Court of Federal Claims Dismisses Contract Award to AbilityOne Entity
We have worked with the AbilityOne Program for many years. For the past two years, we have taught courses on behalf of the NISH Leadership Academy, preparing AbilityOne contractors to successfully pass DCAA audits. One of our largest clients is an AbiltyOne entity, working at military bases throughout the country. We passionately support the AbilityOne Program and its mission of giving meaningful jobs to people with disabilities, including severely wounded warriors returning from military service.
This is not to say that we don’t have some choice words of criticism for the Program.
In fact, the fairly recent emphasis by the Defense Department on AbilityOne contracting, making AbilityOne sources “preferred” over other potential sources, has contributed to the enormous growth of the Program. In turn, that rapid growth has led to some management issues. We have observed the leadership of the AbilityOne Program struggle to adapt and evolve in response to challenges created by its growth and by its new Defense customers. The AbilityOne Leaders have not always made the wisest of decisions in response to those challenges, sometimes holding on to “the way it’s always been done” despite the needs of its newly expanded operating environment.
Recently, the Court of Federal Claims felt the need to point out some of the problems with the AblityOne Program’s eagerness to expand its contracting opportunities (which in turn would create more opportunities for those with disabilities). The decision was the result of a bid protest filed by Systems Application & Technologies, Inc. (SA-TECH), who was the incumbent O&M contractor at the Yakima Training Center in the State of Washington before the Army intended to award its contract to Skookum Educational Systems, an AbilityOne entity. Skookum, who had “zero experience” with the scope of work, proposed to perform the O&M work with at least 60 percent “severely disabled” workers.
As Judge Bruggink wrote—
While to an outsider it would appear that what the Army proposes is sheer folly, the government has aggressively defended its actions as permissible under the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act (‘JWOD’), 41 U.S.C. §§ 8501-506. That act authorized creation of the Committee for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (the ‘Committee’ or ‘AbilityOne’). … The Committee is responsible for developing a ‘Procurement List’ of products and services which are suitable for the Federal Government to procure from qualified nonprofit agencies (‘NPA’) which employ a workforce of blind or severely disabled individuals. … Here, the Committee, with the Army’s concurrence, has designated the contract suitable for addition to the Procurement List and for award on a sole source basis to Skookum, an AbilityOne NPA.
Not everybody was excited at the idea of having severely disabled people performing range management functions. One memo introduced into the record stated, “The stringent requirements under the contract to conform to all OSHA regulations, all explosive ordnance directives and to operate safely in a highly dangerous work environment could be compromised by a severely disabled workforce.”
One key issue concerned the definition of “severely disabled” and whether there were a sufficient number of such people in the remote desert area of western Washington, and whether such people (if they could be found) could safely perform the required work. One Army Memorandum questioned whether “having a labor force that has severe mental and physical disabilities, monitored by non-medical supervisors / work leads, and working in what can be a harsh and stressful environment, will produce a positive outcome.” The Committee held many discussions with stakeholders, including counsel for SA-TECH, and expressed disagreement with the notion that disabled people could not safely perform range O&M services. The Judge related the following exchange—
… [C]ommittee member Kathy Martinez told plaintiff’s counsel, ‘I am very concerned about your concept of what a significant disability means and what people with significant disabilities can do? I happen to be a blind person. I don’t work on a shooting range, but I am you know, a significant, I am a person with a significant disability who is employed. And, I am unaware that the term significant disability means that you can’t hold down a job.’ … After plaintiff’s counsel read the statutory definition of ‘severely disabled,’ Ms. Martinez replied, ‘I think that’s a very antiquated definition frankly.’
As the Judge wrote—
Nine [Committee] members voted in favor, one was undecided, and three disapproved. … The three dissenting members of the Committee expressed doubts as to the propriety of awarding this contract through AbilityOne. They were concerned because the principal behind the incumbent contractor was a disabled person who employed service disabled and other veterans, the work did not seem safe for severely disabled individuals, Skookum was allowed a long phase in period and a low goal for the percentage of severely disabled individuals employed, and Skookum had not presented a plan for transporting severely disabled individuals 33 miles to and from YTC.
SA-TECH filed a bid protest against the Army and its decision to give the work to Skookum under the auspices of the AbilityOne Program. The primary basis of the protest was that the Committee failed to enforce the statutory requirement that at least 75 percent of the contract direct labor hours be performed by the severely disabled. The Committee took the position that the ratio severely disabled labor hours should be applied to the AbilityOne NPA as a whole, and not to any particular contract. But the Judge decided the protest on other grounds and did not resolve that difference of opinion.
