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Apogee Consulting Inc

Let’s Sue DCAA!

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Lets_Sue_Them
We are holding in our hands an article published May 15, 2012 in Bloomberg BNA’s Federal Contracts Report™. Written by attorneys of the august firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge, it has the happy-making title of “DCAA Malpractice: Recovery of Damages.”

This topic has been much on our minds as of late. As we’ve asserted before, contractors are giving up on the idea that they can actually negotiate a reasonable resolution to some of their pesky contract disputes—notwithstanding the FAR’s clear direction to Contracting Officers that they are supposed to give negotiation their best shot. Recognizing that too many COs simply rubber-stamp DCAA’s audit findings, contractors are becoming resigned to the fact that they will have to litigate in order to get a fair, impartial hearing on the merits of their positions. As we wrote (link above)—

… we believe that a tsunami of litigation is in the works. We base that impression not on any inside information, but simply on what we’ve heard around the watercooler. We think the Top 10 defense contractors are girding their loins for some slingshot work, aimed at the giant Federal government—and we expect to have a lot to write about when the stones start flying. …

Here’s the bottom-line, in our view. If you threaten a contractor with negative impacts to its current programs, you have leverage and it will likely try very hard to resolve the issue. If you threaten a contractor with nickel-and-dime cost disallowances, it will likely settle—because doing so is cheaper than litigating. But if you threaten a contractor with multi-million dollar cost disallowances related to ancient issues that have lain unresolved for years (or perhaps even decades)—issues that have nothing to do with its current operations—then it will likely lawyer-up and drag your government ass into court. Because you have left it no other alternative.

And indeed, that’s what seems to be happening, as we reported in this article. In addition, Law360 recently reported that Raytheon has filed suit at the Court of Federal Claims, “contesting $90 million in disallowed costs” related to the company’s development of its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which is currently used in F/A-18 Super Hornet Navy fighters. We don’t have any more details about that lawsuit to share with you, mostly because the rest of the story lies behind Law360’s paywall (and we can’t afford a subscription). But our understanding is that more suits, from more contractors, are in process.

Indeed, we expect to see a deluge of similar suits, each contesting some aspect of a DCAA audit finding that was (allegedly) rubber-stamped by a Contracting Officer and thrown over the transom for attorneys to litigate rather than being the subject of a negotiation aimed at reaching an equitable resolution.

But that’s not what’s got our dander up and what got us thinking that somebody, somewhere needs to sue the bejeezus out of DCAA. No.

Over at Quimba Software, their saga of audit failure and its sad aftermath continues. As does the Quimba blog reporting that sad saga. For those not following the blog and its documentation of how inequitable “the system” can be to a small business that doesn’t appreciate the complexities of how “the system” works, let us just say that Quimba’s complaint to the DOD Inspector General does not appear to be progressing well. In fact, its progress (or lack thereof) is reminiscent of other actions Quimba has taken—or tried to take.

But Quimba’s documentary of its attempts to work the maze of defense contracting—and the dead-ends that it reaches at each turn—is not what’s cheesing us off today. That’s not why we’re studying the article on DCAA malfeasance. No.

What’s really frosted our biscuits today is this decision over at ASBCA in the matter of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. (ASBCA No. 56547, January 22, 2013.)

The case concerns a Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD), issued May, 2008, that Lockheed Martin had “defectively priced” its proposal for the Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP), because DCAA alleged that LM Aero had failed to disclose “significantly lower prices” for the Modular Mission Computer (MMC), which was supplied via a subcontract with Raytheon. The CCIP was a program to retrofit U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters. LM Aero submitted and negotiated its USAF CCIP production prime contract proposal during 1998 and 1999. The contract price was finalized in July 1999. During this time, Raytheon was negotiating with LM Aero on the “Bridge Contract”. DCAA alleged that LM Aero failed to update its cost or pricing data on the production contract based on its negotiations for the Bridge Contract. The CO demanded the LM Aero cough-up $14.58 Million (plus interest). LM Aero declined and appealed the COFD.

DCAA issued its post-award audit report, alleging defective pricing in September 2002. So the COFD was just a hair under six years after the audit report was issued. Consequently, LM Aero did not assert that the CDA Statute of Limitations had passed (to our knowledge, anyway). But let’s note here that we are discussing as 2013 ASBCA decision about a 2008 COFD about negotiations that had taken place a full decade before that.

And people wonder if our system is broken.

Anyway, the bottom-line is that LM Aero won the case. Judge Peacock, writing for the Board, found that “any nondisclosure of the Bridge prices did not contribute to an overstatement of the CCIP prices.” Thus, LM Aero’s appeal was sustained. The decision might be appealed, of course. But right now LM Aero gets to celebrate a victory

So what’s chapping our britches? Just this: the case should never have been litigated.

