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Apogee Consulting Inc

Lessons from the ASBCA

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Lessons_Learned_1
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) is one of two fora to hear appeals of Contracting Officer Final Decisions (COFDs) (the other being the U.S. Court of Federal Claims). Two recent decisions issued by ASBCA Administrative Judges offer lessons to contractors considering litigation. We thought we’d share them with you.

The first decision involves United Healthcare Partners, Inc. (ASBCA No. 58123, April 2, 2013). UHP appealed a Termination for Default (T4D0. UHP was awarded a contract by the Air Force to provide telephonic “Nurse Triage Answering Service” for personnel seeking medical attention. The contract was a firm, fixed-price type valued at $254,259, with an estimated quantity of 19,710 and a unit price of $12.90 per call. The original dispute involved the amount of supporting documentation that UHP was required to provide with its invoices. The Government was concerned that UHP’s invoiced call volume did not match governmental records, and demanded that UHP provide a “monthly clinical statistics report” that supported UHP’s invoiced call volume. For its part, UHP disputed that such a report was necessary or required by contract terms.

The government began to issue CARs (Corrective Action Requests) and refused to pay submitted invoices. When three months had passed without payment, UHP “suspended” its services. The government responded to that action by issuing a Default Termination, characterizing the T4D as a COFD, which could be appealed. UHP appealed that T4D and demanded that its past due invoices, worth about $71,000, be paid.

But while UHP was free to appeal the T4D, it could not appeal the unpaid invoices. Why? Because it had not filed a certified claim for the unpaid invoices to the Contracting Officer (CO), and it had not received a COFD. There was nothing to appeal, according to the Judge Page. She wrote—

There is no proof that UHP's demand was properly submitted to the CO for decision, and appellant cannot first assert a claim as part of its complaint. It is ‘the claim, and not the complaint, [that] determines the scope of our jurisdiction in this appeal’ as a '"CDA claim cannot properly be raised for the first time in a party's pleadings before the Board.'" [Citing American General Trading & Contracting.] ... Appellant [UHP] did not submit a $71,659.30 or other CDA claim to the CO for payment of its invoices in question and did not seek a COFD. Neither UHP's ‘Request for Fair Compensation’ attached to its complaint nor its routine invoices meet the requirements for a cognizable CDA claim.

What lessons can be learned?

First, we noticed that UHP was represented by its CEO. We have railed in the past against contractors who do not hire expert attorneys when litigating against the government. Suffice to say, we don’t think very highly of them.

Second, let’s talk about UHP’s tactics. It chose to stop work when its invoices went unpaid. It chose not to file a claim for its unpaid invoices to the Contracting Officer. We consider those choices to have been … unwise. If you have a dispute with the government, you are pretty much always going to have to keep working (and paying your staff and your overhead) while the dispute is being resolved. There may be exceptions to that general rule but they aren’t worth knowing. (Remember we are not attorneys.) If you want to get your dispute resolved, you don’t stop work; instead, you file a certified claim and get a COFD that you can appeal. The faster you do that, the faster you get paid. It’s really just about that simple. The path UHP followed was essentially the opposite of the correct course of action.

Finally, let’s look at the dispute itself. The government wanted UHP to support the amount of phone calls it was billing for. UHP said such support was not required by the contract. UHP may well have been correct that the contract was silent regarding additional reporting requirements associated with its invoices but, once again, it chose an unwise path from a contracting point of view. Another, perhaps wiser, contractor would have generated the reports—especially if it got the invoices paid faster. To the extent that there were additional costs associated with the reports, a savvy contractor could have submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) for the cost difference. Had UHP chosen that path, it could have gotten paid and it might have been able to get its contract value increased. Instead, UHP’s course of action led to unpaid invoices, sour customer relationships … and a Termination for Default.

The second recent decision involves Servicios y Obras Isetan S.L. (ASBCA No. 57584, April 5, 2013). Servicios y Obras Isetan (SOI) also found its contract terminated, and it also represented itself in litigation. And it also claimed “funds for overhead costs and the return of retained amounts.”

The interesting thing here is the nature of the dispute. SOI’s dispute did not involve insufficient invoice support. Instead, the CO terminated the contract because SOI allegedly “submitted falsified documentation in order to secure the contract.” The allegations were substantiated by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). Although the word “forgery” was used, Judge Wilson simply found that SOI “misrepresented” key facts “in order to obtain a more favorable evaluation of its proposal.”