Judge Bruggink found that the Committee’s decision to add the Yakim range O&M services to the Procurement List was “arbitrary and capricious.” He wrote—
It is uncontroverted that the YTC contract is not the same as the work Skookum does at Fort Bliss and White Sands. Describing the YTC contract as merely ‘facilities maintenance’ makes it sound more like other AbilityOne work, but that description is inaccurate. Conditions on the range are stress-inducing … and involve the explosion of munitions during live fire. An unavoidable question should have been, is it appropriate to put someone who has severe post-traumatic stress disorder with depressive and anxiety disorder on or even near a live fire range. Or, can someone who has degenerative joint disease or polio meet the physical requirements of the job … Instead of asking such questions, the Committee staff shifted the burden to SA-TECH and relied on high-minded policy … It was not SA-TECH’s burden to show that severely disabled are ‘inherently incapable’ of performing any of the tasks on the YTC contract. It was Skookum’s burden, given the numerous reasons for concern, to show that there were a sufficient number of specific jobs that could be done by severely disabled workers. Instead of thinking critically about whether severely disabled individuals are capable of performing the contract, the Committee criticized SA-TECH for assuming ‘that Skookum will perform the work in the same way that SA-TECH has in the past,’ and uncritically accepted Skookum’s unsupported claim that doing the work in some unspecified different way somehow solves the technical problems posed by the YTC contract. … On the basis of the existing record, it was arbitrary and capricious for the AbilityOne Committee to designate the YTC for placement on the Procurement List. Because Skookum was the only contractor being considered, that means that its designation as the contractor for the work was also arbitrary and capricious.
Consequently, the Army was prevented from awarding the contract to Skookum.
This decision has clear implications for the AbilityOne Program. First, it indicates that Courts will take seriously the statutory definition of “severely disabled” and so it behooves the Committee and AbilityOne contractors to use that statutory definition with respect to workers who might be called on to perform the contract SOW. It means that challenging work—work not traditionally performed under the AbilityOne program—should be critically evaluated to ensure that it can be safely performed by individuals who meet the statutory definition. Scoffing at “antiquated definitions” will not work when legal challenges are presented.
Second, the decision should be interpreted as a signal that the AbilityOne Program has limits on its ability to grow, and that those limits are inherent in the Program’s mission. AbilityOne NPAs cannot do everything under the sun; they can only do the work that they can do safely, consistent with the disabilities of those it employs. While it may be tempting to add contract after contract to the Procurement List, that temptation must be tempered by the realization that some work is simply inappropriate to add.
Third, DOD contracting officers looking to respond to the official preference for AbilityOne contract awards—a pressure that will only grow along with the numbers of wounded warriors exiting service—need to evaluate the work requirements in light of the fact that a number of the individuals performing the work will be severely disabled (as that term is defined by statute). There is a lot of work that can be performed by the severely disabled; but not all work can be performed by them. This decision can be used to educate government personnel about the types of work that can, and cannot, be performed—and how the requirements should be evaluated for suitability.
Finally, it’s time for the AbilityOne Program leadership team to use this decision to identify processes and procedures it needs to change, in order to provide assurance that the Program is not over-reaching and is safely operating within its statutory intent. It ought to serve as a wake-up call that the way things have been done will not work in the current environment, and that new management approaches are required.
The AbilityOne Program is too important to founder on the shoals of historic management approaches and practices. It needs to adapt to the current environment, so that it can maximize the number of severely disabled individuals it can employ.
It needs to adapt and change in order to remain successful.
There are many who can assist with that change.
Let them help.
Ending 2012 with a Fraud Settlement that Illustrates an Important Point
In April 2011 we posted an article about Verizon’s $93.5 million settlement with the Department of Justice that resolved False Claims allegations for invoices submitted by an entity it had acquired in 2006. Allegedly, those invoices contained taxes and surcharges prohibited by its contracts with the General Services Administration (GSA). That situation led us to write something that we’ve repeated many times on this site, namely: “government contractor compliance failures tend to be on the very expensive side, such that investments in compliance mechanisms and internal controls tend to pay for themselves.”
The cost/benefit analysis seems frighteningly clear to those who work in this industry. It’s essentially a no-brainer. The probability of being accused of submitting false claims (or making false statements) to the Federal government may be low, but the consequences tend to be huge. The risk analysis always shows that it’s cheaper to invest in an effective compliance program than it is to defend against allegations of wrongdoing.
The problem is that contractors too infrequently perform such a risk analysis. So in times of budgetary pressure—such as that in which we are currently working—it seems like picking low-hanging fruit to cut back on internal controls and compliance programs. Such a decision ameliorates today’s budget problems at the expense of creating potential problems for tomorrow’s leadership—as in when Verizon paid nearly $100 million for the decisions made by MCI/WorldCom nearly five years earlier.
The other problem is that contractors too frequently screw up the risk analysis. This is especially true when commercial companies dabble in government contracting. When the government contract revenue is a small percentage of total corporate sales, then management has a tendency to treat its Federal customers just like any other sales channel. Sure, they know (vaguely) that there are some special regulations involved in that government contracting stuff, and maybe they’ve hired a couple of people to “scrub the books” to make sure that those arcane regulations are complied with. But there is a definite tendency—especially at the most successful commercial companies—to think that those additional hires plus some good ol’ common sense will be sufficient to militate against the risk of noncompliance.
They screw up the risk analysis because they do not understand the risks.
They screw up the risk analysis because they do not understand the true cost of merely being accused of submitting a false claim to the Federal government. The cost of hiring attorneys and other outside experts. The cost of diverting personnel to litigation support instead of what they were hired to do. The cost of litigation-related reserves. The cost of filing SEC disclosures and of preparing special litigation notes to the financial statements. The cost of answering probing questions—not just by the Assistant U.S. District Attorney, but also by investment analysts during investor conference calls. The cost of seeing the stock price fall because of DOJ press releases. The reputational “brand” impact in the marketplace.
