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Apogee Consulting Inc

Executive Compensation: Aiming at the Wrong Target

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Exec_Comp
We’ve recently reported on several misfires by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), as its auditors have tried to question the allowability of contractors’ executive compensation costs using a “fatally flawed” statistical methodology. While nobody has expressed any specific concerns with DCAA’s general methodology, the devil (as they say) is in the details.

DCAA’s general approach recognizes the current OMB-issued executive compensation ceiling as the upper limit on allowable compensation, but then puts the burden on contractors to justify the reasonableness of their compensation levels—even when the compensation is below the OMB ceiling. (We noted that the executive compensation ceiling was extended to all contractor employees in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. However, implementing regulations have not yet been issued by the FAR Councils as this article is written.) Consequently, contractors must not only disallow compensation in excess of the OMB ceiling, but they must also support and justify the reasonableness of all employee compensation. Compensation found to be insufficiently supported and justified is likely to be questioned by DCAA as being unreasonable, and likely to be disallowed by the cognizant Contracting Officer.

The fact of the matter is that only a very few top executives get paid in excess of the current OMB ceiling of $763,029; the vast majority of contractor employees get paid amounts that are far lower. Accordingly, DCAA’s focus on the reasonableness of compensation costs at levels below the OMB ceiling implicates essentially all your compensation costs, and puts those costs at risk from DCAA’s judicially disfavored methodology. (It is in the application of the audit methodology to the compensation costs of the executives that has generated the litigation and ensuing condemnation of DCAA’s audit findings, but much of that methodology is also used to evaluate the compensation levels of rank-and-file employees as well.)

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration has proposed lowering the OMB compensation ceiling amount from its current level to $230,700—the ES Level I level. There’s both good and bad news associated with that initiative. The good news is that it will significantly—perhaps drastically—limit the impact of DCAA’s flawed methodology on your compensation costs. The bad news is that it will result in a humongous amount of compensation costs being automatically disallowed. Any compensation in excess of the lowered ceiling amount will not only be unallowable, it will likely be viewed as being expressly unallowable.

The justification for lowering the compensation ceiling is simple. The ceiling is driven by a statutory formula; as a result of the formula the amount of the ceiling tripled between 1995 and 2011. The feeling is that it has simply grown too large, and that defense employees shouldn’t be permitted to claim that much allowable compensation.

But as we all know, the current compensation ceiling really only affects the top one percent of contractor employees. Whether you set the ceiling at $500,000 or $700,000, you are only effectively disallowing a small portion of contractor costs. But if you set the ceiling at just about $230,000—and then apply that ceiling to all contractor employees—you cut an extremely broad swath through what used to be allowable (and reasonable) compensation.

Or, to put it another way, you may have a zillion independent compensation surveys that justify and support your compensation levels as being right within peer industry norms, but this initiative would moot those findings and arbitrarily define “reasonable” compensation as being less than $230,700.

Is this the wrong approach to defining allowable employee compensation? You bet it is.

First of all, as previously noted many contractor employees are compensated at the $230,700 (or higher) level. And deservedly so. If you are a world class Program Manager or Systems Engineer, then you absolutely deserve that level of compensation. And if Contractor A doesn’t pay you that comp level, then it’s highly likely that Contractors B, C, and D will be very happy to offer it. At the right mix of skill set and experience, $230K is essentially the minimum level of expectations.

Let’s talk fairness and equity. It’s relative. If you live in Mississippi, then perhaps $230K may seem like a lot of money; but if you live in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, then $230K barely achieves a middle-class lifestyle. Folks inside The Beltway perhaps do not understand that the cost of living is variable and dependent on geographic location … and that there is a correlation between many urban environments and many centers of research and innovation. Think Silicon Valley. You think it’s cheap to live in Silicon Valley? Think again.

Let’s discuss comparative stats. There’s a strong vocal opinion out there—nominally championed by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)—that contractors make too much money; or, at least, that they make too much more than their Federal civil service peers. We’ve discussed this issue before. The fact is that there’s as much evidence that Federal employees make more than their contractor counterparts as there is that they make less. The case on either side is far from convincing.

The conclusion that we’ve reached is that this initiative is a bad idea. Cutting allowable compensation down to $230,000 will tend to impact the positions of Program Manager, System Engineer, and Scientist—the very critical positions that contractors (and DOD) rely upon to execute complex develop contracts and Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The defense industry already has too much trouble competing with the private sector for such talent; this initiative is going to make that bad situation worse.

