• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Divided Appeals Court Disappoints General Dynamics

E-mail Print PDF

Government contract cost accounting practitioners recognize that not all Cost Accounting Standards are created equal. Some Standards, such as CAS 406 or 407, are generally considered to be more straightforward and comprehensible than others; whereas some of those other Standards (e.g., CAS 415) are generally considered to be tough nuts to crack.

In other words, some Standards are more difficult than others to comply with. The two pension Standards—CAS 412 and 413—definitely fall into the “tough nuts to crack” category. They are considered by most practitioners to be perhaps the most difficult and complex Cost Accounting Standards to understand, let alone comply with. They are more difficult for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that you need a really good actuary to help make the necessary adjustments between GAAP accounting and government contract cost accounting.

They are so complex that, when revised in 1995, the revisions initiated a “storm of litigation” that continues to this day. And the litigation involves big dollars, too. In many cases, there may be literally tens of millions of dollars at stake.

Take, for example, General Dynamics’ appeal of a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision asserting that GD was in noncompliance with the requirements of CAS 412 for its Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009. It was estimated that approximately $53 million (plus interest) rode on the outcome.

The issue was GD’s use of actual market returns on its pension plan assets instead of actuarial “expected” returns, for purposes of calculating its Forward Pricing Rates. Just to give you a hint of both the complexities and big numbers involved, let’s throw out some numbers from the June 2011 ASBCA decision.

  • The market value of GD’s pension plan assets (as of 1 January 1994) was $2,122,371,000.

  • The actuarial value of GD’s pension plan assets (as of 1 January 1994) was $1,697,968,000.

  • The “expected” actuarial value of GD’s pension plan assets (as of 1 January 1995) was $1,772,424,000.

  • The “projected” market value of GD’s pension plan assets (as of 1 January 1995) was $1,998,698,000.

Since 1986, GD consistently estimated the next year’s market value of its pension plan assets using the actual market performance from the preceding year. For Forward Pricing purposes, future years’ performance was estimated assuming an 8 percent return on assets. When GD updated Forward Pricing Rates during the year (as it did from time to time), it used actual Year-to-Date performance plus an estimated 8% return for the unknown balance of the year. The government acquiesced to GD’s methodology for 20 years, but in 2006 the government objected to GD’s methodology for the first time, asserting that it violated the requirements of CAS 412. The government’s issue was that CAS 412 allegedly required use of actuarial assumptions that reflect long-term trends, so as to avoid distortions caused by short-term fluctuations; whereas GD’s methodology reflected short-term results.

In its response, GD noted that, under the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) it was required to identify cost or pricing data that was “accurate, current, and complete”—and thus was required to update actuarial assumptions with actual cost information where known. GD also argued that its market return data was “historical fact” and not an actuarial assumption of any sort. GD also asserted that using actual market returns reflected its “best estimate” of pension costs to be incurred, and thus complied with the fundamental requirement of CAS 412.

Judge Peacock, writing for the ASBCA, found that a fact is not an assumption, when viewed in isolation. However, when viewed in the context of pension accounting, the rate of return of plan assets was an actuarial assumption subject to the requirements of CAS 412. Judge Peacock also found that there was no conflict between the CAS pension measurement requirements and the FAR Part 15 TINA requirements, writing—

There is no conflict between the CAS and FAR cost or pricing data requirements. Although the FAR does require submission of ‘accurate, complete and current’ cost or pricing data for consideration, it does not dictate the relative importance of submitted data or how that data will be used in cost estimation, negotiation and pricing. Appellant assumes that the most current data is also the most accurate and complete data. That may or may not be the case. Appellant's assumption is particularly problematic here because the RPFPRs [Revised Proposals for Forward Pricing Rates] specifically (and pension cost estimation generally) are intended to make projections a number of years into the future. Moreover, the government maintains that the relevant ‘current’ (as well as most accurate) data is that required for use in the CAS 412 measurement methodology.

GD lost. It filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It lost that Motion as well. Then it filed an Appeal at the Federal Circuit. It lost there as well. Notably the decision was divided, with what seemed to us to be a well-reasoned dissenting opinion from Judge Wallach.

