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Apogee Consulting Inc

Critical Analyses of BBP 2.1

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BBP
The “Better Buying Power” initiative is the step-child of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ 2010 call for $100 Billion worth of cuts to Pentagon overhead.

Gates called for cutting overhead costs so as to “convert sufficient ‘tail’ to ‘tooth’ to provide the equivalent of the roughly two to three percent real growth” via “root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to over time.” Then Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) Dr. Ashton Carter translated this strategic imperative into a reduction of $66.3 Billion over five years, to be found on current programs and initiatives. Dr. Carter wrote in June, 2010—

We need to restore affordability to our programs and activities … by identifying and eliminating unproductive or low-value-added overhead; in effect, doing more without more. … The guidance will focus on getting better outcomes, not on our bureaucratic structures.

Dr. Carter’s “Guidance Roadmap” listed five specific attack vectors in the drive to reduce Defense acquisition costs. The five areas were:

  • Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth

  • Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry

  • Promote Real Competition

  • Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition

  • Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy

We’ve followed the evolution of BBP and written many articles on the topic. Recently, BBP morphed into BBP 2.0, and then was clarified by current USD (AT&L) (Frank Kendall) in a Memo that we sardonically dubbed “BBP 2.1”. We discussed BBP 2.1 here. We were not favorably impressed and offered words of criticism.

Apparently, we weren’t alone in having concerns about BBP 2.1. In late May, the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) sent a letter to Mr. Kendall expressing concerns about the latest incarnation of BBP. The AIA wrote—

AIA is very concerned that the [BBP] section entitled “Eliminate requirements imposed on industry where costs outweigh benefits” was deleted in its entirety from the original document. This section was viewed by our Members as an important initiative to address key drivers of costs in the acquisition process.

Following that paragraph was a fairly lengthy bulleted list of specific AIA concerns. Some of those concerns were:

  • DCAA Incurred Cost Submission backlog and settlement of open years

  • Lack of clarification on profit policy, including policies for contractor profit on major subcontracts

  • Lack of response to industry concerns about the onerous implementation of contractor financing through the use of Performance Based Payments …

  • Continued alignment of DCAA and DCMA in scope and mission

  • Lack of transparency in the use of cost-benefit analysis to support the efficacy of new regulations and oversight

  • “One size fits all” approach to regulation for large and mid/small tier contractors

So notice, if you will, how SECDEF Gates’ call for a reduction in Pentagon overhead has evolved into a focus on contractors’ costs, and how even the notion that contractors’ costs can be reduced by reduction or elimination of non-value-added requirements has been erased from the areas of focus, in the time-honored sense of Soviet-style revisionism.

This chain of events is not really surprising. Indeed, we wrote about an academic who actually predicted something very much like it. It seems to be a fundamental organizational axiom that when you ask bureaucrats to streamline processes, the first thing they do is to add processes. Similarly, it seems to be equally fundamental that when you ask bureaucrats to reduce overhead, the first thing they do is to add people and form a team to study the overhead reduction problem.

Another, similar, viewpoint on the efficacy of BBP was recently expressed by Dr. Daniel Goure, of The Lexington Institute, in an editorial entitled, “The U.S. Military Enemy: DoD Overhead.” Dr. Goure wrote—

There is an enemy. It is not America’s enemy but it is the enemy of the country’s military. It is the Department of Defense’s overhead functions and acquisition system. … According to the Defense Business Board, about a quarter of a million people -- civilian, uniform personnel and contractors -- now work in the Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies and Combatant Commands at an estimated price tag of no less than $116 billion. It may be even higher; the Department of Defense doesn’t have an accurate count of how many people work in the ‘back offices.’ Nor do they have a clue as to the total cost burden of a civilian employee, something which every defense contractor knows down to the penny since they have to report this number to the department.

Dr. Goure continued—

Every major review of the way DoD does business reaching all the way back to the Eisenhower Administration has emphasized the importance of streamlining processes, reducing overhead, employing modern management techniques and programs, reforming the acquisition system and reducing regulations. For decades Pentagon leaders have failed to implement the recommendations of these studies or, having begun to make changes, have allowed the system to backslide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates tried to find $100 billion in savings by reducing overhead, including by shutting down Joint Forces Command. Unfortunately, since most of the personnel slots in the command were merely transferred to other parts of the Pentagon, the savings were minimal. Over and over again, DoD has announced a reform effort only to fail to achieve the desired results.

