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ASBCA Squarely Addresses CDA Statute of Limitations and DCAA Audits

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Bad_Judges
Recently, we told readers about the apparent split in the forums that hear Contract Disputes appeals, with respect to applying the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) Statute of Limitations (SOL).

Over at the Court of Federal Claims, so far Judges appear to be strictly enforcing the six-year SOL invoked by the CDA, and are rejecting appeals (for lack of jurisdiction) that have been found to be untimely. For example, Judge Lettow wrote (in a July 2012 decision regarding CAS 418 litigation between Sikorsky Aircraft and the U.S. Government), that “an agency’s self-imposed, internal regulations are invisible for claim accrual purposes”—meaning that the Government can’t hide behind its own uncompleted bureaucratic processes in order to toll the CDA SOL. If the Government can’t complete its processes timely, then Judge Lettow won’t hear the case. (We focus on Judge Lettow because there are many COFC Judges, and the decision of one Judge is not binding precedent for another Judge.)

Judge Lettow was speaking about the CAS noncompliance process, and didn’t squarely address the question on everybody’s mind. That question—which we’ve covered fairly extensively on this site—is when does the SOL clock start running with respect to a contractor’s submission of its proposal to establish final billing rates? Does the Government have six years from the time the contractor submits its proposal to assert a claim for costs that are allegedly unallowable? Does it have six years from the time the DCAA auditor determines that the proposal was adequate for audit? Does the CDA SOL clock start running from the time that DCAA issues its audit report to the Cognizant Federal Agency Official, no matter how many years that might take? It wasn’t squarely addressed.

And thus, even though it was fairly easy to draw an inference that the pendency of a DCAA audit—like other “internal regulations”—cannot overcome the “should have known” aspect of the FAR definition of “claim accrual,” nobody was absolutely certain that was the case. With respect to DCAA’s enormous backlog of uncompleted, pending, “incurred cost” audits, nobody was absolutely certain that DCAA’s opinion regarding a decent-sized portion of that pile was now completely irrelevant.

While many asserted audits of a chunk of the 25,000 proposals awaiting audit were now mooted (since the Courts would not hear any cases regarding them), nobody at DOD—least of all DCAA leadership—was willing to admit to it. Admitting that was the case would be a more-than-tacit admission that DCAA (and the hierarchy of DOD leadership that oversees DCAA) had mismanaged itself and botched one of its most essential missions: that of auditing contractors’ claimed costs to make sure that those costs complied with applicable rules and regulations.

So even though “Easy Ed” thought DCAA should just “write off” all its backlog of audits that were time-barred by the CDA SOL, and even though we agreed with that suggestion, we weren’t optimistic that DCAA would consider doing so until the audit agency was absolutely convinced that the Courts had mooted those ancient, uncompleted audits.

We also told readers that, over at the ASBCA, enforcement of a strict SOL timeclock has been—shall we say?—inconsistent. In fact, the ASBCA Judges have gotten it wrong. (In our layperson’s opinion, of course.) Although we have no qualifications (in a legal sense) to have an opinion on the matter, we still think Judge Delman authored a decision that added unnecessary confusion to what had been emerging as a relatively bright line with respect to the CDA SOL.

We thought that Judge Delman’s Lockheed Martin decision seemed to have ignored the “should have known” prong of the claim accrual definition, finding that the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (COFD) was not time-barred because DCAA hadn’t informed the CO that there were “overbillings to, or overpayments made by the government on government contracts.” Apparently, DCAA must speak some magic words in the ear of the Contracting Officer in order for the CDA SOL clock to start running—a position which (in our view) ignores the issue of whether the CO should have known the government had been injured, even without the magic audit words.

Regardless of our views, LockMart’s Motion was denied and it settled its case (for a very favorable amount, we’re told). Consequently, we told our readers that “if you have a CDA SOL issue you want to litigate, we expect your attorneys are directing you to the Court of Federal Claims, and not to the ASBCA, because they don’t want to have to deal with this particular decision.”

But in the meantime, other appeals were pending before the ASBCA. Two of those appeals involved The Raytheon Company.

On December 17, 2012, Judge Delman ruled on Raytheon’s Motions for Declaratory Judgment, in ASBCA Nos. 57576 and 57679.

But before we get into that ASBCA ruling, let’s set the baseline. Here’s how FAR Part 33.201 defines “claim accrual” for purposes of establishing the SOL—

‘Accrual of a claim’ means the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been known. For liability to be fixed, some injury must have occurred. However, monetary damages need not have been incurred.

We are all now on the same page.

Before Judge Delman was Raytheon’s Motion that was predicated on an assertion that the Government’s claims “were asserted beyond the six-year presentment period and are untimely.” Let’s look at the two Appeals separately.

In ASBCA No. 57576, Raytheon included allegedly expressly unallowable costs in several years’ worth of its proposals to establish final billing rates. Here are some of the key facts recited by Judge Delman—

  • Raytheon established a restricted stock plan in 1991 and entered into an Advance Agreement (with the Government) regarding that plan in 1992.

  • Raytheon had other incentive compensation plans, which were regularly reviewed with DCAA. In 2000, Raytheon made a complete presentation of its various incentive comp plans to DCAA.

  • With respect to Raytheon’s CY 2000 indirect costs, DCAA “took no exception” to Raytheon’s incentive comp plans. In September 2003, DCAA “took no exception” to Raytheon’s incentive comp plans included in its CY 2002 indirect costs. DCAA expressly found that the costs were allowable pursuant to the Cost Principle at 31.205-6(f). Similar findings were issued for Raytheon’s CY 2003 indirect costs.

  • Regardless of the foregoing, in November 2006 DCAA told Raytheon that its incentive comp costs were “compensation/fringe type costs” and that, to the extent such costs were allocated to unallowable labor, they were also unallowable. Raytheon did not agree.

