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Apogee Consulting Inc

Take a Memo, Please

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We all know that DCAA has developed a taste for checklists. It’s not just DCAA; the DAR Council thinks checklists are a wonderful thing as well. As a result, they are busy revising the DFARS to make use of checklists mandatory. But unlike the DCAA checklists, the DFARS checklists are completed by contractors and submitted to a Contracting Officer for review. The DCAA checklists are completed by auditors and, in some circumstances, can actually take the place of a detailed, GAGAS-compliant audit addressing the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of a contractor’s claimed final direct and indirect costs.

For those contractors whose interaction with DCAA is limited to the auditor filling-out the checklist to assure that the proposal to establish final billing rates (aka “the incurred cost proposal”) is adequate—in the eyes of DCAA—what happens next? Well, DCAA will issue a Memorandum to the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) “listing the audit steps taken to assure that the contractor’s submission was ‘adequate’ and DCAA’s internal records will record that the contractor’s submission was audited, but that no report was issued. Questioned costs and total exception dollars will be reported as being zero.

A DFARS Class Deviation was issued by the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) that permits DCMA Contracting Officers to use the DCAA Memoranda “for purposes of satisfying the audit requirements at FAR 4.804-5(a)(12), 42.705-1(b)(2), and 42.705-2(b)(2)(i).” Since the DCAA Memoranda will not show any recommended cost disallowances, we assume that DCMA will simply accept the dollars and indirect rates proposed by the contractor, and establish final billing rates on that basis.

What Congress will do when somebody tallies up the amount of dollars not audited by the Defense Contract Audit Agency remains to be seen.

But of course that’s not the end of the story. As we told our readers, DCAA will also issue Memoranda in lieu of GAGAS-compliant audit conclusions supported by evidentiary matter as contractors submissions near (or pass) the six-year statute of limitations found in the Contract Disputes Act. We’ve been told that those Memoranda will contain recommended disallowances and/or cost decrements based on average questioned cost issues related to that year (for partially completed audits) or based on average questioned costs related to prior years (for audits not performed at all). The key point is that DCAA will not be expressing a conclusion—just telling the CO about some issues—and so the agency believes it can issue these Memoranda without getting gigged for GAGAS noncompliances.

DCAA’s track record on GAGAS compliance is not particularly noteworthy, according to the DOD Inspector General. The agency can certainly reduce the risk of future scathing IG reports if it stops issuing audit reports. What Congress, GAO, and the IG will make of DCAA’s new risk-reduction strategy remains to be seen.

The onus will be on the DCMA COs and ACOs to establish final billing rates based on those Memoranda. There will be decrements and recommended disallowances, but it seems that those recommendations will be built on a foundation of sand, in terms of support. In other words, our information is that DCAA will be unable (or perhaps unwilling) to support the contents of the Memos, because they will generally lack much (if any) evidentiary support. We predict the situation is going to leave the DCMA folks in a quandary, especially if the contractor pushes back.

Our best information at this time is that if the DCMA CO/ACO believes the DCAA-recommended decrements lack merit or cannot be defended, then the contractor’s proposed costs and rates will be accepted and used to establish final billing rates.

Of course, DCAA’s penchant to issue Memoranda in lieu of formal audit reports is not particularly new. It first came to our attention in connection with the now infamous Contractor Recovery Initiative. In 2011, DCAA issued special audit guidance to permit its auditors to support this high-priority Pentagon initiative. The audit guidance permitted DCAA auditors to calculate their own Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates of the dollars allegedly owed to the Government from CAS noncompliances and voluntary changes in cost accounting practice, and to issue those ROMS without worrying about pesky requirements such as GAGAS. We suspected at the time that that cunning plan was not going to go well for either DCAA or DCMA.

While we don’t have a lot of evidence as to whether or not our suspicions will be validated, we note (for the record) that the four CAS matters Raytheon recently argued at the ASBCA were each generated out of the Contractor Recovery Initiative. Raytheon prevailed on three of the four, based on untimely Government claims. The fourth matter will be litigated on the merits, and the resulting decision will give us some insight into how well DCAA and DCMA fare in their strategy.