According to the Statement of Facts in the decision, the original DCAA audit report confused the pricing negotiated between LM Aero and Raytheon for the MMC 3000 system—which was a fully mature production unit—with the pricing negotiated for the MMC 5000 system—which was in development and intended to supply LM Aero’s Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program. In addition, the DCAA auditors attributed non-recurring engineering development costs to the recurring costs of production, thus inflating the alleged price difference even more.

The two subcontracts had negotiated price points based on volume. Judge Peacock found that the DCAA auditors had used an inappropriate volume price point that also inflated the price difference.

In other words, the DCAA “post-award” audit was a colossal screw-up—an example of professional malpractice in which every aspect seemed designed to increase the amount of costs alleged to have been “defectively priced” rather than to reach an accurate, “apples-to-apples” comparison between the disclosed and negotiated prices of the MMCs.

But don’t take our word for it. Let’s quote Judge Peacock—

If the original price adjustment set forth in the post-award audit and final decision were recalculated by changing only the MMC 5000 system price ($382,868), the government's recommended price adjustment would have been $3,603,962 rather than the initially claimed total of approximately $14,982,578.

The government's auditor conceded at the hearing that the price of MMC systems is very sensitive to, and significantly impacted by, the AMDR [Average Monthly Delivery Rate] and a valid comparison of prices between the Bridge and MRC subcontracts requires that the AMDR be considered. If the price adjustment calculations in the post-award audit and final decision were revised using the Bridge price for an MMC 5000 system shipset ($382,868) at a 10-15 AMDR and comparing it to the proposed and lower MRC price of an MMC 5000 system shipset in the 10-15 AMDR range ($380,220) the entire recommended price adjustment would be eliminated for both years.

[Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.]

In other words, had the DCAA auditor done a decent job, there would have been zero questioned costs. The Recommended Price Adjustment (RPA) would be zero. And the Air Force’s Revised RPA (RRPA)—in which it jettisoned the auditor’s analysis and the CO’s findings—would also have been zero.

Yes, that’s right. Realizing the fatal flaws in the auditor’s analysis, the Air Force attorneys—in a show of adversarial chutzpah, if not actually an abuse of the trial process and their positions as officers of the court—came up with their own damage theories and calculations of quantum. The Air Force RRPA theories did not impress Judge Peacock, who wrote—

There is no evidence in the record that the Air Force's RRPA and/or proposed decrement were reviewed, analyzed, or approved by, negotiators or the CO prior to its presentation in the AF cross-motion, and its assumed decrement is based solely on the above-described price reduction between the first and second period of the MRC in AMDR 4-9 range. It is otherwise unsupported by documents or testimony in the record. The post-award auditor (the only auditor who examined the RRPA after the motion was filed) disclaimed any theoretical justification for the calculation, admitting at trial that his calculations were for the purpose of ‘trying to prepare something for the trial attorney’ and not based on new information or his own independent judgment. The auditor did not discuss the RRPA with his supervisors and no supplemental audit report was issued.

There is nothing in the record that post-trial RRPAs were endorsed by government auditors, negotiators and/or the CO. To the limited extent the calculations and assumptions underlying the post-trial revisions can be understood and analyzed without explanatory and supporting testimony, they appear to suffer from the same or similar conceptual problems and deficiencies discussed above. …

[Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.]

So not only did the DCAA auditors and the Contracting Officer put LM Aero into the position of having to litigate something that never should have been an issue in the first place, but the Air Force attorneys delayed and exacerbated the litigation by introducing their own flawed damage theories, rather than admit the Government was wrong and had suffered no real damage, and asking the Judge to sustain the appeal. Nice job, folks.

And that’s why we’re pissed-off today.

The litigation costs forced upon LM Aero by the flawed DCAA audit, which was rubbed-stamped by the CO and formed the basis of a $14.58 Million (plus interest) payment demand, are damages. Damages might also include the burdened cost of the internal resources devoted to the litigation. Those damages stem from DCAA’s negligence and from the negligent review by the CO. We would love to see LM Aero sue DCAA and/or DCMA for the damages caused by their negligence.

If LM Aero sued for damages caused by the negligence of its government oversight officials, it wouldn’t be the first contractor to do so. See General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 139 F.3d 1280, (9th Circuit, 1998).

