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Apogee Consulting Inc

Hiatus Coming

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Don’t panic but we’re not going to be posting many blog articles on this website for a while.

Why?

Well, relocation, for one reason.

Apogee Consulting, Inc. is moving its physical location from Orange County, CA to North Dallas, Texas.

Moving takes some effort and thus, we will have little time for article writing over the next few weeks.

So please do not give up on us! We’ll be back in August with more articles.

In the meantime, Nick Sanders, Principal Consultant, will be co-Chair at the upcoming DCAA Audit & Compliance Bootcamp in San Diego, CA.

Come to San Diego in late July!

Introduce yourself to Nick: he’ll buy you a drink, we promise.

We’ll be back as soon as we can ….

 

Termination for Default

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It’s a drastic, final, solution—and a decision that the government should never make lightly. We’re talking about a default termination (T4D).

We’re talking about T4D because our long-time supporter “Black Hawk Dawn” asked us to.

There’s so much to write about T4Ds we hardly know where to start. It’s a complex subject with myriad facets. Perhaps most importantly, the government typically needs to follow an exact series of steps in is process and, for each of those steps, the contractor may have one or more defenses available to it. Often, the contractor is able to convince a court that its T4D was inappropriate, and have its T4D converted into a Termination for Convenience (T4C), which is obviously a much more beneficial outcome.

You want to know how complex the T4D process is? Google “A-12 Termination”. There has been roughly 20 years of litigation associated with that particular T4D—including a SCOTUS decision in 2011. Reportedly, both sides spent a combined $500 million on attorneys’ fees during that 20 year period.

The T4D process is so complex that the DOD has a published a 2007 guide—weighing-in at 109 pages in length—to assist Contracting Officers in properly terminating a contract for default.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) discusses T4D at Subpart 49.4. Here’s a link for your reading pleasure. If you read it, you’ll see that a T4D is what happens when a contractor fails to perform its contractual duties. In theory, the T4D remedy is available to any Contracting Officer whose contractor fails to perform any contractual duties, including compliance with those “incorporated by reference” Section I clauses that nobody ever reads. But of course the reality is that T4D is a drastic action that is normally reserved for the most egregious performance failures, such as when a contractor walks off the job or gives the CO an ultimatum involving delivery.

For example, should a contractor tell the CO that it’s not going to deliver any goods unless the contract is modified in its favor, it should expect the T4D process to start.

We found a semi-interesting ASBCA case that illustrates some of the complexities associated with a T4D—it’s the September, 2011, decision in the matter of Environmental Safety Consultants, Inc. (ESCI).

The first thing we noted was that ESCI was represented by its President and not a Beltway attorney. We’ve found that to be a warning indicator in other decisions. (We wrote about our thoughts on the matter right here.)

Here’s the story:

ESCI received a contract in November, 1995, “to remove old and install new underground and above ground fuel storage tanks at 35 building sites on the Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Yorktown, Virginia.” Apparently the contract was firm, fixed-price in the amount of $561,764.25 and permitted submission of Progress Payments. The contract also specified that Liquidated Damages could be assessed at the rate of $500 per each day delivery was delayed. In December, 1995, the government told ESCI that it could proceed with the work. In February, 1996, the government told ESCI that 14 of the 35 tanks were ready and available to be removed.

You might think that, upon winning a contract and being told that you had authorization to proceed with work, you would, uh, actually start work. You might think that, upon being told several weeks later that 14/35 of your workload was awaiting your contractually agreed-upon action, you would, uh, actually start work. Well, if you were ESCI, then you’d be wrong.

ESCI took a different tack. ESCI decided to wait until early April, 1996, to mobilize at the site. ESCI didn’t start doing any work until three weeks later, as April came to a close. Consequently, as of June 30, 1996, “after three months of work and less than two months before the specified contract completion date then in effect (26 August 1996), ESCI had completed only 20 percent of the contract work.”

Now, let’s be honest about this. We’ve all been there—right? We’ve all delayed and procrastinated and waited until the last minute before putting distractions away and getting down to business. Hell, we remember in college, waiting until the midnight before the paper was due before getting out the typewriter and starting to put words on paper. (This was in ancient times before the advent of PCs, obviously.)

The point is: it didn’t matter when ESCI started. What mattered was when ESCI finished. So long as it finished within its contractually agreed-upon due date, all would be well.

And then came the fuel oil spill.

It was alleged that the spill stemmed from ESCI’s failure to properly secure the tank in the excavation, and the Judge found that to be the case.

And then came the second fuel oil spill, two weeks later.