You had better get used to DCAA-issued Memoranda. Until somebody—be it the Courts, Congress, or Pentagon leadership—decides that such Memos are a poor substitute for actually doing audit work in compliance with GAGAS, they seem to be the new norm.

 

CDA Statute of Limitations: The Path Forward

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Remember that time we told you about some conversations with a DCAA auditor? We told you “the story continues,” and indeed it has. Over the past year we have continued to assist our client in continuing to support the continuing DCAA audit of its incurred costs, submitted a very, very long time ago. The reaudit of the previously performed audit has largely wrapped-up, though management review comments have led to a reaudit of the previously performed reaudit of the previously performed audit.

Truly, it is no wonder that DCAA now takes, on average, nearly four years to complete a single incurred cost audit.

But we are coming to the conclusion that DCAA and DCMA have come to the conclusion that they cannot win on disallowances of contractor costs, where the Contracting Officer Final Decision is issued more than six years after the submission of the contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates.

Now, we believe it’s true (as we told you) that DCAA has implemented a policy to continue audits of submissions that are older than six years—especially on smaller contractors—because the agency believes that those smaller contractors may be ignorant of the recent legal decisions that have tended, generally, to strictly enforce the six-year timeclock. But we are learning that the agency strategy can be overturned, simply by the contractor stating its intention to use the untimeliness of the audit as an affirmative defense (or jurisdictional argument) in litigation. Apparently, the mere mention of the CDA SoL may be sufficient to get the DCAA auditor to stop—or perhaps even cancel—the audit.

That last bit isn’t completely definitive, but that’s what we’re hearing and we have no evidence that it’s not working. We’ll let you know how it goes, as we gain experience with this strategy. So stay tuned.

We are also learning that DCAA is desperately trying to beat the CDA SoL timeclock and support DCMA Contracting Officer rate finalization efforts. Where audits cannot be completed in time, DCAA is issuing Memos in lieu of audit reports. Those Memos are not GAGAS-compliant conclusions.

One minion recently reported to us that the Memos will be based on “average questioned issues in audits for that year.” The minion opined that the resulting recommended decrements would “sound good” but would be "arbitrary," and not be based on evidential matter. DCAA believes it can get away with such deficient findings because the Memos are not expressing conclusions and, accordingly, need not be compliant with GAGAS.

For those who are members of this site, you already have access to the DCMA training slides we posted. Those training slides (dated April, 2013) noted that DCAA had told DCMA that there were some 7,000 Incurred Cost Proposals for years 2008 and earlier that were “unaudited and at risk of going beyond a valid claim date.” The training slides also stated—

  • No rates will be established without a DCAA memo or audit report

  • If DCAA provides a decrement for consideration in a memo, a one page or less PNO/PNM discussing the basis for the ACO’s decision shall be placed in the incurred cost file

  • Direct Costs: ACOs will not apply the DCAA offered decrement to direct costs unless DCAA has specific documentation relating to direct costs or DCAA issues a Form 1 for ACO disposition

  • The rate year closeout file will consist of the letter from the ACO conveying the final rates and the DCAA memo. A one page PNO/PNM will be included if the ACO establishes the rates using a DCAA memo and settles at other than at the proposed rates

  • The ACO will use the risk specific decrement information to settle rates where possible or issue unilateral rates. ACOs shall accept the rates as proposed if there is no known risk or the contractor does not accept unilateral rates and the ACO determines the decrement is not significant and/or cannot be defended.

So if you are a contractor with an proposal to establish final billing rates that is older than six years, or coming up on that six year due date, you should expect your DCAA auditors to issue a Memo to the ACO recommending a decrement based on prior questioned cost history. (Note: DCAA does not appear to be adjusting for sustention rates.) The ACO is likely to use that Memo in order to establish the final billing rates unilaterally—i.e., without negotiation and without the contractor’s concurrence.

