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Apogee Consulting Inc

Stryker SNAFU

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Stryker
The M1126 Stryker Interim Combat Vehicle is a Twenty-First Century combat personnel transport for U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams. It is notable for the number of configurations being produced. The U.S. Army lists two main variants, the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). However, the ICV has eight configurations, including: Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Mortar Carrier (MC), Commanders Vehicle (CV), Fire Support Vehicle, (FSV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Anti-tank Guided Missile Vehicle (ATGM), and NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV).

We call it a Twenty-First Century combat vehicle because of its history. That history also illuminates its production challenges, as well as the challenges associated with maintenance and repair of the Strykers in the field. We quote—

The Stryker family of vehicles acquisition program began before the events that would lead us to war in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a part of acquisition reform, the Stryker vehicle was a nondevelopmental item, lending itself to a performance-based logistics approach through the use of CLS [Contractor Logistics Support] because the technical data for the vehicle were not readily available. PMO Stryker stated that the pace of acquisition became an extremely rapid effort that took 31 months from contract award to the initial operational deployment in Iraq.

In addition to the rapid effort, the Army’s deployment needs created complexities requiring concurrent development and production of a common chassis for the 10 original Stryker variants before completion of production verification testing.

Additionally, the program had little operational tempo data from garrison deployments that could be used to identify performance-based logistics metrics for deployment, as well as the first brigade deployment to Iraq, which included CLS, that was in October 2003. This escalated to three Stryker brigades deployed to Iraq in 2006, that required sustainment for 2 years. As brigades were eventually redeploying from Iraq, other brigades were deploying to Afghanistan. The Stryker brigades were now spread across two operational theaters with differing environments, operational tempos, and threats.

Metrics gathered from one theater were not applicable to the new theater. The new threat in Afghanistan led to an urgent requirement to change the design of the flat-bottom Stryker vehicles to a more survivable double-v hull model. Design, test, production, and fielding were accelerated to get this new design into the hands of the soldier within 18 months. This added another new complexity to fleet support as both flat-bottom and double-v hull vehicles required support. The Army deployed a second Stryker brigade to Afghanistan, requiring additional CLS support. The double-v hull vehicles increased the variants to 17, which caused additional development, production, and sustainment complexities. The deployed fleet increased operational miles 10-fold from when fleets were in garrison/peacetime deployment. The operational environment, tempo, objectives, deployment, and utilization plans were all fluid as the threat would change in theater, creating a higher level of complexity for identifying performance-based logistics metrics.

[Emphasis added.]

The foregoing history is quoted from a recent DOD Inspector General report reviewing issues associated with the logistics support for the Stryker PMO. The CLS is provided by General Dynamics Land Systems, who was also the Prime contractor for production. GDLS seems to be doing a bang-up job with respect to CLS—despite the huge challenges described above by the DOD IG—because (according to the DOD IG) it is achieving an operational readiness rate in excess of 96 percent—far in excess of the readiness goal of 90 percent.

So that part was working quite well but, nonetheless, the DOD IG managed to find other issues to squawk about. It reported that the PMO Stryker team “did not properly account” for nearly 20,000 line items of Government property being managed by GDLS, which had a value of nearly $900 million. To be clear, these were property items that had been acquired by GDLS and were being managed by GDLS in the Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated (GOCO) Stryker warehouse, located in Auburn, Washington. According to the DOD IG—

The warehouse has about 700,000 square feet of internal storage space and 30,000 square feet of external storage space. General Dynamics’ personnel receive, store, manage, and issue Stryker inventory for a variety of Stryker efforts, including CLS, battle damage assessments and repairs (BDAR), Reset, and retrofit. … General Dynamics also managed two other Stryker inventory wholesale warehouses at its London, Ontario Canada, facility and the GOCO European Distribution Center in Germersheim, Germany.

GLDS performs its CLS responsibilities under a 6 year CPFF contract valued at roughly $1.5 billion. The DOD IG stated—

General Dynamics is responsible for performing scheduled and unscheduled maintenance; requesting, receiving, storing, and issuing all Stryker vehicle spares and repair parts; and documenting all part consumption and vehicle repairs.

The inventory valuation problem stemmed from the fact that, when GDLS delivered the incoming parts and equipment to the GOCO warehouse, it was properly classified as “government property”—but the PMO Stryker team (i.e., the Government folks) incorrectly classified those inventory items as “contractor-acquired property (CAP).”

