet been issued by the FAR Councils as this article is written.) Consequently, contractors must not only disallow compensation in excess of the OMB ceiling, but they must also support and justify the reasonableness of all employee compensation. Compensation found to be insufficiently supported and justified is likely to be questioned by DCAA as being unreasonable, and likely to be disallowed by the cognizant Contracting Officer.

The fact of the matter is that only a very few top executives get paid in excess of the current OMB ceiling of $763,029; the vast majority of contractor employees get paid amounts that are far lower. Accordingly, DCAA’s focus on the reasonableness of compensation costs at levels below the OMB ceiling implicates essentially all your compensation costs, and puts those costs at risk from DCAA’s judicially disfavored methodology. (It is in the application of the audit methodology to the compensation costs of the executives that has generated the litigation and ensuing condemnation of DCAA’s audit findings, but much of that methodology is also used to evaluate the compensation levels of rank-and-file employees as well.)

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration has proposed lowering the OMB compensation ceiling amount from its current level to $230,700—the ES Level I level. There’s both good and bad news associated with that initiative. The good news is that it will significantly—perhaps drastically—limit the impact of DCAA’s flawed methodology on your compensation costs. The bad news is that it will result in a humongous amount of compensation costs being automatically disallowed. Any compensation in excess of the lowered ceiling amount will not only be unallowable, it will likely be viewed as being expressly unallowable.

The justification for lowering the compensation ceiling is simple. The ceiling is driven by a statutory formula; as a result of the formula the amount of the ceiling tripled between 1995 and 2011. The feeling is that it has simply grown too large, and that defense employees shouldn’t be permitted to claim that much allowable compensation.

But as we all know, the current compensation ceiling really only affects the top one percent of contractor employees. Whether you set the ceiling at $500,000 or $700,000, you are only effectively disallowing a small portion of contractor costs. But if you set the ceiling at just about $230,000—and then apply that ceiling to all contractor employees—you cut an extremely broad swath through what used to be allowable (and reasonable) compensation.

Or, to put it another way, you may have a zillion independent compensation surveys that justify and support your compensation levels as being right within peer industry norms, but this initiative would moot those findings and arbitrarily define “reasonable” compensation as being less than $230,700.

Is this the wrong approach to defining allowable employee compensation? You bet it is.

First of all, as previously noted many contractor employees are compensated at the $230,700 (or higher) level. And deservedly so. If you are a world class Program Manager or Systems Engineer, then you absolutely deserve that level of compensation. And if Contractor A doesn’t pay you that comp level, then it’s highly likely that Contractors B, C, and D will be very happy to offer it. At the right mix of skill set and experience, $230K is essentially the minimum level of expectations.

Let’s talk fairness and equity. It’s relative. If you live in Mississippi, then perhaps $230K may seem like a lot of money; but if you live in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, then $230K barely achieves a middle-class lifestyle. Folks inside The Beltway perhaps do not understand that the cost of living is variable and dependent on geographic location … and that there is a correlation between many urban environments and many centers of research and innovation. Think Silicon Valley. You think it’s cheap to live in Silicon Valley? Think again.

Let’s discuss comparative stats. There’s a strong vocal opinion out there—nominally championed by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)—that contractors make too much money; or, at least, that they make too much more than their Federal civil service peers. We’ve discussed this issue before. The fact is that there’s as much evidence that Federal employees make more than their contractor counterparts as there is that they make less. The case on either side is far from convincing.

The conclusion that we’ve reached is that this initiative is a bad idea. Cutting allowable compensation down to $230,000 will tend to impact the positions of Program Manager, System Engineer, and Scientist—the very critical positions that contractors (and DOD) rely upon to execute complex develop contracts and Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The defense industry already has too much trouble competing with the private sector for such talent; this initiative is going to make that bad situation worse.

Thinking more long term, the aerospace/defense industry has championed science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education. The reason for this is because not enough students are choosing these career paths. Now we are going to be telling those students that these careers, if they are part of the defense industrial base, will be paying even less. And we expect this to make those careers more attractive? We don’t think so.