But should LM Aero choose to follow in GD’s footsteps, what would its legal theory be for entitlement? That’s where we get back to the May 2012 FCR article by Tom Lemmer, Phil Seckman, and Joe Martinez. They wrote—

A DCAA failure to comply with GAGAS is a breach of professional duty, and constitutes malpractice, which creates opportunities for contractors to protect their interests. A Contract Disputes Act (CDA) litigation to overturn a decision based on a negligent audit is the move obvious example. Recovery under the CDA, however, often does not make the contractor whole from the injuries that a negligent audit can cause. … Fortunately, contractors may recover for these injuries caused by DCAA malpractice by suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for DCAA’s negligent acts. …

In order to establish entitlement under tort, contractors must demonstrate that, as a matter of law, the DCAA owes a duty to the contractor to audit the contractor in accordance with the applicable professional standards. Determining whether DCAA owes a duty to a contractor will depend upon the state law where the DCAA negligence occurred. … In the General Dynamics case, the district court, applying California law, held that the DCAA owed a duty to General Dynamics because the audit was intended to have an impact on General Dynamics, and it was reasonably foreseeable that a negligently prepared audit would injure General Dynamics.

[Internal citations omitted.]

Most readers would agree with the assertion that, in today’s audit environment; DCAA auditors too often forsake objectivity in its rush to “protect the taxpayers” by generating questioned costs. Most readers would agree with the assertion that, in today’s oversight environment, Contracting Officers too often fail to exercise independent judgment and instead rubber-stamp DCAA’s audit findings. As the attorneys at MLA wrote, “COs do not feel empowered to exercise the discretion and business judgment granted to them under the FAR. … The shift in authority [toward DCAA] is all the more worrisome because DCAA’s ability to meet its professional obligations repeatedly has been found lacking.”

As a result of the foregoing situation, contractors are being forced to litigate government claims that are clearly not meritorious. The LM Aero ASBCA case is a recent example of this trend. That the Air Force attorneys continued to litigate their case in the face of the obvious flaws in their position does not excuse the initial failures of DCAA and DCMA.

Sooner or later, a contractor is going to get fed up with the situation and sue DCAA for malpractice under the FTCA. We suspect it will be sooner, rather than later. And LM Aero would seem to have a strong case, should they decide to go in that direction. But if it’s not LM Aero, it will be somebody else.

 

 

DARPA Coolness

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DARPA
Longtime readers know that, every so often, we like to take a look at some cool technology that catches our eye. DARPA is one of the places that generate a lot of cool tech ideas.

What’s DARPA? Well, it’s the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is what it is. There’s some bureaucratic blah-blah-blah on its website that tells you about the history of the agency that’s dedicated to “prevent strategic surprise from negatively impacting U.S. national security and create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries” but screw that.

Let’s get to the coolness.

First up is the Phoenix Program, which will be the subject of an upcoming Broad Agency Announcement. According to DARPA—

The goal of the Phoenix program is to develop and demonstrate technologies to harvest and re‐use valuable components from retired, cooperative, non‐operating satellites in or near geosynchronous orbit (GEO) and, using these components, realize the ability to create new space systems at greatly reduced cost. Phoenix seeks to demonstrate around‐the‐clock, globally persistent communication capability for warfighters more economically by robotically removing and re‐using GEO‐based space apertures and antennas from de‐commissioned satellites in the graveyard or disposal orbit.

DARPA wants to start a salvage operation, aimed at dead or obsolete satellites. It wants to go visit those satellites in orbit and “robotically harvest” components from them, to be reused on other satellites and space-based systems. This is a great idea, because those components have already been launched into orbit—which is a huge portion of the total system cost. It also means that the new stuff being launched will be much lighter, thus reducing future launch costs.

Seriously, how cool is that?

Here’s an article with some more details on the Phoenix Program. It says—

Government experts have established a graveyard, or disposal, orbit high above the Earth's surface where decommissioned spacecraft pose little risk of colliding with functioning satellites. The graveyard orbit is necessary because de-orbiting these high-altitude satellites is dangerous and expensive. Until now, the graveyard orbit has been a celestial junkyard filled with decommissioned satellites of no use to anyone. Even tough they no longer function, however, these junked satellites often still have useful components like antennas and sensors.

DARPA officials want to launch orbiting robots that can salvage still-useful satellite components from the graveyard orbit and use them to build new satellites. Spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit are particularly useful for military and civil communications and persistent surveillance.

Yeah, that’s cool, all right.

Next up is the Upward Falling Payloads (UFP) Program. With a name like that, you know it’s got to be good. (Sorry, Smuckers.) The UFP Program is the subject of a very recent Broad Agency Announcement. The BAA states—

… the UFP approach centers on pre-deploying deep-ocean nodes years in advance in forward areas which can be commanded from standoff to launch to the surface. Nearly 50% of the world’s oceans are deeper than 4 km which provides a vast area for concealment and storage. As a consequence, the cost to retrieve UFP nodes is asymmetric with the likely cost to produce and distribute them on the seafloor. The concealment of the sea also provides opportunity to surprise maritime targets from below, while its vastness provides opportunity to simultaneously operate across great distances. Getting close to targets without warning, and instantiating distributed systems without delay, are key attributes of UFP capability.