Dr. Goure evaluated BBP (or, if you will, BBP 1.0, BBP 2.0, and BBP 2.1) in the foregoing context. He wrote—

The current acquisition reform effort, known as Better Buying Power (BBP), is another example of this kind of insanity: doing the same thing over and over, expecting a different result. By imposing new behaviors, additional reporting requirements, and increased oversight of acquisition activities, BBP generally has increased costs to both private companies and government. For someone who prides himself on being data driven, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, needs to do the simple math. More activities, reports, audits and personnel mean higher costs.

Big business routinely responds to down markets by reducing overhead, streamlining their processes and making better utilization of human capital. Only government would do the opposite and increase its overhead costs when money gets tight.

As we said, when viewed in the historical context of past “acquisition reform” or cost reduction initiatives, it is hardly surprising to see the BBP initiative right where it is today. But what is perhaps more surprising is what the Pentagon personnel data shows.

In this Defense News article, readers learned that SECDEF Gates did more than merely call for a reduction to Pentagon bureaucracy and overhead; he actually tried to do something about it. In August, 2010, as part of his efficiency drive, Gates directed “a freeze on the number of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], defense agency and combatant command [COCOM] positions, at the FY10 levels, for the next three years.” So how did the Department of Defense do? According to the Defense News article, “the size of the Pentagon’s vast oversight organizations grew by more than 15 percent from 2010 to 2012.”

Yes: you read that correctly. In response to Gates’ direction to freeze headcount, headcount grew significantly.

The article reported—

Between 2010 and 2012, OSD, the Joint Staff and COCOMs added about 4,500 positions, according to a Defense News analysis of multiple DoD personnel documents and interviews with experts. More than 65 percent of the staff size growth was within the Joint Staff, the organization at the Pentagon that oversees the uniformed military and global operations. The staff sizes do not include the thousands of contractors working within each organization.

Readers may recall that it was Gates’ call for headcount freezes and staffing reductions that prompted Congress to impose limits on funding available for contractor services. We wrote about that hairball right here. We’re not going to recap history here, but we do believe it’s ironic (at best) that, while contractor funding was being limited so as to prevent the back-office headcount from being shifted from the Pentagon to contractors, the Pentagon was actually increasing its back-office headcount.

In other words, the contractors have paid the price (in terms of contract award values, revenue and profit) for the Pentagon’s inability to solve its intractable personnel problems. The Pentagon bureaucracy has continued to build its satrapies, increase processes, and impose additional requirements on contractors, all in the name of cost-savings and overhead reduction. As pointed out by the AIA, the Pentagon bureaucrats don’t even bother to pretend otherwise anymore.

We can all see the truth now. The only meaningful overhead reduction that’s taken place over the past three years has been implemented by the contractors. The Pentagon continues to inflate its bureaucratic bloat. And so it goes ….

 

 

Statute of Limitations Back in the News

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Victory_Is_Mine
We have some well-placed minions, you know.

We have people in active government service—or who claim to be in active government service (we have no means to verify their bona fides)—who give us tidbits of insider information from time to time. Never anything that would get anybody into trouble. Nothing illegal. And never anything that would cause our government leadership to worry: no proprietary or privileged or FOUO stuff. Just little insider tidbits that may or may not turn into future blog articles. Audit leads, you might say.

One of our minions recently reported that “I attended a so-called DCAA Stand Down Day” that dealt with contractor proposals to establish final billing rates (commonly called “incurred cost proposals) that were approaching their 6-year Contract Disputes Act (CDA) Statute of Limitations (SoL) due dates. (If any of that lingo confuses you, then you may want to read one of our numerous articles on the topic.)

Our minion reported “The one important thing is that DCMA is adamant about the SoL dates.” We already had an inkling that DCMA was taking the Court-enforced SoL dates seriously, having participated in some DCMA-led negotiations that established final billing rates without having (shall we say?) the benefit of a formal DCAA audit report. We have heard that DCMA is working on formal direction to its Contracting Officers that tells them what to do in such circumstances, though we confess we have not yet seen it. Nonetheless, our experience (now confirmed by our minion’s report) is that DCMA Contracting Officers are moving forward, with or without DCAA’s support.

