The Strategy and Tactics of Cost Allocation Structures, Part 5
Part 1 of this series can be found here. We discussed why this is an important—nay, critical—topic for you, worthy of an investment of your time and expense.
Part 2 of this series can be found here. We discussed why you need input from a diverse group of stakeholders. You will want to solicit input from a number of diverse perspectives because your cost allocation decisions—including your decision regarding the emphasis you place on maximizing the amount of direct charges—can affect your corporate culture in perhaps unexpected ways.
Part 3 of this series can be found here. We discussed the importance of making sure the entity’s organization structure reflected how the entity was being managed. We also discussed the notion that precision is not a synonym for accuracy; and that the benefit of precise cost allocations is often not worth the price to be paid, in terms of additional administrative burdens and risks of noncompliance.
Part 4 of this series can be found here. We discussed segmentation and how certain business units are afforded flexibility in their allocation structures in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM).
In today’s article we want to discuss the little understood phenomenon of “special allocations.” We are going to focus on the practical aspects, not the theoretical aspects. If you want the theory, Karen Manos, of the firm Gibson, Dunn, has the article you want to read.
Without rehashing Ms. Manos’ article, she notes that several Cost Accounting Standards discuss the use of special allocations—including CAS 403, 410, 418, and 420. Only CAS 410 requires the use of special allocations; the other standards are less prescriptive, stating that the contractor and the Cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) “may agree” to the use of special allocations. Or not. (The Standards are silent with respect to what happens if the parties do not agree.)
Let’s start at the beginning. What is a “special allocation”?
A special allocation is a corrective allocation that makes an individual cost objective (allocation recipient) whole from use of the normal allocation methodology. For example, if the normal allocation methodology is to allocate G&A expense on a total cost input base, but one contract has a disproportionately large amount of (say) direct material dollars, that contract would receive too high an allocation of G&A expense, relative to the benefits received. In another example, if the normal allocation methodology is to allocate Corporate Home Office residual expenses (which include Legal) on a headcount base, but one segment has its own Legal department and receives no benefit from the Corporate Home Office Legal function, then if the segment’s headcount was included in the allocation base, it would receive too high an allocation of Corporate HR costs, relative to the benefits received.
In other words, a special allocation is what you do when your standard cost accounting practices do not result in an equitable distribution of indirect costs.
As noted above, the only Standard that requires use of a special allocation is CAS 410. The requirement imposes a duty on CAS-covered contractors to evaluate the functions and activities in their business units’ G&A expense pools and determine whether or not certain final cost objectives are receiving a disproportionate share of allocated G&A expenses, relative to benefits received. The ASBCA confirmed in the seminal Ford Aerospace decision (ASBCA No. 23883) that each contractor covered by CAS 410 has an affirmative responsibility to choose the proper G&A expense allocation base that is best representative of total activity being managed/supported by the G&A function. Even when the appropriate base is chosen, if there are outlier contracts, a special allocation must be used to correct disproportionate expense allocations.
In establishing your cost allocation structure, including indirect cost pools and allocation bases, care must be taken to ensure that the pools are logical and homogeneous, and that the allocation bases are appropriate. (See CAS 418 for more details on homogeneity and the hierarchy of allocation bases.) Often, one or more stakeholders stops the process, essentially via filibuster, by going into a long diatribe about how their operation or their contract is different, and will be harmed by imposition of the new allocation structure. These passionate pontifications are almost always based on customer financial considerations rather than an objective analysis of costs and benefits. Nonetheless, such concerns must be taken seriously and analyzed, to see if the allocation base chosen is the best one, and whether or not there are outliers that will have to be addressed via special allocations.
To be clear, special allocations should be the exception rather than the rule. They are there to address real inequities and not to placate certain stakeholders. Government auditors look with skepticism on such “special” allocations, and Contracting Officers will expect to see a detailed Advance Agreement for their execution before you implement them. However, they are permissible. Indeed, in some circumstances they are even mandated. Thus, you need to keep them in mind when designing your cost allocation structure.
Designing your cost allocation structure is a non-trivial task, one that is worthy of your time and attention. It supports both your near-term and long-term business strategy. The wrong structure and the wrong allocation methods can be the source of enormous pain; but the right structure and the right allocation methods can be the source of competitive advantage.
We hope you’ve enjoyed this five-part series and gotten some value from it. If you’d like to explore this topic further, Apogee Consulting, Inc. is available to assist you.