The leadership at defense contractors largely (but not universally) understands the cost/benefit analysis. They’ve been in the cross-hairs since the seventies, and they’ve largely adapted to the environment in which they work. But commercial companies who are new to government contracting, and whose government sales are a very low percentage of total sales, don’t get it. They haven’t been burned yet, so they don’t understand the risks of playing with matches. And so they skimp on internal controls and multiple reviews, and on the hiring of subject matter experts in areas such as contract administration, cost accounting, pricing, and billing.
The W.W. Grainger Corporation of Lake Forest, Illinois, presents us with a sterling example of the blown risk analysis.
Now, before we dig into this illustrative example of a commercial company who dabbled in government contracting, to the eventual chagrin of its leadership and shareholders, we have to let you know that we don’t have any inside information about the situation. All we have is what the Internet provides. Accordingly, we may be getting some of the details wrong. But we don’t think so. We think we understand W.W. Grainger, Inc. all too well.
W.W. Grainger, Inc. is a distributor of maintenance, repair, and operating (MRO) supplies, as well as other related products and services used by businesses. Although the majority of its sales take place in North America, it also has a global presence. The company serves about two million customers through its network of branches, distribution centers, websites, and export services. Grainger has centralized business support functions that provide coordination and guidance in the areas of accounting and finance, business development, communications and investor relations, compensation and benefits, information systems, health and safety, global supply chain functions, human resources, risk management, internal audit, legal, real estate, security, tax and treasury. These services are provided in varying degrees to all business units.
(We hope Grainger invested in providing some extra “centralized business support functions” to its business units selling goods and services to the Federal government. But our experience with such centralized service functions leads us to suspect that they skimped in that area. See our comments above about perceptions of low-hanging fruit ripe for cutting in times of budgetary pressure.)
W.W. Grainger had $8 billion in sales in its FY 2011. (FY 2012 numbers have not yet been released.) During its FY 2011, the company made about 105,000 individual transactions each day, selling to “small and medium-sized businesses to large corporations, government entities and other institutions.” No customer—not even the mega-buyer that is the United States Federal government—accounted for more than two percent of corporate sales. Grainger reported two segments, but those segments were differentiated by geography and not by customer. Tellingly, Grainger did not report a separate segment for its Federal sales.
In other words, W.W. Grainger dabbled in government contracting.
Item 1A of its FY 2011 10-K (Annual Report) filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission lists “significant risk factors relevant to Grainger’s business that could adversely affect its financial position or results of operations.” There are thirteen (13) significant risk factors listed. The thirteenth is an admission that the company “is subject to various government regulations.” The paragraph following that statement contains additional details, including:
As a government contractor selling to federal, state and local government entities, Grainger is subject to a variety of laws and regulations, including without limitation import and export requirements, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, tax laws (including U.S. taxes on foreign subsidiaries), foreign exchange controls and cash repatriation restrictions, data privacy requirements, labor laws and anti-competition regulations, and is also subject to audits and inquiries in the ordinary course of business. … Grainger has implemented policies and procedures designed to facilitate compliance with these laws and regulations, but there can be no assurance that employees, contractors or agents will not violate such laws and regulations or Grainger's policies. Any such violations could individually or in the aggregate materially adversely affect Grainger's financial condition or operating results.
Note 19 to the company’s 2011 financial statements contained the following statements—
Grainger is a party to a contract with the United States General Services Administration (the GSA) first entered into in 1999 and subsequently extended in 2004. The GSA contract had been the subject of an audit performed by the GSA's Office of the Inspector General. In December 2007, the Company received a letter from the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (the DOJ) regarding the GSA contract. The letter suggested that the Company had not complied with its disclosure obligations and the contract's pricing provisions, and had potentially overcharged government customers under the contract. Discussions relating to the Company's compliance with its disclosure obligations and the contract's pricing provisions are ongoing. The timing and outcome of these discussions are uncertain and could include settlement or civil litigation by the DOJ to recover, among other amounts, treble damages and penalties under the False Claims Act. Due to the uncertainties surrounding this matter, an estimate of possible loss cannot be determined. While this matter is not expected to have a material adverse effect on the Company's financial position, an unfavorable resolution could result in significant payments by the Company. The Company continues to believe that it has complied with the GSA contract in all material respects. Grainger is a party to a contract with the United States Postal Service (the USPS) entered into in 2003 covering the sale of certain Maintenance Repair and Operating Supplies (the MRO Contract). The Company received a subpoena dated August 29, 2008, from the USPS Office of Inspector General seeking information about the Company's pricing compliance under the MRO Contract. The Company has provided responsive information to the USPS and to the DOJ. Grainger is also a party to a contract with the USPS entered into in 2001 covering the sale of certain janitorial and custodial items (the Custodial Contract). The Company received a subpoena dated June 30, 2009, from the USPS Office of Inspector General seeking information about the Company's pricing practices and compliance under the Custodial Contract. The Company has provided responsive information to the USPS and to the DOJ. Discussions with the USPS and DOJ relating to the Company's pricing practices and compliance with the pricing provisions of the MRO Contract and the Custodial Contract are ongoing. The timing and outcome of the USPS and DOJ investigations of the MRO Contract and the Custodial Contract are uncertain and could include settlement or civil litigation by the USPS and DOJ to recover, among other amounts, treble damages and penalties under the False Claims Act. Due to the uncertainties surrounding these matters, an estimate of possible loss cannot be determined. While these matters are not expected to have a material adverse effect on the Company's financial position, an unfavorable resolution could result in significant payments by the Company. The Company continues to believe that it has complied with each of the MRO Contract and the Custodial Contract in all material respects.
