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Apogee Consulting Inc

The Strategy and Tactics of Cost Allocation Structures, Part 3

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Accuracy_and_Precision
Part 1 of this series can be found here. We discussed why this is an important—nay, critical—topic for you, worthy of an investment of your time and expense.

Part 2 of this series can be found here. We discussed why you need input from a diverse group of stakeholders. You will want to solicit input from a number of diverse perspectives because your cost allocation decisions—including your decision regarding the emphasis you place on maximizing the amount of direct charges—can affect your corporate culture in perhaps unexpected ways.

In today’s article we want to explore the concept of precision as it impacts cost allocation decisions. But before we do that, we’ve got to address your organization structure. Your organization structure is the starting point for your cost allocations.

The reason we start with your organization structure is that government contract cost accounting embraces the concept of full absorption costing. That phrase means that (simply put) all your costs need to be accounted for, and all indirect costs need to be allocated and absorbed by the benefiting “final cost objectives” of your cost accounting system. Your organization structure and its building blocks—whether you call them “cost centers’ or “departments” or “whatevers”—is the framework within which you collect costs for budgeting and costing purposes. The first step in designing the cost allocation pools and bases is to examine your current organization structure and see how the business is managed and run from a budgetary and cost accumulation perspective.

This first step isn’t too difficult—assuming you’re already happy with your current organization structure. If one assumes that all your departments are grouped as you want them and that your management team is working together to get your projects and programs executed, then we can proceed directly to dollarizing those groupings and looking at appropriate allocation bases. If one assumes that you’ve thoughtfully organized your entity into logical groupings of functions and activities, and that there’s a fairly clear relationship between the organization structure and how the business is managed, then we’re good to go.

Based on our experience, this is a huge assumption that often turns out to be wrong.

If you’re happy with your current org structure and believe it supports logical cost groupings and allocations, you can skip the next nine paragraphs. Otherwise, we suggest you keep reading.

You need to do is to look at your organization structure and make sure it reflects how you want to run your business, both now and in the near term future. This is not an easy task. If you’ve been in business for any length of time and have experienced a modicum of growth, it’s more likely than not that you’ve got a patchwork org structure that reflects how individual leaders grew their empires, rather than how the business was intended to be managed. In other words, we suspect your org structure consists of a hodgepodge of individual fiefdoms, rather than being reflective of any particular management theory regarding how the business ought to be run.

For example, one of our past clients had several sales channels within its company. One focused on commercial services while another focused on government services. The purchasing department—which supported all procurements, both direct and indirect—was located in the commercial services group and reported up to the Commercial Services Vice President. This reporting relationship was the result of company history, and not at all the result of any conscious decision-making on behalf of the leadership team. We suggested that the purchasing department be moved into a corporate central services group, which reported to the CFO (there was no Chief Operating Officer at the time), so that its costs could be allocated cleanly to all sales channels that the function supported. That suggestion did not go over well with the Commercial VP.

The problem illustrated by the above anecdote is that changing the existing org structure will very likely be perceived as a threat to certain individual fiefdoms. Some “leaders” who see their corporate world as solely consisting of winners and losers may think that their empires are under threat, and thus they will set themselves in opposition to whatever org changes make logical senses from a cost allocation perspective.

Thus: it is important to have high-level sponsorship of the cost allocation structuring project. You will need somebody who can convene an Executive Steering Committee and push for what makes sense (in contrast to what’s perceived to be in the best political interests of certain stakeholders).

In the prior article, we asserted that executive leadership needed to be involved in the direct versus indirect decisions, because those decisions affect the corporate culture. The same is true for the organization structure discussion and resulting decisions. The org structure not only affects the cost allocation methodologies, but it should also reflect the business management philosophy of the leadership.

For smaller businesses seeking growth, sooner or later you will have to address the challenge of matrix management. Most, if not all, mid-size and larger government contractors have centralized certain functions in order to achieve cost efficiencies and standardize processes. Any company that’s contemplating performing a contract that contains the DFARS Business Systems administration clause(s) will be thinking about how to implement “adequate” business systems in areas such as Property Management, Purchasing, Earned Value Management, and Estimating. Those “business systems” require documentation and consistent application of policies and procedures, if they are to be deemed adequate by Government reviewers. The easiest means of accomplishing that goal is to put all the individuals performing those related functions/activities together, reporting to one leader who can hold them accountable for policy compliance. The individuals may report (on a “dotted line” basis) to the project/programs, but they are first and foremost part of a single group that operates in one way. In summary: centralized standards and decentralized deployment and execution. This concept is generally called “matrix management”.