Which is a great thing and we applaud it!

In fact, we recall having suggested that in one or two past blog articles.

The fact of the matter is that DCMA needs to fulfill its responsibilities to taxpayers and buying commands by establishing contractor final billing rates, so as to permit contract close-outs. If the agency has to stand tall and act alone in order to meet its responsibilities, then so be it. We approve and wish the DCMA Contracting Officers the best of luck in doing what they need to do.

(We suspect the COs will find that the contractors are just as anxious to settle rates and close-out contracts as the government is—perhaps more so. Our experience is that these negotiations tend to go fairly well, with both sides making concessions. Kind of like the way it used to be … but we digress.)

Back to our minion’s report: The Regional Director who attended the Stand-Down Day told the assemblage that the auditors were to “try and get [the incurred cost audits] done even if they are or would be shortly SoL … as many contractors are not cognizant of [the] SoL.” Allegedly, this direction came “right from the top” of DCAA.

In other words, DCAA’s direction to their auditors is to perform their audits of the contractors’ final billing rate proposals regardless of the ability of the government to pursue a claim under the CDA. The rationale for this direction was that “many contractors” were unaware of the recent Court decisions that, in general, tend to strictly enforce the CDA SoL.

Well, those contractors must not read this blog. We expect that our readers are well aware of the CDA SoL and are acting accordingly.

Now, we need to digress another time and define what “acting accordingly” means with respect to the CDA SoL. And we’ll come back and reinforce our position again before this article’s done. But let’s state right now, for the record, that “acting accordingly” does not mean unnecessarily delaying responding to DCAA audit requests, nor does it mean doing anything that smacks of gamesmanship. To us, “acting accordingly” means a timely submission of the proposal to establish final billing rates, compliance with regulatory requirements regarding format and content of the proposal, and timely responses to DCAA requests for information related to the contractor’s proposal.

Even with all that, experience has shown that DCAA will still too often manage to take more than six years after the contractor’s submission to issue a final audit report. But that’s not the contractor’s fault. No contractor should put itself into a position where the government can credibly claim that it was tricked into missing the SoL deadline.

“Acting accordingly” also means that, once that CDA SoL date passes, the contractor is in a superior—almost unassailable—negotiating position, since the government no longer has rights to pursue a claim. It’s not necessarily time to thumb one’s nose at the ACO, but it is time to bargain hard, negotiating from a position of strength.

On the other hand, if you’re the contractor and the government owes you money because you haven’t trued-up to your final billing rates and issued adjustment vouchers, then if you let that CDA SoL date pass, you have put yourself in a very untenable negotiating position. You are now essentially dependent on the good graces of your ACO. We wouldn’t count on getting much, if any, of the unbilled receivables you’ve recorded on your books.

End of digression the second.

Anyway, back to our minion’s report, suffice to say that pursuing a course of action that was largely based on the contractors’ ignorance of their rights did not sit too well with our source. Thus: the report provided to us. Our minion went so far as to opine that continuing to audit contractors’ proposals after the SoL date had passed was tantamount to wasting taxpayer funds. But that’s not for us to decide.

And speaking of decisions, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) finally issued the Raytheon decisions we’ve been waiting for, after passage of the 30-day redaction period. Raytheon prevailed on three of its four appeals: the ASBCA Judge dismissed the government’s claims against Raytheon in three of four matters—leaving one matter for a trial on the merits. In the words of the attorneys at Arnold & Porter (who represented Raytheon before the Court): “Raytheon defeats Government claims arising from changes in cost accounting practices as untimely.

Yes. Three more victories for this defense contractor. Three more government claims thrown-out of Court as being beyond the CDA SoL.

Let’s discuss.

Raytheon filed four appeals at the ASBCA, disputing government claims for money allegedly owed as a result of increased costs stemming from changes to cost accounting practice the company made in 2004 and 2005. One matter concerned changes disclosed to the government in February 2004; the DCMA ACO issued a final decision in July, 2011, demanding $1.2 million (including $404,000 in compound interest). The second matter concerned changes disclosed to the government in November 2004; the ACO issued a final decision in July, 2011, demanding $2.1 million (including $669,000 in compound interest). The third and fourth matters concerned changes disclosed separately in November 2004; the ACO issued a final decision in August, 2011, demanding $3.7 million on one matter and $1.7 million on the other matter. Thus, at stake was some $8.7 million.