  • On 24 September 2007, DCAA issued an audit report relating to CYs 2002-2005 that stated that Raytheon's failure to withdraw from its “incurred cost submissions” a proportionate share of its costs of bonuses, restricted stock and other incentive compensation costs paid to employees engaged in expressly unallowable activities was a violation of FAR 31.201-6(a) and CAS 405-40(a). Raytheon contested the government's position.

  • On 30 May 2008, the government issued to Raytheon an initial determination of noncompliance (IDN) on this matter for CYs 2002-2005. A later DCAA audit report dated 10 June 2008 included CY 2006 costs. The government revised its IDN on 27 June 2008 to include questioned CY 2006 costs.

  • On 14 May 2010, the government issued a final determination of noncompliance (FDN) on this matter for CYs 2002-2008, and demanded a general dollar magnitude impact report from Raytheon, who prepared and submitted impact reports under protest, and also updated these reports to include CY 2009 impact.

  • On 10 January 2011, the Contracting Officer issued a Final Decision, demanding payment of $14.1 million. The CO also issued a penalty against Raytheon due to its inclusion of alleged expressly unallowable costs in its final indirect cost rate proposals for CYs 2002-2009, in the amount of $5,946,762, including interest, pursuant to the contract clause FAR 52.242-3, Penalties for Unallowable Costs (May 2001). In total, the Government demanded that Raytheon pay $20 million. Raytheon appealed the COFD.

Judge Delman ruled as follows (internal citations omitted)—

With respect to CY 2002, the record shows that on 29 September 2003, DCAA issued a memorandum regarding its audit of appellant's bonus and incentive compensation costs for CY 2002, concluding that these costs were fully allowable. However roughly four years later, by audit report dated 24 September 2007, DCAA determined that portions of these same costs were not allowable for reasons stated herein. It was this audit report that ultimately led to the government's present claims under this appeal. Based upon the date of the DCAA memorandum, we believe the government should have known - by 29 September 2003 - that the incentive compensation costs in question for CY 2002 were unallowable and should also have known that the government had paid increased costs under government contracts in CY 2002. We also believe that, for purposes of the government's penalty claim for CY 2002, the government should have known by 29 September 2003 that Raytheon had included these expressly unallowable costs in its CY 2002 final indirect cost rate proposal, which had been submitted to the government in or around June 2003.

The government's claim letter is dated 10 January 2011, and the government's claims must have accrued no earlier than 10 January 2005 to be timely. We have concluded that the government's claim to recover increased costs paid under government contracts in CY 2002 and the related penalty claim for CY 2002 accrued no later than 29 September 2003. Accordingly, we must conclude that the government's claims for CY 2002 are untimely.

With respect to the government's claim to recover increased costs paid under government contracts for CY 2003, Raytheon's overhead cost submission for CY 2003 was submitted to the government in or around June 2004. As for CY 2004, Raytheon's Corporate Home Office Allocations proposal for forward pricing rates was submitted to the government in September 2004. We believe the government should have known - prior to 10 January 2005 - of the subject CAS noncompliance and that the government paid increased costs under government contracts as a result in CY 2003 and CY 2004. We are persuaded that the government's claims of 10 January 2011 for these increased costs in CY 2003 and CY 2004 are untimely.

As for CYs 2005-2009, the government could not have been aware, actually or constructively, of any increased costs paid by the government under government contracts in these years until the advent of these years and until payments were made under government contracts in those years. We conclude that the government's claims of 10 January 2011 to recover these increased costs for CYs 2005-2009 are timely.

As for the government's claim for penalties for CY 2003, Raytheon's final indirect cost rate proposal for CY 2003 was submitted to the government in or around June 2004, and we believe that the government should have known - prior to 10 January 2005 – that said final indirect cost rate proposal included these alleged expressly unallowable costs. Hence, the government's claim for penalty for CY 2003 is untimely. As for the government's claim for penalties for CY 2004, Raytheon's final indirect cost rate proposal for CY 2004 was submitted to the government on 2 June 2005, within 6 years of the date of the government's claim letter of 10 January 2011. We are persuaded that the government's claim for penalty for CY 2004 is timely. It follows that the government's claims for penalty for future years, CYs 2005-2009, are also timely.

[Emphasis added.]

In ASBCA No. 57679, Raytheon included allegedly expressly unallowable costs in incentive comp plans, including its “Long-Term Performance Plan” (LTTP). The LTTP payout was based on several factors, including a “Total Shareholder Return” (TSR) metric. Here is a chronology as discussed in Judge Delman’s decision—

  • Raytheon briefed the government on its LTTP plan, including the TSR metric, as early as January 2004. In July 2004, DCAA issued an audit report in which it concluded that "the Long-Term Incentive Plan compensation system and related internal control policies and procedures of the contractor are adequate".

  • The Judge recited various other DCAA reports, issued throughout 2004 and 2005, in which DCAA examined Raytheon’s LTTP and its TSR factor.

  • However, when DCAA audited Raytheon’s CY 2006 “incurred cost proposal” (submitted in June 2007), it took issue with the LTTP. In July 2008, DCAA opined that the LTPP violated CAS 415-50(a)(3) and CAS 415-50(e)(l). With respect to the TSR metric, DCAA stated that the "TSR costs are not allowable per FAR 31.205(6)(i) [sic] because the number of shares awarded is dependent on the change in the price of Raytheon's stock". Raytheon contested the government's position.

  • On 4 September 2009, the CO issued a FDN to Raytheon on this matter related to CYs 2004-2006. By letter to Raytheon dated 1 June 2011, the CO stated that the cost impact with respect to the CAS noncompliance was immaterial.