The good news is that you don’t have to accept those unilateral rates, particularly if you can show the DCAA Memo was based on erroneously calculated decrement factors, or used decrement factors based on non-sustained questioned costs. If you can put doubt into your ACO’s mind that the decrement factors cannot be defended in court, then you stand a very good chance of having your proposed final rates be accepted by the ACO.

This is really, really good news for contractors.

The only thing missing from this acceptance of the situation by DCMA and DCAA is the guidance to DCAA FAO Managers that tells them to cancel audits as the six-year deadline approaches and they cannot issue a timely audit report. As we write this, DCAA continues to audit, even after the six-year timeclock expires. We suspect that automaton-like approach will change shortly.

 

DCAA Had Another Good Year, According to DCAA

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First, a confession.

We really didn’t want to write this article. Quite honestly, writing this article feels too much like kicking someone when he’s down. We don’t want to be the DCAA bully; truly, we don’t. But we also want to be truthful reporters of the facts.

And the facts are: DCAA still cannot get its act together, no matter how Director Fitzgerald spins the story.

Last year we wrote about DCAA’s annual report to its personnel and about its annual report to Congress. We did not have many nice things to say about DCAA’s report to Congress. We did not have anything nice to say about the decrease in productivity (as measured by the number of audit reports issued) or the startling increase in the length of time it took to issue an audit report on a contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates (commonly called an “incurred cost proposal” or “incurred cost submission”). Rather, we thought DCAA leadership ought to have been ashamed of its statistics.

That article kicked-off a series of articles and comments and input about DCAA’s productivity. Suffice to say, nobody but Director Fitzgerald thought DCAA had had a good year.

The GFY 2012 Report to Congress reads like a clone of the FY 2011 Report to Congress—only things have gotten worse, instead of better.

In GFY 2011, DCAA claimed $3.5 billion in (inflated and inaccurate) taxpayer savings by questioning 9.25 percent of every dollar the agency audited. In that year, DCAA’s 4,225 auditors issued 7,390 audit reports, including 349 incurred cost audit reports that took, on average, 965 days each to complete.

In GFY 2012, DCAA claimed $4.2 billion in (inflated and inaccurate) taxpayer savings by questioning 8.0% of every dollar the agency audited. In that year, DCAA’s 4,492 auditors issued 6,716 audit reports, including 1,795 incurred cost audit reports that took, on average, 1,184 days each to complete.

We also noted that DCAA’s backlog of incurred cost audits pending audit is now up to roughly 26,000 from last year’s 25,000. DCAA told Congress—

This backlog was the result of a conscious decision to defer incurred cost audits. DCAA made this decision because contract spending increased while DCAA staffing levels remained fairly constant between FYs 2000 and 2009; consequently, DCAA did not have the staff to perform all the work it had to do. Incurred cost audits were one of the few areas that could be deferred.

We will avoid further comment, and let the numbers speak for themselves.

As was the case with last year’s Report to Congress, DCAA told Congress that it would be more productive if only it had more authority for force contractors to give them what it needed to conduct audits. For example, DCAA requested “authority to review and subpoena ‘data other than certified cost or pricing data.” The agency also requested statutory authority to have access to contractor’s internal audit reports, and authority “for direct and online access to contractor’s [digital accounting data].” DCAA also requested a FAR revision that would clarify that its access to contractors’ cost data and records would also include access to contractor personnel.

As you might imagine, we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. do not think that granting any of those requests will lead to significant improvements in DCAA audit timeliness or audit quality. We assert the real problem is more fundamental, and includes audit agency management of budgets and personnel. Audit policy decisions made since 2008 may be a significant contributory factor, as well.

Enough of this; we’re tired of deconstructing DCAA spin. Meaningful change and meaningful improvement will only come from fundamental changes at DCAA. Meanwhile, DCMA continues to move forward on its own, freeing itself from its historical reliance on the critically damaged Pentagon audit agency.

 

Phi Has Problems with SBIR Phase 2

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Clueless
Here’s another one of those stories that offer an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of others. Of course, the entities that most need to learn the lessons won’t do so because they don’t read this blog. But for the rest of you, consider the mess that PHI Applied Physical Sciences, Inc. (PHI) has gotten itself into. Don’t do this.