To succeed, the UFP program must be able to demonstrate a system that can: (a) Survive for years under extreme pressure, (b) Reliably be triggered from standoff commands, and (c) Rapidly rise through the water column and deploy a non-lethal payload.

So let’s get this straight: DARPA wants to develop the ability to deploy distributed sensors and “non-lethal payloads” (sure) on the ocean floor and have them sit, silently, for years. Then a command will trigger these payloads, and they will rise “rapidly through the water column” and “instantiate” a distributed system “without delay”. Really. (Note: we had to look up the word “instantiate” and we’re still not sure we understand what it means in this context.) Anyway, that’s a pretty cool concept—at least to us.

Here’s an article that essentially recaps the BAA, but adds some more substantive details. It says—

Imagine a bunch of distracting laser strobes, electronic warfare jammers, or other kinds of non-lethal weapons that pop up seemingly up without warning from the ocean's depths in the middle of one of the world's naval battle groups. That's just what scientists … envision from the [UFP Program] which seeks to pre-deploy sensors or non-lethal weapons on the ocean floor sometimes years in advance for surprise deployment among the nation's naval adversaries during times of war or international tension.

Or, you know, an EMP weapon would work here too. We’re just saying. Or even just a lot of bubbles to futz the sonars. Actually, once you figure out how to embed the gimmicks on the ocean floor and protect them from the crushing pressure while keeping them mission-ready and waiting for the “go code” … well, if you can do that the possibilities as to what the gimmicks might be and how they might be used is pretty damn vast.

Which is very cool.

Good job, DARPA, in once again trying to bridge the gap between the here-and-now and the future.

 

The Allowability of Facility Costs

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Downsizing
All this writing about possible impacts of sequestration cuts got us thinking about the recent penchant of DCAA auditors to question the costs of contractors’ facilities. Let’s take a sec to explain our thought process, and to walk through how we get from sequestration to unallowable facilities costs.

If The Powers That Be don’t get their acts together soon, we may have to deal with “reductions in force” (RIFs)—also known as layoffs. Program stretch-outs and delays and terminations are going to lead, inevitably, to workforce “adjustments”. Naturally, everyone’s focus has been on that obvious and most immediate impact. For those who are laid-off, it’s a tragedy. It’s still stressful even for those who survive. We don’t want to gloss over the employment situation; we just don’t want to focus on it.

Instead, we want to focus on another, less obvious, impact from sequestration cuts: contractors will need less facility space.

As funding cuts impact programs, there will be a reduced need for manufacturing and assembly space. Expect less need for warehouse space. Clean room and SCIF needs will come down, as well. But we suspect the biggest impact will be seen in the need for office space. As indirect heads are cut, we expect contractors will experience floors of abandoned cubicle warrens and corridors of uninhabited executive office suites. We predict contractors will have lots and lots of empty office space to deal with.

It’s almost inevitable, really. Regardless of whether or not sequestration cuts take place, the fact of the matter is that the United States is coming off of a decade-long defense and homeland security spending spree. Cut-backs are destined to happen; sequestration only accelerates the process. So no matter what happens, contractors will need to manage—and downsize—their facilities as they downsize their workforces.

If the affected buildings are owned, then there’s not much to do except to try to sublease or sell. But if the affected buildings are leased, then there are more options to consider. The point is that contractors need to do something. A failure to address excess facility space may very well lead to DCAA auditors questioning a large amount of costs as being unallowable.

Unallowable? Whatever might we mean? How can facility costs be questioned as being unallowable? Well, let’s start with the Cost Principle at 31.205-17, which discusses the cost of “idle facilities and idle capacity.”

The first thing we noticed is that the definition of facilities costs encompasses more than just the costs of paying the lease or the mortgage. The Cost Principle states that the term includes such costs as “maintenance, repair, housing, rent, and other related costs; e.g., property taxes, insurance, and depreciation.” So if DCAA auditors question facility costs, then (potentially) there is a large pot of dollars at stake.

We were surprised to read that the term “facilities” is also broadly defined by the Cost Principle. “Facilities” means “plant or any portion thereof (including land integral to the operation), equipment, individually or collectively, or any other tangible capital asset, wherever located, and whether owned or leased by the contractor.” See that part we italicized? That’s scary, isn’t it? Your facilities include your tangible capital assets, such as test equipment, tooling, dies, and all that expensive machinery.

Did we say that there was a large pot at stake? Yeah, now we’re saying it’s a huge pot at stake. Huge.