The question about which activities/functions need to be centralized and then deployed on a dotted-line basis is fundamentally a question about the entity’s “run rules”—i.e., how it operates on a day-to-day basis. Accordingly, reaching a consensus answer can entail a long and disputatious discussion. But as we said, sooner or later the topic needs to be discussed. Discussing it while also discussing cost allocations is as good timing as any.

Objectively evaluating the current organization chart and designing the future state organization chart is a “must do” if you want clean and logical cost allocations (and straightforward time charging, too). That doesn’t make it an easy task. One past client went through 23 versions of organization structure before we found that that the stakeholders could, mostly, align and achieve consensus upon. Twenty-three. (We counted them.) Another client when through nine different structures, involving different levels of matrix management and cross-charging between operating groups, before it found one that was to its liking. And then it didn’t like the rates that the “final” org structure produced—so it was back to the drawing board once again. This is a task that almost begs for a disinterested facilitator, one who can dispassionately identify the pros and cons of each structure that the discussion participants brainstorm.

Another question to be addressed in the org structure discussion is the number of cost centers/departments/whatevers. (Okay, we’re calling them cost centers from now on. Your mileage may vary.) Why can’t you just have one big corporate cost center and one big operations cost center? Answer: you can. But then you get one big cost allocation from Corporate to Operations, and there’s no visibility into what the project/program teams are paying for. Consequently, many companies like to create individual cost centers for individual functions and/or activities, so as to promote visibility and budgetary control.

Which brings us, finally, to the topic at hand: just how precise do you want to be?

Many companies—especially those providing engineering services—are already very precise in their cost allocations and cross-functional charging. They often do this in the name of “fairness” or “determining the real profit and loss of each organization”. They have already made sure that rent and occupancy expenses are allocated based on a pro rata share of occupied space. They have already made sure that communication expenses are charged to users based on actual usage. They have already broken-out their various IT-related functions into discrete cost groupings for charge-backs to cost centers based on complex algorithms that take into account both usage and storage. The HR function has been divided up and those individual costs are allocated separately. Ditto for Finance/Accounting. Ditto for Marketing/Business Development. They have parsed-out their costs into very small groupings, and each allocates on an individual basis, so that users receive only their “fair share” of costs based on benefits received.

Sounds great, doesn’t it? Sounds like all the work’s already been done.

Well, we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. think it’s a huge mistake. Huge.

The Federal rules applicable to cost allocations depend on whether or not the entity is subject to the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). But even if CAS is in play, the rules are not terribly prescriptive. The general rule is provided by FAR 31.203(c)—which states:

The contractor shall accumulate indirect costs by logical cost groupings with due consideration of the reasons for incurring such costs. The contractor shall determine each grouping so as to permit use of an allocation base that is common to all cost objectives to which the grouping is to be allocated. The base selected shall allocate the grouping on the basis of the benefits accruing to intermediate and final cost objectives. When substantially the same results can be achieved through less precise methods, the number and composition of cost groupings should be governed by practical considerations and should not unduly complicate the allocation.

[Emphasis added.]

See that part we italicized above? Yeah, that’s where we’re going with this thought. Your cost allocation structure doesn’t need to be so complicated. In fact, an overly complex cost allocation structure works against you.

While it may be desirable, on a superficial level, to have multiple detailed individual cost allocations, so as to determine “true profit and loss” by function, when you think about it we hope you’ll see that there’s a price to be paid for such precision.

First, let’s think about the administrative cost associated with your multiple detailed individual cost allocations. You need accountants to make those journal entries each month; at a minimum you need accountants and programmers to make sure your fancy accounting system posts those entries each month. And what about budgeting? You’ve got to budget for each of those allocations, don’t you? And then there’s the variance analyses, where your people compare actual costs to budgeted costs, and try to figure out why there’s a difference. All those efforts cost you money and efficiency.

Next, let’s think about how your show all those multiple detailed individual cost allocations on your annual submission to establish final billing rates (popularly, but incorrectly, called the “incurred cost submission”). According to the DCAA’s Adequacy Checklist, you must include a “cost schedule for each intermediary cost pool” and show “allocation base by recipient, the percentage of the total base for each recipient, and the dollars allocated to each recipient.” In other words, your people will be spending a lot of time and effort showing those multiple detailed individual cost allocations and reconciling all the entries to the general ledger. If they don’t show all the allocations in sufficient detail, your proposal will be determined to be inadequate for audit.

And whenever your cognizant DCAA FAO schedules you for an “incurred cost audit” you’ll need to show the auditors all that detail all over again, with lots of supporting documentation. In other words, the more detailed your allocations, the more challenging the audit support will be.