Fraud Continues to Plague Federal Procurement
 We’d like to think that the continual flow of fraud-related stories emanating from our Federal procurement system is committed by a tiny minority of rogue Federal employees and greedy contractors who have taken advantage of weak internal controls and lax oversight, and that they are not at all representative of the vast majority of procurement activity that takes place every single working day, executed by people and companies who adhere to the highest levels of honor and integrity.
We’d like to think so, but we’re losing confidence in that point of view. Our perspective is being eroded by the flood of stories like the New Orleans levees giving way to Hurricane Katrina.
Let us recite the litany of such stories that are currently sitting in our in-box, polluting our Pollyanna point of view like an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
The Federal Times reported—
A once-prominent Northern Virginia technology contractor is facing bribery charges accusing the firm of paying millions of dollars in kickbacks for contract work and using bogus references to gain entry into a government set-aside program — the latest development in the largest bid-rigging case in U.S. history. Prosecutors said the company, Nova Datacom LLC, worked with former Army Corps of Engineers contracting official Kerry Khan, who agreed to steer business to the firm. Khan, who has pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing, received $7.5 million ‘directly and indirectly’ from Nova DataCom, according to charges. Nova Datacom also submitted false information on educational backgrounds and experience in its application to the Small Business Administration in 2007 to win certification as an 8(a) small disadvantaged business and qualify for set-aside contracts, according to charging papers… In outlining the case against Khan, prosecutors said the investigation involves more than $30 million in bribes, as well as plans to steer a contract worth more than $1 billion. … Separately, prosecutors filed bribery and other charges against Min Jung Cho, who is listed in charging papers as the president of Nova DataCom and as the sister of the company’s chief technology officer, Alex Cho. Court papers show Alex Cho began cooperating in the investigation about two years ago. While the Nova DataCom website isn’t active anymore, Internet archives show the company’s site included a section on corporate citizenship saying the business was ‘committed to holding ourselves to a higher standard of integrity and accountability.’ The company’s site also included a host of awards and recognitions, including a listing by the Washington Business Journal in 2010 for the top 50 fastest-growing companies.
In subsequent story, the Federal Times told its readers that Kerry Khan, “the mastermind of the largest bid-rigging scam in the history of federal contracting,” had “millions of dollars, mistresses in three states and a taste for high-end cars and liquor.” The story reported—
In all, Khan and his associates had illegally pocketed more than $30 million in kickbacks and bribes over almost five years. When authorities finally arrested Khan in October 2011, he had been planning an even bigger scheme to steer a nearly $1 billion federal contract. … Other contractors — some real, others little more than front organizations — were involved, too, according to court records. Harold Babb, former director of contracts for Eyak Technology, has received more than seven years in prison for his dealings with Nova DataCom and Khan. Here is how it generally worked: Contractors involved in the scheme submitted bogus invoices, which the Army Corps — with Khan’s help — paid out. In exchange, the money from those invoices went to payoffs and kickbacks through various businesses… The kickback scheme involved a big Army Corps contract known as TIGER, for Technology for Infrastructure, Geospatial and Environmental Requirements. Until their arrests in fall 2011, Khan and others planned to steer another nearly $1 billion contract known as CORES, for Contingency Operations Readiness Engineering and Support, prosecutors said. … By summer 2011, authorities had begun monitoring Khan’s cellphone. That is when they heard him discussing plans to make a $56,105 payment for a 2012 BMW 650i for a co-worker, who had agreed to chair a contract selection panel on a nearly $1 billion procurement Khan aimed to steer to Nova DataCom, according to records. …
How did this massive scheme, involving multiple conspirators and multiple contractors, work? The Federal Times reported—
But despite recent developments in the case, none of the newly filed documents shed light on one big unanswered question: How could such a scam have grown so big, so fast, without anyone noticing? [U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia] Machen declined to comment on specifics but said all contract fraud cases expose a lack of internal controls, and the Khan case is no different. … Scott Amey, general counsel for the nonpartisan Project On Government Oversight, a watchdog group, said the case exposes a glaring lack of adequate administration and oversight of federal contracts. ‘The government’s limited access to contractor cost or pricing data and failure to conduct robust audits are part of the problem,’ he said. ‘We have to provide one or both of those tools at the pre- and post-award stages to ensure that taxpayers are not fleeced.’