But what will lead DCAA auditors to question costs in this area? Let’s dig a bit deeper.

The first thing we’ll look at is “idle capacity”—which is defined as—

… the unused capacity of partially used facilities. It is the difference between that which a facility could achieve under 100 percent operating time on a one-shift basis, less operating interruptions resulting from time lost for repairs, setups, unsatisfactory materials, and other normal delays, and the extent to which the facility was actually used to meet demands during the accounting period. A multiple-shift basis may be used in the calculation instead of a one-shift basis if it can be shown that this amount of usage could normally be expected for the type of facility involved.

So “idle capacity” is the difference between using a facility at max capacity and what you actually use it at. To the extent you have empty cubicles and empty offices, and empty warehouses and empty program areas—you have idle capacity.

The Cost Principle states that the costs of idle capacity are “costs of doing business and are a factor in the normal fluctuations of usage or overhead rates from period to period.” Thus, “such costs are allowable provided the capacity is necessary or was originally reasonable and is not subject to reduction or elimination by subletting, renting, or sale, in accordance with sound business, economics, or security practices.” So if you are managing your facilities, and seeking to reduce your footprint as your workforce declines, you should be fine in this area.

However, the Cost Principle also states, “widespread idle capacity throughout an entire plant or among a group of assets having substantially the same function may be idle facilities.” Thus, if you are failing to manage your facilities, and do not seek to reduce your footprint as your workforce declines, then a DCAA auditor may assert you have “idle facilities”—which is bad news.

The Cost Principle defines “idle facilities” as “completely unused facilities that are excess to the contractor’s current needs.” The costs of idle facilities are unallowable. However, if the contractor can show that the unused facilities are necessary to meet expected workload fluctuations then the costs are allowable (because they now meet the definition of “idle capacity”). In addition, if the facilities “were necessary when acquired and are now idle because of changes in requirements, production economies, reorganization, termination, or other causes which could not have been reasonably foreseen,” then the costs may be allowable—up to a point. The Cost Principle states that “costs of idle facilities are allowable for a reasonable period, ordinarily not to exceed 1 year, depending upon the initiative taken to use, lease, or dispose of the idle facilities.”

The audit guidance in this area is remarkably sparse, considering how many indirect dollars may be tied up in contractor facilities. What little guidance there is, shows up in unexpected areas.

We found some interesting guidance in the audit program related to assuring CAS 414 compliance (Standard Audit Program 19414, dated June 2012). This audit program guides auditors in evaluating a contractor’s compliance with Cost Accounting Standard 404 in calculating the proper Facilities Capital Cost of Money Factors. When assessing the distribution of Net Book Values (NBV) of capital assets, the audit program directs the auditor to evaluate “risk” in certain areas. The audit program states—

Existence of idle facilities, potential idle facilities, or assets not in use may increase risk. Restructuring activities or other reorganizations may result in unutilized assets that may indicate increased risk. Determine that the asset base includes only those assets used in the regular course of business. Perform analysis to determine if unutilized or underutilized assets are an integral part of the regular operations of the business. Land should be included if the contractor can support is purchase as an integral part of its operations. The following assets should not be included:
  1. Land held for speculation or expansion.
  2. Idle facilities or capacity in accordance with FAR 31.205-17.
  3. Assets under construction and not in use.

We also found some interesting guidance in the Contract Audit Manual related to evaluating contractors’ “make-or-buy” programs. At 6-309.3, the CAM states—

a. FAR Subpart 15.407.2 generally requires contractors to submit make or buy programs for negotiated acquisitions requiring certified cost or pricing data with an estimated value of $12.5 million or more (see exception at FAR 15.407-2(c)). It also allows, for monitoring purposes, the incorporation of the program in negotiated cost-reimbursable contracts, some cost sharing contracts and major systems contracts and subcontracts for monitoring purposes. The contract clause at 52.215-9 requires notification of any changes in the program as incorporated in the contract. Alternates 1 and 2 requires adjustment of incentive fees if during performance the contractor reverses a make or buy categorization which initially was economically detrimental to the Government. Determine the effect of and compliance with any agreements resulting from these requirements.

b. The contractor has the basic responsibility for make-or-buy decisions. Therefore, its recommendations should be accepted unless they are inconsistent with Government interests or policy. Evaluate the contractor's decisions in the make or buy area which may have been motivated by considerations other than economies or efficiencies for the Government operation. For example, the contractor may desire to gain experience in a particular manufacturing or fabricating process. Another consideration which may influence a contractor's make or buy decisions involves the extent of available idle facilities. The contractor's decision to manufacture in lieu of purchase may be in the best interests of the company, but not in the best interests of the Government. When a contractor decides to manufacture a part or component not normally within its experience or production capabilities or which had been purchased in the past, determine whether the decision results in additional costs to the Government.