Let’s first look at the majority ruling, which affirmed the ASBCA decision. As might be expected, the Appellate decision essentially reiterated the ASBCA’s logic. For example, Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, wrote that—

We agree with the government that General Dynamics’ use of midyear market values and the subsequent blended rate for the base year violate CAS 412-50(b)(4). First, both the midyear market value and the subsequent blended rate are actuarial assumptions. CAS 412-30(a)(3) defines an ‘actuarial assumption’ as an ‘estimate of future conditions affecting pension cost.’ As a matter of principle, we agree with General Dynamics’ proposition that the actual value of the plan assets on a given day is a historical fact, not an actuarial assumption. That historical fact, however, must be distinguished from the two decisions concerning which data point to use and how that data point affects the established rate. …

Contrary to General Dynamics’ assertion, the presumed accuracy of the midyear value in the base year does not make the use of that value and the subsequent blended rate compliant with CAS. Indeed, the ‘accuracy’ argument raised by General Dynamics ignores the fact that the forward pricing rate is not only for the base year, but for a projection from three to nine years into the future. Indeed, even if General Dynamics’ approach may be an accurate representation over the short term, that is only because it impermissibly reflects short-term fluctuations. General Dynamics’ method improperly locks in that short-term fluctuation causing a distortion that alters the level of growth throughout the rest of the projection.

Judge Wallach did not agree with the majority opinion. He wrote—

The ASBCA’s decision denying GD’s appeal rests on two invalid assumptions, either of which, if corrected, is sufficient to mandate reversal: First, GD’s use of current, intra-year data is not an ‘actuarial assumption’ within the meaning of CAS 412; Second, even if the data used is an actuarial assumption, the actuarial assumption does not result in ‘distortions caused by short-term fluctuations.’ CAS 412-50(b)(4). For each reason, the Government did not carry its burden to prove a CAS violation. …

There is no evidence that GD’s use of intra-year data results in distortions caused by short-term fluctuations. To the contrary, the record reveals that GD’s method has proven more accurate. We should not require companies to abandon decades-long practices that are compliant with the CAS for less accurate calculating methods suggested by the Government.

Unfortunately for General Dynamics, any future hopes rest with the Supreme Court. And, as we all know, SCOTUS does not agree to hear very many government contracts cases.

For the rest of you, consider this: General Dynamics is one of the largest defense contractors in the world. It has access to some of the best accountants, actuaries, and attorneys. And it still ran afoul of DCAA. GD’s situation ought to make you worried—because if GD can screw up CAS compliance, then so can you.

 

Judge Promotes DCAA Contract Audit Manual to Federal Regulation Status

E-mail Print PDF

Scales_of_Justice
Wow.

If ever an ASBCA decision cried out for a Motion for Reconsideration, this one is it. It concerns the application of J.F. Taylor, Inc. for recovery of legal fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). J.F. Taylor’s application was denied.

You remember J.F. Taylor, don’t you? We wrote about the case here. It was a critical case, as DCAA’s methodology for determining the reasonableness of a contractor’s executive compensation was thrown out as being “fatally flawed statistically.” DCAA questioned roughly $849,000 of Taylor’s exec comp costs, which led to a DCMA demand for about $620,000. The government’s legal case went down in flames, and only about $42,000 of the originally questioned $849,000 was found to have been unreasonable.

Pursuant to the EAJA, J.F. Taylor sought reimbursement of legal fees and expenses associated with its legal victory. As Judge Shackleford wrote—

The government concedes that JFT timely filed its application, that JFT is a prevailing party in these appeals, that JFT meets the net worth and maximum employee requirements for the EAJA, and that the costs the applicant seeks to recover ($192,325.83) were incurred in these appeals and were reasonable. The sole issue disputed by the government and the sole issue we decide is whether the government has proved that it was substantially justified in its position in the appeals.

Notwithstanding the fact that DCAA’s methodology—and the DCMA Contracting Officer’s reliance on it—was flawed, Judge Shackleford found that “the government’s conduct was reasonable and substantially justified” for several reasons. Among the reasons cited by the Judge was this humdinger of a legal error—

… the method used by the government to evaluate the reasonableness of executive compensation had been used over a long period of time and this methodology was part of the DCAA contract audit manual. Cf. R&B Bewachungsgesellschaft mbH, ASBCA No. 42221, 93-3 BCA If 26,010, aff'd on recon., 94-1 BCA 126,315 (government position substantially justified where based on published regulation).

Did you see that?

Judge Shackleford just wrote that the DCAA Contract Audit Manual was a “published regulation”. We all know that’s simply not true. If it were a published regulation, for instance, then public comments would be solicited when revisions were considered. If it were a published regulation, for instance, you could find the DCAA CAM on the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) website.

Just to name two “for instances”.

We bet we could also find other legal precedents that clearly found that the DCAA CAM did not have the effect of a regulation. We trust the Wiley Rein attorneys will cite them in the Motion for Reconsideration that we hope is coming. In the meantime, trust us: the DCAA CAM is not a Federal regulation.

So here’s the deal.