Similar statements were provided in Grainger’s Q1 and Q2 10-Q reports to the SEC. The Q3 10-Q report added the following details—
Following this mediation with representatives of the DOJ, the Company reached a settlement in principle with the DOJ relating to the Company's disclosure obligations and pricing provisions of the GSA and USPS contracts. Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the Company agreed to pay $70.0 million to resolve the parties' dispute (other than with respect to certain alleged claims regarding tax, freight and billing errors that the Company does not believe will require it to make any material additional payments and for which the Company estimates its liability to be approximately $6.0 million). Accordingly, the Company recorded a $76.0 million liability which is included in Accrued expenses at September 30, 2012. The proposed settlement, which does not contain any admission of wrongdoing by the Company, remains subject to approval by authorized officials of the DOJ and the negotiation of a definitive settlement agreement.
We were struck by the statements in the 2011 annual report and the 2012 Q1 and Q2 quarterly reports that the possible litigation liability could not be estimated and thus no provision had been recorded. Despite the fact that the liability could not be estimated, the company told investors that it did not expect the resolution to have a “material adverse effect on the Company’s financial position.”
Yeah, right. The liability could not be estimated, because the company’s executive management team didn’t want to estimate it. They didn’t want to estimate it, because the potential liability was so freaking large. That farce continued for nine months, until the company finally got around to recording the liability in its Q3 (unaudited) financial statements. And the company auditors, Ernst & Young, LLC, accepted that delay, thus leading to earnings that were significantly overstated for a period of nine months—since the $76 million accrual represented roughly ten percent of annual earnings.
One wonders whether the auditors of Ernst & Young, LLC, had the experience and knowledge of Federal contracting matters to properly evaluate whether Grainger should have recorded its litigation liability in 2011, rather than waiting for nine months to do so. Since the Apogee Consulting, Inc. Principal Consultant used to work for EY, we think we know the answer. The answer is that EY very likely treated Grainger like a commercial business instead of as a Government contractor, and they very likely assigned an audit team to Grainger who had little (if any) expertise in Government contracting matters. Thus, we strongly suspect the auditors had no ability to evaluate the potential liability that Grainger was facing.
Like Grainger’s executive management team, the company’s auditors very likely had no clue about the special risks associated with selling to the Federal government. And no clue about whether or not the company was deploying sufficient internal controls and compliance procedures to mitigate those risks.
In fairness, there is nothing that absolutely requires the auditors to be able to assess government contracting risks. Their Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) work focuses on financial reporting and disclosure risks, and not on the more esoteric risks associated with regulatory compliance. On the other hand, the big audit firms have experts to evaluate income tax provisions; one wonders why they don’t have similar experts to evaluate legal and litigation provisions. One wonders why they don’t use their government contract cost accounting experts to assist their audit clients in performing robust risk analyses.
Had Grainger and/or its auditors performed a robust risk analysis, we think it would have been readily apparent that the company’s contracts with the GSA and USPS were extremely risky.
What do we mean? Let’s look at this statement from Grainger’s FY 2011 10-K filing:
The business has a sales force of almost 2,700 professionals who help businesses and institutions select the right products to find immediate solutions to maintenance problems and to reduce operating expenses and improve cash flows. The sales force increased over the prior year with the majority of the new sales representatives focused on acquiring additional business from existing medium-sized customers as well as acquiring new business across the United States.
We already told you that Grainger processed roughly 105,000 transactions each day for nearly 2 million customers each year. It had a sales force of 2,700 individuals, processing transactions through multiple channels. How in the world was it going to ever accurately disclose its commercial pricing practices, as required by its Federal contracts? How in the world was Grainger ever going to provide assurance that it was complying with the contracts’ price reductions clauses?
The fact of the matter is that Grainger should never, ever, have entered into those contracts. It was virtually impossible for it to comply with contractual requirements. We don’t have to know much about the company—and its centralized business support functions—to reach that conclusion.
