Another Look at Sequestration Impacts
 We all understand that the last-minute sequestration compromise reached between Congress and the Obama administration on January 1, 2013 essentially resolved nothing. It simply kicked the can down the road a couple of months. The same parties still have to resolve the same budgetary issues by March 1, 2013, or else draconian automatic spending cuts will be implemented, affecting both defense and non-defense programs.
We’ve examined sequestration before. While we don’t necessarily think that the automatic sequestration spending cuts are the economic nuclear bomb that others assert they are, we understand that the cuts will be painful.1 And they will have a painful effect on government contractors, who rely on continued Pentagon funding to keep programs executing—and to keep employees employed. We’ve already noticed a downturn in capital investments at certain contractors, and at other contractors we’ve started to see hiring freezes being implemented, especially on indirect staff. When you combine that situation with increasing numbers of baby-boomer retirements, you start to see a looming problem in mission assurance. Sure, the top lines will be impacted, and perhaps the corporate bottom-lines as well. But we predict that the more subtle, and the more pervasive, impacts will be felt in domain of corporate learning and knowledge—the business “know-how” that is the real core competency of any contractor.
As we wrote back in September, 2012—
With the sequestration bogeyman looming large and baby-boomer retirements as a percentage of the workforce trending upwards, we think it’s imperative for you to (a) move knowledge out of workers’ heads into more permanent media, and (b) figure out how to develop your next generation of leaders.
Not that you heeded our Cassandra-like warning and, you know, actually did something about the situation.2
But that wasn’t our only prediction. We also wrote a month later that—
We think the real impact is going to be felt on the government side. It is likely that as many as 200,000 Executive Branch employees could be furloughed or laid-off in some sequestration scenarios—though President Obama has promised to protect military service personnel from cuts. If programs are going to be terminated, who’s going to be left to administrate the termination or to process the Termination Settlement Proposals? Who’s going to be left to audit contractors’ claimed costs? Who’s going to be exercising oversight on the remaining contract obligations? … If you cut heads to the point where services can no longer be provided, then you’ve gone too far. Government contractors are very much reliant on their government contracting officers and quality assurance inspectors. If the Government can’t inspect, then it can’t accept. And if it can’t accept, you can’t get paid. If there is no Contracting Officer to obligate funds in MOCAS (or whatever system they’re using these days), then DFAS isn’t going to issue any payments. And if there are no DFAS payment clerks, there will be nobody to process contractor invoices and issue payments. So you may have a contractor with authorized funding, even after sequestration—but you still may not get paid.
We see no reason to change our assessment of the situation as of today’s date. We continue to believe the Executive Branch is going to feel the pain of sequestration first, and we suspect that it’s going to feel the most pain of all stakeholders. And we continue to predict it will be the domino effect of those Federal personnel cuts—and not actual program funding cuts—that will cause contractors to feel the most pain with respect to their ongoing operations.
In fact, we can already see the impacts starting, like the falling of the first few pebbles that start off an avalanche. Let’s recap some of those early pebbles, shall we?
The Federal Times recently published a Q&A session with Dr. Ashton Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Dr. Carter offered some insights into how the Pentagon is preparing for the looming sequestration cuts. He stated—
We are now starting to freeze hiring civilians. We hire in the department 1,000 people a week in order to keep our numbers up, and we would like to continue to do that. However, if I worry that I’m going to run short of money later this year, I’d better stop hiring. Now, that’s not a good thing.
The Federal Times also reported that—
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service on Jan. 27 will freeze hiring, stop nominating employees for performance awards, and slash travel, training and overtime to help it deal with budget cuts. In a Jan. 17 e-mail obtained by Federal Times, DFAS Director Terri McKay said more stringent actions — such as furloughing employees — may be necessary if sequestration takes place or the current continuing resolution expires without another agreement in place to further fund the Defense Department. … The entire federal government is bracing itself for severe budget cutbacks if sequestration takes effect in March. The Army, Navy and Air Force have already frozen hiring and are warning employees that massive furloughs may be required — perhaps for as much as 22 days.