For smaller companies looking to have DCAA tell them that their accounting system is “adequate” for cost reimbursement contracting, all those allocations pose a bigger challenge. Each one needs to be defended. Remember that FAR bit we quoted above? The bit about “logical cost groupings” and common allocation bases on the “basis of the benefits accruing” and all that stuff? You’re going to have to convince a skeptical auditor that each one of those detailed allocations meets the criteria. If you can’t do that, then your accounting system is not going to be found to be adequate. In other words, the more allocations you have, the more risk you have that your accounting system will be found to be inadequate.

And if you are CAS-covered, then the more allocations you have, the more risk you have that your actual practices will be noncompliant with your disclosed practices.

Truly, you only need the allocations that make sense for you to have to distribute centrally incurred costs to the benefiting cost objectives. The more cost allocations you have, the more you increase your risk profile in critical areas. This is not conjecture; we have actually witnessed this phenomenon.

We had this one client—a multi-national engineering services provider that generated more than a billion dollars in annual revenue. The company had several large cost-plus contracts. While it had had trouble in getting its annual rate submissions through audit, there had been no show-stoppers. Until the one day when DCAA told the Controller that the company’s accounting system was inadequate because it couldn’t support its intermediate allocations. The accountants simply could not document and reconcile the hundreds of individual detailed allocations used to make sure every business unit got charged for every service it used. There were too many allocations to document, and too much had been automated. They couldn’t build the Schedules that DCAA demanded. And so the company’s accounting system was found to be inadequate, as were all the pending proposals to establish final billing rates. And then the Controller moved on “for personal reasons.”

In contrast, another very successful multi-national engineering services provider we’ve worked with doesn’t even allocate Corporate costs to its business units. The business units—and by extension the project/program managers—are only held accountable for the gross margin they generate. In other words, they are held accountable for what they can control locally, and not for what they cannot control. Embedded with that philosophical decision was another decision to tie executive incentive compenstation to the performance of the overall company, and not to the performance of any particular business unit. The company made the decision that there was too little benefit from multiple detailed allocations and too much cost and risk associated with them. They decided they would not pay the price associated with precise cost allocations. And they’re doing quite well, in both commercial and governmental sales channels.

Precision has a price. More often than not, the price is too high to pay.

As the FAR states, “practical considerations” should govern your cost allocation decisions, and not abstract notions of precision and accuracy. If you want your benefiting projects/programs to pay for what they use, then you really want to make a decision to have as many costs as possible be direct costs. (See our Part 2 discussion for pros and cons of that decision.) If you’ve decided to make certain functions or activities indirect, then you have by definition surrendered some degree of precision. Let that be okay for your company. Keep the organization structure logical, keep the cost groupings to a reasonable minimum, and you’ll find that you’ll be happier with the results.

Next time we’ll talk about segmentation and intermediate home offices, as well as GOCO’s, special business units, and special facilities.

 

DOD IG Calls Out DCAA Audit Quality Failures—Reactions

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Last week we published our take on the recent DoD Inspector General report, in which it reviewed 50 reports issued by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in Government Fiscal Year 2010, and found that 37 of them (74 percent of the review sample) were noncompliant with applicable requirements of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The DOD IG did not just find one or two GAGAS issues; it identified multiple deficiencies in each audit report.1 The audit quality issues were so pervasive that the IG concluded that “the audit staff did not exercise professional judgment,” and stated that “the abundance of noncompliances with standards identified in the 37 assignments evidences the need for improvements in the area of competence at DCAA.”

In other words, the DOD Inspector General stated in writing that it thought DCAA, as an audit agency, was incompetent. This is not a good thing to be accused of, not when your audit findings can cost contractors millions of dollars just to litigate the matter in front of a (hopefully) impartial tribunal in order to refute those audit findings. But one can’t take this individual DOD IG audit report at face value; it needs to be put into proper context.

The fact of the matter is that this is simply the latest volley in the ongoing series of battles that we’ve come to call “The DOD Oversight Wars.” GAO, the DOD IG, DCMA and DCAA have, at one time or another, taken aim at each other. Congress has, from time to time, weighed into fray as well. For a while, the so-called Independent Commission on Wartime Contracting provided a forum for the various sides to battle with each other, when it wasn’t pushing its own agenda. The point is: you can’t fully evaluate this latest IG report without understanding the historical context in which it was issued.

Over at GovExec.com, Charles Clark (or his editor) noted the historical context, in a story with the headline, “Pentagon’s Internal Feud Over Contract Auditing Takes a New Twist.” Mr. Clark also reported that—

Pentagon executives, in statements emailed to Government Executive, complained that the IG report focuses on old work and fails to factor in reforms instituted at DCAA by Patrick Fitzgerald after he took over as director in November 2009.

‘I'm troubled that the focus of this is on work that was performed between 2006 and 2009, which completely ignores the changes our employees have made in the last three years,’ Fitzgerald said. ‘Not only does the report fail to reflect current operations, it's an unfair characterization of the significant improvements our workforce has made in audit quality. While the issues raised in the report are important, the time period of analysis doesn't begin to account for the progress we've made.’