At the end of the day, we suspect that contractors will continue to pay the going market rate for their personnel. If they don’t, it’s going to be difficult for them to retain employees. Employers will pay the going rate, but they won’t be able to recover the “excess” salary costs over $230K. So the end result of this initiative, if implemented, will be to reduce contractors’ profits. We find this result counter-intuitive, given that it is the official DOD position that they are not targeting contractors’ profits when seeking to reduce costs.

But maybe it’s not a DOD initiative. Perhaps it is truly an Obama Administration initiative, as it’s been postured to be. Maybe the DOD is receiving marching orders from the Commander-in-Chief, and like a good soldier is doing what it’s being told to do.

Look, we don’t want to go off a rant here. We work fairly hard to keep political rhetoric off this blog. But we think Mitt Romney missed an opportunity to take the President to task on this, and related, initiatives.

It’s a fact that the U.S. manned spaceflight program ended under the Obama Administration’s watch. Sure, you can argue that it really ended under the Bush Administration, for failure to plan and fund, but it actually came to an end under the Obama Administration. We reported the death throes here.

We believe that Mr. Romney could have argued, with some justification, that while Mr. Obama was busy bailing out the predominantly blue-collar auto industry, he was allowing the predominantly white-collar aerospace/defense industry to stagnate, or perhaps to decline. One need only look at the recent history of NASA budget appropriations to see support from this point of view.

And from that point of view, the initiative to limit allowable employee compensation to roughly $230,000 is simply another prong of the attack on the white-collar aerospace/industry. Indeed, almost by definition, the compensation limits will only affect white-collar workers in management positions. We’re not saying it’s the correct point of view, but we believe it could have been raised with some justification in the recent election.

So we think that the Obama Administration, the Department of Defense, and the legislators of Congress need to evaluate the impact(s) of this proposed initiative on the defense industry. We hope they evaluate both the near-term impacts, as well as the likely long-term impacts. And we also hope they evaluate the impact of this initiative on the perception of how the Obama Administration views those citizens who are white-collar workers: the Program Managers, System Engineers, and Chief Scientists who form the backbone of the defense industrial base.

 

 

The Price of Fraud Just Got Real for Florida Tech Incubator

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It’s getting tiresome, quite frankly, to keep writing about fraud and fraud-related lawsuits, and settlements and plea-bargains, and fraud-related convictions. (Hell, we’ve even written about the “special plea in fraud,” which is an affirmative defense available only to the government—though we would argue stridently that it should be made available to the other side of the contracting bargain, so as to make the government accountable for its ill-founded suits against contractors.)

The fact of the matter is that the downside of fraud—the getting caught part—is so bad that it ought to deter anybody with two brain cells left to rub together. The cost of fraud is high; the price to be paid for even a fraud-related allegation (let alone a conviction) is higher than almost anybody should care to pay. Even a decent plea bargain agreement is life-ruining, but for those who eschew plea bargains and are convicted to long prison sentences, the price of fraud fairly may be said to be life-ending.

Yet despite the dire consequences of fraud in the government contracting environment, we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., are bombarded with fraud stories nearly every single day, and our blog has become chock-full of articles on the topic. And that’s not the half of it. We don’t even report on the stories of Social Security, Medicare, and other healthcare-related fraud! Believe us when we write that, if we felt like telling you about all the fraud-related stories that we receive, this blog would have a fraud-related article every day, seven days a week; on some days we would have two or three of them.

Which has led us to the following conclusion: the price of fraud does not seem to deter fraudsters from perpetrating their fraudulent actions. Whether we discuss military officers, members of the federal civil service, or contractor employees, the story is the same. Individuals perpetrate fraud, people collude, and groups conspire. Companies contracting with the U.S. Government continue to skimp on internal controls, internal audits, and internal reviews. Federal employees continue to take advantage of lax controls. Military officers continue to dishonor their oaths of service. Not all of them, of course—but enough to keep this blog site awash in fraud-related stories for the past four years.