In unrelated news, Federal contractor CDW-Government (CDW-G) agreed to pay $5.66 million “to resolve allegations” that it submitted false claims to the General Services Administration (GSA). Here’s a link to the DOJ press release. The DOJ press release stated—
The settlement resolves allegations that, during the period 1999 to 2011, CDW-G improperly charged government purchasers for shipping, sold products to the United States that were manufactured in China and other countries that are prohibited by the Trade Agreements Act, and underreported sales in order to avoid paying GSA its ‘Industrial Funding Fee,’ a fee based on total contract sales that is designed to cover GSA’s costs of contract administration. … The allegations arose from a lawsuit filed in a federal court in East Saint Louis, Ill., under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act. Those provisions allow private individuals known as ‘relators’ to sue on behalf of the United States and to share in the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result. The relator in this case, former CDW-G sales representative Joe Liotine, will receive $1,585,892.56 of the total recovery as a statutory award. The relator may also be entitled to receive additional amounts from the defendant for attorneys’ fees and costs.
And speaking of false claims, here’s a link to another DOJ press release, announcing that—
Alabama-based Caddell Construction has agreed to pay to the United States $1,150,000 to settle allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by falsely reporting to the Army Corps of Engineers that it hired and mentored a Native American-owned company to work on construction projects at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Campbell, Ky.
The press release provided additional details, which included the following—
The Army Corps contracted with Caddell between 2003 and 2005 to build barracks at the two bases. As part of the contracts, Caddell represented that it would hire and mentor Mountain Chief Management Services, a Native American-owned company, under the Department of Defense’s Mentor-Protégé and Indian Incentive Programs. The Mentor-Protégé Program reimburses companies for the time and cost of mentoring small disadvantaged businesses, while the Indian Incentive Program provides a rebate to contractors for subcontracting with Native American-owned businesses. The United States alleged that from April 2003 to March 2005, Caddell falsely represented in its invoices and supporting documents that it was mentoring Mountain Chief and that Mountain Chief was performing work on the construction projects. According to the government, Mountain Chief allegedly was merely a pass-through entity used by Caddell to claim payments under the two programs, and didn’t perform the work or receive the mentoring services for which Caddell received payment.
Speaking of misrepresentation and false claims, here’s another announcement.
U.S. Attorney William J. Hochul, Jr. announced today that Raymond Testa, 60, of Rochester, N.Y., and Gerald Testa, 55, of Ontario, N.Y., were arrested and charged by criminal complaint with major fraud against the United States. The charge carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, a $1,000,000 fine or both. Assistant U.S. Attorney Craig R. Gestring, who is handling the case, stated that according to the complaint, the defendants own and operate Testa Construction Inc. Starting in approximately 2008, the brothers started a second business and represented it to be a Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business, when in fact it was not. In order to qualify as a Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business, one must be a veteran with a service connected disability. The complaint further alleges that the defendants applied for and received government contracts from the Department of Veteran Affairs, which were set aside for the Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business program, totaling approximately $13,000,000, funding that they would not otherwise be entitled to.
But let’s be clear: fraud is found everywhere in the Federal procurement system and throughout government operations. Take Brandon Gauss, age 38, of Preston, Maryland, who was discussed in yet another DOJ announcement. According to the announcement—
Gauss … pleaded guilty late yesterday to theft of government property from the Goddard Space Flight Center, part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). … According to his plea agreement, Gauss was a contract employee at NASA. As an engineering technician at the Goddard Space Flight Center, he had access to tools and other property NASA owned. From October 2011 through November 2012, Gauss stole tools and aluminum scaffolding belonging to the government, which he sold to pawn shops for cash. Gauss made over 60 visits to pawn shops throughout Maryland, including Baltimore, Anne Arundel and Queen Anne Counties, and received at least $16,974. The government has recovered some of the items, worth at least $29,736. Gauss admits that he owes the government at least $11,574.35, the money he received from selling the stolen materials the government has been unable to recover.
One more: here’s a story about the “Godfather at Camp Pendleton,” a DOD employee who was “arrested after extorting a $10,000 bribe.” The story reported—
The $10,000 was the first payment of a $40,000 bribe that was intended to influence who got a $4 million flooring contract at the Marine base, FBI Special Agent Darrell Foxworth said in a statement. Natividad “Nate” Lara Cervantes, 64, of San Diego, was taken into custody Thursday after the cooperating witness handed him the $10,000 in an envelope after the two met at a cigar lounge on Miramar Road... Cervantes threw the manila envelope on the ground as federal agents approached … Cervantes supervises the Construction and Service Contracts Inspection Branch at Camp Pendleton, where he managed construction contracts, the complaint said. In November, the cooperating witness told an FBI agent that Cervantes was extorting bribes going back to September 2008. … Cervantes said he ‘normally demands 3 percent of the value of the contract,’ but the witness could not pay that much. The witness made two $2,500 payments to Cervantes. The witness told an FBI agent that Cervantes once said, ‘I am referred to as the ‘Godfather’ at Camp Pendleton.’ Cervantes said he controlled what is called the ‘laydown’ area on the base, where contractors set up their trailers, and determined what contractors got the best spots. … At one point, Cervantes asked that his granddaughter be hired as a full-time administrative assistant, the witness said. …The witness also said Cervantes asked him to do free work on his downtown San Diego condominium.