In addition to the foregoing, the Federal times added another report that discussed civilian workforce cuts at Naval shipyards. It stated—
The Navy will cut more than 3,000 employees — almost 10 percent — from its shipyard workforce through a civilian hiring freeze and by laying off temporary workers, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, said in a Thursday memo. In the face of a potentially stiff funding shortfall this year, the Navy also plans to cancel all aircraft depot maintenance from April through September, halt the bulk of surface ship upkeep at private shipyards, and reduce spending on information technology support, conferences and travel, Greenert told flag officers and top executives in the memo. Also on the chopping block: repair and modernization of most piers, runways, buildings and other facilities through the end of fiscal 2013 in September.
So we think the evidence supports our rather grim predictions in this area. But that’s not all we want to discuss.
Readers might recall that both DCMA and DCAA have complained that their staffing levels are inadequate to meet their requirements. As we told readers long ago, testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting3 indicated that inadequate staffing was “a root cause of poor ‘ground truth’ monitoring of contractors, incomplete contract flies, and untimely or inadequate review of invoices”—according to the Department of State Inspector General.
In response to concerns raised by the CWC, DOD created a “Task Force on Wartime Contracting” (TFWC). We discussed the official TFWC report here. The TFWC report noted that the Secretary of Defense had gotten involved in addressing inadequate acquisition resources at the DOD. It stated—
-
In April 2009, the Secretary announced that the Department would invest the resources to add 20,000 new acquisition positions across the board, which goes beyond contingency contracting capability. For example, the Department will add auditors, program managers, and contract attorneys. It will also reinvest in developing the Department’s capability to perform cost analysis through the addition of cost and pricing experts.
-
Section 852 funding, as well as the Human Capital Strategic Plan and planning process, provide the dollars and leadership attention to ensure that this growth in the acquisition workforce targets the skills and specialties needed to ensure mission success.
As recently as June, 2012, DCMA was still pushing forward on its “expedited hiring” process to fill open acquisition positions. Comments in internet chatrooms indicate that, as of mid-January 2013, DCMA hiring is still going strong.
In addition to DCMA’s ramping-up of acquisition resources, DCAA also announced it was committed to addressing its admitted shortfall in audit resources. In its GFY 2011 Report to Congress, DCAA leadership stated—
With support from DoD, DCAA has increased its audit staff, adding 700 new auditors in the past three years via the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. As stated above, based on DoD budget guidance to DCAA, staffing will increase from about 4,900 employees in FY 2011 to about 5,600 employees in FY 2016.
Indeed, as recently as January, 2013, GAO reported to Congress that DCAA had a plan to whittle away at its backlog of roughly 25,000 unperformed audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates. GAO stated that DCAA leadership had told its auditors the following –
-
DCAA officials stated they plan to increase their staffing levels from 4,900 employees in 2011 to 5,600 by 2016.
-
By 2016, DCAA estimates it will reduce the backlog and reach a steady state of audits, which it defines as two fiscal years of proposals awaiting review.
So the tune has not change in official agency publications. DCMA and DCAA are committed to hiring up and increasing staffing levels, while at the same time senior Pentagon leadership is talking about hiring freezes.
What’s the real story?
Obviously, we don’t know the real story. But we stand by our predictions. We’re no Nate Silver but, so far, we think we’ve got a pretty good track record on this particular issue.
What you do with this information is, of course, up to you.
FAC 2005-65: We Told You So!
 Federal Acquisition Circular 2005-65, published January 29, 2013, included a couple of final rules that affected government contract compliance. But you weren’t taken by surprise. As a long-time, loyal readers of this blog, you already knew about them. You knew about them because we told you they were coming, long ago.
First up: FAR Case 2012-013. This is a final rule that prohibits contracting with “inverted domestic corporations.” We originally brought this issue to your attention when it was first issued as an interim rule, back in July 2009. Six public comments were submitted; but those comments did not affect the language in the final rule.
When the FAR applies, you cannot contract with an inverted domestic corporation. An inverted domestic corporation is one that used to be incorporated in the United States, or used to be a partnership in the United States, but now is incorporated in a foreign country, or is a subsidiary whose parent corporation is incorporated in a foreign country. (See the definition of inverted domestic corporation at FAR 9.108-1.)
You’ll know if the FAR applies because you’ll have the solicitation provision 52.209-2 or the contract clause 52-209-10 staring you in the face when you read the RFP or contract. You are reading those things, right?