  • By letter dated 2 June 2011, the CO issued a final decision, asserting that the costs of the TSR portion of Raytheon's LTPP were expressly unallowable under FAR 31.205-6(i)(l) because the TSR formula "shows that the stock award to a TSR participant is arrived at by determining the change in stock price". The CO asserted a claim under the Allowable Cost clause to recover the expressly unallowable TSR/LTTP costs for CYs 2004-2006 in the amount of $1,316,183. The CO added a claim for penalty under the Penalty clause due to Raytheon's inclusion of these expressly unallowable costs in its final indirect cost rate proposals, in the amount of $1,316,183 plus interest of $360,761, for a total of $2,993,127. Raytheon appealed the COFD.

Judge Delman ruled as follows (internal citations omitted)—

Under this appeal the government seeks recovery of unallowable costs and penalties for CYs 2004-2006. Based upon DCAA's review of the LTPP in 2004 and the information available to DCAA about the program at that time, we agree with Raytheon that the government should have known by 2004 that the TSR formula was based, in part, upon the price of appellant's stock, which in the government's present view makes the related costs unallowable. However, in order for the government's claim to accrue the government also must have known or should have known of some ‘injury’ to the government by that date. The record fails to show that the government knew or should have known in 2004 or 2005 of any injury to the government based upon Raytheon's application of this metric. Indeed, from the motion papers it appears that appellant did not include the subject TSR/LTPP costs in its CY 2004 overhead cost submission or its CY 2005 overhead cost submission because the subject costs were incurred only after a full three-year cycle. To the extent these costs were incurred in CY 2006 and were identified in appellant's CY 2006 overhead cost submission of June 2007, the government's 2 June 2011 claim for these costs is timely. It follows that the government's claim for penalties for including such expressly unallowable costs in its final indirect cost rate proposal for CY 2006 is also timely. We conclude that the government's claims under this appeal are timely.

[Emphasis added.]

The first thing we have to say is that Judge Delman squarely addressed the issue and found that the CDA SOL clock starts running from the time that the contractor submits its annual proposal to establish final billing rates.

The clock starts running when the proposal is submitted. Not when it’s reviewed for adequacy. Not when it’s audited. Not when the audit report is issued. Not when the audit report is received by a CFAO. The clock starts running when the proposal is submitted. The Government has six years—no more—from that date in order to assert a claim against the contractor. Many of those 25,000 whiskered contractor proposals to establish final billing rates are now mooted, because the Courts won’t hear any claims by the Government for allegedly unallowable costs that were included in those proposals. (Well, assuming the ruling is upheld on appeal, of course.)

On the flip side of the coin, the contractor has six years—no more—from that date to assert a claim against the Government. If the contractor’s submitted rates are higher than its provisional billing rates, then it has six years—no more—to file a claim for unbilled indirect costs. If there is fee retention outstanding, the contractor has six years—no more—to file a claim for that unpaid fee. Wait one day longer to demand payment, and you risk having your Government customer laugh in your face.

That’s the good news. (Well, it’s not good news for DCAA, but you get our drift.) That’s the news that everybody’s talking about.

We don’t see anybody talking about the bad news. We don’t see or hear anybody saying that the decision also got it wrong in some respects. While the decision is undeniably good news in one respect, it’s also bad news in another respect. It’s a half-a-loaf, not a full loaf.

What in the world are we talking about?

Well, in our non-attorney, layperson’s view, Judge Delman continues to conflate the concepts of “events” and “facts”. Looking above at the FAR 33.201 definition of “claim accrual,” one can see that it focuses on events and not on facts. It is when the events occur—all events that fix the alleged liability—that the CDA SOL clock starts running.

Looking at the Raytheon ruling in ASBCA No. 57576, we can see that the events that fixed Raytheon’s alleged liability occurred when Raytheon (a) established its incentive comp plans, and (b) DCAA examined those plans. The ruling focuses on when the Government became aware (or should have been aware) that those plans allocated allegedly unallowable costs to government contracts. According to the Statement of Findings, the Government knew it had been injured as early as September 2003—and very likely before that date. That is when the CDA SOL clock started running.

Instead, Judge Delman decided that there was a separate CDA SOL clock for each Raytheon submission of its annual proposal to establish final billing rates. His ruling focused on factual knowledge, not on events. He wrote—

… the government could not have been aware, actually or constructively, of any increased costs paid by the government under government contracts in these years until the advent of these years and until payments were made under government contracts in those years.

We think that’s an incorrect view. We believe that the events that cause the Government’s alleged injury occurred when Raytheon established its plans and incurred costs. The fact that there was a stream of costs over time associated with the plans should be irrelevant to the situation. Indeed, FAR 33.201 expressly states that it is the events that matter—and that “monetary damages need not have been incurred.” Judge Delman’s ruling focuses on the Government’s knowledge of monetary damages for each year in which Raytheon submitted its final billing rates, and elides the fact that those alleged damages continued to stream from an original event that took place more than six years before the Contracting Officer issued the COFD.

Looking at the ruling in ASBCA No. 57679, we see again Judge Delman’s focus on factual knowledge of a monetary injury instead of on the events that caused the alleged injury. Even though DCAA (by the Government’s own admission) knew of the LTTP and its TSR factor as early as January 2004, Judge Delman ruled that the CDA SOL clock didn’t start running until Raytheon included those costs in a proposal to establish final billing rates. According to him, the Government couldn’t have known it had been injured until Raytheon submitted a proposal that included them. That’s a focus on factual knowledge and not on the underlying events. That’s a focus on monetary damages, and not on events. We think Judge Delman missed the mark.

So if we’re right and the ASBCA is wrong, what does this mean for DCAA audits? Does it mean that DCAA is forever precluded from asserting costs are noncompliant with CAS or unallowable, once six years have passed from the time the contractor started to incur the questioned costs? Does this mean that DCAA can never change its mind?

