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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA Reemphasizes Communication

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Recently we had an opportunity to offer words of approval to the recent Department of Energy guidance to its Contracting Officers, guidance that we thought “will tend to reduce cost-related disputes and avoid litigation.” The key aspect of the guidance was to emphasize that “misunderstandings can be minimized by early communication.”

We wholeheartedly agreed with that guidance. And we thought DCMA ought to emphasize the same beneficial role of communication to its Contracting Officers, as well.

In the meantime, the Defense Contract Audit Agency was reemphasizing the benefits of communication between its auditors and those impacted by its audits.

Readers may remember that DCAA first reminded its auditors that communication was important in the now-famous “Rules of Engagement” MRD. We wrote about it here. The latest MRD simply tells auditors that they should follow the Rules of Engagement because the whole communication thing is working out for everybody.

In the words of the MRD—

Since the issuance of that [“Rules of Engagement”] guidance, we have seen many benefits as a result. Because of the significant impact these changes have had on accomplishing our mission, we want to reemphasize why this communication is so important and what our expectations are for auditor communication throughout the audit. Communication adds value to the audit process and helps ensure that we are performing quality audits that are fair, complete, objective, timely, and comply with auditing standards. Specifically, when auditors communicate with contracting officers and contractor personnel:
  • Audit issues are identified early on;
  • Potential problems can be dealt with immediately;
  • Audits are more focused, efficient, and timely;
  • Audit processes, results, and conclusions are better understood;
  • Requests for DCAA support in negotiations increase;
  • Sustention of audit findings go up; and
  • Professional relationships with contracting officers improve.

There’s some good guidance in the MRD, and we suggest that readers retain it for future reference (and to show to auditors should they fail to adhere to the guidance). In particular, we like this one: “At the beginning of the audit, auditors should communicate the rationale for the audit procedures they plan to perform.”

If that actually happened, it would be a first in our experience.

Anyway, good stuff. It has the potential to be a win/win for all stakeholders, if only the auditors comply with the guidance. 

 

DCAA Implements New Instruction to Streamline Report Review Process

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On April 9, 2013, the Defense Contract Audit Agency informed its auditors that it had implemented a new Instruction that streamlined the audit review process. Why did the existing audit review process need streamlining? In the words of the MRD—

… feedback from the field indicated it was taking too long, there were too many required levels of review (some of which were duplicative), and there were inconsistencies in the review process between Teams, FAOs, and Regions.

Yes.

Readers of this blog may recall that, from time to time, we’ve asserted much the same thing. We’ve blamed the audit review process for the lack of timeliness in issuing audit reports as well as the lack of transparency in the process. Once a report goes into the review cycle, the auditee (contractor) loses track of it and must simply wait for it to drop into the Contracting Officer’s mail queue, unexpectedly, like a meteor from the sky. We have personally witnessed reports disappearing into “management review” hell for two, three, or even more, years.

So it’s nice that DCAA leadership finally admitted that its review process needed streamlining.

According to the MRD, the new Instruction (DCAAI 7642.2)—

… outlines the levels of review required for specific activity codes, and the specific role of each level of review during the course of the audit. It also provides that the individual signing the report will determine what additional reviews are necessary based on the risk of the specific engagement.

As a result, the new process “will result in more timely reviews, less duplication of effort, and audits that are meaningful to the reader and in compliance with auditing standards.” Which is nice, to be sure.

We are sorry, but we cannot provide you with the details of the Instruction. We cannot show you which reviews go with each activity code. We cannot do that because DCAA has chosen not to share its Instruction with the public.

We of course agree that internal agency policies and procedures need not be made public. But the sad truth of the matter is that DCAA could have chosen to make this particular Instruction public in order inform contractors and help to set reasonable expectations regarding the duration between exit conference and publication of the final audit report. DCAA could have chosen to make this particular Instruction public so as to address and somewhat remedy the agency’s historical lack of transparency (and candor) in this area.

That DCAA chose not to do so is a reminder that the audit agency still has not reached the levels of openness and transparency mandated by the Obama Administration. That DCAA chose not to make its Instruction public is a reminder that, no matter how far it has come since 2009, it still has some distance yet to travel.