It’s a subtle difference perhaps best appreciated by a Government Property Administrator or contractor Property Manager. We’ll let the DOD IG explain the issue to you—

PMO Stryker relied on the CAP definition in FAR Part 45, Government Property,” which defines CAP as “property acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor for performing a contract to which the Government has title.” CAP business rules for cost-reimbursable contracts were generally designed to address “property acquired, fabricated, or otherwise provided by the contractor” that would eventually be delivered to the Government as part of a higher level end item, not as used by the Army on its logistics services contract with no end item deliverable.

While Stryker inventory consumed during the contract period of performance for the logistics services contract could possibly be considered CAP, the inventory identified in this report was from prior-year periods and needed to be officially delivered and accepted by the Army and accounted for as Government property. In regards to BDAR and Reset efforts, the situation was basically the same because both efforts had specific periods of performance so inventory not consumed during periods of performance needed to be officially delivered and accepted by the Army and accounted for as Government property.

[Emphasis in original.]

The end-result of the inventory nomenclature SNAFU was that “the Stryker inventory was not reported on either the contractor’s or the Army’s financial statements, resulting in no visibility of the Army assets (parts and value).”

Hey, no big deal. That was only $892.3 million that was not being reported on anybody’s financial statements. It’s not like that was a material amount of money, or anything.

When the DOD IG auditors pointed out the SNAFU to the Stryker PMO team, they got push-back. The PMO team’s position was that the property wasn’t delivered to the Government until the item in inventory “was placed on a Stryker vehicle.” In other words, the Stryker PMO team—including the DCMA representatives—believed that GDLS retained accountability over the inventory, because GDLS managed the inventory. They did not believe that the inventory was government-owned until it was installed on a vehicle.

The DOD IG didn’t buy that interpretation, responding—

… the Stryker inventory stored at the GOCO warehouse does not support the production of Stryker vehicles that are later delivered to the Army and accepted by DCMA. Instead, the Stryker inventory consists of spare parts that are used to sustain fielded Stryker vehicles for which the Army had already taken delivery. Therefore, based on the interpretation of the CAP guidance by PMO Stryker and DCMA officials, the Army will never take delivery of the Stryker inventory, assign the inventory a value, record it in an appropriate Army property accountability system, and recognize the inventory on the Army’s financial statements.

[Emphasis added.]

The DOD IG also asserted—

Although PMO Stryker and Army Contracting Command officials classified the Stryker inventory as CAP, the officials did not require General Dynamics to account for the inventory as CAP, follow guidance and accept delivery of CAP by contract line item where the material then becomes Government property, or identify the actual cost of the CAP inventory acquired on previous contracts and transfer the inventory cost to the current Stryker CLS contract.

The DOD IG’s point was, if the Stryker PMO team really thought that all that inventory sitting in the Government-owned warehouse awaiting installation on a military vehicle was, in fact, contractor-acquired property, then they blew the accounting and control there, too.

There was more to the audit report. The PMO Stryker team got gigged for some obsolete parts that should have been disposed of. (But how would they know the parts were obsolete, if they never recorded them in any Army inventory system? How would they dispose of obsolete parts that were never part of the official property records?)

Regardless of the Stryker property SNAFU and the fun of pointing out that nearly $900 of MILSPEC parts were sitting off record, awaiting a potential eBay auction, nobody should ignore the most important fact of this story. This is a very, very, complex fleet of vehicles—with a very challenging operating environment. And yet, despite all obstacles, the PMO Stryker team and GDLS managed to maintain a 96 percent vehicle operational readiness factor.

And that’s simply outstanding.

 

Naval Lt. Cmdr. Facing Disciplinary Action for Displaying Too Much Initiative

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Velocity_Airplane
Speaking for the SoCal residents who drive the dreaded 405 freeway nearly every single day, we have some sympathy for Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Tappen, age 35. We think we can speak for many Angelenos when we note that there have been many days when, stuck in traffic, we too wished for an airplane to soar over the crowded mass of autos, pickups, and big rigs in order to get to where we needed to be. So we can empathize with Tappen’s desire to take a plane and fly over the country—from Norfolk, where he was stationed with Naval Special Warfare Group 2 at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek—to visit his wife, who was waiting for him on the West Coast.

We also have some small amount of admiration for the man because, not only did he desire to have a plane—he actually took the next step and started to build one for himself. He didn’t have the funds to purchase a plane, so he took some do-it-yourself American “can-do” initiative and applied some elbow grease, and he just did it. That’s the American way, right? That’s what we expect of our practitioners of asymmetrical warfare, right? So at least in that respect, Lt. Cmdr. Tappen lived up to our highest expectations, and we acknowledge it.

