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Apogee Consulting Inc

A Failure to Implement the Corrective Action Plan

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Corrective_Action_Plan
In the still relatively new compliance environment established by the DFARS Business Systems Administration clause, it has become clear that the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is the key to minimizing—or avoiding—payment withholds. According to what was stated at a joint DCAA/DCMA industry briefing, if the contractor submits an adequate CAP at the time of the Contracting Officer Initial Determination of an inadequate business system, then it can immediately reduce the prospective payment withhold from five to two percent—mitigating what would otherwise be a significant cash flow impact! Moreover, even if the CAP is submitted after payment withholds have already been implemented, then the contracting officer “will—not may” immediately reduce the withhold percentage.

So the question naturally arises, what does an “adequate” CAP look like?

Well, according to that same industry briefing—

An adequate CAP must include discrete and measurable actions with realistic due dates and an explanation of how the corrective action plan will be monitored. The Contractor should notify CO [Contracting Officer] when the entity believes that the identified deficiencies have been corrected.  The CO, with input from auditor/functional specialist, will determine whether all corrective actions have been completed, or whether there is a reasonable expectation (based on the evidence presented) to believe that the deficiencies have been corrected.  If so, then the CO will approve the system and release the payment withholds

But woe to the contractor that submits a “smoke and mirrors” CAP, and then fails to achieve its planned milestones on time. That same briefing stated—

The DCMA CO, in consultation with auditor or functional specialist, will monitor the contractor’s progress on the CAP.  If the CO determines that the contractor is not making adequate progress, then the payment withhold will be increased.

It’s not good news when a Contracting Officer tells you that you have an inadequate business system and your cash flow is going to be reduced until you show that you’ve corrected your “significant deficiencies”. But it’s even worse news when you’ve convinced the Contracting Officer that you’ve got a decent CAP, and there’s light at the end of the tunnel—only to then blow it by failing to make progress in achieving the promised milestones. Your cash flow will take another hit. And your credibility (and, we imagine, any sympathy) has just gone right out the window. Good luck convincing the CO that you’ve completed your corrective actions.

So we wonder what the penalty might be for a Government agency that identifies corrective actions in response to an agency Inspector General report … and then fails to execute those corrective actions within the promised schedule. There’s no cash flow to reduce. There’s no way to hold the leaders responsible for their lack of action. It seems as if everybody agrees to forget about the agreed-upon actions and just continue with “business as usual.” The auditors pretend they never issued their report with its findings, and the Government agency pretends it never agreed to implement corrective actions to address those findings. And nobody seems to care a whit.

But what if the Government agency in question is the Defense Contract Audit Agency?

What if the DOD Inspector General conducted an audit, had some findings, and submitted some recommended corrective actions? What if DCAA agreed with those findings and those recommended corrective actions? What if DCAA established due dates for implementing those corrective actions, and then missed them … by more than a year? What then?

Well, then nothing. Apparently, there are no repercussions whatsoever when DCAA misses its agreed-upon corrective action milestones to address DOD IG findings. The DOD Inspector General says nothing. The DCAA Director says nothing. And nobody seems to care a whit.

Oh, wait. We know somebody who cares: the auditors who are awaiting the agreed-upon policy changes care. They care because they are trying to comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), and they’re worried that the lack of policy guidance out of Fort Belvoir is going to take them into a GAGAS noncompliance.

We know this is true, because at least one self-identified DCAA auditor brought the matter to our attention. (Note: we have no means to verify that people who send us emails are who they claim to be.) In truth, this issue had been in the back of our mind for a while. It’s not like we weren’t aware of the agreed-upon corrective actions … but we had forgotten how much time had passed without the agreed-upon policy changes.

So now we get to write about it.

You remember the issue right? We discussed it right here.

In that article (link above) we discussed the DOD IG findings contained in audit report D-2011-6-011. The audit report identified inconsistencies in DCAA’s policy regarding “currency” of audit testing. In fact, the audit report identified that DCAA had no such policy—which is why the Inspector General concluded that DCAA’s auditors were “uncertain” when evidentiary data supporting audits of contractor business systems was too old to rely upon. Consequently, DCAA audit reports regarding the adequacy of contractor business systems could "be delayed because of retesting.”

The DOD IG wrote “GAGAS 6.04b requires the auditor to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the conclusion that is expressed in the report. The evidence provided in the report is more helpful if it is current.” Accordingly, the audit report recommended that DCAA implement policy guidance to ensure DCAA auditors were compliant with GAGAS.