Thinking more long term, the aerospace/defense industry has championed science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education. The reason for this is because not enough students are choosing these career paths. Now we are going to be telling those students that these careers, if they are part of the defense industrial base, will be paying even less. And we expect this to make those careers more attractive? We don’t think so.

At the end of the day, we suspect that contractors will continue to pay the going market rate for their personnel. If they don’t, it’s going to be difficult for them to retain employees. Employers will pay the going rate, but they won’t be able to recover the “excess” salary costs over $230K. So the end result of this initiative, if implemented, will be to reduce contractors’ profits. We find this result counter-intuitive, given that it is the official DOD position that they are not targeting contractors’ profits when seeking to reduce costs.

But maybe it’s not a DOD initiative. Perhaps it is truly an Obama Administration initiative, as it’s been postured to be. Maybe the DOD is receiving marching orders from the Commander-in-Chief, and like a good soldier is doing what it’s being told to do.

Look, we don’t want to go off a rant here. We work fairly hard to keep political rhetoric off this blog. But we think Mitt Romney missed an opportunity to take the President to task on this, and related, initiatives.

It’s a fact that the U.S. manned spaceflight program ended under the Obama Administration’s watch. Sure, you can argue that it really ended under the Bush Administration, for failure to plan and fund, but it actually came to an end under the Obama Administration. We reported the death throes here.

We believe that Mr. Romney could have argued, with some justification, that while Mr. Obama was busy bailing out the predominantly blue-collar auto industry, he was allowing the predominantly white-collar aerospace/defense industry to stagnate, or perhaps to decline. One need only look at the recent history of NASA budget appropriations to see support from this point of view.

And from that point of view, the initiative to limit allowable employee compensation to roughly $230,000 is simply another prong of the attack on the white-collar aerospace/industry. Indeed, almost by definition, the compensation limits will only affect white-collar workers in management positions. We’re not saying it’s the correct point of view, but we believe it could have been raised with some justification in the recent election.

So we think that the Obama Administration, the Department of Defense, and the legislators of Congress need to evaluate the impact(s) of this proposed initiative on the defense industry. We hope they evaluate both the near-term impacts, as well as the likely long-term impacts. And we also hope they evaluate the impact of this initiative on the perception of how the Obama Administration views those citizens who are white-collar workers: the Program Managers, System Engineers, and Chief Scientists who form the backbone of the defense industrial base.

 

 

UPDATE: DOJ Drops FCA Suit Against KBR

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In April, 2010, we reported to our readers that the U.S. Department of Justice had filed a $100 million suit against Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) under the False Claims Act, for using private contractors to provide security for its employees and subcontractors who were supporting military troops in Iraq under its LOGCAP III contract.

On November 15, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice informed the Judge hearing the matter that it had decided to drop the suit. No reason was given for its decision.

Meanwhile, we note that the company had to shell out big bucks for defense. We assume those costs will now be allowable, up to 80 percent of costs incurred, in its billings to the U.S. Army. (See the FAR Cost Principle addressing costs related to legal and other proceedings, 31.205-47.)

The other 20 percent of those costs will be unallowable, which means they will be paid for out of corporate profits. Obviously, we don’t have any idea how much that amount is—but we know it won’t be available for distribution to shareholders.

 

 

DCAA Targeted in Better Buying Power 2.0

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BBP
Honestly, we cannot think of a better non-governmental resource on the Pentagon’s Better Buying Power initiative than this blog site. It’s all here, from the original SECDEF Gates 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library to the establishment of the Better Buying Power initiative website at the Defense Acquisition University. Along the way we’ve written numerous articles on various aspects of the “affordability and efficiency” initiative now known as Better Buying Power (BBP), copied slide sets into our knowledge resources library, and added links to our Link Reference Page. From supply chain management to “should-cost” analysis, and from cost affordability to attacks on contractor profit, we think we’ve got this particular issue covered.

And now we announce that the Pentagon has unveiled BBP 2.0 like Ford unveils the next year’s Mustang model: with pomp, self-congratulations, and a press conference.

Readers, please recall that BBP 1.0 focused on five attack vectors. BBP 2.0 adds two more to the list, for a total of seven focus areas. The new attack vectors include “Increase effective use of Performance-Based Logistics" and “Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce.” As was the case with BBP 1.0, the devil is in the BBP 2.0 details.

Here are the BBP 2.0 details.

Here are some more BBP 2.0 details.