Second: FAR Case 2011-011. This is a final rule that first imposes the two percent excise tax on “certain Federal procurement payments to foreign persons,” and then makes payments of that tax unallowable. We first told you about this issue in March 2012, when it was issued as a proposed rule. As we told you at the time—
… in order to determine whether or not an excise tax should be imposed, and whether or not estimated project margins should be reduced by the value of that 2 percent excise tax, you first need to know (a) the country involved, and (b) whether that country has signed a Trade Agreement with the U.S.A. These decision points will need to be addressed at the time the proposal is being prepared—or, even better, at the time of the bid/no bid decision.
Candidly, we didn’t think very much of the proposed rule. We expected that it would create difficulties for companies subject to foreign “offset” requirements in the export of defense articles. However, we also noted that, “since the rule-making is mandated by Public Law, we don’t believe that the Councils have much latitude in the changes they can make.” Accordingly, we didn’t expect public comments regarding the proposed rule to affect the language to any great extent.
And guess what? We were right about that. As the promulgating comments stated, “Based on a review of the public comments … the Councils have concluded that no change to the proposed rule is necessary.”
The final rule revised FAR 31.205-41 to state that the costs of the two percent excise tax are not allowable. FAR 52.229-3, 52.229-4, 52.229-6, and 52.229-7 were amended to provide that the costs for the two percent excise tax cannot be included in either foreign fixed-price contracts with a foreign concern or foreign fixed-price contracts with foreign governments.
So when applicable, you must pay the excise taxes. However, you cannot include them in the proposed contract price, and you cannot submit them as an allowable cost for reimbursement. Essentially, the tax will erode the project margins of your export sales.
As we told you they would.
|
USAID Bid-Rigging?
 The Department of Justice has been investigating the US Agency for International Development (USAID), according to various sources, including this Associated Press story. That AP story, dated January 24, 2013, announced that the DOJ was investigating “possible contract rigging by the general counsel”—Lisa Gomer. In addition, AP reported that "memos from the USAID Inspector General also reveal that there was evidence that Deputy Administrator Donald Steinberg tried to interfere with an internal investigation.”
Allegedly, Ms. Gomer “wired” a competition for an advisory contract award so that the retiring Agency Chief Financial Officer, David Ostermeyer, would be the winner. According to the story, the contract Ostermeyer “would have received in working with foreign governments would have paid between $123,758 and $155,500, according the USAID solicitation document.” Although the allegations were serious, the AP reported that the DOJ had decided not to press criminal charges against Ms. Gomer.
Oh, but there’s more to this story.
This story at the Corporate Counsel website reported that Ms. Gomer had resigned from her position as USAID General Counsel on January 15, to be effective February 9, 2013. Corporate Counsel reported—
The revelation comes after USAID’s Office of Inspector General released a set of internal memos to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform—which the Associated Press reported on Thursday. The memos, which CorpCounsel.com also obtained, refer to an OIG investigation alleging that Gomer ‘colluded’ with USAID’s outgoing chief financial officer David Ostermeyer on a personal service contract for a procurement reform initiative in the Office of General Counsel. ‘This position was advertised at the GS-15, and Gomer planned to select Ostermeyer for the position,’ the memorandum states. GS-15 refers to a government pay-grade.
As a result of the tainted solicitation, CorpCounsel reported that “USAID cancelled the solicitation in question, and the position was never filled. As the OIG continued to probe the matter, Gomer was reassigned to other duties on August 20. The agency’s deputy general counsel, Susan Pascocello, then took over as acting general counsel. She continues to serve in that position.”
Cancellation of the solicitation and Ms. Gomer’s resignation may not end the matter. Congress is interested in the alleged wrongdoing, as GovExec.com reported. According to the GovExec story—
In November, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman Rep. Darrell Issa, R-Calif., and Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, sent a letter to USAID administrator Raj Shah detailing their concerns about the case. ‘If the solicitation was in fact designed for Ostermeyer to win, Ms. Gomer and USAID may have violated various federal laws, the Federal Acquisition Regulation and government ethics policies,’ Issa and Chaffetz wrote.