PHI received a SBIR Phase 2 contract—a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract—in May, 2005, to develop a “miniature fluorometer” for DARPA and to “demonstrate it at the DoD Small Business Innovation Research Program Phase II and Beyond Conference.” That SBIR conference was to be held in July, 2005, a mere three months after contract award. After the conference, PHI had an additional three months to submit a “final technical report”. Accordingly, the contract’s period of performance ended in November, 2005. The contract value was $37,730. The value was based on $37,730 in estimated costs and zero fixed fee.

Based on the foregoing, you pretty much knew PHI was in trouble. The only way they were going to “develop” their gadget in time was to have it already developed. The $37,730 needed to cover travel and labor for the conference, as well as the labor needed to write the final technical report. And it also needed to cover employee fringe benefit costs associated with that labor, as well as any indirect costs associated with running the business that were going to be allocated to the contract. It’s pretty obvious that $37,730 wasn’t going to cover PHI’s direct expenses, let alone any allocated indirect expenses. Yet that’s the deal that PHI signed up for.

By early August, 2005—i.e., within 60 days after contract award—PHI had submitted its first two public vouchers in the aggregate amount of $36,184; DFAS paid those vouchers in September. And then DCMA asked DCAA (Santa Ana Branch, Western Region) to perform a post-award accounting system review. The record does not show why DCMA felt it necessary to spend taxpayer funds to ensure that the contractor had an accounting system adequate to handle a $38,000 contract, or why anybody would think that action to be a prudent use of taxpayer funds. Yet that’s what DCMA requested, and that’s what DCAA did, even though DCAA likely had more important things on its plate at the time. The DCAA auditor showed up at PHI’s facility in September, 2005, to perform the post-award accounting system review.

Now we have had unkind words to say about DCAA in the past. We hope most of our umbrage has been directed at the top of the DCAA pyramid, and not at the individual auditors who are forced to carry out the questionable policy decisions made at Fort Belvoir. But we’d understand if the DCAA workforce felt we were biased against DCAA and in favor of contractors. So the following sentence may come as a bit of a surprise to some readers.

Based on the record, the Santa Ana Branch DCAA auditor was kind and reasonable, and clearly went out of her way to try to help this poor small business contractor who was in far over its head.

For example, the auditor reported back to the DCMA Contracting Specialist as follows—

Just need to let you know that PHI does not have[an accounting]system in place. I just met with them yesterday. The company has 3 direct people and 2 indirect people, and no experience with government contracting. They kept time sheets, but made no distinction between direct and indirect labor, had no idea how to set up their accounts, was not familiar with unallowable [cost], accrued labor but had not paid their employees (so there are no payroll records), did not keep track of their contract ceiling cost = 37K and did not segregate indirect expenses into logical groupings, such as Overhead and G&A. I had nothing to report back to you accounting and billing system wise except that they kept their records manually, on excel worksheets and folders. They just purchased peach tree [accounting software] but had not inputted their financial data into the system. There are indicators of financial distress.

Now in our experience, many auditors would have stopped right there and simply issued a Fraud Referral to the DoD IG. But this auditor seemed to really go out of her way to try to assist PHI with its many, many issues. She wrote to the DCMA Contracting Specialist—

In the meantime, they need to get an amendment raising the ceiling of the contract. They claimed they incurred in excess of $300,000 to create this prototype. You may want to send an audit request for incurred costs to date only. The only thing I can do for you is verify the material and subcontract costs to invoices and payment.

The DCAA sent a follow-up email to PHI, telling it that the government had no funds to increase the ceiling value. That didn’t stop PHI from subsequently requesting a “no-cost” period of performance extension of an additional six months. The buying customer didn’t want to do that. Instead, the government sought to revise the contract type from CPFF to firm, fixed-price. While this action would have undoubtedly benefited the contracting officer, it would have also undoubtedly benefited PHI as well, since it would be off the hook for the requirement to submit a proposal to establish final billing rates, or to support a DCAA audit of that proposal. It might have also reduced the company’s exposure to allegations of violations of certain statutes, among them the False Claims Act.