We could continue reciting these sad stories of seemingly systemic fraud.
We won’t mention the recently unsealed FCA claim against Agave Bio Systems. We won’t discuss the former U.S. Army Captain who was just sentenced to serve 23 months in prison “for conspiracy to accept thousands of dollars in gratuities from contractors during his deployment to Baghdad, Iraq.” We won’t delve into the story of the “former contract employee” of the DOD who was recently sentenced to serve 35 months in prison for “his participation in a bribery and money laundering scheme arising from corruption in the award of defense contracts at Camp Arifjan.” (We’ve more than covered the cesspool of corruption that was Camp Arifjan—just type “Arifjan” into the site’s keyword search feature.)
It’s not just us. Even the mainstream source Defense Industrial Daily stated, “Sadly, this type of headline keeps coming.”
And as you may know, we normally don’t report the multitude of corruption cases that fall under the heading of healthcare fraud. If we reported those, we’d never, ever, report on anything else.
Seriously, WTF? When will our civil service and military leadership wake up and clamp down on internal controls and oversight? We are personally sick of reading, and reporting, the never-ending cascade of fraud-related stories coming out of our Federal operations and the procurement system.
Stop the insanity, someone.
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New DCAA Audit Guidance on Healthcare Costs Associated with Ineligible Dependents Admits Past Mistakes (Sort Of)
 Oh this is a good one.
If you’ve read our stuff, you know that this so-called “issue” has never been an issue except in the minds of a couple of DOD Senior Executives and some DCAA auditors. Essentially, it’s an issue that’s been almost entirely fabricated and hyped-up to amazing levels, when in reality it’s been (at best) a minor ankle-biter that never amounted to a pittance of an immaterial impact at any major contractor ever audited.1 In our view, it has become the poster child that illustrates how a few DOD leaders, fed by misinformation from below and eager to trumpet a new assertion of contractor misbehavior, have used their power to exercise contractors for no good reason.
We discussed this issue in some depth in this article.
We explored some of DCAA’s “audit findings” related to the issue over here. We cited several examples of questionable “findings”—including one audit report wherein DCAA questioned $20 million of health and dental insurance costs “because the contractor lacks adequate documentation and internal controls to verify eligibility.” And that was just one of the bizarre ineligible dependent “findings” DCAA foisted off on Contracting Officers as a result of allegedly GAGAS-compliant audits.
Regardless of our views on this “issue,” the DAR Council believes it’s real—to the extent that it is in the middle of an attempt to revise the DFARS in order to penalize contractors for failing to spend many thousands of dollars in order to prevent the incurrence of a few hundreds of unallowable dollars (metaphorically speaking).
DCAA may have finally realized that its approach to this issue was flawed, because it just issued new audit guidance. The MRD states—
This memorandum transmits a February 17, 2012 memorandum from the Director of Defense Pricing (DDP) to the Directors of DCAA and DCMA regarding unallowable costs for ineligible dependent health care benefits. The DDP memorandum states that costs incurred for ineligible dependent health care are unallowable under FAR 31.201-3 and violate the selected cost principle at FAR 31.205-6(m); however, these unallowable costs are not expressly unallowable. Therefore, auditors should not pursue application of penalties under FAR 42.709 to the questioned ineligible dependent health care benefit costs. Accordingly, auditors also should not cite contractors that fail to exclude these costs from Government contracts for noncompliance with CAS 405. We are updating the guidance provided in MRD 09-PSP-016(R) and MRD 11-PAC-002(R) for the clarifying guidance provided in the DDP memorandum and will incorporate it into CAM 7-505, 7-506.6, 8-502.5, and the audit program titled Incurred Insurance Cost, CAS 416 and FAR Compliance. Accordingly, once the guidance is updated, we will cancel MRD 09-PSP016(R) and MRD 11-PAC-002(R).