Except for one teeny, tiny, little thing.

Lt. Cmdr. Tappen didn’t pay for his airplane parts. He had the Navy pay for them.

Oops!

According to this story at HamptonRoads.com, Tappen—

… admitted in federal court … that he built a plane, on the government's dime, out of parts he ordered through his job. He pleaded guilty to filing a false claim and faces up to five years in prison when he is sentenced April 1.

The story reports that Tappen graduated from his NROTC program at Georgia Tech with a degree in aeronautical engineering, and then received aviator training, and eventually was assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 15, where he served as a pilot from roughly 2000 to 2007. At which point, Tappen “switched to a career in oceanography.”

We’ll let that last sentence speak for itself.

In any case, Tappen wound up at Little Creek, where he “was responsible for purchasing materials and equipment.” Let’s note that his actual job appeared to be a far cry from his apparent vocational desire. He went from Naval Aviator to Naval Oceanographer to … purchasing clerk. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?

In any case, the key aspect of his job as a purchasing clerk was this: “Authorities said he had little oversight.”

Yeah, you know right where this is going, dontcha?

We’ll let the HamptonRoads writers finish this little tale. According to the story—

He began ordering parts for a you-build-it Velocity airplane. Tappen also persuaded the Defense Department to send him to Florida to learn how to fly a drone. Rountree said Tappen really went to Florida to learn how to fly his Velocity.

‘Many of the items that Tappen ordered served no apparent military function,’ Rountree said.

In March 2011, Tappen transferred to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. He took his plane with him and rented a hangar to store it.

Back at Little Creek, Tappen's old colleagues began noticing that the parts, supplies and tools they knew Tappen had ordered could not be located. They called in agents with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

When agents questioned Tappen in California [he] finally admitted that he used his purchasing authority to buy aircraft parts that he kept himself, Rountree said. But he said he kept the parts only because they did not work in the drone flight simulator that had been legitimately purchased for the special warfare unit. The agents were still dubious.

‘Tappen stated that when placing the orders, he knew in the back of his mind that the parts would be useful for his Velocity aircraft and admitted that he did not try very hard to make them work in the simulator,’ Rountree said.

Tappen ultimately gave the agents permission to search his house and the hangar, where they found the partially completed Velocity plane and the tools he ordered through the Navy. They also discovered at Tappen's house numerous computers, cameras and other electronics that he had purchased through the Navy while at Little Creek.

The value of the naval parts with which Tappen absconded was about $74,000. For his part, Tappen’s lawyer stated for the record that his client “had no meritorious defense for the charges.”

Well.

We know Lt. Cmdr. Tappen had a degree. We know he could fly aircraft. But he doesn’t seem like the sharpest tool in the shed, does he?

 

Plan X

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Cyber_Warfare
It’s been a while since we’ve had a decent cyber-warfare story to tell you about. It’s not like there haven’t been lots of stories in the news; but nothing has really caught our eye.

Until now.

You know, if you’re a long-time reader of this blog, that we don’t just confine ourselves to government cost accounting, contract compliance, or even fraud-related stories. We also, from time to time, address new technologies and new development programs that we think might be of interest to our readership. In that vein, we’ve published several stories about cyber-security, cyber-warfare, and how we think the future of warfare will be less “kinetic” (as they say), and more “cyber.” We offer, as but one example, this story published about eighteen months ago.

In that story, we told our readers—

We think we are all watching history being made. We believe that 2011 will one day be noted for the beginning of the cyber-wars.

No, we don’t think we’re being overly alarmist. Just ask Lockheed Martin, or L-3 Communications, or Citigroup, or the IMF. Our website was attacked and wiped-out a few weeks ago—and we had taken the precaution of blocking all IP addresses based in China. (Fortunately, our back-ups worked and we were up and running again within 72 hours.)

We think the U.S. has fallen behind other countries, and parastatial entities, in the strategy and tactics of cyber-warfare. Like the French and their Maginot Line, the U.S. has spent billions on its military assets, without adequately securing the information grid that is the true backbone of its high-tech military. We think the U.S. military is vulnerable; we think corporate America is vulnerable. And we’re pretty sure you are vulnerable as well.

In the past eighteen months the U.S. has taken steps to address what we asserted were deficiencies in its ability to conduct cyber-warfare. We can argue whether those steps are proactive or too-little/too-late reactive, but the fact of the matter is that forward progress is being made—as this story over at NextGov demonstrates.