We really cannot stomach the thought of telling you about how PHI responded to the situation. It was really that bad. Here’s a sample of what the company wrote to DCMA—

We realize that your organization wishes to resolve this issue to the benefit of all parties; we share that goal. But any proposed solution must take into consideration our nation's security, as well as concepts of fundamental fairness. … The DCAA ordered us stop technical work. In fact, such work was not possible for many months because of the oral and written auditing requirements imposed upon us by three government agencies under the terms of the CPFF contract. Such administrative work is normal for such contracts, but we have not been compensated for any of the additional work.

PHI finally submitted its Final Technical Report along with Vouchers 3 and 4. Voucher 3 was in the amount of $36,591.59 for “Overhead on Public Vouchers 1 and 2,” while Voucher 4 was in the amount of $243,443.44 for “payroll” and “overhead”. Details as to how the values were calculated were lacking. Voucher 5 sought reimbursement of $40,000 associated with preparation of the Final Report. PHI also submitted a Form DD250 that sought reimbursement of Vouchers 1 through 4 plus added an additional $25,000 for “fixed fee”. In sum, PHI sought payment in the amount of $343,035, some of which may have already been paid by DFAS.

In addition to the foregoing, PHI subsequently submitted Voucher 6 in the amount of $47,378 for “overhead on final report Voucher 5.” The DCMA Contracting Officer was as helpful as the DCAA auditor had been: she encouraged PHI to submit a public voucher for the $1,546 difference between the contract value and the amounts previously paid by DFAS. The CO stated that PHI had failed to comply with the administrative requirements of the Limitation of Cost clause and thus no increase to the contract value would be forthcoming. Notably, no fraud referral was made.

Instead of counting its lucky stars, PHI filed an appeal of the deemed denial of its alleged claim for $1,276,904 in “cost overruns incurred in performance” of its $38,000 contract. The ASBCA decision can be found here.

The matter turned on whether PHI had complied with the Limitation of Cost (LOC) clause in its contract. The LOC clause is one of those pesky back-office administrative clauses that are incorporated by reference into Section I. You know, the list of clauses that nobody ever reads? Yeah. As we’ve asserted before (many times), those clauses are important and you ignore them at your own peril. PHI ignored the LOC clause, as it ignored pretty much every clause in its CPFF contract.

Regardless, PHI's attorney argued along the following lines—

Appellant primarily argues it was ‘impossible’ to give the 60-day notice because it had overrun the contract essentially from its inception. It also focuses on the actions and instructions of a government auditor arguing that the auditor impliedly authorized its incurrence of costs (exceeding more than 30 times the estimated cost) of complying with contract requirements.

Judge Peacock didn’t buy it.

There was more to his decision, but we’re not going to report it. You can read it yourself (link above). But one point that we should mention is that PHI argued it had been prejudiced by the award of a CPFF contract (vs. a FFP type). As you may recall, we’ve asserted before that using Cost-Type SBIR Phase 2 contracts is a difficulty that negatively impacts too many small businesses. So we were somewhat sympathetic to PHI’s complaints. Here’s how Judge Peacock dealt with them—

Appellant raises several contentions regarding the propriety of awarding PHI a cost-reimbursement contract with allegedly onerous accounting requirements. These contentions appear to be founded in appellant's belief that the CO abused her discretion in selecting the contract type by failing properly to consider the factors set forth in FAR 16.104. Appellant implies that the government should have reviewed and assessed the adequacy of appellant's accounting system prior to awarding the contract. PHI also states that it notified the government that appellant was ‘ignorant of its responsibilities under a CPFF agreement.’ … Therefore, appellant contends it never should have been awarded the CPFF contract in dispute.