The DOD IG wrote—

We recommend that DCAA Headquarters develop written agency-wide policy and guidance on the need to test current data to support opinions on the contractor’s internal controls and business systems. The policy and guidance should include criteria when the auditor should expand testing and perform additional work.

DCAA concurred with the findings and the recommended corrective action. In fact, it was Director Patrick Fitzgerald who concurred, on behalf of his agency.

The DOD IG audit report stated—

By November 2011, DCAA will issue guidance, which will include the requirement for auditors to (i) perform sufficient testing of data that is relevant to the audit objectives, including the period or point in time covered by the report, (ii) perform testing of data generated by the system throughout the period under audit, and (iii) issue timely audit reports. For audits of contractor business systems, DCAA will perform compliance attestation engagements and report on the contractor’s compliance during a period of time or as of a point in time, consistent with the applicable attestation reporting standards (AT 601.55b) in AICPA’s Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements. Circumstances where auditors would need to expand testing to obtain sufficient evidence for the conclusions expressed in the report should be limited since the transactions being evaluated in the audit will coincide with the defined period covered by the audit. DCAA agrees with the guidance in GAGAS A8.02g, that the evidence provided in the report is more helpful if it is current and, therefore, timely issuance of the report is an important reporting goal for auditors.

Note that the corrective action was due to have been completed by not later than November, 2011. That was more than one year ago as this article is being written. And so far DCAA has not generated the agreed-upon policy guidance to its auditors.

Why is DCAA blowing its CAP? Well, one self-identified DCAA auditor had this to say about the situation—

One reason and I think it is the [paramount] reason for no MRD is the number of DCAA audit assignments that would either have to be cancelled or have to be reworked. In my office there are over 40 assignments that are from the 2008-2010 time frame that are open and no one has worked on [them] for years. So most of them would have to be cancelled as their relevance has now dissipated. So [multiply] our 40 by another 100 DCAA [FAOs] and you would see [four] thousand audits [that] would need to be cancelled and a couple million taxpayer dollars down the drain.

So there you go. How many audit assignments would get cancelled if DCAA HQ issued the agreed-upon audit guidance? How many audit assignments would be delayed past the applicable statute of limitations? How many audit findings and how many questioned dollars would be thrown out of court when the auditor testified that his or her testing failed to comply with GAGAS, as interpreted by DCAA?

So perhaps that’s why DCAA has chosen to forget about its Corrective Action Plan. And there have been no repercussions. The DOD Inspector General has said nothing. The Director of DCAA has said nothing. And nobody seems to care a whit.

But the auditors remember. And they care.

 

Questioning Questioned Costs

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DCAA_HQ
As we’ve reported before, the number one metric by which DCAA measures its effectiveness as an audit agency is the amount of “questioned costs” that its audits generate. To be clear, DCAA does not often disallow costs on its own. Instead, it “questions” costs in an audit report that’s addressed to a customer (typically a DCMA contracting officer), and then it’s up to that customer to officially disposition the audit findings—including disallowing questioned costs when warranted. The ratio of contracting officer-disallowed costs to DCAA’s questioned costs is called the “sustention rate”. The higher the sustention rate, the more it can be said that the customer agreed with the audit findings.

Many observers disagree with DCAA’s management approach. They believe that it is not only the gross amount of questioned costs that should be measured, but that the sustention rate needs to be measured as well. For example, when DCAA told the DOD Inspector General that it “non-concurred” with IG findings that DCAA was leaving a quarter-billion dollars in questioned audit dollars on the table each year, it revealed that the sustention rate for those “forward pricing audits” was 41.8 percent. In other words, “in negotiations contracting officers are sustaining just over $4 for every $10 in DCAA questioned costs.”

Some people think that’s a pretty pathetic result—especially in the current contracting environment, where any DCMA contracting officer who disagrees with DCAA audit findings is likely to find him or herself before a Review Board, who will adjudicate the disagreement after reviewing a lengthy written package. Some people think that, in this environment, a sustention rate of 41.8 percent (i.e., where the customer disagrees with audit findings nearly 60 percent of the time) indicates some serious audit quality issues. Those audit quality issues are, of course, in addition to the well documented audit timeliness issues with which DCAA currently struggles.

