Naval Lt. Cmdr. Facing Disciplinary Action for Displaying Too Much Initiative
 Speaking for the SoCal residents who drive the dreaded 405 freeway nearly every single day, we have some sympathy for Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Tappen, age 35. We think we can speak for many Angelenos when we note that there have been many days when, stuck in traffic, we too wished for an airplane to soar over the crowded mass of autos, pickups, and big rigs in order to get to where we needed to be. So we can empathize with Tappen’s desire to take a plane and fly over the country—from Norfolk, where he was stationed with Naval Special Warfare Group 2 at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek—to visit his wife, who was waiting for him on the West Coast.
We also have some small amount of admiration for the man because, not only did he desire to have a plane—he actually took the next step and started to build one for himself. He didn’t have the funds to purchase a plane, so he took some do-it-yourself American “can-do” initiative and applied some elbow grease, and he just did it. That’s the American way, right? That’s what we expect of our practitioners of asymmetrical warfare, right? So at least in that respect, Lt. Cmdr. Tappen lived up to our highest expectations, and we acknowledge it.
Except for one teeny, tiny, little thing.
Lt. Cmdr. Tappen didn’t pay for his airplane parts. He had the Navy pay for them.
Oops!
According to this story at HamptonRoads.com, Tappen—
… admitted in federal court … that he built a plane, on the government's dime, out of parts he ordered through his job. He pleaded guilty to filing a false claim and faces up to five years in prison when he is sentenced April 1.
The story reports that Tappen graduated from his NROTC program at Georgia Tech with a degree in aeronautical engineering, and then received aviator training, and eventually was assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 15, where he served as a pilot from roughly 2000 to 2007. At which point, Tappen “switched to a career in oceanography.”
We’ll let that last sentence speak for itself.
In any case, Tappen wound up at Little Creek, where he “was responsible for purchasing materials and equipment.” Let’s note that his actual job appeared to be a far cry from his apparent vocational desire. He went from Naval Aviator to Naval Oceanographer to … purchasing clerk. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot?
In any case, the key aspect of his job as a purchasing clerk was this: “Authorities said he had little oversight.”
Yeah, you know right where this is going, dontcha?
We’ll let the HamptonRoads writers finish this little tale. According to the story—
He began ordering parts for a you-build-it Velocity airplane. Tappen also persuaded the Defense Department to send him to Florida to learn how to fly a drone. Rountree said Tappen really went to Florida to learn how to fly his Velocity. ‘Many of the items that Tappen ordered served no apparent military function,’ Rountree said. In March 2011, Tappen transferred to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. He took his plane with him and rented a hangar to store it. Back at Little Creek, Tappen's old colleagues began noticing that the parts, supplies and tools they knew Tappen had ordered could not be located. They called in agents with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. When agents questioned Tappen in California [he] finally admitted that he used his purchasing authority to buy aircraft parts that he kept himself, Rountree said. But he said he kept the parts only because they did not work in the drone flight simulator that had been legitimately purchased for the special warfare unit. The agents were still dubious. ‘Tappen stated that when placing the orders, he knew in the back of his mind that the parts would be useful for his Velocity aircraft and admitted that he did not try very hard to make them work in the simulator,’ Rountree said. Tappen ultimately gave the agents permission to search his house and the hangar, where they found the partially completed Velocity plane and the tools he ordered through the Navy. They also discovered at Tappen's house numerous computers, cameras and other electronics that he had purchased through the Navy while at Little Creek.
The value of the naval parts with which Tappen absconded was about $74,000. For his part, Tappen’s lawyer stated for the record that his client “had no meritorious defense for the charges.”
Well.
We know Lt. Cmdr. Tappen had a degree. We know he could fly aircraft. But he doesn’t seem like the sharpest tool in the shed, does he?
Plan X
 It’s been a while since we’ve had a decent cyber-warfare story to tell you about. It’s not like there haven’t been lots of stories in the news; but nothing has really caught our eye.
Until now.
You know, if you’re a long-time reader of this blog, that we don’t just confine ourselves to government cost accounting, contract compliance, or even fraud-related stories. We also, from time to time, address new technologies and new development programs that we think might be of interest to our readership. In that vein, we’ve published several stories about cyber-security, cyber-warfare, and how we think the future of warfare will be less “kinetic” (as they say), and more “cyber.” We offer, as but one example, this story published about eighteen months ago.