[Emphasis added. We assume any “additional costs” so identified will be questioned.]

From the foregoing, we conclude that contractors with idle facilities run the risk of being accused of violating the requirements of CAS 414, and that they may also run the risk of having their Purchasing System deemed inadequate, based on a perceived biased make-or-buy program that puts the contractor’s self-interest ahead of the government’s interests.

In sum, we think this is a surprisingly risky area, one that will become more so as contractors deal with the impacts of DOD budget cuts—whether or not those cuts stem from sequestration. We are advising our clients to closely manage their facility footprint so as to avoid DCAA problems in this area. If a contractor fails to manage its facility footprint, and reduce its facilities along with workforce cuts, it may find itself dealing with a large amount of questioned costs—and in some surprising areas, as well.

But best efforts may not be sufficient.

We have learned that some contractors are still having problems with DCAA auditors, despite their best efforts to manage their facilities. Because there is so little audit guidance in this area, auditors have more individual discretion to use their imaginations in order to generate questioned costs. We have heard that some auditors are starting with 90% facility utilization as the baseline, and questioning costs as being “idle facilities” when a contractor dips below that utilization rate. Clearly, that’s not the bar contemplated by the FAR Cost Principle. But until DCAA issues more prescriptive guidance to assist its auditors in applying the Cost Principle, we suspect the application will be … inconsistent.

Whether or not more prescriptive audit guidance is issued from Fort Belvoir, we suspect the subject of contractors’ facilities costs is going to be perceived by DCAA auditors as being “low-hanging fruit” that can be used to generate lots of questioned costs. You have been warned.

 

Leadership Lessons from Norm Augustine

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Leadership
Norm Augustine was born in 1935 and helmed both Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin corporations. He had a long and distinguished career in public service. We reported on his Committee’s efforts to evaluate and direct the United States’ manned spaceflight program. A glance at his Wikipedia page reveals a life replete with the highest levels of leadership and service.

So when he says something, we think everybody ought to listen to him.

One of our prized possessions is his book, Augustine’s Laws, published in 1997—more than fifteen years ago. We had occasion to page through it once again recently, and we were struck, once again, with the penetrating insight of the man. There are fifty-two Augustine’s Laws. Today we want to share two of them with you.

On audits and auditors—

Auditors, reviewers, inspectors, and other forms of overseers perform a truly important role, but that role can be beneficial only when applied constructively and with considerable moderation. The prevailing trend would suggest the existence of an explosion in the overseer business, with an ominous threat approaching that there will soon be no one left for the auditors to audit. When this day of an infinite watcher-to-worker ratio arrives, it will presumably be necessary to focus audits on the mistakes which would have been made had in fact there been anyone doing anything. … Chuck Mills, a former football coach at Wake Forest, reminds us that a spectator is a person ‘who sits forty rows up in the stands and wonders why a seventeen-year-old kid can’t hit another seventeen-year-old kid with a ball from forty yards away … and then he goes out to the parking lot and can’t find his car.’

An auditor, like any good Monday-morning quarterback, endowed with the 20-20 hindsight of his profession, can never be wrong. This is the beauty of the field. … Auditors are the only people who if four are gathered in a room will have eight opinions as to why whatever went wrong went wrong. But no one can ever doubt that, given the choice, it is better to be the mugger than the muggee. …

A new branch of specialization is now emerging in order to assure that the auditors are themselves performing their assignments effectively; this new branch is called watching the watchers. The possibilities for still further expansion of this specialty are boundless: e.g., watching the watchers watch. The creation of such opportunities represents a breakthrough in that it ensures the perpetuation of the auditing and reviewing trades even in the dread event that the last individual actually doing any work gets fed up and decides to join the legions of watchers overseeing his meager output. …

The process of evaluating proposals submitted by competing companies seeking government contracts serves as an example wherein truly enormous numbers of man-hours are expended not so much to assist the decision-maker in making good selections but rather to build a protest-proof audit trail. … Any bureaucrat worthy of the name will soon strategize that a fail-safe way to guard against criticism is never to take a risk ... Extrapolating the theory that the only people who never make bad decisions are those who never make any decisions, we can logically conclude that the only people whose work cannot be criticized are those who produce no work. …

All of which leads to Augustine’s Law of Perpetual Emotion, borrowed from naval lore and based in turn upon the observation that auditors seldom acquire ulcers, although many are suspected carriers:
Two-thirds of the Earth’s surface is covered with water. The other third is covered with auditors from headquarters.