DCAA has lost twice on the exec comp issue—Metron and J.F. Taylor. The audit agency continues to use its “fatally flawed” methodology to question exec comp costs of smaller contractors—the ones who can’t afford to fight back. We know this because at least one of those contractors is among our clientele.

The government will continue to aggressively pursue this approach because it suffers no penalty, no legal sanction, for doing so. The government will continue to line its pockets with “unreasonable” executive compensation because no Court seems to be interested in stopping government officials from doing so—even though the methodology strikes us as being akin to extortion.

The only way to sanction DCAA and DCMA and the Department of Justice for continuing to advance their flawed legal theories is to award reasonable legal fees and expenses to the contractors to have the gumption to take this issue on, and to prevail.

Now Judge Shackleford has taken away that stick—and he’s done it via a fatally flawed legal analysis.1

Wow.

1 We are not attorneys! Our perception of Judge Shackleford’s analysis may itself be fatally flawed. But we believe that equity and comity demand that this decision be reversed on reconsideration.

 

GAO Says Feds Fail to Manage Acquisition Workforce Training

E-mail Print PDF

Recently we had an opportunity to weigh-in on DOD’s continual failure to adequately administer Performance-Based Payments, by way of reviewing a recent audit report by the DOD Inspector General. Among other recommended fixes, the DOD IG thought that training in that area should be enhanced and made a requirement for DOD Contracting Officers. The DOD Director of Pricing agreed with that recommendation—in a manner very similar to that in which DOD has been agreeing with DOD IG recommendations about enhanced PBP training for more than a decade. And yet, despite more than a decade of enhanced PBP training, no significant improvement in DCMA’s administration of PBPs has been noted by the DOD IG.

The situation might lead one to question the efficacy of training in the domain of contract financing and, in particular, the negotiation and administration of PBPs. Maybe it’s not the users; maybe it’s the instructors and their training materials. As usual, we had an opinion as to the root cause(s) of the continual failure.

We suggested that PBP training offered to DCMA employees has been superficial and has not addressed the real needs of the DOD CO and COR using community. We asserted that DCMA does not need pretty platitudes posted on PowerPoint presentations and, instead, needs detailed “how-to” guidance and tools. We also opined that the goal should not be to train everybody to the same level, but instead to train-up a small cadre of PBP SMEs who could answer real-world questions as they arose during pre-award negotiation and post-award administration.

We have long suspected that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)—the home of DOD acquisition workforce training—has not been meeting the needs of the DOD acquisition workforce. Today, we assert that the continued failure to adequately negotiate and administrate PBPs is but one symptom of a larger and more systemic problem—the Federal government is failing in its mission to train its acquisition workforce. And it really doesn’t matter whether we’re right or wrong in our assertion. The fact of the matter is that most Federal agencies don’t know whether their workforce is receiving adequate training, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO). People might disagree with our assertion; but, according to the GAO, they can’t prove that we are wrong.

The GAO reported on this matter here, in a 55-page report published March 28, 2013. The GAO was reporting on 23 Federal civilian agencies—but not on DOD. (DOD is subject to differing education requirements, according to the GAO report.) Regardless of that fact, we think the findings are applicable to DOD and we think DCMA ought to be listening to what GAO was saying.

Here are the key findings from the GAO report—

The training cost data that agencies collect is not comparable and agencies have limited information on the benefits of their acquisition workforce training investments. … As for determining benefits of training, 7 of 23 federal agencies reported having no metrics, not even basic end-of-course evaluations. Without basic data, agencies do not have insight into the benefits of their acquisition workforce training efforts.

What challenges do Federal agencies face in training their acquisition workforces? According to GAO—

The areas reported as being the most challenging are related to staffing and budgetary resources. Some agencies also reported challenges with the identification of their acquisition workforce, which is a fundamental step needed for managing the workforce and its training. Agencies also reported that additional assistance from OFPP and FAI would help their acquisition workforce training efforts. In addition, the agencies reported that their acquisition workforces are challenged in finding time in their workload to attend training.

GAO reported that the primary objective of acquisition training is to permit individuals to maintain their Federal Acquisition Certificates (FACs). Agencies consider training to “develop expertise” in selected areas (such as negotiation and administration of PBPs) only after the FAC-required training courses have been provided. Accordingly, development of SMEs is a secondary objective—an after-thought, if you will.

It’s hard to develop SMEs when your focus is on the least common denominator standard.