Fitzgerald’s boss, Pentagon Comptroller Robert Hale, said, ‘I am deeply disappointed that this report is being issued when it so clearly reflects old data and replicates findings previously made’ by the Government Accountability Office in 2009. ‘I question the usefulness of a report that is being issued four years after the DCAA work was performed. I remain committed to ensuring that DCAA execute its mission effectively, and I welcome fair analyses that focus on DCAA's current work.’

 

In a similar vein, Sean Reilly at FederalTimes.com reported—

The report is the latest in a series to question the competence of DCAA’s 4,700-strong workforce, but the long lag time drew an unusually heated reaction from the agency’s chief, Pat Fitzgerald, as well as Defense Department Comptroller Robert Hale. In a prepared statement released by DoD’s press office, Fitzgerald said the inspector general’s review ‘completely ignores the changes our employees have made in the last three years.’

‘While the issues raised in the report are important, the time period of analysis doesn’t begin to account for the progress we’ve made,’ Fitzgerald said. Hale echoed that criticism, saying in an accompanying statement that the IG report ‘clearly reflects old data and replicates findings’ made by the Government Accountability Office in 2009.

Amber Corrin, at Federal Computer Weekly, seemed to disagree with both Director Fitzgerald and Comptroller Hale, writing—

According to the [DOD IG] report, DCAA officials said that some of the assignments in question may suffer from residual effects of a ‘production-oriented environment’ that existed before fiscal 2009, when the agency began taking corrective actions. The IG acknowledged the corrective actions, which include revised training, curriculum and guidance, and noted that the effectiveness of those steps would be evaluated in future reviews.

Perhaps the issue that bothered the quoted DOD leaders the most was that the DOD IG report had been “delayed” and was issued long after performance of field work. As Ms. Corrin wrote—

In the report, the IG noted that its findings had been delayed ‘due to a shift in our primary oversight of DCAA to reviewing Defense Hotline complaints during the period of January 2010 through January 2012.’

Similarly, Geoff Whiting at Fierce Government wrote—

The IG acknowledged that the report's completion was substantially delayed due to a shift in its office's oversight priorities of DCAA from quality reviews to hotline reviews from January 2010 through January 2012. It says the effectiveness of corrective actions, such as new training and guidance, is has already taken will be evaluated in future reviews.

You may be wondering about our reaction to the reactions of Director Fitzgerald and Comptroller Hale. Well, wonder no longer, dear readers.

First (as was noted by a commenter on GovExec.com), while it may be true that some or even much of the audit work was performed in GFY 2009—before Mr. Fitzgerald took over his role as DCAA Director—the fact of the matter is that the reports were issued under his watch. All 50 were issued after former Director Stephenson had left the audit agency and while Director Fitzgerald was responsible for the quality of the audit reports. If he was uncomfortable with the quality of the audit procedures or the lack of compliance with GAGAS, he should not have let them be issued.

While it may be true that he could not have personally reviewed all audit reports issued by the agency, it is also true that he was responsible for them. He was accountable for them. It was (and still is) his watch. Moreover, as agency productivity has fallen, it is now quite possible for him to review a fairly substantial portion of the agency’s output.

And speaking of audit productivity, the DOD IG report made it crystal clear that the seemingly endless cycle of management reviews has done little to increase audit quality, and much to delay issuance of audit reports. As we reported in a series of articles, by GFY 2011 (two years into its set of “corrective actions”), the productivity at DCAA had dropped by at least 76 percent, and by one measure had dropped by 81 percent. By DCAA’s own reported metrics, in GFY 2011 it took an average of nearly three full years to issue a single audit report on a contractor’s annual “incurred cost” submission.

Delayed audit reports are what Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s clients experience nearly every single day. That is, when they actually receive audit reports—i.e., when the assignments aren’t cancelled after years of languishing field work.

So when the DOD leaders complain about the DOD IG’s two-year delay in issuing its audit report, we smile knowingly and say to them, “welcome to our world.” It doesn’t feel very good to get audit reports years after the work was performed, does it? So why does DCAA leadership let it happen, over and over and over again?

But you know what does feel pretty good? The schadenfreude. It feels really good, actually.

Look: we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. have been complaining for years about the current DCAA audit environment, where reports are inexplicably delayed for years, and findings seem to lack much (if any) rational basis. The DOD IG’s report is nothing new. It just confirms that our past complaints have had merit.