 

DOE Suggest Measures Designed to Avoid Incurred Cost Disputes

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Storm
Recently we wrote about a Department of Energy Inspector General report in which an audit performed by KPMG led to a DOE Contracting Officer taking action to disallow roughly $1.3 million of General & Administrative expenses that Fluor Federal Services had billed to the Savannah River Nuclear Services joint venture (of which Fluor was the majority owner). Fluor did not agree with the findings of the audit report nor did it agree with the proposed disallowance. We opined that only time would tell whether Fluor “pays up, negotiates a smaller settlement, or takes this issue to Court.”

The thing is, the situation faced by Fluor is far from uncommon. Many contractors are facing the same choices, courtesy of government auditors and cognizant Contracting Officers who have apparently forsaken the official preference, found in the FAR, to resolve potential disputes through negotiation rather than litigation. We even wrote about the phenomenon of increasing litigation in this article.

And yet we have to acknowledge that the DOE is publishing guidance to its Contracting Officers that, if followed, will tend to reduce cost-related disputes and avoid litigation. We are talking about the April 2013 version of the DOE Acquisition Guide, especially section 31.4 (Allowability of Incurred Costs). Here’s a link to the official document.

The Guiding Principle of the document is stated clearly:

Determining the allowability of incurred costs requires understanding the five FAR requirements for reimbursement. The subject is complex. Misunderstandings can be minimized by early communication.

Did you notice that seemingly obvious—and yet profound—statement at the end of the Guiding Principle? We couldn’t agree more: Misunderstandings can be minimized by early communication!

Oh, but there’s more.

The Guide states—

The chapter also encourages Contracting Officers to be proactive in minimizing potential disputes over cost reasonableness and to communicate their view of a potentially troublesome cost’s reasonableness to their contractors in writing before the cost is incurred.

Again, advice that’s seemingly obvious and yet so important. But if it’s so obvious, then why is the advice so rarely followed? Ponder that for a second.

The Guide discusses cost reasonableness, cost allowability, and allocability. That’s good stuff and we hope COs review it in detail. But the part that caught our eye was the role of early communication and Advance Agreements in avoiding disputes. We so like the language that we are going to print it here, in full.

Disputes over an incurred cost’s reasonableness can be a source of unnecessary friction between the Government and a contractor. Once the contractor has incurred a cost in fulfilling its obligations under its contract it is understandable if the contractor is extremely reluctant to pay the cost out of its own pocket. Courts and Boards have been sympathetic to contractors’ appeals of Government decisions to disallow costs because the costs were unreasonable.

On the other hand, if the contractor knows before it incurs a cost that the cost’s reasonableness will be questioned, most disputes regarding a cost’s reasonableness can be avoided. A contractor would likely avoid incurring any cost the Government had indicated it would consider unreasonable.

Advance agreements are not always employed. And it is neither practical nor desirable to address every cost under every circumstance under cost-reimbursement contractual arrangements. There are occasions, however, where the Government is aware the contractor may be contemplating incurring certain costs that would likely lead to disputes over their reasonableness. In such situations, both parties will benefit from a statement from the Contracting Officer indicating what the Government will consider reasonable.

Those are the kind of words that come from an entity that is looking to avoid disputes and litigation. You won’t find those words in the DCMA OneBook. And more’s the pity.

Similarly, we would love to see DCMA adopt the following CO guidance—

In administering cost-reimbursement contracts and other contractual vehicles under which the Government must reimburse a contractor’s incurred costs, Contracting Officers should consider if it is prudent to specify what the Government will consider reasonable regarding a particular cost prior to the contractor’s incurring the cost. The Contracting Officer may proscribe the cost, set a ceiling on the cost, establish criteria for determining the reasonableness of the cost, or take any other action he/she deems prudent to avoid unnecessary disputes regarding the reasonableness of a potential future cost before the contractor incurs it. Contracting Officers should attempt to accomplish such understandings working with contractors, but if circumstances do not permit mutual agreement to be reached in a timely manner they should not hesitate to take unilateral action. Written communication of any ilk from a Contracting Officer to a contractor will help minimize misunderstandings over what the Government will consider reasonable.

[Emphasis added.]