Another key problem for some agencies was the seemingly trivial task of identifying the members of their agency’s acquisition workforce. Yes, it’s true. GAO reported that 11 of the 23 agencies considered it a challenge to simply identify their acquisition workforce, let alone figure out what training those individuals needed. As GAO reported (apparently with no sense of irony)—

If members of the acquisition workforce are not identified as such, it is difficult to ensure their training and development needs are being met. Our prior work on acquisition personnel at the Department of Defense noted challenges with identifying the total workforce with acquisition-related responsibilities. Officials across DOD, including senior officials at DAU, told us that identifying some individuals with acquisition-related responsibilities, such as CORs, is challenging, in part because those personnel are dispersed throughout many organizations, come from a variety of career fields, and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary and not a primary duty. The agencies’ Acquisition Career Managers told us that they face similar challenges in identifying CORs and other personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Three of the four agencies selected for further insight—DHS, Education, and VA—acknowledged that they continue to be challenged by identifying some members of their acquisition workforces.

No shit, Sherlock.

If you can’t identify your folks, it’s tough to train them. And as Tom Reid noted (on a LinkedIn discussion thread)—

I find it interesting that agencies have difficulty knowing who a COR is. … If FAR is followed … the COR MUST be designated in writing. If those letters are tracked (as they should be) it is a relatively simple task to know who your COR’s are.

There’s more to the GAO report (after all, it’s 55 pages long), but we’ll cut to the chase. Here’s how GAO concluded its report—

Given the large acquisition investments the federal government makes each year, it is essential that the people in agencies who manage these procurements day-to-day—the acquisition workforce—be well-trained to handle their responsibilities. Fundamentally, agencies need key information to manage and oversee their acquisition workforce training investments. For example, agencies need to identify their acquisition workforce members, and measure how the training benefits the agencies by providing the workforce with the knowledge and skills to do their jobs effectively. At this point, OFPP, FAI, and federal agencies are taking steps that may potentially improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their training programs, but a number of challenges and limitations need to be overcome.

To which Tom Reid pointed out—

The conclusions say that OFPP, FAI, and the agencies are engaging in activities that ‘may potentially’ improve effectiveness, and then seems to suggest that just getting all the seats filled is one such measure. Seems to me this topic is more critical than taking a lazy shot that ‘may potentially’ fix it.

We couldn’t have said it any better ourselves (which is why we quoted Tom). Whether or not you agree with our viewpoint on the matter, it’s hard to argue that training-up the acquisition workforce should be a top priority for Federal acquisition leaders. And yet, GAO thinks insufficient attention is being paid to this area. That needs to change—and it needs to change for DOD as well.

 

 

BBP 2.1: Pentagon to “Review” and “Modify” Contractor Profit Policies

E-mail Print PDF

Paranoids_and_Their_Enemies
It’s hard to keep from pointing out that we saw this one coming from a mile away.

So we won’t bother to try.

We have long been concerned that what Secretary of Defense Gates announced in 2010 as an urgent initiative to cut Pentagon “overhead costs” and to reduce bloated Pentagon bureaucracy has been seized by certain leaders as an opportunity to attack the contractors who enable the warfighters to, uh, fight wars. Not two months after SECDEF Gates’ speech, the “Better Buying Power” initiative was birthed, with the goal of “restoring affordability and productivity in defense spending.” Over time, the drive for Pentagon efficiency—spear-headed by the SECDEF himself—seems to have virtually dropped off the radar screen, while the drive for weapon system affordability seems to be quite healthy and, as we’ve told our readers, it’s morphed into “Better Buying Power 2.0” (or “BBP 2.0,” for short).

When we say we’ve “long been concerned,” allow us to elaborate a bit.

In December, 2011, we published a screed about how the words and deeds of the Defense Procurement & Acquisition Policy (DPAP) Directorate indicated an intention to work to reduce defense contractors’ profits, despite public protestations to the contrary from higher levels of Pentagon leadership. We continued in that vein nearly a year later, ranting about attempts to limit the allowable compensation of contractors’ personnel—which seemed to us to be, fundamentally, an attempt to reduce contractors’ profits once again. And a couple of months after that, we told you about the Navy’s “price fighters” and we asked you to consider who they were fighting and what they were targeting. (Hint: they were not fighting foreign terrorists, nor were they targeting international drug cartels.)

In that last article we also discussed the fairly recent phenomenon of “should cost” pricing, which is where the government demands thousands upon thousands of pages of cost information from the contractor, so that government personnel can then engage in long, drawn-out, adversarial, negotiations—with the expressed objective being to tell the contractor what its own products are going to cost (as opposed to relying on the contractor’s official cost estimate, which of course would almost certainly have been subject to the requirements of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act).

Please note: the contractor is required to submit its TINA-compliant cost estimate anyway, even though the government will then proceed to ignore it in favor of its own estimate of what the product “should cost.” Thus, under the “should cost” initiative, the contractor now has to support the government’s estimate in addition to its own estimate—and the additional costs associated with that effort will end up in its overhead.