Well, yes. Statutory violations, violations of the FAR requirements, and ethical lapses. That about covers it. And by an Agency General Counsel, to boot.
We would very much like to think that somebody holding that position would have known better. We’d like to think that an Agency General Counsel would be a role model for integrity and transparency, and for being a good steward of taxpayer dollars.
Unfortunately, stories like this tend to create a certain level of cynicism.
GAO Discusses Contractor Pension Costs: Adds to DCAA Audit Burden
 How to start this?
Let’s face it—most Americans don’t care about pension costs. That is to say, they care very much about their own pensions, but not so much about other peoples’ pensions. And almost nobody cares about cost accounting issues associated with pensions.
Even in our small world of government contracting, almost nobody wants to talk about pensions. In fact, let us go so far as to assert that the number of government contract cost accounting experts—the gray-haired CAS gurus—who feel comfortable discussing the nuances of CAS 412 and 413 can be numbered on two hands. Hell, our Principal Consultant has participated in CAS 413-related litigation before the Court of Federal Claims, and even he has to run back to the CAS and to review court cases before being able to confidently discuss some of the issues.
Yes, it’s that complex.
And it’s that boring, at least to most folks.
So our challenge today is to write about a recent GAO report, issued to Congress, which discusses pension matters within the Defense industrial base, without putting our readership into a coma. The GAO report is entitled, “PENSION COSTS ON DOD CONTRACTS: Additional Guidance Needed to Ensure Costs are Consistent and Reasonable.” Yeah, with a catchy title like that, we’re sure all the Senators and staffers are going to be all over it like white on rice. Dan Brown should be worried it’s going to displace his upcoming next installment of the adventures of Robert Langdon from the bestseller lists.
But before we delve into the GAO best-seller, let’s remind our readers that we’ve ventured onto the thin ice of this issue before. So if you’re a long-time reader, we expect you’re up to speed on issues associated with defined benefit pension plans and—more importantly—the variety of issues associated with recent “harmonization” revisions to Cost Accounting Standards 412 and 413 necessitated by the Pension Protection Act of 2006. If you need a refresher, trying searching for “pension” using the site search feature.
The GAO report is interesting reading for those few gray-haired CAS gurus who have to deal with the various issues. It’s an important topic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that some of the largest defense contractors have been mired in litigation over their pension plans for a number of years. The GAO report notes that, for defense contractors that have defined benefit pension plans subject to CAS 412/413, measured pension costs will start to increase starting in 2014, driven by the “harmonization” revisions to the Standards. It also asserts that the CAS Board failed to carry forward aspects of harmonization into the segment closing provisions of CAS 413. The report asserts that DOD guidance regarding inclusion of defined benefit pension plan costs into forward pricing rate proposals needs more specificity.
The GAO report is actually a pretty good primer for those interested in getting more knowledge of the subject. That’s as much as we’re going to say about that.
But we do want to discuss what GAO has to say about oversight and audits of defense contractors’ pension costs.
According to GAO, DOD “relies on centralized expertise for management and oversight of defined benefit pensions.” GAO wrote—
The corporate-level contracting officer has two primary sources of technical expertise available to assist in determining that the contractor’s CAS pension costs meet CAS and FAR requirements that they be allowable, allocable, reasonable, and compliant: the DCMA CIPR Center and auditors from DCAA. … The CIPR Center represents a key element in DOD’s oversight process, giving recognition to the complexity and highly technical nature of defined benefit pension plans. As DOD’s centralized source of actuarial expertise, it advises DCMA contracting officers on pensions as well as insurance, including review of forward pricing proposals. The CIPR Center assesses the reasonableness of actuarial assumptions, including the discount rates used to calculate liabilities. It also provides an independent measurement for projected pension costs. … DCAA auditors at the contractor’s corporate office are responsible for reviewing other aspects of proposed pension forward pricing, such as previous CAS pension cost estimates to assess how close they were to actual CAS pension costs for those periods. DCAA employs technical specialists who provide auditors with additional support on pension issues. DCAA audits may question costs that they identify as not allowable, allocable or reasonable, which the contracting officer may incorporate into negotiations with the contractor. For example, DCAA audits have questioned costs in forward pricing proposals because estimated CAS pension costs were higher than the contractor’s historical cost trends or the calculation methods were not compliant with CAS.