Now it’s time for DOD leaders to stop reacting defensively to these audit findings, and to start admitting that their “corrective actions” have not addressed the fundamental issues that, as we have asserted in the past, are driving astounding levels of litigation activity. Pushing the sole metric of the amount of questioned costs does nothing to lead to the quality of audit findings; instead, it leads to audit findings that both lack evidentiary support and are unsupported by applicable regulatory requirements. Implementing multiple reviews does little to drive audit quality; instead, it leads to delayed issuance of audit reports. Forcing extreme working paper documentation does not drive GAGAS compliance; instead, it leads to auditors spending more time documenting audit procedures than they spend actually performing those procedures in audits of contractors’ costs.

These facts must be admitted and the audit agency needs to do a 180 degree course correction. If it doesn’t enthusiastically embrace change, future GAO and DOD IG (and external quality reviewer) reports will become tediously repetitive in their excoriation of DCAA audit quality.

1. In fairness, the IG’s methodology kind of guaranteed that it would find multiple GAGAS violations if it found any GAGAS violation.

 

The Strategy and Tactics of Cost Allocation Structures, Part 2

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Part 1 of this series can be found here. In it we discussed the importance of designing your cost allocation structure to support your business strategy and customer requirements. Hopefully, we convinced you, our readership, that (a) this is an important topic, and (b) you haven’t invested sufficient time or effort into ensuring that you’re adequately addressing point (a).

This is not a topic that your accounting/finance function should be addressing in isolation. It requires input from stakeholders across the enterprise. For instance, your BD/marketeers need to be thinking about the nature of the contracts they’ll be going after in the next two or three (or five) years. Designing and implementing a cost allocation structure is not something you want to mess with every single year; thus, today’s structure needs to support tomorrow’s business environment. And it’s your BD/marketing folks who are in the best position to give you insight into what tomorrow’s business environment is likely to look like.

And don’t forget your IT folks. You may or may not implement your government cost accounting and allocation structure within your accounting system. If you’re running CostPoint or Jamis, then it’s not going to be a big deal either way. But if you’re running SAP/R3—particularly if you’re a big commercial firm that does things its own way—then you may be starting with the internal financials and then “worksheeting away” from the General Ledger to get what you want for your government proposals, billings, and claims. Which is fine. But determine how much you’re going to rely on your IT folks to automate the allocations and the calculations—and then keep their input in mind as you move forward.

Moving forward can be hard—particularly if you’ve already established a cost allocation structure that’s aligned with your organization structure and are seeking to revamp it significantly. The way it’s always been done is still the easiest road to travel on for almost everybody (even if it’s now the wrong road), and so you’re likely to get lots of push-back. Or—and this is even worse—you’re going to get an ominous silence, followed by a bunch of managers with folded arms, determined to wait you out and then go back to their comfort zones. Then there are those people who will start bad-mouthing your efforts, pointing out how much money and resources you’re spending to “reinvent the wheel that wasn’t broken”—and that whisper campaign might even get uglier, with active attempts to sabotage your efforts.

Which is to say: this is an effort that involves change management, as well as subject matter expertise. You can design the greatest structure in creation, but if you don’t get the rest of the company to buy into it, then you’ve failed. And change management is about communication. You need to get everybody involved and you need to get everybody to feel like they have a stake in the outcome.

And HR—you’ve got to make sure HR is actively involved, because you’ll need their assistance in many areas. In some circumstances, you will be messing with the existing org structure, because it will have been decided to keep the org structure and the cost allocation structure in close alignment. In other circumstances, you’ll be looking at different methods of accounting for fringe benefit costs, or labor costs, or SCA H&W costs. HR is going to care (rightfully) about those things. Exclude HR at your own peril.

Assuming you’ve got the right people involved, one of the first questions you’ll want to answer is “how much costs need to be direct?” This is not at all an easy question. Indeed, it’s a very deep question with far-reaching implications. It involves thinking about customer perceptions and the costs of accounting and the kind of culture the entity wants to create for itself.

On one extreme, most everything is a direct cost of one and only one contract. Yes, this can be done. In this type of culture, pretty much everybody is a direct employee with the ability (and need) to discretely charge to contracts. Only the residual labor that cannot be charged to a contract is charged as indirect labor. This is essentially activity-based accounting, with everybody charging based on some cost drivers. Accounts Payable charges direct based on which supplier invoices get paid that day. Accounts Receivable charges direct based on which customer invoices they generated that day, or which customer payments they processed. Et cetera.

In the foregoing scenario, indirect cost rates are kept as low as possible by maximizing the amount of direct costs. It’s great if your customers are rate-sensitive. Your marketeers will love it.

The problem with the foregoing scenario is that you need to be able to estimate those direct costs before you incur them, during the bidding phase. If you have history, you can develop parametric estimating factors; but if not, then it’s a crap-shoot what kind of “taxes” the so-called “non-productive back-office functions” will end up charging the contract.