So while “should cost” sounds nice, in practice it’s been a nightmare, resulting in additional overhead costs and delays in finalizing contract prices. Ironically, much of the Pentagon’s recent cost-cutting efforts have focused on assisting contractors to reduce their overhead expenses. Consequently, “should-cost” may turn out to be a viable approach to creating a perpetual motion machine—one where contractors are required to incur increased overhead costs so as to provide government personnel with information to enable them to tell the contractor where to cut its overhead costs.

Should-cost negotiations that do not result in significant price reductions (when compared to the contractor’s own estimate) seem to be seen as a failure by the government’s negotiators. In other words, the objective of “should cost” does not seem to be to arrive as a “best guess” or “most probable” estimated product cost; the objective appears to be to brow-beat the contractor into price concessions so that victory can be claimed in the fight against contractor profits.

At least, that’s the way we see it; your mileage may vary.

Despite our perhaps overly harsh rhetoric, we do not seem to be alone in our concerns about the adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors. For example, in December, 2012, the Los Angeles/South Bay Chapter of the National Contract Management Association (NCMA) hosted a workshop with the title: “Is DoD Waging a War on Contractor Profits?” Speakers included senior contractor representatives as well as representatives from DCMA Western Region and the US Air Force Space and Missile Center’s contracting team. We were unable to attend (but would have loved to!). But just the fact that the workshop was held (and attended by more than 100 members) is indicative of the widespread concern felt over this issue.

Recently, the Honorable Frank Kendall, Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) issued additional guidance to assist in implementing Better Buying Power 2.0. We are now dubbing this latest version BBP 2.1. (You heard it here first.)

Now, you know that we’ve been keeping our readers up-to-date with BBP goings-on. (For example: right here.) This lengthy article continues that trend. Let’s discuss, shall we?

Mr. Kendall’s BBP 2.1 memo was interesting for several reasons, not the least of which was a seeming desire to give detailed direction to government acquisition professionals, as opposed to the high-level strategic objectives that characterized BBP 1.0 and BBP 2.0.

Predictably, most news reports focused on the direction to Shay Assad (Director, DOD Pricing) to “review” and “modify” contractor profit policies. And we’ll get to that: it was our headline, after all. But we want to build to that, and then cover some other relevant stuff in the Memo.

Should-Cost under BBP 2.1

The first thing we want to discuss is new implementing guidance on the “should-cost” initiative. (If you’ve read this far, you may have gleaned a slight clue about how we feel about that particular initiative—but now we’re just going to report the facts, by quoting the Kendall BBP 2.1 Memo.)

According to Mr. Kendall’s memo, managing to “should-cost” targets instead of to program budgets “is fundamental to proactive cost control throughout the acquisition lifecycle”. The Memo continued that thought as follows—

Managers should scrutinize each element of cost under their control and assess how it can be reduced without unacceptable reductions in value received. Should cost applies to all acquisition activities and it spans product and service acquisitions. The key is to seek out and eliminate, through discrete actions, low-value-added ingredients of program cost and to appropriately reward those who succeed in doing this, both in Government and in industry. … For industry, it is a matter of tying financial incentives to overall cost reduction. … The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), in collaboration with the CAEs, will implement an annual planning process to maximize the use of the DCMA Cost and Pricing Center capability for assisting program offices and PEO organizations with should cost activities by June 1, 2013.

That’s pretty clear, right?

DOD managers are directed to “scrutinize each element of cost … and assess how it can be reduced.” This is to be done by focusing on “low-value-added ingredients of program cost.” What part of that direction is ambiguous?

You. You in the back. What did you say? Speak up. Did you identify some ambiguity in that clear direction? Yeah? Okay; then tell us what you found.

You think that the part about “low-value-added ingredients” is ambiguous? So you’re saying that identification of such costs might be subjective—that what is perceived as being “low-value-added” (or “LVA”) by the government might not be the same as the contractor’s perception of what is LVA?

Bingo.

Obviously, from the government’s perspective the lowest value-added ingredient is contractor profit. Profit adds zero value to the product. Reduce profit, and you’ve accomplished the directive without sacrificing product quality in the slightest.

We’re just saying.

Evaluating Reasonable Contractor Profit under BBP 2.1

Speaking of profits, the Memo did not declare war on contractors’ profits. Instead, it linked contractor profits to accomplishment of Pentagon objectives. The Memo stated—

Profit is the key lever in motivating contractors to perform in alignment with DoD goals. The defense industrial base must be profitable or there will not be a defense industrial base, but the profits DoD provides should be consistent with the risks industry takes and the return needed to attract the required capital to defense companies. Current profit levels in the aggregate are reasonable and sustainable, but they are not tied tightly enough to successful performance in meeting DoD goals. Traditionally, the Government’s objective position for contract profitability has been a function of perceived risk and the anticipated value to be achieved by successful contract performance. DoD profit policy and our acquisition strategies should provide effective incentives to industry to deliver cost-effective solutions in which realized profitability is aligned and consistent with contract outcomes.