Well, isn’t that special.
The audit guidance first issued in August, 2009, is being rescinded because the Director of Defense Pricing told DCAA it was wrong. Let’s be very clear on this: it’s been nearly four years since the audit guidance was issued. It’s been nearly four years that DCAA has been tormenting contractors and forcing them to support audits and to prepare CAS cost impacts for an imaginary non-compliance with CAS 405. It’s taken four years for everybody to calm down and take a deep breath and realize that they have been wasting everybody’s time.
And wasting many thousands of taxpayer dollars.
The audit agency is changing course. What should the auditors (and Contracting Officers) do with the old reports? Here’s what the MRD says—
In instances where a FAO issued a report in which it identified ineligible dependent health care benefits costs as expressly unallowable and recommended the application of penalties, the FAO will need to supplement the report or document that a supplement would not serve a useful purpose. If the FAO issued a report citing the contractor for noncompliance with CAS 405, the FAO should consider the DDP memo a subsequent event that, if known at the time the FAO issued the audit report, would have affected the audit results. When this type of event occurs, Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) require that the auditor disclose this information to the parties currently relying on or likely to rely on the audit report. The disclosure to the contracting officer should describe the nature of the subsequently acquired information and the affect it would have had on the audit report. It should advise the recipient not to rely upon the audit report. The FAO also should include adequate documentation in the working papers and the FAO’s permanent files to ensure that auditors no longer rely on the audit report.
[Emphasis added.]
So here’s the thing.
It’s nice that DCAA has admitted a mistake. It’s nice that the audit reports issued under the past four years of erroneous guidance are (in effect) being rescinded. That’s good.
DCAA was wrong. We’ve been telling our readers that DCAA has been wrong for four years. And they have finally admitted it—but only because Shay Assad told them so. Not because they recognize what the FAR says, but because a Senior Executive at DOD told them they were wrong.
Why does it take a memo from DDP to get DCAA to reassess its position? Does the audit agency not have sufficient internal resources to determine—on its own—what its audit positions should be?
More to the point, if DCAA changes its positions on regulatory compliance solely based on the direction of an outsider—somebody who’s not even a CPA—what does that say about the independence of DCAA?
Think about it.
The DFARS Proposal Adequacy Checklist
 Well, it’s here.
We first brought this matter to your attention as part of an article on how DOD was gearing up to mount a concerted attack on the profit of defense contractors. When the DAR Council issued a proposed rule on the topic, we did a deep dive into it—and we didn’t like what we saw. As is our wont, we didn’t pull any punches, writing, “we start off with the proposition that this rule is unnecessary, overly bureaucratic, and possibly un-American.”
We didn’t like what we saw to such an extent that we were moved to submit our comments to the DAR Council for consideration as they finalized the language.
And now the final DFARS rule is here, issued on March 28, 2013. Coincidentally, it is also effective on that same date.
And we continue to dislike what we see. You want to know what we dislike about the checklist, please go check out the links provided above.
So no, we are not going to repeat our “concerns” about the final rule here. It’s final and our “concerns” are now moot. But we are going to devote some verbiage to complaining about the DAR Council’s cavalier treatment of public comments on the proposed language—including our own. We think the DAR Council did not adhere to the standards established by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) itself.
DFARS 201.301(b) states—
When FEDERAL REGISTER publication is required for any policy, procedure, clause, or form, the department or agency requesting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD (AT&L)) approval for use of the policy, procedure, clause, or form (see 201.304(1)) must include an analysis of the public comments in the request for approval.
That requirement is aligned with other statutory and regulatory requirements imposed on rule-makers of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system. For example, FAR 1.301 states—
(b) Agency heads shall establish procedures to ensure that agency acquisition regulations are published for comment in the Federal Register in conformance with the procedures in Subpart 1.5 and as required by section 22 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, as amended (41 U.S.C. 418b), and other applicable statutes, when they have a significant effect beyond the internal operating procedures of the agency or have a significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors. However, publication is not required for issuances that merely implement or supplement higher level issuances that have previously undergone the public comment process, unless such implementation or supplementation results in an additional significant cost or administrative impact on contractors or offerors or effect beyond the internal operating procedures of the issuing organization. … (c) When adopting acquisition regulations, agencies shall ensure that they comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.) as implemented in 5 CFR 1320 (see 1.106) and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.). Normally, when a law requires publication of a proposed regulation, the Regulatory Flexibility Act applies and agencies must prepare written analyses, or certifications as provided in the law.