And it’s not all about the fraudsters themselves. Those who engage in fraud don’t do so in a vacuum, because most everybody is accountable to somebody else. Which has led us to another conclusion: leaders continue to fail to lead, managers continue to fail to manage, and supervisors continue to fail to supervise their subordinates—and nobody seems to care very much. Why do we fail to hold those in charge accountable for their inactions? Do we simply accept their excuses, such as “We don’t have budget to establish proper internal controls,” or “We don’t have the personnel to perform adequate oversight,” as being adequate justification and/or rationale for their negligence?

Or is it simply the overall environment? Do we accept the continual leadership failures and endemic corruption because that’s just the way it is today?

The hell with it. Here’s today’s fraud-related story. It illustrates, quite plainly, the high price of fraud. Not that we expect this story is going to do anything to change the situation.

Today’s story comes to us from Florida, as reported by Florida Today. It concerns the state’s Technological and Research Development Authority (TRDA). Founded in 1987, TRDA was a “technology-based economic development organization focused on helping fledgling high-tech businesses.” In March, 2012, the Department of Justice filed suit against TRDA under the False Claims Act, alleging “the authority improperly applied for millions of dollars of grants and then knowingly misused some of that funding to build its Melbourne headquarters and business incubator,” according to Florida Today.

According to this Florida Today story—

The government’s lawsuit was on behalf of NASA and the Economic Development Administration, a branch of the U.S. Department of Commerce, both of which provided grants to TRDA in the early 2000s.

The six-count complaint, detailed in a filing submitted Thursday, centered on alleged violations of the False Claims Act. The government was seeking three times the amount of federal grant money used in the project from TRDA as well as interest and damages, or more than $9.4 million. …

Government lawyers alleged the authority improperly applied for millions of dollars in grants and then knowingly misused some of that funding to build its Melbourne headquarters and business incubator.

TRDA reached a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice—one that illustrates the price of fraud about as plainly as anything we’ve ever seen.

The TRDA settlement agreement included a “consent judgment” of $15 million. However, the DOJ agreed that it would not attempt to recover the judgment from TRDA. In return, TRDA agreed to disband and close its facilities within 14 months.

Yep, after 25 years, TRDA will be no more. Employees will be let go. But that’s not the end of the story. According to Florida Today—

The TRDA currently has 13 tenants in the building and about 15 ‘virtual tenants,’ businesses and individuals from all over Florida who use authority resources for their entrepreneurial ventures. … Tenants, and others affected by TRDA’s decision were notified late Thursday afternoon of the settlement.

So the technology incubator will be no more, which means that those 28 start-up companies will need to find another warm spot in which to hatch their corporate eggs.

Note, readers, that none of the current TRDA staff or Directors were employed by TRDA at the time of the alleged improprieties (according to the Florida Today story). They just have to pay some of the price. And the tenants also have to pay more than their fair share, as well, even though they had nothing to do with decisions on how to spend grant funds.

We don’t know how the decision to shut down TRDA will affect those 28 start-ups. Perhaps they will quickly find another tech incubator and will move forward without much of a hitch. But perhaps they won’t find such a warm place and will, as a result, end their start-up dreams. Certainly, not all start-ups go on to become successful businesses; but those that do end up employing lots of people and contributing to the local, state, and national economy. As a result of the settlement, it’s certainly possible that real consequences will be evidenced in the derailing of what might have been the next Google, Facebook, or Apple.

And that’s a very steep price to pay, indeed.

For all of us.

 

UPDATE: DOJ Drops FCA Suit Against KBR

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In April, 2010, we reported to our readers that the U.S. Department of Justice had filed a $100 million suit against Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act, for using private contractors to provide security for its employees and subcontractors who were supporting military troops in Iraq under its LOGCAP III contract.

On November 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice informed the Judge hearing the matter that it had decided to drop the suit. No reason was given for its decision.

Meanwhile, we note that the company had to shell out big bucks for defense. We assume those costs will now be allowable, up to 80 percent of costs incurred, in its billings to the U.S. Army. (See the FAR Cost Principle addressing costs related to legal and other proceedings, 31.205-47.)

The other 20 percent of those costs will be unallowable, which means they will be paid for out of corporate profits. Obviously, we don’t have any idea how much that amount is—but we know it won’t be available for distribution to shareholders.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.