[Emphasis added.}

No, that’s not a declared, open war. Instead, we think that Mr. Kendall just called for some covert activity to be initiated, for some SPECOPS types to be mobilized and inserted to create deniable mischief. And we think he also identified the exact SPECOPS team he’s mobilized.

The Memo states that, to accomplish the foregoing objectives, the Director of Pricing (Mr. Shay Assad) will “review,” among other things, the current DOD Weighted Guidelines approach to profit analysis, and will “modify” them in order to “motivate[ ] behaviors of value to the Government.”

And that’s where our headline comes from.

We don’t know about you, but that last bit sounds kind of scary to us. Given that the DOD and its contractors are no longer in a trust-based partnership, and are instead locked into an adversarial relationship—fighting each other for every last taxpayer dollar—we are concerned that “behaviors of value to the Government” might not always align with contractors’ responsibilities to their owners and/or shareholders. We are concerned that profit will be transformed from a carrot into a stick: “Do what we (the Pentagon customers) say, or you’ll get no profit.” That doesn’t sound very good to us.

We’ll have to see how the SPECOPS forces accomplish their mission—i.e., what recommended changes to the current weighted guidelines approach that Mr. Assad’s team comes up with

Moving on….

Focusing on DCAA in BBP 2.1

Another aspect of BBP 2.0 (as we’ve previously reported) is to focus DCAA on reducing its ginormous backlog of incurred cost submissions awaiting audit. The BBP 2.1 Memo stated—

I have worked with DCAA and we agreed upon goals for the Agency to reduce the current incurred cost backlog by the end of FY2014 and achieve a steady state on all incurred cost audits (defined as 2 years’ worth of incurred cost inventory) by the end of FY2016.

Again, no surprises in the above statement. We have reported, several times, that DCAA is telling everybody that it is just a couple of years away from whittling down its audit backlog to a manageable state—at least in the area of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates. DCAA’s assertions (and the BBP 2.1 Memo) ignore the elephant in the room: the impact of DOD budgets constraints and sequestration on the DCAA workforce, which is expected to actually fall in GFY 2013, in contrast to the planned headcount increase. Moreover, the DCAA assertions and the Kendall Memo also ignore the statistical fact that, to date, DCAA’s productivity is running roughly 25 percent below its planned levels. To say that accomplishment of the FY2016 “steady state” objective is doubtful seems (to us) to be very fair assessment of the situation.

Regardless of the foregoing challenges to meeting DCAA’s publicly proclaimed objectives, the BBP 2.1 Memo states that “DCAA has agreed to issue a memorandum describing the incurred cost backlog initiatives undertaken by the Agency by June 1, 2013.” We feel compelled to point out that the act of simply describing historical initiatives—initiatives that are already failing to produce necessary results—does not appear to be helpful in the slightest. But we suppose Mr. Kendall had to say something.

Superior Supplier Incentive Program in BBP 2.1

Getting back to the adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors, let us now discuss the BBP 2.1 Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP). The intent of the SSIP is to “publicly acknowledge and reward top-performing defense companies.” Top-performing contractors, designated as “SSS” will “receive more favorable contract terms and conditions in contracts.” That sounds nice, doesn’t it?

The devil, as they say, is in the details.

The devil is in how the term “top-performing” is defined. According to the BBP 2.1 Memo—

Under the SSIP, contractors that have demonstrated exemplary performance at the business unit level in the areas of cost, schedule, performance, quality, and business relations would be granted Superior Supplier Status (SSS).

Okay. See that part we italicized—that phrase “business relations”? What do you suppose that means? Go back and read it again; try to guess what it might mean.

Then go back up this lengthy article and read the part about reviewing the weighted guidelines and modifying them so as motivate “behaviors of value to the Government.” Now try to guess what “business relations” might mean in the context of becoming a Superior Supplier.

Are you nervous yet?

According to the Memo, the SSIP will start with contractors’ past performance information contained in the CPARS. However, the Memo states that “we may also identify other sources of data, including information available to program offices and Government contract administration organizations that the Department may use to supplement CPARS data in implementing the SSIP.”

