The Strategy and Tactics of Cost Allocation Structures, Part 4
Part 1 of this series can be found here. We discussed why this is an important—nay, critical—topic for you, worthy of an investment of your time and expense.
Part 2 of this series can be found here. We discussed why you need input from a diverse group of stakeholders. You will want to solicit input from a number of diverse perspectives because your cost allocation decisions—including your decision regarding the emphasis you place on maximizing the amount of direct charges—can affect your corporate culture in perhaps unexpected ways.
Part 3 of this series can be found here. We discussed the importance of making sure the entity’s organization structure reflected how the entity was being managed. We also discussed the notion that precision is not a synonym for accuracy; and that the benefit of precise cost allocations is often not worth the price to be paid, in terms of additional administrative burdens and risks of noncompliance.
In today’s article we want to explore further the organization structure, albeit at a higher level than before. We want to discuss segmentation, as well as special types of organizational structures.
Before we get too deep into the subject at hand, we need to define some terms, using the definitions found in the Federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). You may not be subject to CAS coverage, but you should still know CAS—if only because most DCAA auditors will use CAS allocation standards as the “best practices” standard for evaluating your cost allocation practices. Plus, you will want to speak the auditors’ language, using appropriate terminology, when you support audits; that is its own “best practice” right there.
One can easily get confused about the CAS terminology applicable to organization structures. Some terms you need to know are:
Home Office – A Home Office is an office responsible for directing or managing two or more but not necessarily all segments of an organization. It typically establishes policy for, and provides guidance to, the segments in their operations. It usually performs management, supervisory, or administrative functions, and may also perform service functions in support of the operations of the various segments. An organization which has intermediate levels, such as groups or divisions or sectors, may have several home offices which report to a common “headquarters” or “corporate” home office. (See CAS 403, Definitions.)
Intermediate Home Office – A Home Office located at an intermediate level, such as Group, Division, or Sector. An Intermediate Home Office may be both a segment and a Home Office. (For example, it can be a segment of the Corporate Home Office for purposes of receiving Corporate allocations, and a Home Office with respect to allocating costs to the segments it manages.) (See CAS 403, Definitions.)
Segment – A Segment means one or two or more, divisions, product departments, plants, or other subdivisions of an organization reporting directly to a Home Office, usually identified with responsibility for profit and/or producing a product or service. The term includes Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities, and joint ventures and subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) in which the organization has a majority ownership (or control). (See CAS 403, Definitions.)
Business Unit – A Business Unit is any segment of the organization, or an entire business organization which is not divided into segments. (See CAS 410, Definitions.)
(You may note that the definitions for “segment” and “business unit” are remarkably similar. For purposes of this article, when we discuss allocations of centralized payments and service functions, and centralized management, from a home office, we will use the term “segment”. When we discuss allocations of segment management and other segment expenses to contracts/projects, we will use the term “business unit”.)
The first thing you’ve got to do is to identify your segments and home offices. This may be quite easy to do; then again, it may be painful and involve loud voices and fingerpointing. As is the case with so many cost allocation issues, the correct answer goes to the heart of your entity’s business strategy. First of all, note that the CAS definition does not align precisely with the requirements of SFAS 131 (ASC 280) or with the requirements of IFRS 8—both of which are concerned with information reviewed by the Chief Operating Decision Maker (CODM). Instead, CAS focuses on where the entity determines profit/loss “and/or” produces a single product/provides a single service. Consequently, your reportable segments for government contract cost accounting may differ significantly from your reportable segments for financial reporting purposes.
But in that difference lies freedom. For government contract cost accounting, you have the freedom to define your segments in manner that promotes compliance with applicable regulations. To state it another way, you have the freedom to reduce your risk of noncompliance by smartly structuring your segments. For example, you can structure your segments to keep your commercial operations the hell away from your government operations, so as to let your commercial operations do what they need to do in the way that works for them, while locking down your government operations so as to keep the government auditors happy.
And that’s the first choice: do you separate your government and commercial operations, or integrate them. Keep them separate, and you are largely deciding to have two separate infrastructures; integrate them, and you can find process efficiencies and cost savings.