The problem with the current DOD oversight regime, according to GAO, is that they “do not address reasonableness of value of defined benefit pension plans.” This means that—
DOD’s oversight processes do not clearly assign responsibility for assessing the reasonableness of the value of pension benefits to plan participants, focusing instead on the reasonableness of actuarial assumptions or fringe benefits as a whole.
According to GAO, the fundamental flaw in this approach is that, under CAS, the amount of pension costs measured in any particular year may not equate to the real value to the employees. GAO wrote—
Auditors are instructed to review fringe benefit costs as a whole when determining their reasonableness, but CAS costs for defined benefit pensions are an imperfect measure of the value of pension benefits participants earned in a year as part of their total compensation. Multiple factors drive CAS pension costs. For example, the pension cost could be zero in a given year due to strong asset returns, and this pension cost would not capture any of the value of the benefits earned that year by employees. Conversely, the pension cost could be higher in a given year than the value of the benefits earned that year by employees as a result of actuarial losses. While they may be aware of the CAS costs of defined benefit pensions, auditors do not know the value of these benefits to an employee in a given year. They lack guidance on how to measure this value (containing, for example, acceptable methodologies, assumptions, or data sources), and therefore are unable to get a complete picture of the reasonableness of total compensation for contractor employees. Neither the CIPR Center nor DCAA’s compensation team currently assess the reasonableness of benefits offered through defined benefit plans.
Consequently, GAO recommended that DCAA start evaluating the reasonableness of employees’ compensation stemming from defined benefit pension plans. Yeah, you read that correctly. The audit agency that currently has a backlog of some 25,000 unperformed audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates should begin evaluating the reasonableness of the value of defined benefit plans as an individual element of compensation.
Even GAO thought that was a bit of a challenge throw at DCAA. It wrote—
Accurately applying the cost of a defined benefit pension to an individual employee’s total compensation package is challenging due to the complexity and annual volatility of costs even if the value of the ultimate benefit does not change. DCAA compensation team officials noted that it is not clear how costs of a defined benefit plan should be evaluated. In addition, they lack current market survey data for defined benefit plans, and team officials noted that companies participating in these surveys do not consistently calculate and report their compensation costs.
But that didn’t stop GAO from making the recommendation.
And it didn’t stop the Honorable Richard Ginman, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, from agreeing to the recommendation. He wrote—
Concur. DCAA will be responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of pension plans offered by contractors. DCAA will review its current policy to ensure it assesses the value of benefits earned by participants. … If an initial review of the pension plan offered by the contractor indicates a potential for unreasonable compensation, the [DCAA] policy will require an evaluation of other parts of compensation to determine if total compensation is unreasonable as required by FAR 31.205-6(b)(2). … DCAA will reassess its guidance covering the evaluation of defined benefit pension plans as part of the assessment of reasonableness of executive compensation.
Based on our reading of the GAO report, it’s clear that DOD is starting to react (more than six years too late) to the specter of increased contractor pension costs. The fact that their interest in the increasing pension costs comes at a time of increased budget pressures on the Defense Department is purely coincidental, we’re sure.
So if you are one of the “lucky” contractors that has a defined benefit pension plan, you should expect DCAA to start nosing around, smelling for “unreasonable” benefit levels. Exactly how the auditors will evaluate reasonableness of unclaimed costs, or of costs other than those measured by CAS, remains to be seen.
And if you’re one of the “lucky” auditors who gets assigned to evaluate the reasonableness of a contractor’s defined pension plan, you should expect contractors to push back a little bit. For instance, we suspect contractors might ask you what right you have to audit a cost that they haven’t claimed, or a cost that’s different from that measured by CAS.
And we think some smart-ass contractor is going to suggest your time is better spent catching up on all those unperformed audits, rather than tackling new assignments that are likely not to result in large amounts of questioned costs.
P.S. We were interested to note that DPAP now has the authority to establish DCAA audit policy on behalf of the audit agency. The last time we checked, DCAA reported directly to the Defense Comptroller and not to the USD (A,T&L). Perhaps there was a reorg and nobody told DCAA Director Fitzgerald?
|