While appellant may have avoided requisite formal audit review had a fixed-price contractual vehicle been selected, it would have assumed the risk of cost increases without the protections afforded by the LOC clause. In essence, in the reverse of the more typical situation where the contractor argues that such risks were not properly allocated to it by a fixed-price contracting vehicle, appellant here suggests that it was an abuse of discretion not to allocate appellant such risks. … Appellant was not prejudiced by selection of the CPFF contractual arrangement. The most obvious point is that appellant would not have received more than the fixed-price of the contract. Equally significant and, as emphasized throughout this opinion, the simple protection and solution for appellant was to provide the overrun notice and await notice from the CO that the estimated costs of the contract were increased before expenditure of the funds in question. Appellant was repeatedly advised of its rights and obligations under the LOC clause and could not have been confused. PHI was aware of these issues almost from the very inception of the contract yet knowingly entered into it. … No abuse of discretion occurred ….

So here’s the deal. PHI was a clueless contractor that never, ever, should have accepted its contract. It didn’t understand what it was signing and it didn’t understand the administrative requirements associated with a cost-type contract. We’ve written about this phenomenon before.

PHI is very lucky that it is not facing a criminal investigation into its accounting and billing practices. In fact, everybody from the auditor to contracting officer to government attorney to Judge seems to have gone out of their way to handle this small business with kid gloves.

Learn from the mistakes of PHI. Don’t make similar mistakes yourself. The treatment afforded PHI is unusual; a company that pursued a similar path would be in deep trouble, more likely than not.

Do not do this.

 

Dear SAIC: When Will You Learn?

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The government contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), is in a transition period at the moment. The publicly traded company is splitting itself into two independent pieces. The effort to make the split is not without cost. The Washington Post recently estimated that SAIC’s “Project Gemini” has spent nearly $40 million so far, including $1 million spent on a branding firm to develop the name of one of the new entities. (The new name is Leidos, for those who may be interested.) And that’s just for starters. Company executives reportedly told investors that they would spend in the neighborhood of $140 million in FY 2014 on Project Gemini, according to WaPo. The story (link above) reported—

A large chunk of the expense —$55 million — will cover fees for bankers, lawyers, accountants, and consultants and to cover severance, among other things, said Mark W. Sopp, SAIC’s chief financial officer, during the call. The contractor also anticipates spending about $65 million to shrink its real estate footprint. It will cost another $20 million to complete the move of corporate employees who have remained in San Diego — where the company previously was based — to McLean and other offices.

How much of the nearly $200 million will be recoverable as “restructuring costs” remains to be seen. Certainly, SAIC expects to see cost savings from its changes. As WaPo reported—

[SAIC Chief Operating Officer] Shea said the contractor plans to cut about $350 million in annual costs, including $220 million by simplifying its organizational structure and cutting ‘indirect’ staff not tied to specific contracts.

To put that figure in context, the company reported that in the fiscal year ended Jan. 31, it paid $576 million in general, administrative and bid and proposal expenses.

Another $70 million in savings will come from reducing SAIC’s facility footprint by about 30 percent, which would be about 2.8 million square feet of the company’s 9.2 million total square footage. The contractor also plans to save about $30 million through improving its corporate procurement.

Another interesting aspect of the transition from one to two companies is that it gives each company a “fresh start”—an opportunity to evaluate its practices and discard those that haven’t proven optimal, and to replace those suboptimal practices with better ones. The WaPo story quoted Byron Callan (of Capital Alpha Partners) as follows—

… the split is providing an opportunity for SAIC to reconsider the way it has done business. ‘With the cost structure they had ... in some of these services [competitions], they were not going to be as competitive,’ [Callan] said.

It is perhaps obvious that a VC Partner would focus on the cost aspects of the transition. And it’s perhaps obvious that WaPo would focus its reportage on the dollars involved. But we want to focus on another, different, aspect of the transition.

Project Gemini gives SAIC to rethink its corporate culture and commitment to ethical business practices. The transition gives SAIC a chance to deploy better internal audit functionality, better internal controls, and better management dashboards. Each of the two new companies will be smaller—and presumably more manageable. The two new entities—both of which will be government contractors with annual revenues of roughly $5 billion—will have an opportunity to focus on their business, and to ensure that their processes (and employees) adhere to the standards of integrity expected of a government contractor.