In that story, we told our readers—
We think we are all watching history being made. We believe that 2011 will one day be noted for the beginning of the cyber-wars. No, we don’t think we’re being overly alarmist. Just ask Lockheed Martin, or L-3 Communications, or Citigroup, or the IMF. Our website was attacked and wiped-out a few weeks ago—and we had taken the precaution of blocking all IP addresses based in China. (Fortunately, our back-ups worked and we were up and running again within 72 hours.) We think the U.S. has fallen behind other countries, and parastatial entities, in the strategy and tactics of cyber-warfare. Like the French and their Maginot Line, the U.S. has spent billions on its military assets, without adequately securing the information grid that is the true backbone of its high-tech military. We think the U.S. military is vulnerable; we think corporate America is vulnerable. And we’re pretty sure you are vulnerable as well.
In the past eighteen months the U.S. has taken steps to address what we asserted were deficiencies in its ability to conduct cyber-warfare. We can argue whether those steps are proactive or too-little/too-late reactive, but the fact of the matter is that forward progress is being made—as this story over at NextGov demonstrates.
According to the NextGov story, DARPA is “setting up a technology incubator for Defense-funded developers to stitch together computer code to automate offensive cyber operations.” The incubator, dubbed the “Collaborative Research Space,” will be located in Arlington, VA. (Of course. Why would you want to locate it in Silicon Valley? But we digress.) The goal of the CRS (according to NextGov, who quoted a DARPA solicitation document) is to develop "an end-to-end system that enables the military to understand, plan, and manage cyberwarfare in real-time." This will be the testing ground for “Plan X,” according to the story.
The NextGov story provided some light details of “Plan X,” reporting—
Plan X, also called ‘foundational cyberwarfare,’ signals an increasingly aggressive turn in the Defense Department’s approach to addressing threats to its networks. The laboratory, a designated Collateral Secret area, is described as a collaborative space for contractors and the military. “DARPA intends to arrange program interaction with a variety of users from DoD and other government agencies, including onsite military personnel who will be testing and using the Plan X system on a daily basis,’ contract databases indicate.
Further, NexGov stated—
With algorithms that can help calculate the resources and tools needed to infiltrate networks, assess possible collateral damage from targeting enemy systems, and capabilities to model opponent moves, DARPA hopes that planners will be able to draw up a plans of action more quickly. Once a cyberwarfare mission plan can be drawn up for an operation, ‘the next step is to compile or synthesize the plan into a fully encapsulated executable program or script,’ according to the tender. DARPA wants researchers to think about how to build ‘automated techniques that allow mission planners to graphically construct detailed and robust plans that can be automatically synthesized into an executable mission script.’ While automation could speed up the response time of the military, moves to reduce human control could raise concerns, especially if computer glitches go unchecked.
NextGov also noted—
The initiative comes as the National Cyber Range for Defense personnel to hone computer attack capabilities is slated for a multimillion dollar boost as the system transitions from research laboratories into deployment. President Obama in October signed a secret directive giving the military additional leeway to address computer threats, according to reports.
Okay. This cyber-warfare stuff is getting real. If you are a small business with expertise in these areas (and appropriate clearances) you might want to get the DARPA solicitation and see if you can play in the new CRS sandbox. If you are a U.S. adversary, you might want to think twice about going toe-to-toe with this country, as it appears to be moving quickly to position itself to respond to attack by launching its own cyber counter-attacks.
As has been said before, by many others, we are truly living in the future.
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Academic Asserts BBP 2.0 is Asinine
Sometimes we write a blog article and put it out there, and we know almost right away it’s a grand slam. The article hit count takes off, and the e-mails come in. Once in a while, the phone rings and somebody wants to argue a point. In one instance, a Fed-Ex package arrived with a letter in it, written by the investor relations lead of a corporation we had taken to task. On those days, we feel good. Love us or hate us: at least we know somebody is reading these posts and that we struck a nerve.
Sometimes we don’t publish any articles for a couple of days, and we get a few e-mails asking if we’re okay, encouraging us to keep putting finger to keyboard. And those feel pretty good, as well.
But sometimes we write a blog article and put it out there … and nothing happens. Sure, the hit counts rise—slowly, as would be expected simply from the length of time the post has been on the internet—but there’s no other sign that we did good. There’s simply no feedback, none at all. And on those days, we wonder why we bother.
Such was the case with our article on Better Buying Power 2.0. Indeed, most of our articles on the initiative to increase efficiency and affordability of the Defense Department have dropped into the pond with scarcely any ripples, despite our attempts to be all provocative and edgy, like pointing out how BBP 2.0 targeted two areas near to our heart—the competency of DCMA acquisition personnel and the backlog of audits at DCAA. Even when we assert—as we have—that the primary output of the BBP initiative is the creation of more bureaucracy, we don’t seem to be striking the right nerves.
Perhaps it’s simply because the DOD Leadership doesn’t read our blog?