In our view, the problem with separating the two types of operations is that—sooner or later—the commercial side is going to want to bid on a government or quasi-government job, or the government side is going to want to borrow labor from the commercial side. At that moment, the Berlin Wall you have carefully built and maintained will start to crumble, and now your commercial side is subject to those pesky and burdensome government rules. So if you suspect that will be the long-term result, you may as well go all-in now and just admit you’re a government contractor.
On the more positive side, having separate segments permits each segment to have its own unique cost accounting practices. You can also parse out CAS coverage by segment, with one (or more) segments being fully CAS-covered, while others are subject to Modified coverage or perhaps exempt from CAS altogether. This situation, if properly handled, can reduce your risk of CAS noncompliance and permit you to tailor your cost accounting practices to the needs of your operations.
However, you should also keep in mind that the more segments you have, the more Inter-Organizational Transfers you will also have. IOTs are difficult to account for, as we have discussed more than once on this site. As in many aspects of cost allocations, the more complexity you have, the more administrative burden you create—and the more your risk of noncompliance increases. It is important to strike the proper cost/benefit balance.
Remember, you do not need government approval for your organization structure and your definitions of your segments and home offices. This will be your management and cost allocation structure. Do not let government employees—especially DCAA auditors—substitute their judgment for yours. Your job is to comply with applicable regulations (including CAS where applicable), and once you’ve met that burden then you are good to go. We’ve seen far too many junior auditors try to opine on the propriety of contractors’ cost accounting structures (without any reasonable basis for doing so); and we’ve seen too many contractors cave in to those auditors’ comments without challenging them on the missing regulatory basis.
Some aspects of your organization structure can qualify for special cost treatment. Perhaps surprisingly, the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) permits flexibility in certain circumstances.
The first type of organization structure that can qualify for special treatment is a “special facility,” as that term is defined by the DCAA CAM at 7-300. Actually, to call the discussion a “definition” may be overstating the case. The CAM states—
Facilities to which this guidance is applicable cannot be specifically designated by name or type but rather must be determined by whether or not they meet certain basic criteria. The first criterion to be met is that the costs involved in the operation of each facility must be significant in amount with respect to the contractor's overall operations. The second criterion is that the facility benefits only a limited portion of the contractor's total workload. Wind tunnels and space chambers are representative of facilities which, if they meet the criteria above, would be subject to the guidance provided in this section.
For those “special facilities” discussed in the foregoing paragraph, as well as for certain Microelectronic Center (MEC) facility costs, the CAM permits three methods of allocating the facility costs to the benefiting work. Importantly, the CAM states that the requirements of CAS 418 do not apply to “special facilities” so you may be free to be creative—so to speak—in your cost allocation methodology. (But read the CAM first!)
Another type of organization structure that can qualify for special treatment is a “special business unit” (SBU). This is DCAA's term to describe a contractor subsidiary, division, or other form of business organization that is established to accomplish certain specific tasks or to gain a competitive advantage. The DCAA CAM states that a SBU “is not a distinct entity form,” and “therefore, the accounting for an SBU should follow the principles established for the actual entity involved and be consistent with the contractor's disclosed accounting practices.” Again, the term (and associated audit guidance) is somewhat ambiguous and it can encompass several different “flavors” of organization structure, including joint ventures and teaming arrangements. The CAM states (at 7-1804)—
An SBU is a segment of the establishing contractor since the SBU is either a subdivision of that contractor or is controlled by that contractor. (1) Some SBUs have employees hired and paid by the SBU who actually perform the required contract effort. These SBUs may also have their own assets and liabilities and have profit and loss responsibility. They are usually reportable segments for financial and tax purposes. These SBUs are often engaged in foreign military sales or direct commercial sales to foreign governments. These SBUs are usually formed to limit tax and /or legal liability. (2) Other SBUs are more like joint ventures and teaming arrangements. These business organizations have no employees and subcontract virtually all (over 90 percent) contract effort to other contractor division s and/or outside subcontractor(s). Often these SBUs have little or no assets. This type of SBU may have been formed to gain competitive, cost, and/or technical advantages.