It’s clear that the company’s current organization and culture has failed to instill those standards and values across the $11 billion entity.

We’ve written about SAIC before. Type “SAIC” into the site’s search feature and you’ll see that we’ve written more than a dozen articles that either mentioned SAIC or focused on the company as the main topic. In one of those focus articles, we opined on SAIC’s relatively sad record with respect to controlling rogue employees. We wrote—

In SAIC’s case, one single state/local project led to a $500 million settlement, and one single failure to secure client data has led to eight separate lawsuits and a potential legal liability of more than $5 billion. How much more can one corporation, no matter how large, afford? At what point does the Board of Directors—or the shareholders—start to lose confidence in the executive leadership team?

Remember, SAIC only recently became a publicly traded company. From its founding in 1969 through 2005, it was an employee-owned company. … The thing is, the SAIC of today isn’t the SAIC of 1969 or even 1999. It’s a publicly traded company with responsibilities to its shareholders. We wonder if perhaps it’s time, or even past time, for the company to consider changing its entrepreneurial culture and move toward a more centralized command-and-control structure—one that might act to mitigate some of the corporate risks that do not seem to be fully managed by its employees.

We wrote that piece in March, 2012. Now, more than a year later, we read that SAIC has settled another lawsuit, this time one involving allegations of False Claim Act violations. It cost SAIC nearly $12 million of shareholder profits to do so. Here’s a link to the Department of Justice press release that triggered today’s blog article.

According to the DoJ press release, SAIC received subgrants from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (New Mexico Tech). New Mexico Tech had received six federal grants “to train first responder personnel to prevent and respond to terrorism events involving explosive devices.” New Mexico tech had given SAIC funds to “to provide course management, development, and instruction.”

The first thing that comes to mind when reading the foregoing is, if SAIC was developing the courses, teaching the courses, and managing the courses, then what the heck was New Mexico Tech doing? Where were New Mexico Tech’s value-added services? One is very much tempted to think that New Mexico Tech was acting as a shell, a façade through which the federal funds passed on their way to SAIC. But that wasn’t the focus of the suit.

The FCA suit, filed by a former SAIC employee, focused on the allegation that SAIC used bait-and-switch tactics in its proposal to New Mexico Tech. As the DoJ press release stated—

SAIC’s cost proposals falsely represented that SAIC would use far more expensive personnel to carry out its efforts than it intended to use and actually did use, resulting in inflated charges to the United States.

We used to call that “defective pricing” and there was a legal remedy for such tactics to be found within the Truth-in-Negotiation Act (TINA). But apparently somebody was going for bigger game, because SAIC found itself with a FCA suit on its hands, one initiated by its own (former) project manager who led the program.

The fact of the matter is that this is not the first time that government attorneys have linked defectively priced contracts to the False Claims Act. In our experience, the contractor’s intent is one of the key factors in the government’s decision to move beyond TINA and into FCA territory. Apparently, the government was confident that it could prove its allegations—that SAIC always intended to use lower-priced personnel than it had bid—it this particular case.

But this particular case is simply one of several recent SAIC compliance missteps that have cost its shareholders dearly. As we have asserted, it appears that the company, admittedly staffed by entrepreneurs and managed on a largely decentralized basis, is not controllable by the executive management team. Thus, perhaps the split should be seen as a win/win scenario: where the span of control associated with each of the two smaller entities is more manageable, and where the rate of compliance missteps is reduced, leading to more profit dollars to be returned to shareholders.

And we see it as an opportunity to move away from the “cowboy culture” developed by Dr. Beyster, which seems to have outlived its usefulness. We see it as an opportunity to instill a culture devoted to ethics and integrity, rather than to scheming and gaming “the system” so as to avoid necessary oversight and control. We see it as an opportunity to turn a corner and move forward in a new direction.

We hope SAIC will seize the opportunity. We hope the company will learn from its mistakes, and stop paying fines and penalties for the actions of its employees. If it doesn’t learn, we suspect its shareholders may run out of patience.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.