According to the NextGov story, DARPA is “setting up a technology incubator for Defense-funded developers to stitch together computer code to automate offensive cyber operations.” The incubator, dubbed the “Collaborative Research Space,” will be located in Arlington, VA. (Of course. Why would you want to locate it in Silicon Valley? But we digress.) The goal of the CRS (according to NextGov, who quoted a DARPA solicitation document) is to develop "an end-to-end system that enables the military to understand, plan, and manage cyberwarfare in real-time." This will be the testing ground for “Plan X,” according to the story.

The NextGov story provided some light details of “Plan X,” reporting—

Plan X, also called ‘foundational cyberwarfare,’ signals an increasingly aggressive turn in the Defense Department’s approach to addressing threats to its networks. The laboratory, a designated Collateral Secret area, is described as a collaborative space for contractors and the military. “DARPA intends to arrange program interaction with a variety of users from DoD and other government agencies, including onsite military personnel who will be testing and using the Plan X system on a daily basis,’ contract databases indicate.

Further, NexGov stated—

With algorithms that can help calculate the resources and tools needed to infiltrate networks, assess possible collateral damage from targeting enemy systems, and capabilities to model opponent moves, DARPA hopes that planners will be able to draw up a plans of action more quickly.

Once a cyberwarfare mission plan can be drawn up for an operation, ‘the next step is to compile or synthesize the plan into a fully encapsulated executable program or script,’ according to the tender. DARPA wants researchers to think about how to build ‘automated techniques that allow mission planners to graphically construct detailed and robust plans that can be automatically synthesized into an executable mission script.’ While automation could speed up the response time of the military, moves to reduce human control could raise concerns, especially if computer glitches go unchecked.

NextGov also noted—

The initiative comes as the National Cyber Range for Defense personnel to hone computer attack capabilities is slated for a multimillion dollar boost as the system transitions from research laboratories into deployment. President Obama in October signed a secret directive giving the military additional leeway to address computer threats, according to reports.

Okay. This cyber-warfare stuff is getting real. If you are a small business with expertise in these areas (and appropriate clearances) you might want to get the DARPA solicitation and see if you can play in the new CRS sandbox. If you are a U.S. adversary, you might want to think twice about going toe-to-toe with this country, as it appears to be moving quickly to position itself to respond to attack by launching its own cyber counter-attacks.

As has been said before, by many others, we are truly living in the future.

 

Academic Asserts BBP 2.0 is Asinine

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Sometimes we write a blog article and put it out there, and we know almost right away it’s a grand slam. The article hit count takes off, and the e-mails come in. Once in a while, the phone rings and somebody wants to argue a point. In one instance, a Fed-Ex package arrived with a letter in it, written by the investor relations lead of a corporation we had taken to task. On those days, we feel good. Love us or hate us: at least we know somebody is reading these posts and that we struck a nerve.

Sometimes we don’t publish any articles for a couple of days, and we get a few e-mails asking if we’re okay, encouraging us to keep putting finger to keyboard. And those feel pretty good, as well.

But sometimes we write a blog article and put it out there … and nothing happens. Sure, the hit counts rise—slowly, as would be expected simply from the length of time the post has been on the internet—but there’s no other sign that we did good. There’s simply no feedback, none at all. And on those days, we wonder why we bother.

Such was the case with our article on Better Buying Power 2.0. Indeed, most of our articles on the initiative to increase efficiency and affordability of the Defense Department have dropped into the pond with scarcely any ripples, despite our attempts to be all provocative and edgy, like pointing out how BBP 2.0 targeted two areas near to our heart—the competency of DCMA acquisition personnel and the backlog of audits at DCAA. Even when we assert—as we have—that the primary output of the BBP initiative is the creation of more bureaucracy, we don’t seem to be striking the right nerves.

Perhaps it’s simply because the DOD Leadership doesn’t read our blog?

Even so, it’s nice when somebody else seems to agree with some of our intentionally provocative and edgy assertions. Such as when J. David Patterson, Director of the National Defense Business Institute at the University of Tennessee, writes an op-ed piece in the November 26, 2012, edition of Aviation Week that tells readers that the people charged with implementing BBP activities are bureaucrats themselves. Thus: “People within bureaucracies perpetuate self-sustaining behaviors despite the benefits of refining processes.” In other words, major process improvements, such as BBP, do not result in reduced bureaucracy. Quite the opposite is, in fact, true. Major process improvements just result in more bureaucracy, because the bureaucrats seeking to implement the process improvements simply can’t help themselves.