In this scenario, you also see a lot of very small labor hour charges, which tend to drive the Contracting Officer’s Representative batty. So you end up with a lot of questions that are difficult to answer. Even if there are no customer questions, you’ll notice that you have a lot of folks spending too much time filling out timesheets and trying to drive their labor to contracts, so that they don’t end up on the “poor utilization” reports.

Congratulations—you’ve just created a Darwinian “survival of fittest culture” where those who made friends in project/program management have charge numbers to record their time, whereas those who didn’t, don’t. And now everybody is a bean-counter, worried about how to drive their $100 charge out of overhead.

On the other extreme, very few things are direct and many functions are indirect. For example, Contract Management and Supply Chain Management are indirect functions. Accounting and Finance are indirect functions. Security and HR and general management are indirect functions. Which is great because you only need to estimate the direct charges actually associated with the customer Statement of Work (SOW). Cost estimating is made dramatically easier, and the timecharging issues described above go away to a great extent.

But now you have other problems. For instance, your indirect rates are through the roof while your competitors’ rates are dramatically lower. Regardless of the total cost involved, you suddenly seem a lot more expensive—too expensive, according to your BD folks. Your budgeting folks will spend inordinate time working through the Annual Operating Budget and trying to justify all the indirect expenses, in the face of dire warnings from the marketeers about all the business you’ll be losing. And even if you manage to win the bids that your marketeers said were jeopardized by your too-high rates, your project/program managers will start telling the story about “unknown and uncontrollable indirect rates” that drove up their costs and eroded profit. And don’t forget that, when times are tough, the first thing to go will be all the indirect heads that seemingly don’t drive program execution.

Obviously, the right answer depends on input received from BD/marketing, Operations, project/program management, and HR. Executive management might also be interested in the kind of culture created by the strategic decisions made regarding cost allocation. Indeed, you need to survey all the stakeholders in order to find the answer that’s right for your entity and its particular niche in the marketplace. More likely than not, you’ll end up somewhere in the middle, with certain functions consigned to being entirely indirect, other functions determined to be fully direct, and some functions with the ability to charge direct in limited circumstances.

In our experience, there are always functions that seem to generate questions and in-depth discussion.

  • Finance looks like an indirect function, but what about the Finance folks working EVMS, which is tied to requirements of specific programs (but not others)? What about the Finance folks supporting a PMO on a full-time basis?

  • Contracts can go either way. Which way will it go for your entity?

  • Ditto for Supply Chain Management.

Regardless of your decisions, it will be important to (a) communicate the decisions that are made, and (b) ensure that the decisions are followed consistently. CAS 402 requires that the same cost must be either direct or indirect in similar circumstances—but not both. If you are going to determine that certain Finance functions (e.g., EVMS) are direct-charged, but that others (e.g., Annual Budgeting) are indirect, then you need to clearly spell-out which is which, and keep everybody on the same page. And if you determine that any function is a direct-charging function, then it must always be that way (in similar circumstances) regardless of the impacts to your project/program budgets. You cannot tell direct-charging people to start charging their labor to indirect accounts because the project or program can’t afford them anymore.

Well, you can. But then you’re going to have an investigation to support that will very likely result in a fairly substantial legal bill and a nice-sized legal settlement. We’re going to assume you don’t want that.

Okay. That’s enough for today. In the next article, we’ll explore the question: What price precision?

 

San Diego Navy Fraud

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While its big sister city Los Angeles is often thought as being the home (if not the heart) of the modern Aerospace/Defense industry, many people forget that San Diego has been a Navy town since World War II. Accordingly, we are too often surprised when we learn that San Diego has its share of fraud, waste, and abuse stories.

Here are two stories of Navy-related fraud perpetrated in the San Diego area.

The first story was reported in the Los Angeles Times on March 5, 2013. The LA Times story reported that two individuals and one corporation had been found guilty “of being part of a fraud and bribery scheme involving phony payments for the repair of military aircraft at North Island Naval Air Station in Coronado.”

They were convicted as part of prosecution of at least 11 individuals (including five former Navy employees). The Times reported—

Robert Ehnow and Joanne Loehr, owners of Poway-based companies, were convicted Monday of showering Navy officials with gifts and cash in exchange for millions of dollars in payments for work supposedly done on planes at the Fleet Readiness Center. Loehr's firm, Centerline Industrial Inc., also was convicted. Among the items were retail gift cards, flat-screen television sets, luxury massage chairs, model airplanes, bicycles costing thousands of dollars and home repairs. The cost of the bribes was hidden in bills submitted to the Navy, according to prosecutors.

The LA Times also reported our second story, that of three civilian contractors at Marine Base Camp Pendleton who pleaded guilty to theft of $3 million in Navy medical equipment “meant to be shipped to Marine combat units, including those in Afghanistan.”