Even so, it’s nice when somebody else seems to agree with some of our intentionally provocative and edgy assertions. Such as when J. David Patterson, Director of the National Defense Business Institute at the University of Tennessee, writes an op-ed piece in the November 26, 2012, edition of Aviation Week that tells readers that the people charged with implementing BBP activities are bureaucrats themselves. Thus: “People within bureaucracies perpetuate self-sustaining behaviors despite the benefits of refining processes.” In other words, major process improvements, such as BBP, do not result in reduced bureaucracy. Quite the opposite is, in fact, true. Major process improvements just result in more bureaucracy, because the bureaucrats seeking to implement the process improvements simply can’t help themselves.
We wish we could give you a link to Mr. Patterson’s piece—entitled “Fix Bureaucratic Behaviors First”—but we can’t, because of copyright restrictions. But suffice to say, Mr. Patterson pointed out that the primary output from the original BBP initiative was the addition of “16 tasks and reports.” Similarly, he pointed out that the BBP 2.0 memo “institutes new processes while not detailing procedures, reports or reviews to be eliminated.” He concluded that, despite the lofty objectives of BBP, “the processes are addictive.”
According to Mr. Patterson, this is the expected outcome. Looking at the history of acquisition reform, he concluded that it is the “cultural behaviors” of the Pentagon bureaucracy that has “impede[d] progress in improving the acquisition system.” When the bureaucrats are invited to implement new processes or refine existing processes, so as to increase efficiency—they simply can’t do it. The historical result of such improvement attempts has been almost the exact opposite of the intended objectives. He asserted that “Suborning people to processes results in the least-productive bureaucratic behaviors.”
If one wishes to truly streamline the existing processes and to reduce the existing bureaucracy, then one must first address the cultural issues, according to Mr. Patterson. He wrote, “Acquisition community leadership must address workforce behaviors to achieve concrete, productive reform in how the Defense Department buys weapons, equipment and services.”
If this is not done, “the defense acquisition system will not improve.”
To which we can only add—Amen, brother.
Cost Accounting and Pricing Issues Related to Inter-Organizational Transfers
Long-time blog reader “Black Hawk Dawn” asked us to comment on a recent DCAA assertion that an executed Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data (CCCPD) was required “of each separate entity from the same parent.” In essence, DCAA was asserting that work performed by an affiliated entity was effectively a subcontract with that entity. We wish that were the case, because it would solve so many difficulties … but unfortunately it is not. The DCAA auditor was wrong.
A cost transfers between affiliated entities under common control is not a matter of subcontracting. Instead, such transfers are commonly known as Inter-Organizational Transfers (IOTs). Yes, there are many names for such transfers—including Inter-Divisional Transfers, Inter-Entity Transfers, or even (our favorite) Inter-Divisional Work Authorization and Delegations ( iWADs). But they are not subcontract costs. Subcontract costs are a separate cost element, related to, but not the same as, IOTs.
The proper cost accounting (and pricing) for IOTs is established by the FAR Cost Principle found at 31.205-26(e), which states—
(e) Allowance for all materials, supplies and services that are sold or transferred between any divisions, subdivisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of the contractor under a common control shall be on the basis of cost incurred in accordance with this subpart. However, allowance may be at price when—
(1) It is the established practice of the transferring organization to price interorganizational transfers at other than cost for commercial work of the contractor or any division, subsidiary or affiliate of the contractor under a common control; and (2) The item being transferred qualifies for an exception under (b) and the contracting officer has not determined the price to be unreasonable.
(f) When a commercial item under paragraph (e) of this subsection is transferred at a price based on a catalog or market price, the contractor—
(1) Should adjust the price to reflect the quantities being acquired; and (2) May adjust the price to reflect the actual cost of any modifications necessary because of contract requirements.
[Emphasis added.]
That seems fairly straightforward, does it not? IOTs must be priced, and costed, on the basis of actual cost incurred in accordance with the various cost accounting rules of FAR 31.2. (Unless the stated exception applies, which it may only in very rare circumstances.) In other words, the performing entity must transfer only allowable, allocable, costs. And it must transfer all costs actually incurred; it cannot agree to a fixed-price or lump-sum budget value, and then simply bill that agreed-upon amount.
It seems fairly straightforward, but compliant cost accounting is more difficult than it seems, as Bell Textron learned to its chagrin. In addition, we also told readers about similar problems faced by U.S. Foodservice for allegedly creating shell companies (called “value-added service providers”) that were used to inflate the cost of goods and services provided to the DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
So, no, getting the cost accounting and pricing right for IOTs is more difficult than it might seem. And penalties for being caught getting it wrong can be painful.