The guidance to auditors continues—
Basically, there are two types of cost advantages that SBUs can attain. The first type results from the fact that an SBU is a specialized contracting entity supported by one or more established contractor entities. The second type results from cost allocation practices that enable an SBU contract to significantly reduce, or altogether avoid, the amount of material overhead and G&A that the contractor would normally have to allocate to its subcontracts and/or interdivisional work. [However] f the cost allocation practices cause a significantly different allocation to a SBU contract than would have been allocated to the same contract if issued directly to the contractor's operating segment, the cost allocation practices may be inequitable and/or CAS noncompliant.
The DCAA CAM has several pages discussing cost allocation issues associated with SBUs. If you think you want to try to set up an SBU, you would be well advised to review the discussion.
To sum up, when you establish your organization structure you will identify your segments and the home offices to which they report. Segmentation is an important decision, with implications for mitigating risk of noncompliance as well as implications on the amount of administrative work you will be incurring. Not all segments are created equal: in some circumstances you can establish special cost allocation practices and use the DCAA CAM to justify why they are compliant.
If you’ve come this far, you’ve done most of the work. You’ve created a logical organization structure and made some key decisions about how your cost allocations are going to work. The rest of the job includes choosing logical indirect cost pools and appropriate allocation bases. But the standard pool and base methodology may not be appropriate in all circumstances. There may be some outlier-type segments, business units, and/or contracts that are so different from everything else that they require special handling.
Accordingly, the next installment of this series will discuss the little understood phenomenon of “special allocations.”
USPS OIG Says Nice Things about DCAA, for Which We Offer Criticism
 We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. are not DCAA-haters. We admit, though, that it’s tough to find a complimentary word about the Defense Contract Audit Agency on this blog. We assert that situation arises not from any inherent bias on our part, but instead from an objective assessment of the factual reality of the current defense contract audit environment.
While DCAA may be in the process of implementing corrective actions that will lead to Solomon-like audit conclusions while streamlining quality review processes to permit issuance of audit reports faster than a speeding bullet, as of this date we have yet to experience the wonderful goodness that is the promised future state of the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Instead, we and our clients continue to be mired in the same old miasmic swamp of conclusions unsupported by evidence; misinterpretation of applicable statutory, regulatory, and contractual language with the apparent goal of generating as much questioned costs as possible; and auditors who seem far more interested in creating pretty working papers than in getting to the facts.
The next time your DCAA auditor refuses to accept your 5 year-old spreadsheet as sufficient transaction support (the one that was created by the accountant who retired two years ago, and that’s been stapled to the original Journal Entry in the box that you’ve been paying a third-party to store for you in anticipation of an eventual DCAA audit)—and instead requires you to rehost your entire legacy cost accounting system for the sole purpose of observing your personnel actually downloading accounting data into that spreadsheet—we suspect you’ll empathize with the experiences of our clientele. You perhaps may even start to feel our frustration and angst with the current DCAA approach to performing contract audits.
Regardless of our feelings on the matter, we were happy for DCAA that the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Postal Service had very complimentary things to say about DCAA audits performed on a reimbursable basis for the USPS over the past three Government fiscal years (2009-2012). The USPS OIG said very complimentary things about DCAA in its recent report. And the USPS OIG said those complimentary things a lot. There was so much repetition, it got irksome.
And we think the USPS OIG got it wrong. We looked at the same data the IG auditors looked at, and we would have reached different conclusions than the IG auditors did.
But let’s start with the happy words from the “Highlights” section of the IG report.
DCAA audits are cost-effective tools that help Postal Service contracting officials negotiate lower contract costs and manage contracts. These audits have consistently contributed to significant savings and averaged a return on investment of $105 for every dollar spent over the last 4 fiscal years. During FYs 2009–2012, DCAA audits identified more than $185 million in unallowable and unsupported contract costs; and disclosed internal control weaknesses related to contractors’ accounting systems, financial capabilities, and labor charges. These results assisted contracting officials in negotiating lower contract prices and settlements.