The four matters were differentiated (in Judge Grant’s decision) by the information provided by Raytheon to the government concerning cost impacts stemming from the changes to cost accounting practice. In three of the four matters, Raytheon provided high-level cost impact information (by contract type) and claimed the cost impacts were immaterial in amount. In the first matter, Raytheon did not provide any cost impact information until 2006, roughly two years after submitting its revised CASB Disclosure Statement. Judge Grant found the differences in information provided to be significant.

Raytheon argued that the SoL clock began running when it notified the government of the changes to cost accounting practice. Consequently (according to Raytheon), each of the four matters was now time-barred under the SoL requirements of the CDA. However, Judge Grant didn’t agree with that argument. As we noted above, she found that more was needed from Raytheon in order to start the SoL clock. With respect to the first matter, she wrote—

Here, the government did not know it had a claim because Raytheon did not report that there would be an adverse impact, and stated instead that its analysis would be provided later. Although the government knew of the fact of the change, it did not know the consequences (i.e., it did not know if it had a cause of action), nor do we think it reasonable for the government to have to pursue this on its own, especially in light of the affirmative duty FAR 52.230-6(a) places on the contractor to submit a GDM [Gross Dollar Magnitude cost impact analysis]. Once Raytheon provided cost impact information to the government on 3 April 2006, the statute of limitations began to run.

However, with respect to the other three matters, she found that Raytheon had provided sufficient information, at the time it filed its Disclosure Statement revisions, to have put the government on notice that it had suffered injury (in the form of increased costs arising from the changes to cost accounting practice). Even though the government argued that Raytheon had not submitted “the level of information and supporting data required by FAR 52.230-6,”Judge Grant found that the notification of a cost impact, regardless of the associated detail and support, was sufficient to start the SoL clock running. She wrote—

The government argues that Raytheon did not submit the level of information and supporting data required by FAR 52.230-6. However, Raytheon did notify the government of a dollar cost impact from the accounting change, which is enough to trigger the statute of limitations. Claim accrual does not depend on the degree of detail provided, whether the contractor revises the calculations later, or whether the contractor characterizes the impact as ‘immaterial.’ It is enough that the government knows, or has reason to know, that some costs have been incurred, even if the amount is not finalized or a fuller analysis will follow.

[Emphasis added.]

In the words of the attorneys at Arnold & Porter—

This decision is noteworthy because it is the first to specifically set forth the elements that give rise to the accrual of a government claim against a contractor for increased costs associated with changed cost accounting practices. A claim relating to a change in cost accounting practices accrues when the contractor (1) notifies the government of the change; (2) provides the government an estimate of the increased costs that may result from the change; and (3) implements the change.

They then recommend that CAS-covered contractors making changes to cost accounting practices “notify the government of any increased costs that may result from a change in cost accounting practices as soon as practicable, i.e. as soon as the contractor has reliable information reflecting a cost impact, to start the clock on the CDA’s statute of limitations.”

Practitioners of CAS will note that the contractor is not required by the CAS Administration clause (52-230-6) to submit an estimate of any cost impact stemming from a change in cost accounting practice at the time it submits its revised CASB Disclosure Statement. What is required is established by 52.230-6(b), which states that the only requirement is to submit the revised Disclosure Statement and (if applicable) a statement that the estimated impact of the changes is immaterial. A GDM cost impact is to be submitted only upon Contracting Officer request. Apparently, Raytheon complied fully with the clause requirements but Judge Grant found that Raytheon’s failure to submit a cost impact estimate was fatal to its SoL argument.

Using Judge Grant’s logic, a Contracting Officer can delay asking the contractor for a cost impact analysis, and thus indefinitely toll the CDA SoL. The only way to defeat this is to submit a cost impact estimate—of pretty much any type, so long as it’s made in good faith—at the time the revised Disclosure Statement is submitted.

Consequently, the contractor is much better off (under the CDA SoL) providing as much cost impact information as it can at the time of the submission of the revised CASB Disclosure Statement. This is essentially what the attorneys at Arnold & Porter recommended. In this fashion, the contractor will start the SoL clock as early as possible.