The LA Times reported that the three individuals had been employed as supply clerks, where they had access to the medical equipment, which was stored in warehouses awaiting shipment. The LA Times reported—

Included in the list of stolen items, according to the indictment, were ultrasound machines, defibrillators, ventilators, a laryngoscopy, and kits for dealing with broken bones -- the kinds of equipment used to treat injured or wounded troops. The equipment, including an autoclave for sterilizing medical instruments, was meant to be shipped to ‘combat commands throughout the world.’ Instead the three loaded the equipment in their cars ‘often meeting with customers during nighttime rendezvous in secluded parking lots,’ according to court documents.

So warehouse security was so porous that these supply clerks could simply walk off with the equipment, load it into their personal automobiles, and sell it at their leisure? And nobody though it odd that supply clerks were carting off medical equipment, and ostensibly shipping it “throughout the world” via their personal cars? Nobody thought to challenge these supply clerks?

Really?

Okay. We’ve written about the culture of accountability in the Navy before. We’ve even written about a Naval purchasing clerk who helped himself to parts so that he could build a personal airplane to help him with his commute. These latest stories are really just more of the same, aren’t they?

We hope the U.S. Navy can do better in the future.

 

BAM! DOD IG Issues a New Report on DCAA Audit Quality

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DCAA
We interrupt our series of articles on the structuring of indirect cost allocations to let our readers know that the DOD Inspector General has just issued its latest assessment of DCAA audit quality.

The reported results were consistent with historical findings reported by both the DOD IG and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

In other words, they weren’t very pretty, folks.

The DOD IG used to be the “peer reviewer” that audited the quality of DCAA’s audits, so as to comply with the requirements of GAGAS (Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards). According to the IG, GAGAS requires that “organizations performing audits or attestation engagements in compliance with GAGAS [must] have an external peer review at least once every 3 years. Based on the criteria, DCAA should have obtained a peer review on its work performed in [Government] FY 2009.” But DCAA didn’t do so. In fact, the last peer review opinion (covering audits performed in FY 2006) was withdrawn in August, 2009, because of the IG’s “significant findings … coupled with the results of the July 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, ‘DCAA Audits: Widespread Problems with Audit Quality Require Significant Reform’ (GAO-09-468).”

Many observers, including those here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., identify the withdrawal of the external quality opinion in August 2009 as the point in time where the organization that is DCAA went insane. In its subsequent attempts to comply with GAGAS and avoid criticism on the quality of its audit reports, the DCAA audit approach underwent a Kafkaesque metamorphosis into a bizarre and largely incomprehensible monstrosity, from which it has yet to recover.

The DOD IG explained DCAA’s reaction this way—

Prior GAO and DOD Inspector General (IG) reviews of DCAA reports identified significant deficiencies in audit work, including poor supervision, inadequate documentation, inappropriate changes to report opinions, and lack of sufficient testing to support report opinions. To address audit quality issues, DCAA implemented various corrective actions such as revised supervisory training; a required computer - based training course on working paper documentation; required training on GAGAS; revamped audit programs; and issuance of revised guidance on variable and attribute sampling with relevant training modules.

What the DOD IG did not state was that DCAA’s “corrective actions” included issuance of (let us say) questionable audit guidance and creation of multiple management review layers. (For an example of our thoughts on the new layers of audit review, see our article here.) The end result of DCAA’s corrective actions was an environment that, by any measure, was dramatically less productive. Audits took significantly more hours to conduct and took significantly longer to issue. That’s not an opinion: that’s an objective assessment based on DCAA’s own reported statistics.

Another one of the changes DCAA undertook was to exclude the DOD Inspector General from further peer reviews. In fact (as the DOD IG reported)—

In FY 2012, with the assistance of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Audit Committee, DCAA started the process of obtaining an outside firm to perform its next peer review. DCAA stated that the peer review is to be performed in FY 2013 and cover [audit] reports issued in FY 2012.

DCAA’s attempt to find a more sympathetic external quality control auditor didn’t stop the DOD IG from performing further reviews on DCAA audit quality; it simply stopped those reviews from having any effect on the officially “expired” peer review assessment. In other words, the IG has declared that it cannot be shut out and that this latest report will not be its last on the topic of DCAA audit quality.

Before we get into the meat of the report, let’s note for the record (as the IG did) that though it reviewed audit reports issued in GFY 2010, most of the field work had been performed in GFY 2009—i.e., before DCAA had implemented many of its “corrective actions” that were ostensibly intended to address the audit quality issues identified by the DOD IG and GAO. Accordingly, the DOD IG report gives DCAA an out. The audit agency can (and did) claim that when the outside firm performs the external peer review in GFY 2013 (covering audit reports issued in GFY 2012), those corrective actions will have been digested and all will be well, quality-wise.