Yes, that’s exactly the implication of our position. The logical outcome of our interpretation is that the Government has six years from the events that created the costs to assert a claim. Period.

Which is perhaps why the ASBCA Judges are shying away from it.

Now, again we are not attorneys and we are not Judges. You must read our opinions of legal matters with a grain of salt the size of the Rock of Gibraltar. If you litigate a position based on our Internet rants, then you’re a fool. Instead, obtain the advice and counsel of a licensed attorney with deep expertise in these matters. And then do what he or she advises.

But in the meantime, we expect that your attorney will be advising you to avoid CDA SOL litigation at the ASBCA, and head on over to the Court of Federal Claims. Perhaps—just perhaps—they will tell you that the ASBCA interpretation of the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations is a problem to be avoided.

 

Who are the “Price Fighters”?

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Price_Fighters
This is one of those articles where several recurring themes coalesce into something new—perhaps something unexpected. Let’s explore:

One of the recurring themes on this site has been to discuss the apparent love/hate relationship between the Pentagon and its defense industrial base—the contractors who enable the warfighters to, you know, fight. We’ve written about it too many times to easily count. (But you can do a keyword search for all those articles, if you’re so inclined.) It’s become clear that the relationship that existed in the mid-90’s—that of “trusted business partner”—is no longer the case. Instead, it’s become adversarial. We assert that this is no longer a matter of opinion; it’s now a matter of documented fact.

When former Secretary of Defense called for reductions in non-valued-added Pentagon bureaucracy, those self-same bureaucrats almost immediately redefined the mission into a drive for reductions in contractor prices. Several of them did pretty well for themselves, parlaying their pieces of the redefined mission into cushy, well-funded, promotions. We documented that phenomenon as well.

The thing of it is, we can’t flatly say it’s wrong to attack the contractors in a drive for efficiency and affordability—a Defense Department “that works better and costs less”. (How many of you get that reference?) The “jointness” of integrated operations now includes the contractors. They’re ineluctably intertwined and can’t be separated. So if you want to address Pentagon bloat and bureaucracy, you also need to address how that bloat and bureaucracy is outsourced to the support contractors.

But it’s plainly wrong to focus on reducing contractors’ costs in a vacuum, as DOD has largely done to date. The attack on contractors is one of the clearest symptoms of the disease that has infected the Pentagon over the last decade or so. We don’t pretend to have all the answers, but we think one aspect of the overarching disease is a myopic focus on the “sharp end”—the tactical warfighter—and a concomitant lack of focus on the rest of the spear—which includes logistics, maintenance and support, as well as the contractors who enable the vast military machine to move toward its objectives.

Whereas yesterday’s military travelled on its stomach, today’s military travels on the backs of its contractors. Pentagon leadership has failed to adapt to this new reality and, as a result, are attacking the very infrastructure that gets them where they need to go.

Part of the attack on defense contractors has been the creation of “should-cost” pricing. We’ve written about it before. It’s a theory, created by those self-same Pentagon bureaucrats, that is predicated on the notion that the bureaucrats should tell the contractor what its costs will be, as opposed to having the contractor tell them. Implementation of that theory on price negotiations for the next buy of F-35 aircraft led to some interesting results: (1) there was an inordinate delay in reaching an acceptable negotiated price, (2) the parties polarized and relationships soured, and (3) the contractor’s overhead costs went up, driven by the costs of providing the government negotiators with thousands of pages of information, so that the negotiators could establish their “should-cost” targets. It was an unmitigated disaster.

But that didn’t keep the Pentagon bureaucrats from trumpeting their victory over the contractor, in terms of negotiated savings achieved by their strong-arm tactics.

Recognizing that full implementation of the new aggressive negotiating postures required access to many types of information, DCMA and the DOD Director of Pricing (Mr. Shay Assad) issued a memo late last year calling for better integration of DOD Buying Commands and military service personnel with DCMA Contracting Officers and DCAA auditors in the evaluations of contractors’ proposals to establish “forward pricing rates” (FPRs). FPRs are used by contractors in their cost proposals when they tell DOD how much they think their programs are going to cost.

Yes, those are the same proposals that DOD is working hard to ignore as part of its “should-cost” initiative. So apparently, DOD not only wants to be in a position to ignore a contractor’s cost proposal, it also wants to be in a position to ignore its proposal to establish an agreement as to the indirect rates to be used in those proposals.

This approach must make sense to somebody. It doesn’t make any sense to us. In our view, it’s just another symptom of a bureaucracy looking elsewhere—anywhere—rather than to look in a mirror and tackle its own issues. And it’s crystal clear what those issues are, as the Government Accountability Office told the Pentagon Leadership more than a year ago.

Now, let us come to yet another symptom of the adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors. They are called “Price Fighters”. This is real. Apparently, the intent is to link these “Price Fighters” to the real warfighters who risk their lives every day to accomplish the nation’s national security objectives. We ain’t those guys, so we’re not particularly offended by the name. But let’s not fool ourselves: there ain’t nothing “risky” about looking at cost or pricing data, and negotiating contract prices.

Where did we hear this term? We heard it right from the same Pentagon bureaucrats who have been championing the “should-cost” initiative. We heard it right from the same Pentagon bureaucrats who have been pushing the integrated forward pricing rate review teams. We heard it right here.

The language of the memo is filled with noble phrases. Phrases such as “surge support,” “right place, right time,” and “on-time delivery of quality pricing products.” That’s all very nice, we’re sure. Just like the theory behind “should-cost” was also very nice.

But notice: “Price Fighters”.

Who are they fighting?

Who’s the adversary?

If the “warfighters” are fighting a war, what are the “Price Fighters” fighting?

Yeah, you know where we’re going with this.