Some might also assert that a sustention rate of just over 40 percent indicates that DCAA is padding its audit findings, and that the audit agency is questioning costs simply for the sake of questioning costs— knowing that the costs it questions will never be sustained. And it need not even be that intentional. If the auditors in the field thought that they were being measured solely on the basis of the amount of costs they questioned, then it would simply be human nature to want to question more costs, or to push the envelope regarding which costs should be questioned. We all want our bosses’ approval, and what better way to get it than to excel at the most important agency metric?

Yes, we understand that GAGAS—Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards—should operate to ensure that audits are conducted with impartiality, independence, and objectivity. But you know what? Auditors are people too. People with all the human foibles endemic to any bureaucracy. You tell them that generating questioned costs is the most important thing in the world, and you are very likely to get questioned costs—lots and lots of them.

If you are a contractor, you should be concerned that DCAA’s recent penchant for generating lots and lots of questioned costs is going to put you in a tough position. You either agree with DCAA’s audit findings (thus eroding your profits), or you try to convince your cognizant federal agency official that DCAA is wrong. And if you can’t convince your CFAO to override DCAA, then you’ve got to pay up or litigate.

We thought we would look at some of the costs that DCAA is questioning these days, courtesy of the recently issued DOD Inspector General’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress, covering the six month period ending September 30, 2012. Appendix G of the Semi-Annual Report lists “Contract Audits with Significant Findings”. Here are some selected “significant findings” generated by DCAA from that Appendix G list.

  • Audit Report 02211-2006S10100001 was an audit of a corporate incurred cost proposal (i.e., a proposal to establish final billing rates) for the contractor’s FY 2006. (Note that the audit report was issued just a hair under the Contract Disputes Act’s six-year statute of limitations, in April, 2012.) DCAA questioned $33.3 million, including $24.8 million of “medical expenses due to ineligible dependents.” Our opinion on that particular issue is well documented on this blog.

  • Audit Report 02161-2011G10110001 was an audit of travel costs billed to a single Army contract. DCAA questioned $21.7 million—100% of all billed contract travel costs—because “the contractor did not obtain advance written approval for the travel as required by contract terms.” And yet—the customer apparently approved the invoices containing the travel costs; and (apparently) the customer received benefit from the contractor’s travel. (Can anybody say quantum meruit?)

  • Audit Report 02701-2006A10100003 was an audit of a contractor’s incurred cost proposal for the contractor’s FY 2006. (Again, note the timing; in this case, the audit report was issued July 31, 2012.) DCAA questioned $76.6 million, including $60.1 million of “direct material for which the contractor did not provide documentation of government inspection and acceptance and/or documentation demonstrating the material costs were based on competitive awards.” While we are of course unaware of the specific details of this contractor’s situation, we find it odd that government inspection and acceptance would be required for contractor-acquired material. Can’t contractors have their own receiving inspection and acceptance? Even so, one would think that the customer inspection and acceptance of the end product would have sufficed. And as for the notion that material costs must be based on competition in order to be allowable … we are concerned that DCAA’s position could have survived a supervisory review.

  • Audit Report 04911-2010J10100001 was an audit of a NASA contractor’s “final allocated direct cost report.” DCAA questioned $78.6 million, including $30.5 million in “questioned subcontract costs due to inadequate price competition, failure to evaluate cost overruns, and rework costs that should have been absorbed by the subcontractor.” In addition, DCAA questioned $20 million of health and dental insurance costs “because the contractor lacks adequate documentation and internal controls to verify eligibility.” Again with the ineligible dependents issue; notice how the lack of internal controls led to questioned costs. That’s a new twist, as far as we can tell.

  • Audit Report 04911-2006B10100001 was an audit of a contractor’s FY 2006 incurred cost proposal (issued September 19, 2012) in which DCAA questioned $58.2 million in claimed costs. Among the questioned costs were $21.6 million of “unauditable subcontract costs because the subcontractors are no longer in business and/or the records are unavailable.” Well. We think that if DCAA is going to delay performing its audits, it is hardly the contractor’s fault if the subcontractor went out of business in the meantime. (Can anybody say “laches”?) Further, DCAA questioned $2.9 million of “medical insurance costs due to lack of supporting documentation for the eligibility of claimed dependents.” Notice how DCAA has cleverly reversed the burden of proof there? Normally, in order to assert that a cost is unallowable, the government bears the burden of proof; in this case, DCAA has asserted that the contractor has the burden to prove that a cost is allowable. Wrong!