Now let’s review the wording from the “Conclusion” section of the IG report—
DCAA audits are cost-effective tools that help Postal Service contracting officials negotiate lower contract costs and manage contracts. These audits have consistently contributed to significant savings and averaged a return on investment of $105 for every dollar spent over the last 4 fiscal years. During FYs 2009-2012, DCAA audits identified more than $185 million in unallowable and unsupported contract costs. They also disclosed internal control weaknesses related to contractors' accounting systems, financial capabilities, and labor charges. These results assisted contracting officials in negotiating lower contract prices and settlements.
Now let’s look at Page 2 of the body of the IG report—
DCAA audits are cost-effective tools that help Postal Service contracting officials negotiate lower contract costs and manage contracts. These audits have consistently contributed to significant savings and averaged a return of $105 for every dollar spent over the last 4 fiscal years. During FYs 2009-2012, DCAA audits identified more than $185 million in unallowable and unsupported contract costs due to reviews of price proposals, termination claims, and equitable adjustments. They also disclosed internal control weaknesses related to contractors' accounting systems, financial capabilities, and labor charges. These results assisted contracting officials in negotiating lower contract prices and settlements.
The entire audit report (excluding Appendices) weighed in at a lengthy eight pages. Within that page count we found three Tables and many bulleted points. So as you can see, repeating the same conclusion over and over took up a significant portion of the total report page count. Plus (as we noted) it was irksome. Look USPS OIG report drafters, we heard you the first time. You didn’t need to tell us three times. (Oh, wait. Let’s go back and see to whom the report was addressed. Maybe the report drafters did know their audience….)
And the thrice-repeated conclusions are wrong, in our view. Let’s dig into some details, shall we?
Table 1 of the report lists the audits that DCAA performed for the USPS by year between 2007 and 2012. There weren’t that many of them. In the most hectic year (2009), DCAA performed 29 audits for USPS; in the least hectic years (2011 and 2012), DCAA performed 11 audits (per year) for USPS. The OIG noted that the decline in audit workload “may” be attributable to an overall decrease in Postal Service spending. However (as the report stated), “management indicated they did not strongly pursue additional DCAA audit requests during this period because of concerns regarding DCAA’s audit quality and timeliness.”
Appendix B of the report provides details regarding the types of audits that DCAA performed for the USPS. Between 2009 and 2012, DCAA performed a total of 58 audits. 14 of the 58 (24%) were audits of “price proposals”—i.e., audits of cost proposals submitted to the USPS for evaluation prior to award of a contract. Three of the 58 audits were audits of proposed contract “equitable adjustments”—which are contractor proposals to modify contracts based on changes made by the USPS. Let’s add to those two audits of Termination Settlement Proposals, which are contractor proposals to establish final contract prices after a Termination for Convenience. That makes a total of 19 audits out of 58. Roughly a full third of all the DCAA audits performed for USPS related to contractors’ proposed costs.
How did DCAA do in that area?
According to the USPS OIG, DCAA questioned “unallowable or unsupported costs” in the amount of $181,204,699—or roughly 98 percent of all the DCAA audit “return on investment” calculated by the OIG in its report. That $181.2 million was found on 12 of the contractor proposals audited. One proposal had no opinion because DCAA found the contractor’s proposal to be inadequate for audit, and another proposal has zero questioned costs. Here’s what the USPS IG reported about that $181.2 million in DCAA findings—
Six of the 12 proposals contained $153,723,825 in unsupported costs primarily because the contractor did not provide adequate supporting documentation for subcontractor costs, direct material, and overhead rates.
As you know, we have been skeptical of such claimed taxpayer savings. Our position is that questioned costs save taxpayers nothing, unless a contract is awarded that includes negotiated reductions based on the DCAA findings. Happily for us, the USPS IG report provided some details as to how the USPS Contracting Officers handled the DCAA findings in their negotiations with contractors.
The following is taken verbatim from the IG report. Our analysis is in parentheses.
- One price proposal disclosed unallowable costs of $10.9 million and unsupported costs of $143.5 million. The CO was able to negotiate the proposed price of $382.1 million down to a negotiated final price of $346.8 million, for a savings of $35.3 million. ($154.4 million questioned; $35.3 million sustained. Sustention rate = 22.86%.)