As was the case with UHP, SOI found its claims for monetary compensation denied because the company had never submitted a certified claim to the Contracting Officer in order to receive a COFD. Further, Judge Wilson found that the contract was “void ab initio” because of SOL’s misrepresentations. The government argued that SOL’s misrepresentations amounted to “fraud in the inducement,” but Judge Wilson simply found that SOL “materially misrepresented” key facts, that the government relied on the misrepresentation when deciding to award the contract, and that the government’s reliance on the misrepresentation was reasonable. Thus, the contract was voidable and it was voided.

We have dealt before with contractors that have “enhanced” their proposals by making misleading and possibly flat-out untrue statements. It is never---ever—a good idea to make demonstrably false statements to government officials. Proposals are not an exception to that rule. We suspect that SOL was lucky to receive the outcome that it did.

Small business contractors often receive contract award opportunities not available to other contractors. However, with respect to contract compliance and contract breaches, they are held to the same standards as are the largest and most experienced contractors. These two contractors learned their lessons the hard way; we trust our readers will learn from the mistakes of UHP and SOL.

 

 

DOD Withdraws Proposed DFARS STEM Rule

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We recently told you about a proposed DFARS rule that would “encourage contractors to develop science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs. STEM programs are, programs or initiatives, either formal or informal, which encourage the pursuit of education and experience in the Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics disciplines.”

We also told you about a catch in the proposed rule. Buried in the language were the following phrases:

  • “The Contractor shall assume the responsibility for all the costs and investments in support of the STEM disciplines.”

  • “The Contractor will not be reimbursed for any costs incurred or associated with the support of the STEM disciplines. Any costs incurred for supporting the STEM disciplines are unallowable under this contract.”

Based on the catch, we concluded the following about the proposed rule—

… it is disingenuous and perhaps even contrary to Congressional intent, to both ‘encourage’ contractors to engage in STEM-related activities, while at the same time declaring that if the contractor does engage in such activities, the costs are not allowable contract costs. One is tempted to assert that the two policy positions are contrary to one another. Declaring that STEM-related costs are unallowable seems to be faint encouragement, indeed.

We asked our readers to consider submitting comments to the DAR Council. Perhaps they did so, because the DAR Council recently announced that the proposed rule was being withdrawn.

Why did the Council withdraw the rule? According to the Federal Register announcement—

DoD has determined that the proposed amendment to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is not a necessary part of the Department's plan to implement a section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, that requires DoD to encourage contractors to develop science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs. … At this time, DoD is in the process of reassessing the most effective and efficient methods by which it can encourage contractors to develop science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs.

We suppose that’s as close to an acknowledgement of a misstep as we are ever going to see from current DOD rule-makers. But while we could quibble with the wording, we are quite satisfied at the outcome—as we trust our readers are. Thanks to those who submitted comments.

 

 

DCAA Admits Sequestration Will Impact Efforts to Reduce Audit Backlog

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We have previously provided our opinions on the impacts of sequestration on the Department of Defense civilian workforce to our readers. We have explored the apparent disconnect between the comments of DOD leadership regarding hiring freezes, furloughs, and layoffs and the comments of DCAA leadership regarding the agency’s intentions to increase its audit workforce from 4,900 to 5,600 by the end of GFY 2016. (That’s an increase of roughly 14 percent, by the way.) The personnel ramp-up was part of a high priority initiative (announced by the Secretary of Defense in April, 2009) to add 20,000 new acquisition positions, including auditors, program managers, and contract attorneys.

The DCAA ongoing staffing increase has been a key step in the agency’s plan to address its current backlog of some 25,000 unaudited contractor “incurred cost” submissions—a backlog that (by the agency’s own admission) has quadrupled over the past decade. DCAA recently told the GAO that it intended to reach a “steady state”—defined as a backlog of two years’ worth of audits—by the end of GFY 2016.

Bloomberg recently reported that those plans may be in jeopardy, because the impacts of sequestration have impeded the agency’s hiring initiative. The Bloomberg article quotes remarks by DCAA Director Patrick Fitzgerald, who stated that DCAA “has frozen hiring and will lose about 5 percent of its workforce, or 250 employees, this year.”