  • Audit Report 06271-2002A10100103 was an audit of a contractor’s FY 2002 incurred cost proposal—issued more than ten years after the contractor submitted its proposal. DCAA questioned $4.9 million in claimed subcontractor costs “which were not adequately supported with documentation to verify that services had been received.” Yes. What do you think the odds are that receiving documentation would be maintained for 10 years—more than double the time required by FAR 4.7? Is it reasonable for anybody to think that such minutiae could survive for a decade? We assert that it is not. Apparently, DCAA disagrees and thinks that 10 years is just the right amount of time to retain documents, despite what the FAR requires.

To be fair, we cherry-picked the audit findings reported above. There were a number of other findings that might well be legitimate, and which will likely save the taxpayers considerable sums of money. But the thing is—DCAA is obviously cherry-picking its findings, so we think turnabout is fair play here.

So if you agree with us that most, if not all, of the findings we reported above reek of auditors desperate to generate questioned costs at any price, then perhaps you’ll be better prepared the next time DCAA comes calling.

One final item, which we report with some trepidation. We have received a report that DCAA HQ is inflating the questioned costs reported by its auditors. It’s (allegedly) not enough that the auditors are reaching and pushing the envelope in order to generate loads of questioned costs; apparently HQ is piling additional costs on top of the auditors’ findings. HQ is (allegedly) doing this by counting as questioned costs items that the contractor has voluntarily withdrawn prior to the audit. Our sources say, “DCAA’s OWD group massages all the numbers at HQ … if only you could get them to show the public how much of our CQ is not found by DCAA [because] they are voluntary deletions [by the contractor].” In other words, the more the contractor complies with the FAR allowability requirements, the more questioned costs that DCAA reports as audit-generated taxpayer savings.

Now let’s just say this allegation is, as of this writing, unconfirmed by official sources. But if true, it would add a new level to our little discussion of DCAA’s number one management metric, would it not? One might perhaps believe that new heights in Kafkaesque management had been reached.

 

 

DCAA Defends Itself While Disgruntled Auditors Disagree

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Recently we’ve posted our thoughts about a recent DOD Inspector General audit report that took issue with DOD’s decision to forego DCAA audits on certain low dollar-value contractor cost proposals, which pushed that workload over to DCMA contracting officers. In the past, we’ve posted our thoughts about DCAA’s insane backlog of unperformed audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates. We’ve also posted our musings about a GAO audit report that found that DCMA had been mismanaged and, as a result, had lost critical skills—leaving it overly reliant on DCAA.

As a result of the foregoing—as well as certain other issues such as DOD’s difficult-to-understand obsession with the healthcare costs of ineligible dependents—we called out DCAA, DCMA, and DPAP leaders. We suggested that it was time for them to let other folks take their turns in the batter’s boxes. That suggestion was quoted by GovExec.com in its story about DCAA “auditing triage” approach that reviews “fewer contracts” but focuses on “high-dollar returns.”

Recently, GovExec published a “rebuttal” to the DOD IG audit report from “a senior Defense official familiar with DCAA.” That anonymous source generated a nice blind quote that the IG “analysis is fundamentally flawed” and asserted that the new audit approach does not leave “money on the table.”

There are more blind quotes from the anonymous senior Defense official. They’re hardly worth mentioning, because they’re blind quotes. Anonymity might be all the rage within The Beltway, but we don’t believe anonymous quotes should be taken too seriously. Nor should anonymous comments left by self-identified current and former DCAA auditors.

But before we move on, we want to let you know that this anonymous senior Defense official offered the following assertion to GovExec—

The official said the savings DCAA achieved through its reassignments of employee hours to high-risk contracts were higher in fiscal 2012 than the previous year, and, contrary to the IG’s conclusions, the efficiency of the ‘move of auditor resources to the right spots has proven out.’ DCAA’s backlog of pending audits, the official added, ought to come down now that the agency has been given additional people and resources.

Well.

We’ve posted our thoughts about this issue on this website blog for all to see. The fact is that we agree with the anonymous official. We also expect that DCAA will be able to show a significant reduction in its backlog of pending audits in its next reporting cycle. However, we disagree as to the cause of the reduction.

The anonymous Defense official asserts that the backlog reduction stems from “additional people and resources”—but we think it’s going to come from risk-waiving low ADV audits as well as relaxing some of the GAGAS-compliance insanity imposed on the auditors during 2010 and 2011. Other contributing factors will be the near disappearance of CAS compliance reviews, business system reviews, and post-award “defective pricing” audits from the “pending” category.