Getting back to the original question, DCAA should not be requesting separate CCCPDs from each affiliated organization whose costs were included in the proposal, since all IOT efforts are considered to be parts of the same overall effort to be performed by the parent organization. How do we know that?
Well, because the FAR tells us so.
Let’s start by disposing of the very rare circumstance when the IOT is transferred at price (including profit), because the contractor met all the requirements of 31.205-26(e) and (f), and 15.403-1(b)—and the Contracting Officer has not determined that the transfer price was unreasonable. If the basis of the 15.403-1(b) exception is that the contractor is transferring a “commercial item” (as that term is defined in FAR 15.403-1(c)(3) and FAR 2.101), then the DCAA auditor might have a slight scintilla of a point. In that circumstance—and in no other—the IOT would be considered to be a subcontract. (See the definition of “subcontract” found at 15.401. As we told you before, the FAR has many definitions of “subcontract” and you need to know which one applies to your situation. In this case—and in this particular case only—the IOT should properly be treated as a subcontract for purposes of determining compliance with FAR Part 15 requirements.)
But while that transfer of a commercial item at commercial prices would be considered to be a subcontract for purposes of determining compliance with FAR Part 15 requirements, that commercial item “subcontract” would not need a separate CCPD. So the DCAA auditor is still wrong.
We know this because we read FAR 15.403-1(b), which references 15.403-1(c)(3). And 15.403-1(c)(3) states—
(3) Commercial items. (i) Any acquisition of an item that the contracting officer determines meets the commercial item definition in 2.101 … is exempt from the requirement for certified cost or pricing data. …
There’s quite a bit more verbiage under that section, worth reading if one is thinking about trying to justify commercial item inter-organizational transfer pricing, but it’s not particularly germane to the main topic. The point is, if one takes advantage of the exception to the default rule that IOTs must be costed and priced on the basis of actual, allowable, incurred costs—and the basis of that exception is that the item in question is a commercial item being transferred at commercial prices—then one is dealing with a subcontract. But it’s also a subcontract that is exempt from the requirement to submit certified cost or pricing data; and hence it’s also exempt from the requirement to submit a separate CCCPD. So that’s the story on that.
We’re going to move on from this rare situation, because it’s very hard to jump over the regulatory bar imposed by the FAR. It’s far more likely—perhaps almost certain—that your organization will be forced to price and cost (and bill) its IOTs on the basis of actual, allowable, incurred costs.
If that’s the case, then you most definitely do not have a subcontract. This is made manifestly clear at FAR 15.407-2 (“Make-or-Buy Programs”). For those who may not know, a make-or-buy decision is simply that: it’s a decision (made by the Prime Contractor or higher-tier subcontractor) as to whether or not it will perform the work itself (in-house) or if it will outsource the work to another, lower-tier, contractor. A “make” item is one that is made in-house, while a “buy” item is one that will be acquired from an external source. FAR 15.407-2(b) states—
(b) Definition. ‘Make item,’ as used in this subsection, means an item or work effort to be produced or performed by the prime contractor or its affiliates, subsidiaries, or divisions.
So an IOT is not an acquisition from an external source. It is clearly a “make” item, and not a subcontract.
But there’s more support for the notion that your basic, average, IOT is not a subcontract—and that support comes from DCAA itself.
We told readers that DCAA has developed a checklist to ensure the adequacy of proposals it is auditing. DCAA reasons that, after all, why should it waste its scarce resources auditing proposals that are inadequate for audit? While we respectfully disagree with DCAA’s notion that it is the sole arbiter of cost proposal adequacy, we don’t mind using its “Criteria for Adequate Contract Pricing Proposals” (issued January 2012) to support our position.
Criteria Number 25 addresses IOTs. (You can find it at the bottom of Page 6 of 8 of the adequacy checklist.) It says (in part)—
NOTE: Interorganizational work is considered to be part of the cost or pricing data submission of the prime. As such, the prime contractor’s responsibility for conducting subcontract cost/price analyses does not apply to interorganizational transfers. Prior to the submission of the proposal, the prime contractor shall (a) ensure that all statement of work tasks are addressed without duplication and are consistent with the overall program performance schedule and, (b) ensure ground rules and assumptions are consistent with the prime’s proposal.
So there you go. The IOT is not a separate subcontract; it is an inherent part of the cost or pricing data of the organization submitting the proposal. As such, it is subject to the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements of the organization as a whole—but it is not subject to any separate TINA requirements. In particular, it need not submit a separate CCCPD; the organization’s single CCCPD covers all IOTs subject to certified cost or pricing data submission requirements.
So there you have it.
Our thanks to “Black Hawk Dawn” for submitting this issue for us to think about. If you have a similar conundrum of your own, please feel free to do the same.
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