According to the article, DCAA intended to reduce its $600 billion backlog by about two-thirds (or $400 billion) by the end of GFY 2014. That’s the first we’ve heard of that milestone—and now it’s not likely to happen.

It’s not only the staffing impacts that will make reaching that goal nearly impossible. As we’ve reported, even with a renewed emphasis on performing “incurred cost” audits, DCAA’s productivity in GFY 2012 (ending September 2012) was about 25 percent below its planned levels (completing 2,930 audits against a plan of 4,065, according to GAO). In addition, DCAA’s new “risk-based” approach to choosing which submissions it audits (and which submissions it kicks over to DCMA, unaudited) has not yielded the hoped-for results. The new approach was expected to knock-out 80 percent of the backlog, but DCAA told GAO that the actual number of “low risk” contractor submissions was about two-and-a-half times below its predictions—meaning that it will be forced to actually, you know, perform audits on more contractor submissions than planned.

So even though the Bloomberg article stated, “A study by the Army Force Management Support Agency said the audit office needs a workforce of 6,250 by 2015,” the audit agency’s more modest goal of reaching a workforce of 5,600 is now in jeopardy. In fact, it’s going to actually be losing staff in the near term.

Accordingly, we expect that the current audit backlog has a decent chance of actually increasing by the end of GFY 2013, despite DCAA’s efforts to reduce it.

We wonder how that outcome will play inside the Beltway, should it come to pass.

 

DOD IG Says DCMA Cannot Manage Performance-Based Payments

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Sigh.

The_Endless_Cycle
Reading this recent DOD IG report is like listening to a doctor diagnose a patient’s illness by listing the symptoms. The doctor tells the patient nothing new, fails to identify the illness that is the root cause of the symptoms, and then charges the patient $800 for the appointment. And to make it worse, the patient was already aware of the symptoms—because they are why s/he went to the doctor’s office in the first place.

We’re talking about the DOD IG report that evaluated the ability of DCMA Contracting Offices to negotiate and administer Performance-Based Payments (PBPs). DOD IG reported—

Contracting personnel did not properly evaluate and negotiate schedules. Specifically, they did not:

  • Establish appropriate events for 1,807 events out of 2,356 total events on 57 approved performance-based payment schedules, and determine whether the event value fairly represented contract performance for 44 schedules;
  • Clearly define the criteria for successful completion in 33 schedules, identify events as severable or cumulative in 23 schedules, and specify completion dates in 21 schedules; or
  • Properly negotiate and verify the contractors’ need for contract financing or level of investment before authorizing performance-based payments in all 60 sample contracts.

Based on those findings, the DOD IG provided the following incisive root cause analysis—

This occurred because DoD contracting personnel did not perform adequate reviews of schedules provided by contractors and did not use expenditure data or other independent data to value events. In addition, DoD guidance did not require contracting personnel to take any performance-based payment contract financing training and DoD guidance was inadequate and inaccurate.

Yes. It was a failure of guidance that led to the systemic failures to properly administer PBPs. Thank you, DOD IG, for the value-added diagnosis. Here’s your $800.

This is not the first time DOD IG has expressed concerns with the Pentagon’s administration of PBPs. In 2003—a full decade ago—audit report number D-2003-106 found that DOD was not adequately administering contracts that used PBPs, and asserted that billions of dollars’ worth of contracts “had poorly defined event schedules … lacked performance criteria, or did not document event dependence.”

Partly in response to that 2003 IG report (as well as in response to an earlier IG report on the same topic), the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Directorate convened a PBP Working Group to improve PBP administration. The PBP Working Group’s final report, issued March 8, 2005, can be found here. In that report, DPAP committed to revise FAR language to eliminate confusion, revise the DOD User’s Guide to Performance-Based Payments, and to revise training to address concerns and confusion about administration of PBPs.

A decade later, in its response to the 2013 DOD IG audit findings, the Director of Defense Pricing committed to take the following actions:

  • Update/revise existing policy guidance

  • Enhance required training

  • Revise and issue the (draft) 2012 Performance-Based Payments Guide

So let’s recap the bidding.