And nobody had to be a subject matter expert to predict that the combination of commercial mind-set with the multiple sales channels and gigantic sales workforce was going to lead to a problem in contract compliance. Thus: the inevitable DOJ press release. It said (in part)—
Today’s settlement resolves issues discovered during a GSA post-award audit of Grainger’s MAS contract. The GSA Office of Inspector General learned that Grainger failed to meet its contractual obligations to provide the GSA with current, accurate and complete information about its commercial sales practices, including discounts afforded to other customers. As a result, government customers purchasing items under the Grainger MAS contract paid higher prices than they should have. In addition, today’s settlement resolves allegations that Grainger failed to meet its contractual obligations to provide “most-favored customer” pricing under two USPS contracts for sanitation and maintenance supplies. The USPS contracts required Grainger to treat USPS as Grainger’s ‘most-favored customer’ by ensuring that USPS received the best overall discount that Grainger offered to any of its commercial customers. Agents and auditors from the USPS Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated Grainger’s pricing practices and discovered that Grainger did not consistently adhere to this requirement, causing USPS to pay more than it should have for purchases made under the two contracts.
Yeah, big surprise, that.
Where was the corporate risk analysis? Where were the mitigation controls and procedures? And where were the auditors? Indeed, this is a great example of a blown risk analysis by a commercial dabbler in government contracting.
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We Are Not Alone
In typical melodramatic fashion we recently posted—
We are perhaps a lone voice in the wilderness. Or perhaps we’re that little boy in the crowd, shouting that the Emperor has no clothes. In either case, we say what we mean, and we mean what we say. The truth is out there, whether or not those in power wish to hear it.
Yeah. Not so much, actually.
The truth of the matter is that we are not the only voices asking troubling questions. We are not the only fingers pointing out serious problems in the current Defense contract oversight regime. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported significant concerns several times over the past few years. The DOD Inspector General has reported significant concerns several times over the past few years. The Project on Government Oversight has reported significant concerns several times over the past few years. People who know the situation are publicly questioning DOD leadership decisions regarding how contract audits are conducted (or are not conducted, as the case may be).
In late December, 2012, the GAO once again weighed-in on DCAA’s audit backlog and its effect on the ability of DOD to close-out physically completed contracts, in a report to the Senate’s Committee on Armed Services (GAO-13-131). Basically, it’s a terrible report. Not only is it superficial—glossing over important issues—but it is also untimely as well. The work was conducted before DCAA has had much of a chance to evaluate the impact of its recent changes in management approach.
As a result, while the report spends significant verbiage discussing DCAA’s new “risk-based” approach to triaging its audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates, it is forced to conclude that “DCAA has not yet fully developed measures to evaluate the initiative’s results and assess whether the changes will require further adjustments” and “it is too early to tell whether DCAA will achieve its goal of eliminating the backlog by 2016, in part because DCAA does not yet know how many proposals under $250 million ADV will be determined low or high risk and its initial estimates have proven inaccurate.” Those types of audit conclusions aren’t going to be helping any Senator figure out why DOD can’t close-out its contracts.
The audit report devotes significant word count to the May 2011 revisions to the FAR “quick close-out procedures” but fails to discuss whether or not those revisions helped, or perhaps actually impeded, contracting officers’ ability to close out contracts. We expressed our opinion right here. We wrote—
… this rule does nothing to streamline contract close-outs. Instead, it gives DCAA sole authority to determine whether a contractor has submitted an ‘adequate’ incurred cost submission/final indirect cost rate proposal. … The [final] rule omits any discussion regarding whether the ACO’s determination constitutes a ‘final decision’ under the Contracts Dispute Act. If the determination is a final decision under the CDA, then it is appealable to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or to the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals. If it is not a final decision, then no appeal is possible. And any attempt to fight DCAA’s checklist approach to adequacy, to argue that certain mandatory schedules are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular contractor, will result in monetary penalties—as the ACO invokes mandatory fee withholds that will not [be] released until the contractor agrees (under financial duress) to submit exactly the schedules that DCAA demands.
While we found much to criticize in the FAR revisions, the GAO report had nothing at all to say about them—other than to note that even though DCMA had provided its contracting officers with a FAR deviation that permitted them to make “broader use” of quick close-out procedures, “DCMA and the contracting offices we reviewed made only limited use” of them.
Gee, we wonder why that could be. Perhaps it’s because the rules, even with the DCMA deviation, are still too restrictive? Apparently, GAO couldn’t be bothered to address that foundational issue in its evaluation of DOD efforts to close-out aged contracts.
Still, there were some nuggets to be mined out of the report. We offer the following---
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The DCAA backlog is approximately 25,000 incurred cost audits as of the end of [government] fiscal year 2011, some dating as far back as 1996. This backlog represents hundreds of billions of dollars in unsettled costs, and according to DCAA has quadrupled over 10 years.
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DCAA raised the threshold above which an audit is required based on “Auditable Dollar Value” (ADV) from $15 million to $250 million, thereby decreasing the number of proposals automatically qualifying for audit from 5,194 to 659, based on the backlog as of the end of fiscal year 2011. (19,528 out of 24,722—or 79 percent—of contractor incurred cost proposals awaiting audit at the end of GFY 2011 had ADVs of less than $15 million dollars.)
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DCAA does not yet know how many proposals under $250 million ADV will be determined low or high risk and its initial estimates have proven inaccurate. DCAA auditors have completed risk assessments on 13,522 contractor proposals that had an ADV of less than $15 million—out of a universe of 19,528 proposals—as of September 2012. Of 13,522 risk assessments completed, DCAA determined that 7,815 proposals were high risk, or about two-and-a-half times more than it had initially anticipated. DCAA determined that the number of high risk proposals is higher than expected because over 3,500 of those proposals belong to contractors with no incurred cost audit history. [Note: we predicted this would be the case.]