This is yet one more symptom of the same disease with which the Pentagon is currently afflicted: the idea that the contractors are the enemy—the idea that there’s a war going on and it’s DOD against its own industrial base.

But who are these “Price Fighters”? We think it may also be contractors. Yes, we have reason to suspect that the Pentagon has hired contractors to assist in attacking other contractors.

Of course,

That’s the problem with attacking contractors. They’re so baked-into the mechanism of how things are done, you can’t distinguish them from the DOD civilian workforce. You can’t tell ‘em apart. And since nothing can get done without the contractors to do it, you need to hire contractors in order to attack the contractors, because you don’t have the internal resources to attack the problem any other way.

And thus some contractors are making a profit helping their Pentagon masters attack the profits of other contractors.

In prison, those folks are called “trusties”—they are the convicts who are regarded as being worthy of a certain amount of trust, and thus they receive special privileges in return for acting as agents of the prison guard force.

In World War Two, those folks were called “collaborators,” or “quislings”—and while they benefited from their support of the fascist occupiers, they later paid a price after liberation.

Now, we’re not saying that contractors who collaborate provide support to the Pentagon in its efforts to drive down contractor prices should have their heads shaven, or be blindfolded and shot at dawn. No. Don’t think for a moment that we’re advocating any type of retaliation.

But do think for a moment about the people in power at the Pentagon, who apparently are so taken with their war on their own contractors that they have named a group of cost analysts “Price Fighters”.

Really?

Are they really in a war?

Is that really how they see it?

Based on what we’ve seen over the past few years, the answer can only be “yes”.

 

Hey, It’s the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, and You Had Better Read It

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We were amused during the last election cycle by those who refused to vote for Obama because of some provision in the 2012 NDAA they didn’t like. As if the President had much effect on the provisions Congress—and lobbyists—added to what is an annual piece of legislation. People really need to get a clue.

And speaking of clues, you need to get one about the many provisions of the 2013 NDAA. Thankfully (for all of us), Bob Antonio over at WIFCON takes the time each year to analyze the legislation and show what the House and Senate had to say about each provision. Here’s a link to his analysis, which should be taken as the definitive analysis of the 2013 NDAA, otherwise known as H.R. 4310 and soon to be known as Public Law 112-xx.

You had better read it, because the various sections of the law are going to become future FAR and DFARS rules. There are some 83 individual sections, ranging from 801 through 3121. Obviously, we are not going to repeat all 83 provisions. But we do want to draw several of them to your attention, as we think they may have significant effects on compliance and contract management. (Remember, this bill affects only the Defense Department unless other Agencies are specifically identified.)

802 – Requires the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development to issue such guidance and regulations to ensure that in any case in which an offeror for a contract or a task or delivery order informs the agency (pursuant to FAR provision 52.215-22) that it intends to award subcontracts for more than 70 percent of the total cost of work to be performed under the contract, task order, or delivery order, the contracting officer for the contract is required to (1) consider the availability of alternative contract vehicles and the feasibility of contracting directly with a subcontractor or subcontractors that will perform the bulk of the work; (2) make a written determination that the contracting approach selected is in the best interest of the Government; and (3) document the basis for such determination.

804 – Requires the Secretary of Defense to review the profit guidelines in the Department of Defense Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation in order to identify any modifications to such guidelines that are necessary to ensure an appropriate link between contractor profit and contractor performance.

827 – Extends whistleblower protections to “an employee who initiates or provides evidence of contractor or subcontractor misconduct in any judicial or administrative proceeding relating to waste, fraud, or abuse on a Department of Defense or National Aeronautics and Space Administration contract or grant.” Extends the disallowance of legal fees defending against a suit initiated by a contractor employee, where the disposition is imposition of a monetary penalty or an order to take corrective action.

828 – Establishes a pilot program to enhance contractor employee whistleblower protections, such that “An employee of a contractor, subcontractor, or grantee may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing to a person or body … information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract (including the competition for or negotiation of a contract) or grant.”

831 – Requires the USD (AT&L) to issue guidance and standards (and training) for evaluations of price reasonableness, including “standards for determining whether information on the prices at which the same or similar items have previously been sold is adequate for evaluating the reasonableness of price; … standards for determining the extent of uncertified cost information that should be required in cases in which price information is not adequate for evaluating the reasonableness of price; [to] ensure that in cases in which such uncertified cost information is required, the information shall be provided in the form in which it is regularly maintained by the offeror in its business operations; and … [to] provide that no additional cost information may be required by the Department of Defense in any case in which there are sufficient non-Government sales to establish reasonableness of price.”

832 – Requires the Director of DCAA to revise audit guidance regarding access to contractor internal audit reports to ensure that requests for access are “properly documented.” The document must include a “written determination that access to such reports is necessary to complete required evaluations of contractor business systems; a copy of any request from the Defense Contract Audit Agency to a contractor for access to such reports; [and] a record of response received from the contractor, including the contractor's rationale or justification if access to requested reports was not granted.” In addition, “he revised guidance shall include appropriate safeguards and protections to ensure that contractor internal audit reports cannot be used by the Defense Contract Audit Agency for any purpose other than evaluating and testing the efficacy of contractor internal controls and the reliability of associated contractor business systems.” Moreover, the law directs that “A determination by the Defense Contract Audit Agency that a contractor has a sound system of internal controls shall provide the basis for increased reliance on contractor business systems or a reduced level of testing with regard to specific audits, as appropriate. Internal audit reports provided by a contractor pursuant to this section may be considered in determining whether or not a contractor has a sound system of internal controls, but shall not be the sole basis for such a determination.”