On controlling overhead costs—

There are probably few areas of management more challenging or fundamentally cantankerous than seeking to control overhead costs. This is perhaps in part because there are few areas in management wherein managers themselves can be said to be so literally a part of the problem—or, as it is sometimes called in moments of descriptive candor, ‘The Burden.’ …

It is, of course, a widely accepted tenet of business economics that in hard times overhead rates tend to creep upward. This is logically explained by the need to spread fixed costs over a smaller business base, exacerbated by less efficient production rates and the need for increased research and marketing to help reverse the downward sales trend. Managers therefore happily anticipate the day of an increasing sales base when the opposite will be true and overhead rates will properly and almost automatically reduce themselves. ...

The figure [in the book] clearly confirms that in times of decreasing base, overheads do indeed increase. But, alas, it additionally confirms, as is widely suspected by most modern-day practicing Don Quixotes of management who have jousted with overhead costs, that in prosperous times overhead rates also tend to increase. … It has been widely observed in this vein that, for example, adding floor space to house more people causes [workforce] employment to decline. The additional cost of the space leaves less money with which to pay a staff. …

Hardly a manager is alive today who has not experienced surprise and puzzlement at finding both base and overheads rising, contrary to all expectations and diligent efforts, during a period of good times. … to the eternal frustration of managers who seek to put major overhead reductions into effect, the principal impact of their actions is usually no more than to set into motion once again what has historically come to be known … as ‘The Great Timecard Hunt,’ wherein all employees immediately shift first priority to seeking each day the timecard which authorizes them to remain on the payroll. …

Any pragmatic manager having had the facts of life explained by his subordinates will thus dutifully realize that Augustine’s Law of Insatiable Comfort must, regrettably, be recognized:
Decreased business base increases overhead. So does increased business base.

Thus endeth this dissertation on two of Augustine’s Laws. Search for the book and buy it; you will not regret reading it.

 

 

Another Look at Sequestration Impacts

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Hourglass
We all understand that the last-minute sequestration compromise reached between Congress and the Obama administration on January 1, 2013 essentially resolved nothing. It simply kicked the can down the road a couple of months. The same parties still have to resolve the same budgetary issues by March 1, 2013, or else draconian automatic spending cuts will be implemented, affecting both defense and non-defense programs.

We’ve examined sequestration before. While we don’t necessarily think that the automatic sequestration spending cuts are the economic nuclear bomb that others assert they are, we understand that the cuts will be painful.1 And they will have a painful effect on government contractors, who rely on continued Pentagon funding to keep programs executing—and to keep employees employed. We’ve already noticed a downturn in capital investments at certain contractors, and at other contractors we’ve started to see hiring freezes being implemented, especially on indirect staff. When you combine that situation with increasing numbers of baby-boomer retirements, you start to see a looming problem in mission assurance. Sure, the top lines will be impacted, and perhaps the corporate bottom-lines as well. But we predict that the more subtle, and the more pervasive, impacts will be felt in domain of corporate learning and knowledge—the business “know-how” that is the real core competency of any contractor.

As we wrote back in September, 2012—

With the sequestration bogeyman looming large and baby-boomer retirements as a percentage of the workforce trending upwards, we think it’s imperative for you to (a) move knowledge out of workers’ heads into more permanent media, and (b) figure out how to develop your next generation of leaders.

Not that you heeded our Cassandra-like warning and, you know, actually did something about the situation.2

But that wasn’t our only prediction. We also wrote a month later that—

We think the real impact is going to be felt on the government side. It is likely that as many as 200,000 Executive Branch employees could be furloughed or laid-off in some sequestration scenarios—though President Obama has promised to protect military service personnel from cuts. If programs are going to be terminated, who’s going to be left to administrate the termination or to process the Termination Settlement Proposals? Who’s going to be left to audit contractors’ claimed costs? Who’s going to be exercising oversight on the remaining contract obligations? … If you cut heads to the point where services can no longer be provided, then you’ve gone too far. Government contractors are very much reliant on their government contracting officers and quality assurance inspectors. If the Government can’t inspect, then it can’t accept. And if it can’t accept, you can’t get paid. If there is no Contracting Officer to obligate funds in MOCAS (or whatever system they’re using these days), then DFAS isn’t going to issue any payments. And if there are no DFAS payment clerks, there will be nobody to process contractor invoices and issue payments. So you may have a contractor with authorized funding, even after sequestration—but you still may not get paid.

We see no reason to change our assessment of the situation as of today’s date. We continue to believe the Executive Branch is going to feel the pain of sequestration first, and we suspect that it’s going to feel the most pain of all stakeholders. And we continue to predict it will be the domino effect of those Federal personnel cuts—and not actual program funding cuts—that will cause contractors to feel the most pain with respect to their ongoing operations.