We wish we could give you a link to Mr. Patterson’s piece—entitled “Fix Bureaucratic Behaviors First”—but we can’t, because of copyright restrictions. But suffice to say, Mr. Patterson pointed out that the primary output from the original BBP initiative was the addition of “16 tasks and reports.” Similarly, he pointed out that the BBP 2.0 memo “institutes new processes while not detailing procedures, reports or reviews to be eliminated.” He concluded that, despite the lofty objectives of BBP, “the processes are addictive.”

According to Mr. Patterson, this is the expected outcome. Looking at the history of acquisition reform, he concluded that it is the “cultural behaviors” of the Pentagon bureaucracy that has “impede[d] progress in improving the acquisition system.” When the bureaucrats are invited to implement new processes or refine existing processes, so as to increase efficiency—they simply can’t do it. The historical result of such improvement attempts has been almost the exact opposite of the intended objectives. He asserted that “Suborning people to processes results in the least-productive bureaucratic behaviors.”

If one wishes to truly streamline the existing processes and to reduce the existing bureaucracy, then one must first address the cultural issues, according to Mr. Patterson. He wrote, “Acquisition community leadership must address workforce behaviors to achieve concrete, productive reform in how the Defense Department buys weapons, equipment and services.”

If this is not done, “the defense acquisition system will not improve.”

To which we can only add—Amen, brother.

 

Cost Accounting and Pricing Issues Related to Inter-Organizational Transfers

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Long-time blog reader “Black Hawk Dawn” asked us to comment on a recent DCAA assertion that an executed Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data (CCCPD) was required “of each separate entity from the same parent.” In essence, DCAA was asserting that work performed by an affiliated entity was effectively a subcontract with that entity. We wish that were the case, because it would solve so many difficulties … but unfortunately it is not. The DCAA auditor was wrong.

A cost transfers between affiliated entities under common control is not a matter of subcontracting. Instead, such transfers are commonly known as Inter-Organizational Transfers (IOTs). Yes, there are many names for such transfers—including Inter-Divisional Transfers, Inter-Entity Transfers, or even (our favorite) Inter-Divisional Work Authorization and Delegations ( iWADs). But they are not subcontract costs. Subcontract costs are a separate cost element, related to, but not the same as, IOTs.

The proper cost accounting (and pricing) for IOTs is established by the FAR Cost Principle found at 31.205-26(e), which states—

(e) Allowance for all materials, supplies and services that are sold or transferred between any divisions, subdivisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of the contractor under a common control shall be on the basis of cost incurred in accordance with this subpart. However, allowance may be at price when—
(1) It is the established practice of the transferring organization to price interorganizational transfers at other than cost for commercial work of the contractor or any division, subsidiary or affiliate of the contractor under a common control; and

(2) The item being transferred qualifies for an exception under (b) and the contracting officer has not determined the price to be unreasonable.
(f) When a commercial item under paragraph (e) of this subsection is transferred at a price based on a catalog or market price, the contractor—
(1) Should adjust the price to reflect the quantities being acquired; and

(2) May adjust the price to reflect the actual cost of any modifications necessary because of contract requirements.

[Emphasis added.]

That seems fairly straightforward, does it not? IOTs must be priced, and costed, on the basis of actual cost incurred in accordance with the various cost accounting rules of FAR 31.2. (Unless the stated exception applies, which it may only in very rare circumstances.) In other words, the performing entity must transfer only allowable, allocable, costs. And it must transfer all costs actually incurred; it cannot agree to a fixed-price or lump-sum budget value, and then simply bill that agreed-upon amount.

It seems fairly straightforward, but compliant cost accounting is more difficult than it seems, as Bell Textron learned to its chagrin. In addition, we also told readers about similar problems faced by U.S. Foodservice for allegedly creating shell companies (called “value-added service providers”) that were used to inflate the cost of goods and services provided to the DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs.

So, no, getting the cost accounting and pricing right for IOTs is more difficult than it might seem. And penalties for being caught getting it wrong can be painful.

Getting back to the original question, DCAA should not be requesting separate CCCPDs from each affiliated organization whose costs were included in the proposal, since all IOT efforts are considered to be parts of the same overall effort to be performed by the parent organization. How do we know that?

Well, because the FAR tells us so.