The foregoing references FAR 1.5. Looking at 1.501-2, we see the following—
(a) Views of agencies and nongovernmental parties or organizations will be considered in formulating acquisition policies and procedures. (b) The opportunity to submit written comments on proposed significant revisions shall be provided by placing a notice in the Federal Register. Each of these notices shall include—
(1) The text of the revision or, if it is impracticable to publish the full text, a summary of the proposal; (2) The address and telephone number of the individual from whom copies of the revision, in full text, can be requested and to whom comments thereon should be addressed; and
(3) When 1.501-3(b) is applicable, a statement that the revision is effective on a temporary basis pending completion of the public comment period. (c) A minimum of 30 days and, normally, at least 60 days will be given for the receipt of comments.
Accordingly, both statute and regulation require that the public be given an opportunity to provide comments regarding proposed regulations. And the DFARS requires that those comments must be analyzed; the required analysis is to be provided to the USD (A,T&L) in the approval package. The clear inference is that the required analysis should be substantive and provide the USD (A,T&L) with meaningful input. The clear presumption is that the USD (A,T&L) should review the analysis prior to approving the final language of the proposed rule.
And it was in the foregoing that we believe the DAR Council blew it.
Allow us to provide evidence in support of our assertion, if you would. Consider the following comments and the responses from the DAR Council.
Comment: Two respondents stated that this new rule would result in increased costs that will ultimately be passed on to the Government and may be financially prohibitive to seeking other business. Response: This provision results from a long history of incomplete proposals resulting in rework and lost time, and it aims to achieve cost savings by improving initial proposal submissions from contractors. Comment: Several respondents believed that this checklist imposes additional reporting requirements on the contractor and note that many of the checklist items are not currently required for submission of certified cost or pricing data. One respondent noted that while this checklist adds the new requirements it appears to add no value to the contracting process. Response: This rule does not impose additional requirements over what is already required under the conditions where certified cost or pricing data are required and these requirements are already covered by OMB Control Number 9000-0013. This provision is applicable to solicitations with an estimated value greater than the TINA threshold and that require certified cost or pricing data. This provision intends to increase uniformity across DoD, minimize local variations, and thereby decrease proposal preparation costs. Comment: Several respondents suggested that the checklist is unnecessary and duplicative. One respondent noted that it is the offeror's responsibility to comply with the requirements of the solicitation and an offeror that is unable to submit a compliant proposal is likely to be noncompliant after award. The same respondent noted that this checklist is somewhat duplicative of the DCAA forward pricing adequacy checklist. Another noted that most of the checklist items already appear in FAR 15.408 at table 15-2 and suggested that the rule should require contractors confirm that their proposal complies with all applicable requirements of 15-2. Another respondent noted that this rule is: (1) Not compliant with Executive Order 12866 as there is no defined problem that this rule aims to solve; (2) the rule is inconsistent, incompatible and duplicative of what is already in Table 15-2; and (3) that this checklist only adds a layer of regulatory requirements. Show citation box Response: This provision is a single, uniform tool that is applicable across DoD to address the inconsistent interpretations of Table 15-2. The intent of this provision is to increase uniformity across DoD, minimize local variations, and thereby decrease proposal preparation costs. The checklist created by this rule is a DFARS provision; any checklist that DCAA currently uses is outside the scope of this rule. Comment: Several respondents stated that the proposed rule does not support the BBP Initiative and noted that the rule does not align with any of the 23 principal actions. The respondents believed that the proposed rule is contrary to the BBP Initiative to reduce nonproductive processes and bureaucracy. Response: While this initiative predates BBP, it is consistent with the BBP's cost reduction initiatives. Comment: Two respondents stated it would be wastefully time consuming and burdensome for offerors to disclose which pages of the proposal contain a judgmental factor applied and the mathematical or other methods used in the estimate. The respondents suggested a large percentage of the pages comprising the proposal would contain such information. Response: Having contractors identify this information prevents miscommunication and misunderstanding, and it will save time in the proposal evaluation process.
We could continue with the recitation of comments and responses, but the litany would simply become repetitive. Clearly, the DAR Council was bound and determined to require contractors to fill out the proposal adequacy checklist and no amount of public input was going to dissuade them.
We are disappointed in the DAR Council’s cavalier treatment of the public comments (including our comments!) and we continue to believe that the new DFARS requirement adds little value while adding significantly to the costs of preparing proposals to the Defense Department.
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