Which brings us back to what we said earlier. The best way to win on a CDA SoL matter is to provide information early and to cooperate fully with government audits and reviews. Gamesmanship and unnecessary delays in responding risks having a Judge find that the contractor somehow misled the government into missing its SoL deadline. You don’t want that.

Be aware of your SoL clock. Know when it started and know when it hit the six-year mark. You will then be prepared to bargain hard with your government ACO, knowing that a Court is unlikely to hear any government claims that are filed untimely.

 

 

DCAA Reemphasizes Communication

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Recently we had an opportunity to offer words of approval to the recent Department of Energy guidance to its Contracting Officers, guidance that we thought “will tend to reduce cost-related disputes and avoid litigation.” The key aspect of the guidance was to emphasize that “misunderstandings can be minimized by early communication.”

We wholeheartedly agreed with that guidance. And we thought DCMA ought to emphasize the same beneficial role of communication to its Contracting Officers, as well.

In the meantime, the Defense Contract Audit Agency was reemphasizing the benefits of communication between its auditors and those impacted by its audits.

Readers may remember that DCAA first reminded its auditors that communication was important in the now-famous “Rules of Engagement” MRD. We wrote about it here. The latest MRD simply tells auditors that they should follow the Rules of Engagement because the whole communication thing is working out for everybody.

In the words of the MRD—

Since the issuance of that [“Rules of Engagement”] guidance, we have seen many benefits as a result. Because of the significant impact these changes have had on accomplishing our mission, we want to reemphasize why this communication is so important and what our expectations are for auditor communication throughout the audit. Communication adds value to the audit process and helps ensure that we are performing quality audits that are fair, complete, objective, timely, and comply with auditing standards. Specifically, when auditors communicate with contracting officers and contractor personnel:
  • Audit issues are identified early on;
  • Potential problems can be dealt with immediately;
  • Audits are more focused, efficient, and timely;
  • Audit processes, results, and conclusions are better understood;
  • Requests for DCAA support in negotiations increase;
  • Sustention of audit findings go up; and
  • Professional relationships with contracting officers improve.

There’s some good guidance in the MRD, and we suggest that readers retain it for future reference (and to show to auditors should they fail to adhere to the guidance). In particular, we like this one: “At the beginning of the audit, auditors should communicate the rationale for the audit procedures they plan to perform.”

If that actually happened, it would be a first in our experience.

Anyway, good stuff. It has the potential to be a win/win for all stakeholders, if only the auditors comply with the guidance. 

 

Be Careful What You Sign

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Read_the_Contract
Not too many people would argue with the proposition that before you sign a contract, you ought to read it. And it almost goes without saying that, when reading the contract, you ought to be sure you understand what it says and what it requires of you.

Yet far too often we encounter otherwise competent men and women who sign their government contracts without reading them and/or without understanding them. They simply do not understand what all those “incorporated by reference” contract clauses actually mean. They simply do not understand the compliance requirements. They simply do not understand that they may be in breach of their contract, not because they didn’t deliver what was promised on time or per spec, but because they didn’t submit a required CDRL or because they didn’t comply with some other seemingly unimportant clause that was only administrative in nature.

It’s easy to dismiss such people as idiots, but that’s wrong. They are not idiots; they’ve just failed to appreciate the technical nuances of government contracting. And they usually get away with it, too. Until one time they don’t get away with it and then it costs them. It costs them a lot.

Before you dismiss such people, consider this: When is the last time you actually read a software user’s agreement in full, from start to finish, before you clicked on the button that said you agreed to all terms and conditions? Yeah. See? You’re one of them, too.

Anyway, one of the first rules of government contracting is to, you know, actually read your contract. All the way through. In full. From start to finish.

It’s also nice if you actually understand what you just read. Understand what you signed up for.

Those two things, reading and understanding, can save you big bucks.

If you don’t have the time or inclination to read your contract, then that’s a sign that you need to hire some additional resources to take care of that little task for you. If you did read the contract but you don’t really understand what you read, then that’s a sign that you need to hire (at a minimum) a SME consultant to explain to you what you just signed up for. (And a big plus would be getting that SME consultant to give you a compliance roadmap to help you implement necessary systems, processes, and/or controls to make sure you lived up to your end of the contractual agreement.)