But that’s not all.

The linkage of MAARs with the 10100 audits has permitted auditors to perform only the most superficial procedures to address the Mandatory Annual Audit Requirements. We’ve also noticed that FAOs are dialing down the WAWF voucher reviews that have plagued the audit workforce since DCAA withdrew contractors’ direct-billing authority. The use of Memos in lieu of formal audit reports has permitted costs to be questioned without the unpleasant necessity of complying with GAGAS and going through all that nasty IRR and SAQ stuff that slows down more formal audits.

So we think those are the critical causal factors that will lead to the backlog reduction, and not the addition of “people and resources.”

Also: to the anonymous “senior Defense official familiar with DCAA,” we offer the observation that the phrase “additional people and resources” is, by and large, redundant. DCAA’s audit resources are made up of nothing but people. Its people are its resources. Something to consider the next time you offer a blind quote, perhaps?

And speaking of DCAA people: we get e-mails. A couple of concerned DCAA auditors (or folks who claimed to be DCAA auditors) weighed-in with some vitriolic comments about DCAA leadership and audit procedures. A couple of them asked that Apogee Consulting, Inc. sponsor a discussion forum on this site, so as to give these disgruntled DCAA folks a place to vent. To those people: we are looking at the best way to make that happen. It’s our New Year’s resolution.

But make no mistake: despite our provocative assertion that the current leaders of the DOD contractor oversight regime should consider making room for new leaders with new visions, we are NOT DCAA-haters. We respect the mission of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and we respect the mission of the Defense Contract Management Agency. Those are essential organizations that provide a critical set of skills that support the war fighters in executing their national security mission.

But we think those missions are so critical that they demand a more effective leadership. We need effective oversight, and not more entrenched bureaucracy.

So if we do open up a discussion forum on this site, it will be moderated. And we will demand constructive criticism; we will not tolerate personal attacks. Those who can’t offer respectful, informed, criticism will be banned. You have been warned.

And to those who e-mailed us about the new Leadership Program at DCAI, thanks for the info. Our natural cynicism tells us that using the current leaders to train the next generation of leaders is going to be problematic. We’ve also come to the conclusion that leaders can’t flourish in an environment of fear, where the truth is suppressed in order to perpetuate the party line. (That latter comment is not directed at any particular organization; we think it’s a general truism.) So while we’d like to be able to see this as a hopeful sign, we’re not really convinced it’s going to work out as planned.

As a side note, we offer another observation that when you create so many new Branch Offices and Resident Offices, you create an artificial demand for new leaders. If you were to de-establish those new FAOs and “demote” those recently promoted Branch Managers back to the ranks of experienced Supervisory Auditors, you might find you had some excellent auditors, capable of exercising judgment and discretion. We offer that observation in the spirit of constructive criticism.

See? It’s not that hard.

 

Fraud Recoveries

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Big_Bucks
Recently the Department of Justice announced, via a press conference, that it had recovered just a hair under $5 Billion from its GFY 2012 enforcement efforts related to the False Claims Act. That was “a new record for a single year,” according to the DOJ spokesperson. The spokesperson stated—

Since January 2009, we have obtained a total of $13.3 billion in False Claims Act cases, the largest four-year total in the Department’s history.  That is more than a third of the total recoveries under the Act since it was amended a quarter of a century ago in 1986. … The False Claims Act is, quite simply, the most powerful tool that we have to deter and redress fraud.

Of the $5 Billion in FCA recoveries, about $3.3 Billion originated from qui tam relators filing suits. According to the DOJ spokesperson, in GFY 2012, nearly 650 qui tam cases were filed under the FCA—“more cases than ever before under the Act.”

The folks at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) trumpeted this DOJ announcement, calling the recoveries testament “to the FCA’s versatility and far-reaching impact.”

So why does the Federal government think it needs to expand its arsenal of fraud-fighting weapons to include asset forfeitures under civil proceedings?

Hey! We’re not lawyers. But we’re confused here.

On one hand, we have the Feds crowing about how successful the FCA is at recovering illicit fraud-related gains. But on the other hand, we have those very same Feds using other statutes as the basis of asset forfeiture.

So which is it?

We refer you to this DOJ press release.

As you can see from perusing that press release—

Kentucky-based Lusk Mechanical Contractors and Commonwealth Technologies, and their owners, Harry Lusk and Wendell Goodman, have agreed to pay $6.25 million to resolve allegations that they submitted false statements to the Small Business Administration and false claims to the Army….