Here are some snippets of policy details from those links:

BBP 2.0 introduces a new focus area to support and recognize members of the acquisition workforce. Our acquisition professionals are essential to changing the way we provide critical capabilities to the Warfighter. Within this area, we are introducing four new initiatives:

  • Establish higher standards for key leadership positions

  • Establish stronger professional qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties

  • Increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition management

  • Continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce – change the culture
Additionally, BBP 2.0 includes new initiatives focused on: enforcing affordability caps; controlling costs through cost performance measurement, stronger partnerships with the requirements community, and increasing the incorporation of defense exportability features in initial designs; incentivizing industry by aligning profitability more tightly with Department goals and employing appropriate contract types; increasing the effective use of performance-based logistics; reducing cycle times while ensuring sound investment decisions; using the technology development phase for true risk reduction; and strengthening contract management through the expanded use of requirements review boards and tripwires, among others.

We were very interested to see that DCAA made the list of areas in which the drive for affordability and efficiency might significantly impact the DOD budgetary landscape. Under “Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government,” one finds:

Reduce backlog of DCAA Audits without compromising effectiveness: The Department has a significant backlog in both closeout and pre-award audits. DCAA, with the assistance DCMA and DPAP, is increasing audit resources and developing a risk-based process for reducing the audit backlog. We expect to make major gains in reducing audit-associated delays in both contract closeouts and pre-award audits in 2013.

In the press conference (link above), USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall commented as follows—

There's been a problem for some time now, and this is about productivity.  Today, it takes almost a year-and-a-half to award a contract -- a competitive contract.  When I was starting out in this business, we could do it routinely in about nine months.  And one of the reasons for those delays is the auditing that's required. 

Now, DCAA, the contract audit administration -- agency has a long backlog of both closeout audits at the end of contracts, which our industry doesn’t get paid fully until they close out the contract; and also pre-award audits.  So, we're working closely with the DCAA to put a number of techniques in place to try to reduce that backlog and improve our efficiency and productivity there.  It's taking far too long to get people on contract today. 

Candidly, we’re not sure what the Honorable USD (AT&L) was actually saying in the above comments. He seemed to be focusing on “priced proposal” audits—an area in which DCAA and DOD have already made significant strides in reducing audit workload. They reduced the workload by arbitrarily deciding that cost proposals under a certain value would no longer be audited; they would no longer count as part of the audit backlog. So if there’s a backlog, it’s not over at DCAA. In fairness, we agree that DCAA still takes too long to perform those audits (when they choose to perform them), but again, we don’t see that as a backlog situation.

The USD (AT&L) also mentioned “closeout audits,” which is an area that most government contract cost accounting and acquisition practitioners haven’t had a lot of experience with. The reason they haven’t had a lot of experience is that almost nobody is actually doing them anymore. You need final billing rates—audited and negotiated and signed-off in accordance with FAR Part 42.7 and contract clause 52.216-7—before you get to the point of actually submitting final vouchers and having a contract close out audit. Since DCAA has such an unbelievably large backlog of “incurred cost audits” on its collective desk, most contractors can’t get to the stage of actually having final billing rates … so DCAA never gets a chance to actually perform contract closeout audits.

If the Honorable Frank Kendall was actually trying to note that the lack of productivity with respect to performing audits of the annual contractor proposal for final billing rates has impacted DOD’s ability to actually close out its whiskered contracts, then we absolutely agree. And we have posted blog articles on that particular issue. Repeatedly.

We’ve also published an article covering DCAA’s brand-new approach to reducing its incurred cost audit backlog. The audit agency’s approach (as approved by DOD leadership) is very similar to its approach to reducing the backlog of priced proposal audits: just stop performing audits on “low-risk” contractor proposals.

That this new approach will inevitably lead to many millions of contract dollars going unaudited hardly needs to be said—but we say it for the record, so that one day we’ll link to this article (and other similar ones) and go “We told you so. Neener neener.” (And we’ll feel superior about our perspicacity for a minute or two.)

Yet, in fairness, we are forced to concede that the risk-based approach will lead to a reduced audit backlog. So we expect that DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald, and the Honorable USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will have lots of opportunity for back-patting in a year or so, when they proudly announce the successful strides made under Better Buying Power 2.0.

Yeah, there are other aspects or BBP 2.0 that are probably worth discussing. Some interesting stuff, particularly with respect to enhancing the competency of acquisition folks. But somehow we just don’t have the heart for it right now. Why don’t you click a link or two and read for yourself.

 

 

Government Actions Lead to Increased Litigation Activity

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Look, we could link to article after article on this site, predicting an increase in litigation activity stemming from government initiatives, actions, inactions, and general incompetency. Trust us; we have the support at hand. But we’re not going to do it.

Instead, allow us a brief moment to say “Told you so.”