Oh, we’re sure that we are being overly sensitive. Of course the intent would never be to give contractors that “play nice” with DCMA and DCAA and buying commands by (for example) caving-in during negotiations and offering significant reductions to proposed profit rates, a competitive advantage over contractors that stick to their guns during negotiations. We’re sure that nobody would ever dream of rewarding compliant contractors with a competitive advantage (in terms of “more favorable terms and conditions”) while contractors who submit change orders and Requests for Equitable Adjustment and claims, who dispute contracting officer findings (as is their statutory right), would be penalized with less favorable contract terms and conditions.

That could never be what Mr. Kendall meant, could it?

It must be just us.

Oh, for those who are interested, Mr. Kendall’s BBP 2.1 Memo stated—

DCAA has agreed to coordinate the results of the low-risk sampling initiative as a potential incentive element of DoD plans to implement a SSIP. DCAA has agreed to work with the Navy to incorporate low-risk sampling into the SSIP and will provide a recommendation on incorporating low-risk sampling into the DoD SSIP incentives for presentation to the BSIG by October 1, 2013.

What does that mean? We could tell you what we think it might mean, but you already think we’re paranoid as it is. We don’t want to add any fuel to that particular fire.

And even though this article is lengthy, there’s quite a bit more we could write about. You really should read the Kendal BBP 2.1 Memo in its entirety. But in the meantime, we trust you found our focus areas to be of some interest. And perhaps we’ve moved your needle on the paranoia meter, as well.

Remember, just because you’re paranoid, it doesn’t mean they aren’t really out to get you.

 

Leadership Lessons from Netflix

E-mail Print PDF

netflix-long-term-stock-prices
Back in the 1990’s the Defense Department wanted to be more like Silicon Valley. The Pentagon felt it was no longer the “leading edge” of technological innovation, despite the many hundreds of millions of dollars it continued to spend on contractor Independent Research and Development (IR&D) costs each year. It believed it was hamstrung by onerous MILSPEC requirements, by “non value-added” administrative controls—and by a prescriptive, bureaucratic, culture adverse to risk-taking. The period from 1992 to 2000 was largely defined by broad attempts to “reinvent” government in an effort to make it “work better and cost less”—and many of those reform initiatives were aimed at (and embraced by) those in the defense acquisition field.

Since then, not so much.

The Obama Administration’s “acquisition reform” efforts (to the extent they qualify for that description) have seemed, by and large, to focus on undoing the acquisition reform efforts of the Clinton Administration. We have studied the contrasting efforts at acquisition reform, and concluded that Clinton-era reform efforts imbued Federal employees with enhanced discretion, but failed to impose commensurate levels of accountability. This failure led to well-documented abuses during the Bush Presidency; and ultimately it led to more prescriptive bureaucratic processes and controls imposed on acquisition professionals during the Obama Presidency. Failing to find accountability, the Obama Administration seemingly has chosen to limit discretion.

It’s about culture, not processes. But culture has never been the strong suit of any large bureaucracy; it’s far easier to focus on changing processes rather than changing culture. Moreover, growth seems to inevitably lead to imposition of additional processes: the larger and more complex the organization, the more it seemingly focuses on imposing control processes in order to assure its people are working toward strategic objectives. Attempts to streamline bureaucracy and reduce control process are themselves implemented via new, additional, processes. We’ve discussed this phenomenon with respect to the DOD’s Better Buying Power initiative before. We quoted J. David Patterson, Director of the National Defense Business Institute at the University of Tennessee, who stated, “Suborning people to processes results in the least-productive bureaucratic behaviors.” In other words, if you want change, you need to focus on people and culture, not processes.

Being ourselves implementers of process change and not cultural change, we’ve wondered about organizations that focus on process and ignore culture—especially those that contract with the Defense Department. We’ve noticed that the larger and more successful government contractors seem to mimic the Executive Branch’s own organization and culture—and perhaps that’s what makes them so successful.

But does it always have to be this way? Should we simply accept the onerous rules and regulations and business processes as a fact of life in the government contracting environment? Is it endemic only to the defense acquisition arena, a by-product of a multi-level hierarchy coupled with political pressure and the occasional newspaper headline? Or is it perhaps some immutable axiom of organizational behavior, a phase that all organizations grow into as they increase in size and complexity?

Is there a way out?

Well, we don’t know the answers to all of our questions, but we do know that Netflix thinks it both understands the problem and has found a solution to it. And Netflix has documented its corporate analysis in a 126-page slideshow, which we provide below.

Now we know you. You are not going to click through 126 pages of somebody telling you about their corporate culture. You don’t have the patience, and you don’t think it applies to your organization in any case. And there’s a real argument to be made that, no matter how innovative and cross-my-heart-true this cultural approach sounds, it simply could never be implemented in your organization. We get that. Which is why we are going to print selected quotes and paraphrases from the Netflix slideshow.