- Another price proposal contained unallowable costs of $3.9 million. Based on the DCAA findings, the CO negotiated the original proposed price of $49.8 million down to a final negotiated price of $47.1 million, for a savings of $2.7 million. ($3.9 million questioned; $2.7 million sustained. Sustention rate = 69.23%.)
- For a price proposal containing $6.2 million in unallowable costs, the Postal Service later cancelled negotiations and issued a separate solicitation, which it subsequently placed on hold indefinitely. ($6.2 million questioned; zero sustained. Taxpayer savings = zero.)
Looking at the termination settlement proposals and equitable adjustment proposals, DCAA found “unallowable costs totaling about $3.3 million, or about 90 percent of total claimed costs.” $812,171 in questioned costs related to two TSPs; and $2.51 million in questioned costs related to one of the three equitable adjustment proposals. The following is taken verbatim from the IG report. Our analysis is in parentheses.
- One contractor submitted a termination claim for $702,230, $475,322 of which DCAA questioned based on the comingling of terminated proposal costs, unallowable fee costs, and disallowed subcontractor estimated-to-complete costs included by the prime contractor. The Postal Service terminated this contract for convenience and settled the questioned cost of $475,322. (While we are not sure what “settled” means in this context, we think if savings had been obtained, they would have been reported. So we are going with: $475,322 questioned; zero sustained. Sustention rate = zero.)
- Another contractor submitted a termination claim for $336,849 and the entire claim was questioned due to inadequate cost and pricing data. The Postal Service was able to negotiate a lower price of $73,475, a reduction of about 78 percent of the claimed cost. ($336,849 questioned; $263,374 sustained. Sustention rate = 78%.)
- A contractor submitted an equitable adjustment that resulted in $2,514,232 in questioned costs out of $2,639,618 total claimed costs. The questioned costs were primarily due to excessive labor costs claimed for holiday staffing, nonconforming mail, and excess staffing due to truck schedule changes. The DCAA report was a useful tool for the CO to use during claims negotiations and for substantially reducing contract settlement amounts. As a result, the CO negotiated the claim down to $16,562. ($2.514 million questioned; $2.514 sustained. Sustention rate = 100%.)
Looking just at the foregoing, we can see that the USPS realized savings of about $40.78 million. That’s a good result; there’s nothing to criticize anybody for. But it’s a far cry from the $185 million in repetitively claimed savings and “return on investment.” If the $185 million in DCAA questioned costs resulted in a “return on investment” of $105 for every dollar spent, then the real ROI (based on sustained findings) is more like $23 for every dollar spent. Again, that’s not bad—not bad at all. But it’s significantly different from the amount reported by the OIG. One is tempted to say it’s so far off, it’s actually misleading.
Looking at the totals for this area, we can see that the USPS CO’s sustained about $40.78 million out of $181.205 million initially questioned by DCAA, for an overall sustention rate of 22.5%--meaning that 87.5% of questioned costs were not sustained. We believe that the sustention rate is the one metric that best measures the quality of DCAA’s audit findings. In our view, that is not a superlative sustention rate; indeed, one is tempting to say it’s a pathetic sustention rate.
Regardless of our difference in opinion with that of the USPS OIG, it is important to report (again) that DCAA didn’t just question costs: the audit agency “also disclosed internal control weaknesses related to contractors' accounting systems, financial capabilities, and labor charges.” Let’s dig into those reported findings, shall we?
DCAA performed 18 “reviews” in this area (31 percent of all DCAA activity in the review period covered by the USPS OIG). 12 of the 18 were reviews of contractor financial capability; the less said about them, the better. (We will note for the record that, with respect to one review, the IG reported that “the CO felt the findings did not accurately reflect the supplier’s financial capability.”)
Of the other six reviews, four were reviews of USPS contractors’ “business systems” (3 Accounting System reviews and 1 Estimating System review). Before getting into the details, we need to note that the adequacy criteria were not disclosed by the OIG in its report. It’s not clear whether DCAA used the Accounting System adequacy criteria found in its standard audit programs for Internal Controls Adequacy (ICAPs)—which would be based on inapplicable DFARS criteria—or if the auditors tailored the audit program for USPS requirements. That matters, a lot.