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DCAA officials stated they plan to increase their staffing levels from 4,900 employees in 2011 to 5,600 by 2016.
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By 2016, DCAA estimates it will reduce the backlog and reach a steady state of audits, which it defines as two fiscal years of proposals awaiting review.
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DCAA’s ability to reach a steady state by 2016 will also depend on whether DCAA completes its audits within anticipated time frames. However, DCAA was not able to complete the number of audits it planned to in 2012. Specifically, DCAA planned to address 4,065 incurred cost proposals in fiscal year 2012 by, for example, completing an audit or desk review, but the agency reported that it addressed 2,930 as of the end of September 2012. [Note: that’s better than FY 2011 productivity, but still far short of what is needed.]
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The October 2011 DCMA FAR Deviation allows a DCMA contracting officer to waive the requirement for an incurred cost audit, in consultation with DCAA, when a compelling reason exists. DCMA guidance indicates that compelling reasons may include contracts with funds at risk of canceling, contracts that have been over-age for 6 or more years, and contracts where a contractor’s historical final indirect cost rates have been fairly consistent with proposed certified final indirect cost rates. Yet, contracting officers don’t make use of their authority. [Note: perhaps because they are afraid of being criticized for doing so.]
So that’s it for the GAO assessment of why DCAA can’t issue audit reports and why DOD can’t close-out contracts. While the report provided some interesting insights, we think a reasonable person would agree it failed to even identify, let alone address, the fundamental roadblocks in the various close-out processes. Color us disappointed.
But that’s not all we have to report on this topic.
The mid-Atlantic regional audit/accounting firm of Aronson LLC has recently voiced its concerns about DCAA’s backlog of unperformed audits on the blog of its Government Contract Services Group, writing—
… Controllers ‘dream’ about how they will have to pull data from seven or more years ago by digging through records of the organization that were prepared and filed in a ‘logical’ manner by their predecessor to ultimately survive the audit. The dream is stressful with a constant search for the documentation to support an expense incurred in some cases seven years ago. The receipt is found stapled to the voucher but it has faded with age and is no longer readable. The audit starts and stops for months and years with auditors coming and going; either leaving the agency or being reassigned to another priority. With each new auditor and each delay in the work, inefficiency is the result not an audit report. … While the Controllers ‘dream’ about pulling old documents for an audit; DCAA Directors and Branch Managers ‘dream’ about the stacks and stacks of ICS’s awaiting audit, the piles of work that continue to build and the constant requests for new audits and new priorities. … DCAA had estimated that there are approximately 15,000 Incurred Cost Submissions awaiting audit (this number has fluctuated in reports but we will stick with this one as a conservative estimate). Per last year’s report to Congress DCAA completed 349 Incurred Cost Audits; at this rate we will clear the backlog in approximately 40 years. I am not sure either side will survive! …
Darrell Oyer, a former DCAA bigwig who has run his own successful government contract accounting consultancy for many years—and who has acted as a mentor to us over the years—has also offered his opinion of the current state of Defense audit. His opinion is not an optimistic one.
As we have previously reported to our readers, DCAA did not fare well in litigation before the ASBCA when contractors challenged audit findings related to questioned Executive Compensation costs. Mr. Oyer expressed his concerns with DCAA’s apparent failure to change its audit methodology in the face of two strong repudiations by the Courts. Writing in his December 31, 2012 newsletter, Mr. Oyer stated—
A long-time associate commented on last month’s Newsletter regarding DCAA and executive compensation. The basic comment was that from all appearances DCAA is simply pretending that neither case (FJ Taylor nor Metron) ever happened. And likely, internally DCAA has rationalized that DCMA poorly present[ed] the cases. This is but one example of how different DCAA is today versus the years before. In the past when the government lost [a] court decision, the word went out that DCAA should not be using the same approach to pursue similar issues. DCAA management should be embarrassed; however, due to the influx of noncontract auditors into key management positions there is insufficient knowledgeable of government contracting to even know that embarrassment is the operative word. … Much of the new DCAA attitude is derived from the difference between a ‘contract’ audit and an ‘internal’ audit. For the latter the auditor’s word is final. For the former, there is the potential for litigation to correct wrong audit conclusions. It must be shocking to an internal auditor to find that there is a ‘higher authority.’ [Ed. Note: E.g., the ASBCA.] An internal auditor may merely plow ahead despite the lack of merits of a position; whereas for a contract audit, inappropriate findings and decisions may see the light of day and may be corrected via litigation. This ‘internal audit’ philosophy applied to a ‘contract audit’ environment provides little value to a besieged contracting officer who must make a ‘contract administration’ decision with irrelevant internal audit type findings!
So no, Apogee Consulting, Inc., is not alone in expressing concerns—grave concerns—about the management of the Defense oversight regime. In particular, we think Mr. Oyer’s comments on the differences between performing internal audits and contract audits are particularly insightful. We’ve expressed some of the same thoughts—though not with Mr. Oyer’s depth of background experience or his eloquence.