May we close by offering the opinion that DCMA would do well to adopt both the philosophy and the guidance of the Department of Energy? May we respectfully suggest that it’s past time for the adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors to be replaced by a more cooperative relationship that acknowledges the partnership that is necessary for both parties to accomplish their objectives?

If DOD doesn’t start proactively issuing guidance to its COs to help prevent disputes and avoid litigation—guidance similar to the DOE language we’ve quoted here—then the tsunami of litigation will continue to swell until it inundates the courts, ultimately leaving only the attorneys on dry land.


 

 

You Like Checklists? Too Bad: Another One is on the Way!

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Checklist_2
Ah, checklists.

Love ‘em, hate ‘em: you can’t get away from ‘em.

‘Specially in the world of 21st Century government contracting.

We’ve already said our piece about DCAA’s proclivity to use checklists in lieu of auditor judgment.

We’ve already said too much about DOD’s new Proposal Adequacy Checklist, now enshrined in the DFARS like an ancestral vase, containing the ashes of the venerated (and yet departed) Contracting Officer ability to write clear solicitation Section L proposal instructions, and the CO ability to evaluate cost proposals s/he receives.

And now comes the Forward Pricing Rate Proposal Adequacy Checklist, courtesy of DFARS Case 2012-D035.

Because this is a proposed DFARS rule, it will not affect all contractors—just the ones trying to sell to the Pentagon. So there’s that, anyway.

The purpose of the proposed rule is to “provide[ ] guidance to contractors for the submittal of forward pricing rate proposals by requesting that contractors submit a proposed forward pricing rate proposal adequacy checklist with their forward pricing rate proposals to ensure submission of thorough, accurate, and complete proposals.” The assumption being, of course, that without such a checklist those ignorant defense contractors won’t be able to submit FPRPs that are thorough, accurate, and complete. Almost as if no contractor had ever submitted a thorough, accurate, and complete FPRP in the history of defense contracting, stretching back at least to the publication of the Federal Acquisition Regulations in 1984.

The proposed revision would add a section to the current language at DFARS 215-403-5 (“Instructions for submissions of certified cost or pricing data or data other than cost or pricing data pursuant to the procedures in FAR 42.1701(b)”). The additional language would state—

(b)(3) For contractors following the commercial contract cost principles in FAR 31.2, if the contracting officer determines that a forward pricing rate proposal should be obtained pursuant to FAR 42.1701, the contracting officer shall require that the forward pricing rate proposals comply with FAR 15.408, Table 15-2, and DFARS 252.215-7002. The contracting officer should request that the proposal be submitted to the Government at least 90 days prior to the implementation date for the proposed rates. To ensure the proposal is complete, the contracting officer shall request the contractor complete the contractor forward pricing rate proposal adequacy checklist at Table 215-XX, and submit it with the forward pricing rate proposal.

Before we get into the actual Table 215-XX requirements, let’s take a second and look at that paragraph above. First of all, it clearly implies that submission of FPRPs requires compliance with the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA), when it requires contractors to submit FPRPs that comply with Table 15-2. In fact, the only time contractors must comply with the format requirements of FAR Table 15-2 is when they are submitting “certified” cost or pricing data associated with a pricing action subject to TINA. Otherwise, compliance with FAR Table 15-2 format requirements is discretionary. Since the proposed rule makes compliance with Table 15-2 mandatory, and only TINA-compliant proposals must comply with Table 15-2, then it seems quite clear that the DAR Council thinks FPRPs are subject to TINA.

But does TINA really apply to Forward Pricing Rate Proposals? Let’s look at the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (February 19, 2013 edition), at 14-103.2 (“TINA Applicability”). It says—

The TINA applies to negotiated prime contracts, modifications, and subcontracts where the Government required certified cost or pricing data. (See FAR 15.403-1 and DFARS 215.403-1 for exceptions to this requirement.) In addition, this includes interdivisional work, final price redeterminations, equitable adjustments, and termination settlements. TINA also applies to modifications of advertised contracts when the modification exceeds the applicable dollar threshold. TINA also applies to change orders when the absolute value of the increase and decrease exceeds the applicable dollar thresholds, even though the net change in price itself is under the threshold.

We are sorry. We do not see FPRPs in the above list of contract actions subject to TINA. In fact, FPRPs are not contract actions; they are proposals to establish rates to be used in pricing future contract actions that may be subject to TINA.