In any case, the USPS IG reported—
The DCAA reports disclosed that two of the three accounting systems reviewed were unacceptable for accumulating and segregating costs on Postal Service contracts. One accounting system review was initiated prior to awarding a fixed-price contract.
It should be noted that the two Accounting System reviews that found the contractors’ systems to be inadequate were issued in 2009. 2009 was a banner year for DCAA; it was the year in which its external peer-reviewed quality control system opinion was pulled because of systemic quality failures—particularly in the area of business system adequacy reviews. We’re not saying that DCAA reached wrong conclusions in those two reports; but we are saying that one should be skeptical of DCAA’s opinions issued at that time.
In contrast, the report of the Estimating System review was issued in 2012, when all the corrective actions taken by DCAA since 2009 should have resulted in a solid, supportable, opinion as to the adequacy of the contractor’s Estimating System. The company upon which this helpful review was visited was Accenture.
Here’s what the DCAA reported to the USPS, with respect to Accenture’s Estimating System—
This audit disclosed several weaknesses in the system, including not:
-- Using historical experience. -- Monitoring and tracking estimates against actual costs. -- Subjecting estimates to periodic internal reviews. -- Requiring periodic training on the Estimating Manual. -- Reviewing management documentation sufficiently. -- Reviewing subcontractor costs adequately. -- Documenting policies, procedures, and practices.
The funny thing about the foregoing is that they are, largely, policy deficiencies and not deficiencies in actual practice. The other funny thing is that they are deficiencies only when measured against DFARS adequacy criteria. The DFARS is not applicable to USPS contracts, and we would be shocked to see the DFARS Estimating System Adequacy contract clause (252.215-7002) in a USPS contract. Indeed, as the USPS IG itself noted in separate audit report, “While the Postal Service is not subject to the FAR or DFARS, it does not currently have specific policies and procedures or clauses that address supplier estimating systems.”
In other words, it appears that DCAA applied the wrong adequacy criteria to Accenture when concluding that the Accenture Estimating System was inadequate. That does not strike us as the basis for a high-quality conclusion.
Regardless of our opinion about the basis of DCAA’s conclusion, the USPS OIG used the DCAA conclusion to initiate its own probe of Accenture’s Estimating System, so that it could reach its own conclusion. The IG report on Accenture is right here. While the USPS IG did not, as DCAA did, use the DFARS Estimating System adequacy criteria as the basis for its audit conclusions, it did reprint them in full in Appendix C of its report—and call them out as being “best practices”. So it seems that the USPS OIG believes that the quasi-private, civilian, entity that is the United States Postal Service would be better served if it ran its contracting operations like the Department of Defense.
Words fail us.
Accenture’s response to the original DCAA audit report and/or to the follow-up OIG audit report, were not provided. We wonder what they said.
In conclusion, we offer the foregoing as constructive criticism of the USPS OIG and its decision to use DCAA. We suggest that DCAA still has a measure of distance to travel, in terms of improving its audit quality (as measured by the sustention rate) and in improving the timeliness of its audit reports. Although the USPS OIG was seemingly much taken with the use of DCAA as outsourced auditors, we thought that the love was not so very much warranted.
But perhaps that’s just us. If you think we’re wrong, feel free to leave your comment below.
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Giving Back
 Hi there!
Nick Sanders here, President and Principal Consultant of Apogee Consulting, Inc.. I have a personal message to those who visit our website for news and information.
I was surprised last Saturday when a package arrived at my doorstep. It was not ticking!
Instead, it contained a large can full of salted Virginia peanuts, courtesy of Tim Snyder. Thanks for the treat, Tim!
Tim enclosed a brief note, letting me know that he appreciated my efforts to keep churning out blog posts week after week. (We’re well north of 600 individual entries at this point.) Well, Tim, my family and I very much appreciate the tasty and tangible manifestation of your appreciation from the “peanut gallery”!
I do get feedback every so often. Most of the feedback is positive (which is nice). Some of it is thoughtful. Some of it contains tidbits of information that finds their way into future blog posts. Some of it consists of marriage proposals from erstwhile single women in the Russian Republic.