Unfortunately, we’ve come to the reluctant conclusion that those bureaucrats with the power to change the management—and implementation—of Defense contractor oversight have little to gain by making changes. We suspect they have everything to gain by maintaining the status quo ante of inefficient and ineffectual contract audits and administration—of which the inability to timely close-out completed contracts is but one of the many symptoms.
What would seem to be needed is radical change, not more of the same. Let us offer some thoughts for consideration.
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Get DCAA out of the forward priced cost proposal business. Entirely. DCAA does not belong in the business of applying its rigorous audit procedures to what are essentially guesses of future costs to be incurred. GAGAS is simply not applicable to such reviews. DCMA should perform its own cost and price analyses, and negotiate with contractors based on those internal efforts. All those hours that DCAA now spends auditing contractor proposals—the results of which are used to grossly inflate its estimates of taxpayer savings—should be redirected at other audits. The truth of the matter is that DCAA saves taxpayers very little by such audits; the most that can be said of them is that they identify areas in which the DOD negotiators may be able to reduce the agreed-upon contract price during negotiations with the contractor. DCAA has better uses for its scarce audit resources.
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DCAA should be forced to determine that a contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates is or is not adequate within 90 days of receiving it. A failure to do so should act like a waiver, and thus the proposal will be found to be adequate after 90 days unless DCAA determines it is inadequate. Though current DCAA audit guidance calls for that determination to be made “timely,” that establishes a goal, and a paper one at that. There is no downside to taking months to evaluate a contractor’s proposal for adequacy, nor is there any downside to determining that a proposal is adequate only to declare (years later when the audit finally starts) that the proposal has now been found to be inadequate. We need to force DCAA to make that adequacy determination quickly, and then stick with it even if audit guidance subsequently changes.
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DCAA should be forced to start all “incurred cost” (10100) audit assignments within 12 months of receipt of a demand letter from a Contracting Officer. Any 10100 assignment not started within 12 months should be cancelled, with a letter to the CO stating that the work cannot be performed timely. DCAA should be forced to report to Congress metrics regarding such cancelled audits. FAO Managers should have that metric used in annual performance evaluations.
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DCAA should be forced to complete all 10100 audit assignments within 24 months (two years) of starting them. For ADVs of less than $15 million, it should be forced to complete the 10100 assignments within 12 months of starting them. Failures to complete the work timely should be reported to Congress, along with the causes. DOD IG should review all such reported audit failures to verify the root cause(s) and recommend appropriate corrective actions. Metrics on cancelled 10100 assignments should be used in annual performance evaluations of all staff.
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DCAA should be forced to issue all audit reports within six months of completion of testing and field procedures. Any audit reports not issued after that time should be cancelled and reperformed. In such cases, the cognizant Supervisory Auditor and FAO Manager (and other interested parties such as Tech Specialists) should have a letter of reprimand placed in their files. Any individual who receives more than two letters of reprimand in one year should receive an annual performance rating of “Needs Improvement.”
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DCAA must get back in the mode of performing business system reviews and other MAAR-type audits, so that it can rely on the contractors’ reported data. DCAA used to have a system where the “incurred cost” assignments built on a foundation of system reviews and other compliance audits. Nowadays, the prevailing philosophy is that every audit report must stand alone, on its own. That philosophy leads to additional testing and working paper requirements, which slows down the audits. The audit agency needs to get back to its old integrated-audit approach. If it doesn’t, then virtually every contractor is going to be assessed as a “high risk” contractor, because it will have too many unassessed business systems. And consequently DCAA won’t be able to take advantage of its new “risk based” audit approach.
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With respect to the new “risk based” audit approach that permits a percentage of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates to go completely unaudited, we have only one comment. DON’T.
So to sum this all up, there are many parties—both within and outside of government—who think the current DCAA approach to managing its audits has left the Defense Department in an untenable position. Or (as we used to write in audit reports) “there is room for improvement”. We are not alone.
But when looking at recent DOD IG and GAO reports of the situation, we tend to think we are alone in pointing out some of the issues, and making concrete recommendations for corrective action. We wish that were not the case; but it seems very much to be so. We think it’s time—past time—for the other guys to start earning their salaries.
Starting 2013 with a Look at 2012
For the first couple of years this site was active, we always started off the New Year with an open letter to the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). But that was just a stunt; we never actually believed that the Director would have either the time or inclination to read our letter. And even if he did (by some miracle) read our letter, it never seemed to make any difference. So we discontinued that practice.
Even so, we still like to start off a New Year with something special. It’s a hopeful time and we like to offer some hopeful thoughts to those fellow government contracting enthusiasts who read this blog. This year, we wanted to start off by looking back at the past twelve months’ worth of events, to see if they might foretell something about the next twelve months to come.
The first thing that stands out about 2012 is that many people woke up to the fact that DCAA had mismanaged itself into a corner. In responding to 2008 and 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) findings that too many of its audits were of poor quality, and to the “expiration” of its externally reviewed quality control system, the audit agency seemed to go out of its way to create a culture that emphasized work paper documentation at the expense of actually issuing audit reports. Auditors spent so much time performing risk assessments and documenting the files in preparation for one internal review after another—and then re-performing work and preparing additional file documentation in response to review “notes”—that the productivity of the entire agency fell like a boulder falling off a cliff.