Their agreement resolved allegations made false statements to the SBA in order to be certified as a HUBZone company, which they then used to obtain Army contracts for work at Fort Knox. According to the press release—

The United States alleged that, using the falsely obtained HUBZone certification, the companies obtained contracts from the Army that had been restricted to qualified HUBZone companies, in violation of the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).

More to our point, the settlement agreement called for the parties to pay $3.74 million and “to forfeit $2.5 million seized by federal agents from their bank accounts under a civil forfeiture action.”

We checked, and this is a fairly unusual step for the Feds to take. Yes, FIRREA does have an asset forfeiture provision. But our information is that the Feds used an allegation of Wire Fraud, and not a FIRREA violation, as the basis of their asset forfeiture action.

You can Google “civil asset forfeiture” and you’ll get a number of articles about the topic—most of which condemn the practice. We’re not really qualified to know whether or not it’s justified, but we are confused as to why the Feds thought it was justified in these particular circumstances.

It seems to us that the False Statements Act and the False Claims Act provide plenty of statutory strength for the Federal government. Things appear to be going swimmingly, as $5 Billion in annual recoveries would seem to evidence. And yet, civil asset forfeiture was felt to be warranted in these circumstances.

We don’t get it.

But in any case, you have now been warned. If the Feds think you’ve violated the False Claims Act, they now have another tool in their toolkit, another weapon in their arsenal. And apparently, they are not reluctant to use it.

 

Latest DOD Business Systems News

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In a government contracting world threatened by the recently revised and strengthened DFARS Business System Administration contract clause, Apogee Consulting, Inc. continues to bring you the latest info and insight into how it is impacting Defense contractors.

(Can’t you just hear that sentence in the voice of the movie guy?)

Anyway, here’s what we’ve learned.

DCMA has not yet implemented the new Business System regime across the entire defense industrial base. Instead, only the top 5 defense contractors—those who have Corporate Management Councils—have been subject to reviews under the new Business System adequacy criteria with potential payment withholds for significant deficiencies. But the rest of you shouldn’t get complacent: DCMA has reiterated that its goal is to expand the reviews “to all [defense] contractors”.

In the meantime, those five defense contractors have more than 1,000 individual business systems that DOD has to assess and disposition. So it’s going to be some time before the mid-tier gets to experience reenergized DOD oversight.

We told you that DCMA had created a Review Board to provide oversight over preliminary Contracting Officer decisions to find that a contractor’s business system was inadequate, based on audit findings of significant deficiencies. According to the information we received, that Review Board has conducted 19 oversight reviews to date. 15 of those reviews addressed recommended system disapprovals. (We are unsure what the other 4 reviews were for. Perhaps DCMA is reviewing all Business System determinations and not just disapprovals?)

Only five of the 15 reviews resulted in business system disapprovals. In 10 of 15 reviews, the Review Board “non-concurred” with the Contracting Officer’s preliminary finding—effectively over-riding the Contracting Officer. This, we think, bodes well for defense contractors. That being said, those 5 concurrences resulted in an aggregate payment withholding of $42 million to date.

We were informed that any reductions in payment withhold rates (e.g., reductions from 5% to 2% based on submission of an acceptable corrective action plan), do not trigger an immediate return of previously withheld funds. DCMA’s position is that changes to withholding rates are prospective only, and that the withheld funds will be retained by the Government until the contractor’s corrective action plan is complete and the business system has been approved. This was not only DCMA’s position; it was also the official position of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).

Interestingly, we were informed that one of those five contractors fully implemented its corrective action plan, and had 100% of their withheld payments returned to them. This is another fact that we think bodes well for defense contractors.

As we’ve noted in other blog articles, the current DFARS regime of six contractor business systems may not stay static. In particular, we were informed that DCMA is actively considering eliminating the “Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS)” business system, and replacing it with a business system focused on detection and prevention of counterfeit parts (the “secure supply chain” system). DOD Leadership has become concerned about this issue and a proposed DFARS rule will be issued shortly to implement Section 818 of the 2012 NDAA.

Readers of this blog will recall that Apogee Consulting, Inc. has long been a proponent of securing the program supply chain. (We think those particular blog articles contain some of our best rants.) If this actually happens, we are so going to post a big “we told you so”.

So that’s the status of the DFARS contractor business systems administration regime at the end of 2012. Stay tuned for 2013.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.