Consider the following as statements of cultural philosophy, as statements of intent to create and foster a unique culture. Consider how you could, in a perfect world, unfettered by your HR policies and procedures, implement them within your organization. Consider the impact. Consider what it would be like to work in such a culture.

  • Actual company values, as opposed to the nice-sounding values, are shown by who gets rewarded, promoted, or let go. Actual company values are the behaviors and skills that are valued in fellow employees. At Netflix, we value nine behaviors and skills: Judgment, Communication, Impact, Curiosity, Innovation, Courage, Passion, Honesty, and Selflessness.

  • We seek excellence. A great workplace created by Stunning Colleagues—people you can respect and learn from. We’re like a pro sports team, not a kid’s recreational team. We want stars at every position. Adequate performance gets a generous severance package.

  • Each Netflix manager uses the Keeper’s Test to evaluate employees: Which of my people, if they told me they were leaving for a similar job at a peer company, would I fight hard to keep at Netflix? The other people should get a generous severance now, so that we can open a slot to try to find a star for that role. The more talent we have, the more we can accomplish. To that end, we assist each other all the time; we help each other to be great.

  • We don’t measure people by how many hours they work or how much they are in the office. We care about accomplishing great work. Sustained B-level performance, despite an “A for effort,” generates a generous severance package, with respect. Sustained A-level performance, despite minimal effort, is rewarded with more responsibility and great pay.

  • We insist on high performance. In procedural work, the best are 2x better than average. But in creative/inventive work, the best are 10x better than average. There is a huge premium on creating effective teams of the best performers.

  • We are looking for responsible people who thrive on freedom, and who are worthy of freedom. Responsible people are self-motivating, self-aware, self-disciplined, self-improving, act like leaders, don’t wait to be told what to do—and they pick up the trash on the floor. Great managers figure out how to get great outcomes from their people by setting the appropriate context, rather than trying to impose control. High performance people will do better work when they understand the context, the overall goals and strategies. When one of our talented people does something dumb, a great manager doesn’t blame the employee; instead, the manager asks where s/he failed in setting the context.

  • The Netflix model seeks to increase employee freedom as we grow, rather than to limit it. We do that by focusing on increasing talent density as we grow. Many companies impose process controls as they grow, in order to manage increasing complexity. That’s fine: such companies may be market leaders, defined by their optimized processes that drive efficiency and permit few mistakes. But they are also defined by: minimal thinking required of their employees, a lack of curious innovators/mavericks, and a lack of flexibility. When the market shifts, those companies have trouble adapting to new conditions. But we seek to avoid that by-product of successful growth by adding more and more high performers, who have the self-discipline to thrive in an informal work environment. We increase talent density by: (1) paying top of market compensation, (2) giving our people an opportunity to make a big impact, and (3) continuing to demand high performance.

  • We seek to have only outstanding employees. One outstanding employee gets more done and costs less than two “adequate” employees. We have three questions, or tests, to determine a person’s compensation: (1) What salary could this person get elsewhere? (2) How much would we have to pay for a replacement? (3) How much would we pay to keep this person if they received an offer from elsewhere? Our goal is to keep each employee at the top of the market for that person. We will pay an outstanding employee more than anybody else likely would; we will pay them as much as a replacement would cost; and we will pay them today as much as we would if they had a higher offer from elsewhere. These questions are asked of each employee every year.

  • We do not have centrally administered “raise pools” or salary range percentiles. We don’t focus on internal parity or giving everybody the same flat raise; instead, we focus on what the employee is worth in the marketplace. Regardless of how well Netflix is doing, we will always pay our people top of market compensation. Think of a sports team: even if the team has a losing record, it is still paying its players the market rate.

  • We do not rank our employees into “top 30%” or “bottom 10%” categories. We do not want our employees to feel competitive with each other. We want all our employees to be in the top 10% relative to the pool of global candidates. This approach fosters cooperation, which is want we want.

  • Formalized employee development is rarely effective, and we don’t do it. We don’t have rotations, mentorships, etc. Instead, we develop people by surrounding them with stunning colleagues, and by giving them big challenges to work on. If we would promote somebody to prevent them from leaving, we will promote that person today.

  • Bad processes are in place to prevent mistakes. Our model focuses on rapid recovery rather than error prevention. For example, we don’t have a vacation policy. Further, our policy for expense reports, travel, acceptance of gifts, and entertainment consists of five words: Act in Netflix’ best interest. That’s it.

Netflix is working hard to create its own organizational culture, and it says it understands why the culture it has created fosters accomplishments of its strategic vision and goals. Can you say the same about your organization and your culture?

 

 


Page 148 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.