If you need further evidence to support our position that TINA is not applicable to FPRPs, ask yourself the following questions.

  1. TINA requires an executed Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data (CCPD), certifying that all cost or pricing data submitted is accurate, current, and complete as of the date of completion of price negotiation. What is the date of completion of price negotiation on a set of Forward Pricing Rates? What is the price that was established by submission of an FPRP?

  2. The remedy for a TINA violation (called “defective pricing”) is a unilateral downward price adjustment (plus interest on any overpayments). How would a price adjustment associated with a set of Forward Pricing Rates be calculated?

Yeah, no.

Also, look at the statement that says, “The contracting officer should request that the proposal be submitted to the Government at least 90 days prior to the implementation date for the proposed rates.” The Pentagon would have the contractor calculate its best guess of future indirect cost rates to be incurred, and then wait 90 days to use those rates.

Think about it.

If the contractor had submitted those rates, but did not use them (or at least disclose them) on its proposals for 90 days, then any proposal subject to TINA submitted during that period would have been defectively priced. Nope. When submitting proposals subject to TINA, the contractor should always be using its most current direct and indirect cost estimates (or at least disclosing them). Any other practice essentially invites the government to have post-award audit findings.

So, once again: Yeah, no.

As for the Checklist itself, there are 27 required items. None of the 27 items are particularly objectionable, though perhaps some will be considered burdensome for many contractors who consider estimates of future direct and indirect costs three, four, or five years in the future to be more in the nature of a scientific wild ass guess (SWAG) than a rigorous and auditable cost estimate.

Is this Checklist even necessary?

Well, the fact of the matter is that many contractors have been complaining for several years that they can no longer reach agreement with their DCMA Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) on Forward Pricing Rates to be used. DCMA has resorted to issuing Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs)—which are essentially unilateral determinations of the rates that DOD will agree to in contract negotiations—instead of the bilateral Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). This is not a good thing and leads to protracted negotiations and contractor complaints of unfairness.

As we’ve opined before, we see two primary causes of the dearth of FPRAs. One root cause is that DCAA cannot perform both a timely and high-quality GAGAS-compliant audit on contractor FPRPs. Even though the audit agency has recently revised its audit guidance in this area, our view is that DCAA’s continued attempts to comply with GAGAS in audits of what are essentially contractor guesses about the state of the company many years in the future is both overzealous and overreaching.

The second root cause, as we’ve told our readers before, is that DCMA itself has created a process that is overly bureaucratic, and it’s executed by DCMA personnel who have—in the opinion of both GAO and DCMA leadership—lost the critical skill sets and expertise to perform it. Again, we are not pulling this assertion from some rectal database full of imaginary numbers; this is one of the key findings from the Government Accountability Office, based on interviews of DCMA contracting personnel.

Apparently, the rule-makers at the DAR Council believe they have found a third root cause for the lack of FPRAs. It’s the contractors’ fault. If only those lazy contractors would submit thorough, accurate, and complete FPRPs, then the auditors could audit timely, reach high-quality (and supportable!) conclusions, and then the ACOs could work their bureaucratic processes more quickly. Problem solved!

Yeah, no.

We’re not saying that contractor FPRPs are perfect; certainly, there is room for improvement. But mandating a Checklist and requiring contractors to comply with the format of FAR Table 15-2 ain’t gonna fix the problem.

This is another example of bureaucrats fixing a problematic process by adding more processes. We discussed that unfortunate phenomenon right here. DCMA would be better off, in our view, by training up its contracting workforce to restore the lost expertise, and then giving the trained personnel discretion to enter into FPRAs without the burdensome and time-consuming oversight of the current process. DCAA would be better off, in our view, by admitting that contractor FPRPs are not the same as cost proposals submitted to enter into a priced contract, and permitting auditors more flexibility in audit approach. (Establishing firm deadlines wouldn’t hurt either.) Taking an incurred cost audit approach to a SWAG is never going to work out well for either DCAA or the contractor.