DOD has been using PBPs for contractor financing since 2000. DOD IG has been criticizing DOD’s administration of PBPs for just about that same length of time. While some of the details have changed, in a larger sense none of the 2013 criticisms are new; they are essentially the same criticisms asserted in 2001 and 2003. Pentagon policy-makers continue to largely concur with the IG’s audit findings, and continue to commit to enhanced/revised policy guidance and enhanced/revised detailed user’s guidance, and to enhanced/revised training for DCMA personnel involved in the administration of PBPs. Not too much has changed over the past decade.

So let us offer this prediction.

Sometime in the next decade, the DOD IG will conduct an “audit” of DOD’s administration of PBPs on its fixed-priced contracts. That audit will find many failures. It will recommend enhanced policy guidance. It will recommend more detailed direction. It will recommend enhanced training. And the Pentagon policy-makers will concur, and agree to implement the recommendations.

And that cycle will continue. Forever.

The patient will continue to visit the doctor, because something’s not quite right. And the doctor will repeat the symptoms back to the patient. And the patient will go home with no more knowledge than before—and perhaps poorer by $800 for the experience.

Let us end the cycle now. Let us diagnose the problem for Pentagon policy-makers.

  1. Using PBPs requires a trade-off. PBPs require an upfront investment of time and effort in order to identify meaningful events that reasonably correlate to a contractor’s expenditure of funds. It requires time and effort to negotiate them and to come to an agreement. In return, “non value-added” administrative efforts are reduced during contract performance. PBPs should not be audited, and event confirmations should be a breeze. It’s a trade, but one that many Contracting Officers cannot make, because they have neither time nor schedule to invest in such pre-award negotiations. If DCMA cannot address theCO workload and pressures to put contractors on contract, then it cannot fix this problem--no matter how much the guidance is improved and how many training classes COs attend.

  2. Using PBPs requires education and know-how. It’s a relatively new area (even though it’s nearly 15 years old at this point.) Unfortunately, training has been perfunctory and had not addressed the real needs of the users—including Contracting Officers and CO Representatives. There aren’t a lot of gray-haired mentors around to help out young COs. If you can't create DCMA PBP SMEs, you cannot fix this problem--no matter how much the guidance is improved and how many training classes the COs attend.

Based on (1) and (2), above, there will be a high percentage of compliance failures. If you want to reduce the amount of failures, you’ve got to give the COs time (and schedule) to make the initial upfront investment. You’ve got to give them “how-to” guidance and tools—not just some pretty platitudes about “PBPs are DOD’s preferred financing solution”. You’ve got to give them detailed guidance and step-by-step instructions. And you’ve got to create a small cadre of experts who can answer questions.

Until you do all those things, you are never, ever, going to break this endless cycle of IG audit findings and empty promises to fix things.

 

 

More Good Audit Guidance: More Nice Words

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Our last blog article broke a long-standing streak of never having a nice word to say about DCAA. We actually complimented a piece of recent guidance issued to help drive value-added findings in audits of contractor cost proposals. This article also has nice things to say about another piece of recently issued audit guidance. Perhaps this is the start of a new streak?

The audit guidance in question is MRD 13-PAC-002(R), issued March 28, 2013. It concerns the allowability of contractor travel costs under the FAR Travel Cost Principle, 31.205-46. Ostensibly, it does not break any new ground, stating that it only “emphasizes existing Agency guidance.” Despite that somewhat innocuous statement, we suspect its intent is to minimize the issuance of inaccurate audit findings by auditors who either don’t know or don’t care that what the regulations say.

Let us quote the pertinent section of the MRD—

The Government travel regulations provide for two ceiling amounts: one for lodging and one for meals and incidental expenses. However, as provided in CAM 7-1002.3c(2), contractors are subject to only one ceiling, a total of lodging plus meals and incidental expenses. This CAM guidance is consistent with the regulatory intent that the ‘maximum per diem’ rates represent a single combined ceiling.

In other words, contractors can offset higher reimbursements in one area by lower reimbursements in another area. The only ceiling that matters for contractors is the total ceiling, and not the individual ceilings for M&IE and/or lodging, which applied only to Government personnel in travel status.

We think this piece of audit guidance will serve as a good reference for both auditors and contractors. Good job, DCAA. Good job, Donald J. McKenzie, Assistant Director, Policy and Plans.

 


Page 149 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.