Let’s start by disposing of the very rare circumstance when the IOT is transferred at price (including profit), because the contractor met all the requirements of 31.205-26(e) and (f), and 15.403-1(b)—and the Contracting Officer has not determined that the transfer price was unreasonable. If the basis of the 15.403-1(b) exception is that the contractor is transferring a “commercial item” (as that term is defined in FAR 15.403-1(c)(3) and FAR 2.101), then the DCAA auditor might have a slight scintilla of a point. In that circumstance—and in no other—the IOT would be considered to be a subcontract. (See the definition of “subcontract” found at 15.401. As we told you before, the FAR has many definitions of “subcontract” and you need to know which one applies to your situation. In this case—and in this particular case only—the IOT should properly be treated as a subcontract for purposes of determining compliance with FAR Part 15 requirements.)

But while that transfer of a commercial item at commercial prices would be considered to be a subcontract for purposes of determining compliance with FAR Part 15 requirements, that commercial item “subcontract” would not need a separate CCPD. So the DCAA auditor is still wrong.

We know this because we read FAR 15.403-1(b), which references 15.403-1(c)(3). And 15.403-1(c)(3) states—

(3) Commercial items.

(i) Any acquisition of an item that the contracting officer determines meets the commercial item definition in 2.101 … is exempt from the requirement for certified cost or pricing data. …

There’s quite a bit more verbiage under that section, worth reading if one is thinking about trying to justify commercial item inter-organizational transfer pricing, but it’s not particularly germane to the main topic. The point is, if one takes advantage of the exception to the default rule that IOTs must be costed and priced on the basis of actual, allowable, incurred costs—and the basis of that exception is that the item in question is a commercial item being transferred at commercial prices—then one is dealing with a subcontract. But it’s also a subcontract that is exempt from the requirement to submit certified cost or pricing data; and hence it’s also exempt from the requirement to submit a separate CCCPD. So that’s the story on that.

We’re going to move on from this rare situation, because it’s very hard to jump over the regulatory bar imposed by the FAR. It’s far more likely—perhaps almost certain—that your organization will be forced to price and cost (and bill) its IOTs on the basis of actual, allowable, incurred costs.

If that’s the case, then you most definitely do not have a subcontract. This is made manifestly clear at FAR 15.407-2 (“Make-or-Buy Programs”). For those who may not know, a make-or-buy decision is simply that: it’s a decision (made by the Prime Contractor or higher-tier subcontractor) as to whether or not it will perform the work itself (in-house) or if it will outsource the work to another, lower-tier, contractor. A “make” item is one that is made in-house, while a “buy” item is one that will be acquired from an external source. FAR 15.407-2(b) states—

(b) Definition. ‘Make item,’ as used in this subsection, means an item or work effort to be produced or performed by the prime contractor or its affiliates, subsidiaries, or divisions.

So an IOT is not an acquisition from an external source. It is clearly a “make” item, and not a subcontract.

But there’s more support for the notion that your basic, average, IOT is not a subcontract—and that support comes from DCAA itself.

We told readers that DCAA has developed a checklist to ensure the adequacy of proposals it is auditing. DCAA reasons that, after all, why should it waste its scarce resources auditing proposals that are inadequate for audit? While we respectfully disagree with DCAA’s notion that it is the sole arbiter of cost proposal adequacy, we don’t mind using its “Criteria for Adequate Contract Pricing Proposals” (issued January 2012) to support our position.

Criteria Number 25 addresses IOTs. (You can find it at the bottom of Page 6 of 8 of the adequacy checklist.) It says (in part)—

NOTE: Interorganizational work is considered to be part of the cost or pricing data submission of the prime. As such, the prime contractor’s responsibility for conducting subcontract cost/price analyses does not apply to interorganizational transfers. Prior to the submission of the proposal, the prime contractor shall (a) ensure that all statement of work tasks are addressed without duplication and are consistent with the overall program performance schedule and, (b) ensure ground rules and assumptions are consistent with the prime’s proposal.

So there you go. The IOT is not a separate subcontract; it is an inherent part of the cost or pricing data of the organization submitting the proposal. As such, it is subject to the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements of the organization as a whole—but it is not subject to any separate TINA requirements. In particular, it need not submit a separate CCCPD; the organization’s single CCCPD covers all IOTs subject to certified cost or pricing data submission requirements.

So there you have it.

Our thanks to “Black Hawk Dawn” for submitting this issue for us to think about. If you have a similar conundrum of your own, please feel free to do the same.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.