In fact, we can already see the impacts starting, like the falling of the first few pebbles that start off an avalanche. Let’s recap some of those early pebbles, shall we?

The Federal Times recently published a Q&A session with Dr. Ashton Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Dr. Carter offered some insights into how the Pentagon is preparing for the looming sequestration cuts. He stated—

We are now starting to freeze hiring civilians. We hire in the department 1,000 people a week in order to keep our numbers up, and we would like to continue to do that. However, if I worry that I’m going to run short of money later this year, I’d better stop hiring. Now, that’s not a good thing.

The Federal Times also reported that—

The Defense Finance and Accounting Service on Jan. 27 will freeze hiring, stop nominating employees for performance awards, and slash travel, training and overtime to help it deal with budget cuts.

In a Jan. 17 e-mail obtained by Federal Times, DFAS Director Terri McKay said more stringent actions — such as furloughing employees — may be necessary if sequestration takes place or the current continuing resolution expires without another agreement in place to further fund the Defense Department. …

The entire federal government is bracing itself for severe budget cutbacks if sequestration takes effect in March. The Army, Navy and Air Force have already frozen hiring and are warning employees that massive furloughs may be required — perhaps for as much as 22 days.

In addition to the foregoing, the Federal times added another report that discussed civilian workforce cuts at Naval shipyards. It stated—

The Navy will cut more than 3,000 employees — almost 10 percent — from its shipyard workforce through a civilian hiring freeze and by laying off temporary workers, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, said in a Thursday memo.

In the face of a potentially stiff funding shortfall this year, the Navy also plans to cancel all aircraft depot maintenance from April through September, halt the bulk of surface ship upkeep at private shipyards, and reduce spending on information technology support, conferences and travel, Greenert told flag officers and top executives in the memo. Also on the chopping block: repair and modernization of most piers, runways, buildings and other facilities through the end of fiscal 2013 in September.

So we think the evidence supports our rather grim predictions in this area. But that’s not all we want to discuss.

Readers might recall that both DCMA and DCAA have complained that their staffing levels are inadequate to meet their requirements. As we told readers long ago, testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting3 indicated that inadequate staffing was “a root cause of poor ‘ground truth’ monitoring of contractors, incomplete contract flies, and untimely or inadequate review of invoices”—according to the Department of State Inspector General.

In response to concerns raised by the CWC, DOD created a “Task Force on Wartime Contracting” (TFWC). We discussed the official TFWC report here. The TFWC report noted that the Secretary of Defense had gotten involved in addressing inadequate acquisition resources at the DOD. It stated—

  • In April 2009, the Secretary announced that the Department would invest the resources to add 20,000 new acquisition positions across the board, which goes beyond contingency contracting capability. For example, the Department will add auditors, program managers, and contract attorneys. It will also reinvest in developing the Department’s capability to perform cost analysis through the addition of cost and pricing experts.

  • Section 852 funding, as well as the Human Capital Strategic Plan and planning process, provide the dollars and leadership attention to ensure that this growth in the acquisition workforce targets the skills and specialties needed to ensure mission success.

As recently as June, 2012, DCMA was still pushing forward on its “expedited hiring” process to fill open acquisition positions. Comments in internet chatrooms indicate that, as of mid-January 2013, DCMA hiring is still going strong.

In addition to DCMA’s ramping-up of acquisition resources, DCAA also announced it was committed to addressing its admitted shortfall in audit resources. In its GFY 2011 Report to Congress, DCAA leadership stated—

With support from DoD, DCAA has increased its audit staff, adding 700 new auditors in the past three years via the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. As stated above, based on DoD budget guidance to DCAA, staffing will increase from about 4,900 employees in FY 2011 to about 5,600 employees in FY 2016.

Indeed, as recently as January, 2013, GAO reported to Congress that DCAA had a plan to whittle away at its backlog of roughly 25,000 unperformed audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates. GAO stated that DCAA leadership had told its auditors the following –

  • DCAA officials stated they plan to increase their staffing levels from 4,900 employees in 2011 to 5,600 by 2016.

  • By 2016, DCAA estimates it will reduce the backlog and reach a steady state of audits, which it defines as two fiscal years of proposals awaiting review.

So the tune has not change in official agency publications. DCMA and DCAA are committed to hiring up and increasing staffing levels, while at the same time senior Pentagon leadership is talking about hiring freezes.

What’s the real story?

Obviously, we don’t know the real story. But we stand by our predictions. We’re no Nate Silver but, so far, we think we’ve got a pretty good track record on this particular issue.

What you do with this information is, of course, up to you.

 

1 Yes, we used to be among those equating sequestration with doomsday. No longer.

2 ** Sigh. **

3 Remember them?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.