833 – Establishes that “the cost of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts are not allowable costs under Department contracts” unless “the covered contractor has an operational system to detect and avoid counterfeit parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts that has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Defense … the counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts were provided to the contractor as Government property in accordance with part 45 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation; and … the covered contractor provides timely notice to the Government….” [Note: The use of the conjunction “and” may be of some concern in this context.]

864 – Instead of the drastic drop in the ceiling to establish allowable contractor compensation (which we have previously discussed), requires the GAO to issue a report to Congress on the effect of “reducing the allowable costs of contractor compensation to employees to the amount payable to the President … or to the Vice President.”

1701 – 1708 – Enhances requires relate to prevention of trafficking in persons. Among other things, requires contractors to annually certify that they have a compliance plan and have “implemented procedures to prevent [human trafficking] and to monitor, detect, and terminate any subcontractor, subgrantee, or employee of the recipient engaging in [such activities].” Covered contractors will “provide a copy of the plan to the contracting or grant officer upon request, and as appropriate, shall post the useful and relevant contents of the plan or related materials on its website and at the workplace.”

As we stated, there are many provisions in the 2013 NDAA that may be of interest to government contractors. The foregoing are but a few of them—but we think you’ll agree that they are especially interesting and worth knowing about in advance of rulemaking action by the FAR and DAR Councils.

Remember, when the proposed and/or interim rules are issued in response to the requirements imposed by Congress, there’s not much to argue about. The Councils need to comply with the statutory requirements imposed on them.

But watch and see if the Councils’ rulemaking is consistent with the statutory language in the NDAA, and with the various Conference Reports that discuss Congressional intent. It’s not unheard of for the Councils to take—shall we say?—liberties with the language.

 

 

The Eisenhower Matrix

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Reflecting on our recent articles about DCAA’s problems in working down its audit backlog and DOD’s problems in working down its backlog of physically completed but unclosed contracts, we got to thinking about how workload is generally prioritized. As you know (because we told you), we had some specific recommendations for DCAA and DCMA to consider as they contemplate how to whittle down their respective backlogs. But those recommendations were specific, and we were thinking about workload prioritization in general

We received an email from “Easy Ed” in response to those articles. “Easy Ed” claimed to be a retired DCAA Regional Audit Manager (RAM). (Remember, we cannot often verify peoples’ identities. However, in this instance, we believe there were sufficient details to provide confirmation that “Easy Ed” is who he claimed to be.) “Easy Ed” wrote—

I still have the utmost respect for many DCAA personnel who try their very best each day. However, it appears that the GAO, DCMA and DCAA have not addressed the implications of the Statute of Limitations and the return on investment aspects of drawing down the backlog.

“Easy Ed” recommended one additional tactic to DCAA management, in order to help them reduce their backlog of some 25,000 “incurred cost” audits (aka “10100 assignments,” for those who speak DCAA)—at least a few of which are dated as far back as 1996. He advocated the following—

It would seem appropriate that the DoD consider writing off any incurred cost proposal/submission subject to a time bar available by the SOL. and just close out the contracts. Concurrently, the DCAA would have to also evaluate how many submissions which could not possibly be audited within the window of the ticking SOL due to the length of time to complete their engagements. Working on those assignments appear to be a waste of time if any contractor anticipates exercising the SOL time bar.

Our response: Absolutely.

The problem with that idea, as common-sense as it well may be, is that we don’t believe DOD is convinced that the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations is as firmly established by the Courts as “Easy Ed” (and many others, including Apogee Consulting, Inc.) would like it to be. We’ve explored the CDA’s SOL in depth on this site. For example, here’s one article entitled, “DCAA Audits and the Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations.” In that article, we quoted Professor Richard Loeb, who wrote, “It is very likely that for many of the contracts, the statute of limitations for recouping overpayments will run out before DCAA gets around to completing the audits, resulting in a significant loss of savings to the taxpayer.” Which is absolutely true and correct, assuming the Courts establish that completion of a DCAA audit is not a prerequisite for establishing the date of the accrual of a CDA claim. If the Courts conclude that the CDA SOL is tolled pending outcome of the DCAA audit, then DCAA can simply take its time and finish up anytime within the next millennium.

In point of fact, the CDA Courts seem to be split on the issue. Over at the Court of Federal Claims, several Judges have firmly established that the CDA SOL clock runs without regard to Federal administrative proceedings. For example, in July 2012, Judge Lettow wrote (in the matter of Sikorsky v. U.S.)—

… while the government may have its own internal review procedures that it must follow prior to submitting a claim, nothing in the CDA mandates such procedures, nor can such procedures delay accrual of a claim. … [A]n agency’s self-imposed, internal regulations are invisible for claim accrual purposes because they are not part of the contract.

[Emphasis added.]

While that seems clear and on-point with respect to aging DCAA audits, over at the ASBCA the issue is far murkier, as we told you in our CDA SOL article (link above).

In March 2012, the ASBCA tackled a dispute between Lockheed Martin and the United States (ASBCA No. 57525), ruling on a motion by LockMart to dismiss the Final Decision of its Divisional Administrative Contracting Officer (DACO) that demanded $29.9 million related to alleged noncompliances with Cost Accounting Standards 418 and 420. The dispute started in 2002, when DCAA issued a letter to the contractor, with a copy sent to the DACO, in which the auditors asserted that costs associated with certain Independent Research and Development (IR&D) projects were unallowable and should have been charged directly to a particular contract.

Much jockeying ensued. DCAA issued a “draft/preliminary” audit report on the matter in September 2005; DCAA issued a final audit report in February 2007; the DACO issued a Final Decision in September 2008, finding that LockMart was in noncompliance and demanding that LockMart calculate damages. LockMart issued its “cost impact” analysis and submitted it in March 2009. In December 2010, the DACO issued another Final Decision and demand for monies owed the Government (at an amount roughly twice was LockMart’s calculations indicated that damages had been).