The chickens are coming home to roost for the U.S. Government and its multitude of trial attorneys, agency attorneys, and legal advisers. Quite honestly, the litigation tsunami is manifesting a bit earlier than we thought. But with just as much candor, let us also predict that this is but the tip of the iceberg.

Readers, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.



The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) recently reported an increase in its docket of 114 appeals—which is an increase of about 20 percent over last year’s docket. Our understanding is that the increased workload for government attorneys is leading to an increase in motions for extensions—though of course that’s anecdotal and unsupported by statistical evidence.

Over at the GAO, the FY 2012 bid protest statistics were just released. The very respected government contract attorneys at the firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge described the statistics and noted that the number of protests filed was up by five percent and the sustention rate increased from 16 percent to 18.6 percent. (Note that 2.6 point increase is a relative increase of more than 16 percent.) Interestingly, the McKenna Long attorneys wrote—

… the number of decisions on the merits, 570, is almost double the number of decisions issued in 2008, a remarkable jump in only four years. Moreover, the Report shows a decrease in the amount of protests that utilize the GAO’s alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) procedures. For fiscal year 2012, the number of ADR cases is down by about 25 percent from fiscal year 2011, and down by 33 percent from fiscal year 2010.

So what’s happening at the GAO is consistent with our prediction: bid protests are up, the sustention rate is up, and the use of ADR has dropped significantly. This situation is, in our view, not good. Bid protests occur (generally) because one party thinks it’s been treated inequitably. Protests are sustained when the GAO attorneys agree with that party. ADR is used when the government wants to settle the matter quickly, without a lot of formalities. The statistics seem to say that acquisition competency is down but the agencies don’t want to admit to their employees’ lack of acumen.

We can’t find similar stats for the Court of Federal Claims, but we’re willing to stick with our prediction that the tide of litigation is rising there, as well.

And you ain’t seen nothing yet.

 

 

Update on Corruption at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

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Corruption
You know, in the history of services provided by Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s Principal Consultant, we have briefed Department of Justice attorneys on damages suffered by the Government. We’ve worked with Army CID and Navy NCIS investigators. We’ve worked with many different attorneys, hired to advise and/or defend contractors accused of wrongdoing. We’ve performed forensic accounting investigations and internal audits. We’ve reviewed the expense reports of executives where the Board of Directors was concerned about improper reimbursements. We’ve seen a Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) stripped of his pension, 18 months before retirement, because of wrongdoing so perfidious that it can’t be discussed to this day.

We thought we’d seen it all. And then we came across reports of the cornucopia of contracting corruption at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

We first wrote about Camp Arifjan here. At that point, fourteen contracting folks were suspected of bribery and corruption. We subsequently updated that story at the bottom of this catch-up article, where we noted sentencing of one malefactor. We updated the story again over here, and noted that the fourteen had become sixteen.

And now it’s time to update the story once again. At this point, the count is now 19. Nineteen individuals who have “pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial” in the “ongoing investigation of corrupt contracting at Camp Arifjan.”

How do we know? The Department of Justice told us. It told us in the announcement that a former Army major had been sentenced to 18 months in prison “for his participation in bribery scheme related to his activities as a contracting official” at Camp Arifjan. Former Major James Momon, Jr. pleaded guilty to two counts of bribery and one count of conspiracy. The DOJ reported that Momon had accepted approximately $5.8 million in bribes, “including $1.6 million in cash and luxury items.” (No word on what the other $4.2 million consisted of, if it was nether cash nor luxury items.)

Momon is the second U.S. Army Major who violated his officer’s oath, by breaking the trust and faith placed in him by the country. According to the DOJ press release—

… Momon took over contracting duties at Camp Arifjan from former U.S. Army Major John C. Cockerham, who served as a contracting official in Kuwait in 2004 and 2005. Cockerham, who solicited and received bribes from DoD contractors in exchange for contracts and BPAs for bottled water and other goods and services, pleaded guilty for his role in the conspiracy in February 2008 and was sentenced to serve 210 months in prison and ordered to pay $9 million in restitution.

As we write this article, the press is in a feeding frenzy regarding wrongdoing that may have led to the resignation of a highly respected retired General, and may well implicate another who is currently serving in Southwest Asia. We have to ask, where is the similar outrage regarding the commanding officer(s) of Camp Arifjan, who seem to have let their contracting staff run amuck? Where is the accountability for those in command?

We understand the allure of a story of hidden infidelity by a respected public figure. But we have to ask, did the corrupt actions of those officers at Camp Arifjan damage national security even more? If so, where is the media feeding frenzy?

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.