It’s all good (even though we are blocking Russian IP addresses as fast as we identify them). Feedback is welcome. If you don’t know my email address, it’s right over there on the contact button. This year, we also added comment and feedback functionality for each new article—though precious few readers have made use of it to date.
Some readers have asked how they can support the website. At least a couple of you have offered to throw some money my way. So far I have refused all such offers with as much courtesy as I can muster. Money is not the primary motivation for writing these articles; in fact, I’m quite sure that I lose a certain amount of new business because I refuse to “tone it down” and be more politically correct in my pontificating. So be it.
If you are looking to support me and Apogee Consulting, Inc., then I have two options for your consideration.
- I am working on a couple of articles/short publications that I will try to self-publish on Amazon. They won’t be expensive. I’m thinking somewhere in the neighborhood of $1.99 to $5.99. I’ll let you know when they’re available. It would be very nice if you were to buy a copy. If you like it, your review on Amazon would be helpful. That will be later this year, if all goes well. Supporting my output on Amazon supports me here
- My family and I—all four of us—will be walking in the AIDSWalk Orange County fundraiser this year, on May 4th. The funds we raise go to the AIDS Service Foundation of Orange County, CA. This will be the fourth time we’ve walked to raise funds for that entity. Would you please consider sponsoring us—which would be a tax deductible donation for you? If interested, you can find a brief blurb and sponsorship link at the bottom of the site’s main page.
Most of us are doing well—or at least getting by—while so many others around us struggle with day-to-day survival. My family gives back to others in our community in various ways that include walking each year to raise money for the AIDS Service Foundation of Orange County. Won’t you please consider joining us in those efforts?
Thanks for your continued support!
Nick Sanders
President and Principal Consultant
Apogee Consulting, Inc.
Retention Bonus Fraud
 This is a new one for us.
We told our readers about the scheme to unjustly obtain recruitment referral bonuses from the U.S. Army. Subsequently, we posted an update in which it was reported that 10 persons had been charged with criminal conduct related to their (alleged) scheme to obtain payments for referring recruits, when in fact those recruits had never been referred by anybody; they had just wandered into the recruiting location of their own volition. The individuals allegedly claimed to be eligible for the referral payments when in fact they were not. Some of those individuals received prison terms as part of their plea deals.
Apparently certain government agencies not only offer incentive payments for referrals, they also offer incentive payments to stay on the job. Yes! This is true! We have learned that some civil service positions involve such highly in-demand skills that the Federal government must pay employees to stay on the job!
One employee found a way to turn this phenomenon to his advantage, as this DOJ press release informed us. We not only learned about the retention bonuses paid to key employees with critical skills, we also learned that Michael Balady (a former employee of the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (HHS-ASPR)), had figured out a way to profit from his situation. Mr. Balady pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud (the same crime as the Army referral bonus fraudsters), for successfully receiving nearly $100,000 in retention bonuses over the period 2009 – 2012.
According to the DOJ press release—
… Balady admitted that he conspired with an employee of a communications firm based in Alexandria, Va., to fabricate employment offers for a position with that firm in order to justify retention bonuses paid to him by HHS. Retention bonuses are monetary incentives paid by HHS to employees deemed essential to its mission who would be likely to leave in the absence of such a bonus.
Thus, while most of the other Executive Branch civilian employees suffered pay freezes and work furloughs, Balady figured out how to augment his salary. He got fake employment offers from a buddy at an outside firm, and used those offers to show his management how “in demand” he was in the private sector. They caved and offered him money to stay and keep working for the Department of Health and Human Services.
You might be wondering what “mission essential” skills the fraudster possessed. The press release didn’t say, but it did list his job titles. It reported—
… Balady worked in the HHS-ASPR first as the director of acquisition management systems in ASPR’s Biological Advanced Research and Development Authority and later as the acting director of ASPR’s Office of Acquisitions, Management, Contracts and Grants.
So Balady understood the acquisition systems of HHS. That was his “mission essential” knowledge that allowed him to profit while other civilian employees around him struggled.
He faces up to 20 years in prison for his crime.
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