Judge Delman, writing for the Board, ruled against Lockheed Martin’s motion, stating—

The record also does not show that the government knew or should have known at this time that the contract price itself was increased as a result of the alleged misallocation of these costs. … Appellant has not persuaded us on this record that the government knew, or should have known of any injury to the government at or around the time of the 31 December 2002 DCAA letter arising out of the Sniper contract. … It is true that DCAA's letters to appellant of 31 December 2002 and 30 March 2004 recommended adjustment of certain accounts of appellant … but there were no statements in either letter regarding overbillings to, or overpayments made by the government on government contracts …. As far as this record shows, it was the DCAA draft/preliminary report of September 2005, copied to the DACO, that indicated that appellant's CAS noncompliance resulted in overbillings to the government …. The CO's 8 December 2010 final decision asserting the government's monetary claim was issued within six years of this report.

We didn’t have many nice things to say about that decision, which was not appealed. (We are reliably informed the decision was not appealed because Lockheed Martin received a very favorable settlement offer from the Government attorneys, who were delighted at the ruling and the precedent it established.) Accordingly, if you have a CDA SOL issue you want to litigate, we expect your attorneys are directing you to the Court of Federal Claims, and not to the ASBCA, because they don’t want to have to deal with this particular decision.

And more to the point of “Easy Ed’s” recommendation to DOD and DCAA, we suspect that they are not going to walk away from hundreds—perhaps thousands—of aged audits, so long as the legal principle regarding when the CDA SOL clock starts to run remains murky. We think it’s going to take a ruling at the Federal Circuit to get the Government folks to take another, harder, look at DCAA’s audit backlog—and then swallow hard before sweeping the ancient uncompleted assignments off the table.

But perhaps we digress. We were talking about workload prioritization and we wound up talking about why DCAA and DCMA might not feel burning pressure to prioritize the workload, as they would if they knew the CDA SOL was a hard, locked-in-stone, deadline.

“Easy Ed” had his recommendation. Our Technologist, Mark Sewall, had another one. He thought DOD leadership needed a new approach to management. He recommended that they consider using the Eisenhower Matrix.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower is said to have asserted that, “What is important is seldom urgent, and what is urgent is seldom important.” In that spirit, he is credited with creating the Eisenhower Matrix—a 2 x 2 (four quadrant) box that helps prioritize tasks and manage time.

Essentially, Eisenhower created his four quadrants along the axes of Urgency and Importance. (See the illustration.)

Urgency refers to the near-term (immediate future) task deadline. These are time-sensitive items and need to be worked right now. Importance refers to the value added by the task, recognizing that some tasks are more relevant than others to attainment of long-term goals.

The brilliant part of his approach is the recognition that important tasks should never be urgent. If the task at hand is important, you should have been working it all along, and should never have let it become urgent.

Looking at the Matrix, Quadrant A lists tasks that are both urgent and important. This indicates where the crisis is. Having a number of tasks that are both urgent and important is an indication of poor planning, or of poor management.

Quadrant D (for “dustbin”) lists tasks that are neither urgent nor important. These are time-wasters and should never be worked, so long as there are any other tasks listed in the matrix.

Quadrant C lists tasks that are urgent but not important. These are reactive tasks that don’t move you toward attainment of your long-term goals, but need to be worked right now anyway. These tasks are what you have to do, not what you should be doing. If you are in management, these are tasks that would be good candidates for delegation to staff.

Quadrant B lists tasks that are important but not urgent. This is where the value lies, where tasks that move you toward attainment of your long-term goals are to be found. This is where your future can be found.

This is a simple, yet effective, approach to time management. Your goal should be to keep Quadrant A empty and to minimize tasks in Quadrant C. Your goal should be to spend as much time as you can in Quadrant B.

Applying these principles to DCAA audits, we suggest that the backlog of unperformed “incurred cost” audits belongs in Quadrant A. We suggest that the backlog of the other unperformed audits should be there as well (though perhaps the urgency is not the same). The urgent but not important stuff includes working for non-DOD agencies.

What do we think belongs in DCAA’s Quadrant B?

How about employee development? How about training and quality control? How about developing innovative ideas for working paper documentation and ensuring audit timeliness? How about hiring and employee retention, and performance reviews?

What might go into DCAA’s Quadrant B? Send us an email with your thoughts. We’ll aggregate responses and publish the results (protecting identities, of course).

Until then, we hope somebody in DOD Leadership is contemplating how to get all the work done with the resources available.

 

 

Small Business Opportunities and Obstacles

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It’s tough to be a small business, competing against larger contractors in today’s shrinking budget environment. Sure, there are set-asides and 8(a) programs and the AbilityOne Program and Mentor-Protégé programs. They do provide opportunities to qualifying small business that the larger businesses simply can’t access. But the fact is that the qualifying small businesses simply don’t have the capital or the resources to compete against the bigger firms in a “full and open” environment.

Small businesses typically don’t have the working capital to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars in a proposal, only to wait six months (or more) to see if they won the contract. If they don’t win—and they believe they were wronged—they usually lack the funds to hire competent attorneys to pursue bid protests. They may not even understand that such an avenue of redress is available to them.

Even when the competition is on the up-and-up, small businesses generally lack the skilled subject matter experts to put together proposals that comply with the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) or, for that matter, to support DCAA audits (performed in compliance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, or GAGAS) that start with a 34 point adequacy assessment and then get deep into the details of how the estimate of future direct and indirect costs was generated.

Speaking of direct and indirect costs, too many small businesses lack “adequate” accounting systems (as that term is defined by either the Standard Form 1408, or by DCAA 17740 audit programs, or by the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) contract clause 252.242-7006 (“Accounting System Administration”). Consequently, they are officially ineligible to receive cost-type contracts. In addition, it’s quite difficult to receive Time & Material or Labor Hour contract types as well, because those contract types are lumped together into the “flexibly priced” contract category.