If we’ve persuaded you that something’s amiss with this proposed rule, you can submit your comments to the DAR Council. As the proposed rules says in the Federal Register—

Written comments and recommendations on the proposed information collection, including suggestions for reducing this burden, should be sent to Ms. Jasmeet Seehra at the Office of Management and Budget, Desk Officer for DoD, Room 10236, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, or email This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it , with a copy to the Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Attn: Mark Gomersall, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room 3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3060. Comments can be received from 30 to 60 days after the date of this notice, but comments to OMB will be most useful if received by OMB within 30 days after the date of this notice.

Public comments are particularly invited on: whether this collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of functions of the DFARS, and will have practical utility; whether our estimate of the public burden of this collection of information is accurate, and based on valid assumptions and methodology; ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and ways in which we can minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, through the use of appropriate technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Why not take advantage of the invitation and submit your comments?

 

 

CAS and FAR Collide at DOE Site

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Atomic_Collision
What happens when a contract clause makes unallowable indirect costs required to be allocated by Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)? Let’s find out, courtesy of this recent audit report by KPMG LLP, courtesy of the DOE Inspector General.

In 2007, Savannah River Nuclear Services (SRNS) received a Management and Operating (M&O) contract from the Department of Energy (DOE) to manage and operate the Savannah River Site. SRNS was a joint venture whose members included Fluor Federal Services, Inc. (FFS), Newport News Nuclear (NNN), and Honeywell International. FFS was the majority owner of the SRNS joint venture.

CAS 403 required Fluor to allocate Home Office expenses to both FFS and SRNS, since those two entities met the CAS 403-30 definition of a “segment”. Unfortunately, the M&O contract contained a special “Section H” clause – H-20 – which stated, “Home office expenses, whether direct or indirect, relating to activities of the Contractor are unallowable, except as otherwise specifically provided in the Contract or specifically agreed to in writing by the Contracting Officer consistent with DEAR 970.3102-3-70."

The Home Offices expenses allocated by Fluor to SRNS were not charged to the M&O contract. We assume they were written off against profit. On the other hand, Home Office expenses allocated to FFS were received in the FFSI G&A expense pool and included in allowable G&A expenses allocated to FFS cost objectives.

The inclusion of Fluor Home Office expenses in FFS indirect cost rates would not normally be a problem, except when FFSI employees charged to the SRNS M&O contract on a “labor loaned” basis.

The DOE IG hired KPMG LLP to perform an audit on the loaned labor costs from FFSI to SRNS. (DCAA auditors take note! Historically, that would have been DCAA and not KPMG performing such audit work.) KPMG found—

In accordance with the Loaned Employee Agreement and Cost Transfer Agreement between SRNS and FFS, employees loaned to SRNS by FFS under the corporate reachback arrangement were billed at actual cost plus applicable FFS burdens (fringe benefits and G&A costs). The fully burdened costs including travel expenses for the employees under the corporate reachback arrangement were billed to SRNS and charged to the M&O contract.

KPMG confirmed that Fluor’s Home Office expenses were included as allowable costs in the G&A rates applied to labor loaned from FFS to SRNS. KPMG estimated that $1,256,481 in Home Office expenses had been billed to SRNS between 2008 and 2012, plus an additional $36,763 in related Facilities Capital Cost of Money (COM) allocations.

For its part, SRNS argued that the indirect cost burdens applied to loaned labor were fully allowable. As KPGM wrote—

SRNS management stated that the H-20 clause within M&O contract DE-AC09-08SR22470 and DEAR 970.3102-3-70 applies only to the DOE contractor, SRNS, and therefore, the fully burdened FFS corporate reachback costs (which include home office allocations from Fluor Corporation and Fluor Government Group Headquarters via the FFS G&A rate) charged by SRNS to the M&O contract were appropriate, because the FFS G&A costs are attributable to FFS and not SRNS.

The SRNS management response was printed, in full, in the KPMG audit report. It is a masterly discourse on why the DOE M&O contract clause is not applicable to labor loaned from FFS to SRNS. Unfortunately, it did not persuade the DOD IG nor did it persuade the cognizant DOE Contracting Officer—who “initiated action.to disallow the $1,256,481 in home office expenses” that KPMG had identified.

We’ll have to see whether Fluor pays up, negotiates a smaller settlement, or takes this issue to Court. In the meantime, the DOD IG gets an opportunity to tout some questioned costs, courtesy of KPMG LLP.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.