(Pause for skeptical throat-clearing.)

So here’s what the DOD IG auditors found, with respect to the 50 GFY 2010 DCAA audit reports they reviewed:

In 37 of the 50 assignments (74 percent) reviewed, the audit staff did not exercise professional judgment as evidenced by deficiencies identified in multiple standards areas. The 37 assignments had a high number of deficiencies, ranging from 6 to 9 deficiencies out of 9 standards areas excluding professional judgment. … The abundance of noncompliances with standards identified in the 37 assignments evidences the need for improvements in the area of competence at DCAA.

[Emphasis added.]

Some of the GAGAS noncompliances were tied to the use of inexperienced auditors coupled with inadequate supervision. The DOD IG wrote—

In 3 of the 50 assignments reviewed, auditors with limited experience or training were assigned to complex engagements. In two assignments, the auditors either did not possess the knowledge and skills required or did not receive appropriate supervision reflective of their limited experience to adequately perform the assignment. In the other assignment increased supervisor and audit manager involvement made up for the lack of experience and training of the audit staff. GAGAS 3.33 discusses the interrelationship between professional judgment and competence because auditors’ judgments are dependent upon the auditors’ competence. GAGAS 3.36 further links the determination of whether professional judgment was demonstrated in an engagement to the appropriateness of the consideration of the collective experience, training, knowledge, skills, abilities, and overall understanding required by the audit team and its members to properly perform the engagement. Without the appropriate mix, the audit team will not be able to properly assess the risks that the subject matter under audit may contain a significant inaccuracy or could be misinterpreted. Therefore, DCAA used inexperienced auditors under limited supervision, which contributed directly to the audit teams not demonstrating professional judgment. DCAA[‘s] use of inexperienced auditors and the associated lack of professional judgment also led to the noncompliances identified in the assignment with key standards such as planning, evidence, documentation, and reporting.

[Emphasis added.]

And despite the efforts of DCAA to keep the DOD IG from commenting on its audit quality control system (as described above), the DOD IG commented on the DCAA audit quality control system. It wrote—

In 46 of the 50 assignments reviewed, the DCAA quality control system was ineffective in ensuring that its attestation engagement and performance audit assignments complied with applicable professional standards. … The need for improvement in the DCAA quality control system was evidenced by the deficiencies identified in multiple standards areas; in engagements performed in all regions and Field Detachment; and in all engagement types reviewed.

DOD IG also reported that DCAA’s implementation of multiple quality reviews prior to issuance of reports did not significantly improve the quality of those audit reports. The DOD IG wrote—

The DCAA regional and Field Detachment quality control procedures were generally ineffective in ensuring that attestation engagements and performance audits complied with GAGAS and DCAA policies and procedures. The quality control procedures including regional and Field Detachment management pre-issuance reviews varied among regions and Field Detachment. The regional and Field Detachment pre-issuance reviews did not identify significant noncompliances with GAGAS and resulted in the regional or Field Detachment audit managers approving reports that should not have been issued. In addition, the regions and Field Detachment management did not have adequate procedures in place to ensure that audit offices complied with regional and Field Detachment quality control procedures for which the audit offices were assigned responsibility.

[Emphasis added.]

We could go on and on, just like the DOD IG audit report did, listing example after example of poor audit planning, poor communication, poor documentation, lack of professional competence, lack of adequate supervision, insufficient evidence, delayed reports, and other GAGAS violations. But why bother? The report is, unfortunately for DCAA, damning.

Just as the prior DOD IG and GAO reports on DCAA audit quality have been damning.

We’re not particularly surprised by the findings in the DOD IG report; nor do we suspect our readership is particularly surprised by them. We’ve asserted for some time that the DCAA initiatives intended to increase audit quality have not worked out as planned. As this report demonstrates, DCAA audit quality is still lacking.

In other words, DCAA has implemented its revised procedures and multiple reviews and, as a result, has dramatically delayed its audit report production for no good reason. They still suck.

So we think DCAA may as well just throw the audit reports over the transom to the customer just as quickly as it can. The quality will still be as poor; but at least the reports will be more timely.

But we can hear the chorus of cries from Fort Belvoir from here—“just wait until the next review!” Yes, things will be so much better then. Higher quality audit reports issued faster.

Sure.

We’ll be very happy to report on the assessed quality of DCAA audit reports when that next external peer review report is issued. If things have improved significantly, we’ll be first in line to say so.

In the meantime, we’re not so happy to be reporting on this assessment. Nor, do we think, should current and former DCAA auditors be happy to read about the quality of their agency’s audit reports, as assessed and documented by the DOD Inspector General.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.