(Our opinion that FAR Part 16 does not list “flexibly priced” as a recognized contract type does not seem to help our clients get over this hurdle. They seem to be stuck with the choice of either having an “adequate” accounting system or not receiving a T&M contract award. But we digress ….)

And we haven’t even mentioned unallowable costs, or management of Government property, or a host of other contract compliance requirements whose compliance regimes take significant investments of time and money (and expertise) to create.

So yeah, small businesses have it tough when they want to go up against the big dogs on an open playing field. But when they stay within their niche markets, they can do pretty well for themselves.

Recently, the Small Business Administration (SBA) issued a final rule that expands the number of companies that qualify for participation in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program. As the respected government contract attorneys at the firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge summarized—

The final rule allows concerns that are majority-owned by multiple venture capital operating companies, hedge funds or private equity firms (‘investment companies’) to participate in the SBIR program, as long as no single investment company owns more than 50 percent of the concern. In order to be eligible, the investment company must have a place of business in the U.S. and be incorporated in the U.S. Furthermore, concerns that are majority-owned by multiple investment companies must register with SBA on or before the date they submit a response to an SBIR solicitation and these concerns must indicate in their SBIR proposals that they have completed this registration. Unlike the proposed rule, however, the final rule does not allow concerns that are majority-owned by multiple investment companies to participate in the STTR program. …

Currently, investment companies would not be eligible to participate in the SBIR program, because the concern would be considered to be affiliated with not only the investment companies, but also the other companies owned by these investment companies. SBA’s final rule provides that a concern is an affiliate of an individual, concern, or entity that owns or has the power to control more than 50 percent of the concern’s voting stock. However, SBA may find a concern an affiliate of an individual, concern, or entity that owns or has the power to control 40 percent or more of the voting equity, based upon the totality of the circumstances. If no individual, concern, or entity is found in control, SBA will deem the Board of Directors to be in control of the concern.

The SBIR Program has helped many small businesses get a toehold into government contracting. And now the market niche has been widened to accept participants that have venture capital funding, which is going to make it more difficult for the other small businesses to compete. Those venture capital-backed small businesses may well have access to the funds and expertise to address some of the obstacles to growth that we recited at the beginning of this article. Accordingly, those venture capital-backed small businesses will likely have an advantage over the non-affiliated small businesses in the competition for scarce SBIR dollars. Certainly, they will be better positioned to transition from SBIR Phase 1 to SBIR Phase 2 contracts.

(As we have opined before, the SBIR Phase 1 FFP contracts are an order of magnitude easier to win and execute than the SBIR Phase 2 cost-type contracts, but again we digress ….)

So small businesses take note. You have been warned.

With respect to large businesses who cannot participate in these Programs, period. You should also take note of the recent settlement entered into by Caddell Construction Co., who agreed to pay $2 million in order to “resolve criminal fraud allegations arising from Caddell’s intentional overstating of developmental assistance provided to a disadvantaged small business” as part of the DOD Mentor-Protégé Program.

The DOJ reported that (according to the settlement and Non-Prosecution Agreement executed by Caddell)—

… from February 2004 to March 2005, Caddell submitted more than 20 requests for payment to the DoD in connection with the Mentor-Protégé Program that significantly overstated the amount of developmental assistance Caddell had provided Mountain Chief.  [Note: Mountain Chief was “certified as a Native American, woman-owned and economically-disadvantaged small business”.] In addition, Caddell filed documents falsely stating Mountain Chief’s size and income, as well as the status of Mountain Chief’s technical capabilities and business infrastructure.  From April 2003 to October 2004, Caddell also submitted at least eight requests to the DoD for the Indian Incentive Program, for rebates based on services purportedly performed on subcontracts Caddell gave to Mountain Chief.  Mountain Chief performed few, if any of these services, and the invoices were created solely to support Caddell’s applications for payment.

Oops!

But that’s not all. The settlement and NPA resolved the issues for the corporation, but not for the individuals accused of committing the alleged crimes. The DOJ press release also stated—

In January 2012, Daniel W. Chattin, 50, of Granite Bay, Calif., the son of Mountain Chief’s owner and a project manager and consultant for Mountain Chief, and Mark L. Hill, 57, of Montgomery, Ala., the Mentor-Protégé Program Coordinator and a director of business development at Caddell, were indicted in the Middle District of Alabama on three counts of major fraud against the United States stemming from the same scheme.  In addition, Hill was charged with one count of making a false statement to the DoD.  Chattin and Hill await trial, which is scheduled to begin on April 22, 2013.

At the DOJ reminded the public, “The charges and allegations against Chattin and Hill are merely accusations and they are considered innocent unless and until proven guilty.”

Small businesses have a tough challenge when they go up against larger companies in a “full and open” competition for government contracts. But when they stay in their niches designed to encourage and foster small businesses, they tend to do just fine. Those program niches are so attractive that, sometimes, larger companyes cut corners in an attempt to obtain some of the program benefits. When the companies (and their executives) get caught cutting corners, they have significant challenges of their own to overcome—challenges of the legal variety.

Recent changes to the SBIR eligibility rules have expanded the number of firms that can participate. Those newly eligible firms are likely to be better capitalized and have better access to subject matter experts, than traditional non-affiliated small businesses. We think that’s going to make it more important than ever for the traditional small businesses to get their house in order, so that they can successfully compete for scarce SBIR dollars.

Not to make this article into too much of an advertisement, but Apogee Consulting, Inc., has helped small businesses with cost accounting, estimating, and administrative issues associated with the SBIR Program, as well as with other matters. If you think you might need some assistance, why not consider giving us a call?

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.