The first step is being willing to admit you don’t understand what you read. That’s actually a big step, and many folks can’t take it. The next big step is being willing to admit that you need to change, to implement new systems, processes, and/or controls. But we digress…

All this came to mind when reading the recent ASBCA decision in the matter of Tri-County Contractors, Inc. At stake was a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by the Government, seeking to have Tri-County’s appeal of a Contracting Officer’s denial of its claim for $242,830 dismissed, based on the doctrine of “release and final payment.”

Tri-County submitted a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) that was apparently treated by the parties as a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, even though it lacked the required certification language. Tri-County submitted its REA/claim on February 25, 2011, and amended it in November, 2011. The parties did not negotiate a final REA value. Subsequently, on December 12, 2011, Tri-County’s President submitted a “FINAL” contract invoice in the amount of $9,676.85. On December 15, 2011, the Contracting Officer told Tri-County that the final invoice could not be paid until a Final Release was executed. Tri-County executed a Final Release on that same day. The final invoice was paid a month later.

Oops!

Readers, do you see where this is going?

Had the REA been negotiated, the contract value would have been increased. Thus, the final amount due under the contract—and hence the final invoice value—would have been significantly more than the $10K Tri-County sought.

In executing the Final Release, Tri-County waived its right to claim the costs associated with its REA.

The Contracting Officer denied the REA and Tri-County was left in a most untenable position as it tried to appeal that denial to the ASBCA. Even though the Contracting Officer had admitted (in writing) that the REA/claim “had some merit,” the fact that Tri-County had executed its Final Release meant that the contract value stood. Note, that Tri-County could have “excepted” specific claims from its Final Release, but it did not do so—probably because the President didn’t know enough to do so.

Tri-County’s only argument before the Court was “mutual mistake”—meaning that neither party intended that the Final Release would cover the pending REA/claim.

Fortunately for Tri-County, Judge James found that there was sufficient evidence to deny the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment. And so Tri-County survived and will (we suppose) receive a trial on the merits of its claim.

Learn the lesson from Tri-County. Read the document(s) in front of you. Understand what you are reading. Obtain services from SMEs as required. Otherwise, you too may one day sign away your rights to a quarter million dollars.

 

 

DCAA Implements New Instruction to Streamline Report Review Process

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On April 9, 2013, the Defense Contract Audit Agency informed its auditors that it had implemented a new Instruction that streamlined the audit review process. Why did the existing audit review process need streamlining? In the words of the MRD—

… feedback from the field indicated it was taking too long, there were too many required levels of review (some of which were duplicative), and there were inconsistencies in the review process between Teams, FAOs, and Regions.

Yes.

Readers of this blog may recall that, from time to time, we’ve asserted much the same thing. We’ve blamed the audit review process for the lack of timeliness in issuing audit reports as well as the lack of transparency in the process. Once a report goes into the review cycle, the auditee (contractor) loses track of it and must simply wait for it to drop into the Contracting Officer’s mail queue, unexpectedly, like a meteor from the sky. We have personally witnessed reports disappearing into “management review” hell for two, three, or even more, years.

So it’s nice that DCAA leadership finally admitted that its review process needed streamlining.

According to the MRD, the new Instruction (DCAAI 7642.2)—

… outlines the levels of review required for specific activity codes, and the specific role of each level of review during the course of the audit. It also provides that the individual signing the report will determine what additional reviews are necessary based on the risk of the specific engagement.

As a result, the new process “will result in more timely reviews, less duplication of effort, and audits that are meaningful to the reader and in compliance with auditing standards.” Which is nice, to be sure.

We are sorry, but we cannot provide you with the details of the Instruction. We cannot show you which reviews go with each activity code. We cannot do that because DCAA has chosen not to share its Instruction with the public.

We of course agree that internal agency policies and procedures need not be made public. But the sad truth of the matter is that DCAA could have chosen to make this particular Instruction public in order inform contractors and help to set reasonable expectations regarding the duration between exit conference and publication of the final audit report. DCAA could have chosen to make this particular Instruction public so as to address and somewhat remedy the agency’s historical lack of transparency (and candor) in this area.

That DCAA chose not to do so is a reminder that the audit agency still has not reached the levels of openness and transparency mandated by the Obama Administration. That DCAA chose not to make its Instruction public is a reminder that, no matter how far it has come since 2009, it still has some distance yet to travel.

 


Page 145 of 278

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.