Audit quality actually may have improved. We don’t think so but, then again, we don’t see every audit report. However, even if audit quality did improve, timeliness crashed and burned. The backlog of audits has grown over the past four years, and is now at the point that it’s nearly unimaginably large. And that fact got noticed in 2012.
The Defense Department—led primarily by the Honorable Shay Assad—took action to try to help DCAA with its audit backlog problem. The assistance did not come in the form of helping the audit agency reform its management approach or in the form of helping the auditors figure out how to audit faster while maintaining audit quality. Instead, the assistance came in the form of shifting the workload away from DCAA and permitting DCAA to waive certain audits that it normally would have had to perform.
We didn’t think very highly of that bureaucratic maneuver. And we were not alone in that regard.
DOD’s internal Procedures, Guidance, and Instructions (PGI) document was revised to reduce DCAA’s involvement in audits of contractor proposals submitted in hopes of receiving new contract awards. As the DOD Inspector General noted, this change had the effect of shifting the proposal analysis workload from DCAA to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)—who by all accounts was ill-prepared to accept it (having had its own mismanagement crisis that led to the “loss of critical skill sets” in relevant areas). Moreover, as the DOD IG reported, DCAA’s own back-tracking on the officially approved PGI revisions led to a situation where significantly less audit hours were saved than had been initially estimated.
In addition, DCAA implemented a new “risk-based” approach to the audits of contractor annual proposals to establish final billing rates (inaccurately called by DCAA “incurred cost proposals”). This new approach stratified the contractor proposals by auditable dollar value (ADV). Lower ADV proposals were subjected to a “risk assessment,” and those proposals found to be “low risk” would have a significantly reduced chance of being audited … ever.
We’ll repeat that: If a contractor’s proposal was both low ADV and low risk, it might not ever be audited by DCAA, and then it would be up to DCMA to negotiate final billing rates without the benefit of an audit report.
This was a huge sea change in DCAA’s audit approach. Formerly, the contractor “final incurred cost proposal” was the primary means by which DCAA audited a contractor’s indirect costs for allowability, allocability, and reasonableness. (Which is redundant, because in order for a cost to be allowable it must also be allocable and reasonable … but we digress.) Even today, the multiple “mandatory annual audit requirements” that DCAA imposes on itself are tied to performance of the “10100” audit of a contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates. So DCAA’s decision to not perform a certain (unknown) percentage of its audit backlog in this area is a game-changing management decision. It’s so significant that everybody—including GAO—is awaiting the results.
So the big news of 2012 was that DCAA had a ginormous audit backlog, and was going to reduce that backlog by choosing not to perform certain audits that it had formerly considered to be mission essential. It also created “virtual incurred cost audit teams” and shifted workloads internally, between Field Audit Offices (FAOs), so that it could focus on whittling down the huge backlog that still remained even after its policy changes.
Will the 2012 policy changes affect 2013? We’re not confident that they will. We believe that DCAA’s problems are too intractable and that they will continue to persist. Let us offer some observations in support of that belief:
We noticed that the most recent DOD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report to Congress told lawmakers that DCAA had issued a paltry 22 post-award “defective pricing” audits in the past six months. Twenty-two. Across the entire audit agency. And we noticed that the implementation of the still new DFARS “business system definition and administration” oversight regime has been limited to only the very largest defense contractors at this point. And we haven’t seen very many CAS compliance audits for a while. And DCAA still has to review Disclosure Statements for adequacy sooner or later. And those timekeeping “floorcheck” audits aren’t going to perform themselves.
Just to mention a couple of audit areas that DCAA still considers to be mission essential (as of this date).
Accordingly, we think the backlog of unperformed audits is still there, waiting like the elephant in the room, as soon as Congress picks itself up from the bottom of the fiscal cliff it’s just about to run over as we write this. And if Sequestration has the cataclysmic effect predicted by many doomsayers, then DCAA is going to have a backlog of Termination Settlement Proposal audits to add to its already fantastically large pile of unperformed audits.
Sooner or later, somebody on The Mall is going to notice what’s happening—and perhaps more importantly what’s not happening—at DCAA. And then, we predict, the grilling that Mr. Fitzgerald will receive is going to make the grilling that Ms. Stephenson got before Senator McCaskill look tame in comparison.
Many critics like to point out problems without offering solutions. That ain’t us. We used to write an open letter to the DCAA Director each year, offering what we thought were practical, constructive, solutions. In addition, we frequently offer suggestions for improvement of Defense oversight on this site. So far, nobody in Fort Belvoir or in the Pentagon seems to be listening.
Which is fine.
We are perhaps a lone voice in the wilderness. Or perhaps we’re that little boy in the crowd, shouting that the Emperor has no clothes. In either case, we say what we mean, and we mean what we say. The truth is out there, whether or not those in power wish to hear it.
For our readership, we intend to continue telling the truth throughout 2013. To our readers, we wish you a Happy New Year.
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