The Judge found that the second spill was caused by ESCI’s failure to “properly shore the tank during excavation.”

At this point, the government customer began to get concerned. As the Judge wrote—

By letter dated 24 July 1996 and at a meeting on 30 July 1996, the government expressed its concerns to ESCI about its performance of the contract to date. These concerns included among others, the lack of an effective quality control (QC) program with no full-time QC manager on-site and non-compliance with the contract requirements for: (i) marking utilities; (ii) providing shoring and site safety plans; (iii) notification to the contracting officer 48 hours before beginning excavation; (iv) barricades for open excavations; (v) protection of government utilities; (vi) repair of utilities damaged in the course of the work; (vii) timely submission of daily production and QC reports; (viii) timely submission of weekly payrolls for labor standards enforcement; and (ix) secondary containment piping material, sump and depth of underground installation.

The government began to issue “contract non-compliance notices” to ESCI. Meanwhile, ESCI kept submitted requests for Progress Payments. As the Judge wrote—

On 21 August 1996, five days before the contract completion date specified in Modification No. POOOOl, ESCI submitted its progress payment Invoice No.3 indicating that as of 21 August 1996, performance of the contract was 34.9 percent complete. The government estimate of the percentage of completion on that date was 30.4 percent.

The government paid the request and ESCI kept working on the site, long after the contractually specified due date had passed. It was not until 18 September that the CO issued a “cure notice” which is a mandatory step in the T4C process. For its part, ESCI responded to the cure notice by proposing to hire a subcontractor to complete the remaining work. On October 4, the CO sent a letter to ESCI stating that the government was “considering default termination” and “offered ESCI the opportunity to show that its failure to perform ‘arose from causes beyond your control and without fault or negligence on your part.’”

In October and November, ESCI’s subcontractor(s) continued to perform work at the site, with the government’s knowledge and approval. One of those subcontractors was Rickmond Environmental. The record supports the assessment that Rickmond performed well and that the government was satisfied with how things were going.

In May 1997, ESCI’s payment bond surety notified the government that it was paying claims for four ESCI subcontractors. A month later, “Rickmond left the site and did not return to work thereafter.” At that point, ESCI owed Rickmond $114,000 on unpaid invoices.

At that point, ESCI submitted progress payment request No. 7, showing that 78.7 percent of the contractually agreed-upon work had been completed. It was now 10 months after then contractually agreed-upon performance completion date. But this time, the CO refused to pay the request, citing ESCI’s unpaid subcontractors.

On September 30, 1997, thirteen months after the original completion date, the CO gave ESCI another 30 days to get its act together “or termination for default proceedings will be initiated.”

On January 6, 1998, ESCI received another cure notice.

On January 22, 1998, the CO offered ESCI an opportunity to “show cause” why its contract “should not be terminated for default.” ESCI replied, stating that the failure to complete the contract “was caused by government changes and delays and by the government's wrongful withholding of payment of ESCI's progress payment Invoice No.7.”

On March 20, 1998—

ESCI submitted a letter to the contracting officer stating among other things that ‘ESCI is owed approximately $257,833.25 for work completed, plus interest as of June 30, 1997.’ This letter also referred to its plan for having the work completed by a subcontractor or subcontractors other than Rickmond.

On April 10, 1998, the CO replied to ESCI’s letter, disputing its assertions. On May 8, 1998, the government issued its third show-cause letter to ESCI. (Actually, we think it was the second show-cause, but it might have been the third cure notice.) ESCI replied to that letter, proposing to increase the contract price by $128,000 so that a subcontractor could complete the work.

On June 12, 1998, the CO terminated ESCI’s contract for default, roughly 21 months after the original contract completion date had passed.

Guess what? The ASBCA Judge found that the government had not complied with the T4D processes, and thus ESCI’s T4D would be converted to a T4C.

What?

We mean, if ever a contract should have been T4D’d it would appear to have been this one. Nearly two years after the contractual completion date, the work still had not been completed. How could ESCI have escaped its T4D fate?

Well, let’s see how the Judge parsed the situation.

The Judge found that the government had waived its right to enforce the contract’s completion date by its actions. As the Judge wrote—

… the subsequent actions of the parties starting with the instruction in the second paragraph of the contracting officer's 30 June 1997 notice of rejection of Invoice No.7 and extending over the next 11 months clearly indicated that the 30 June 1997 completion date in Modification No. P00006 was not of the essence of the contract … The repeated incantation of reservation of rights language in some of the government letters, followed by no action to terminate and further suggestions for compromise, further weakened any validity to the 30 June 1997 completion date. After eleven months of this dalliance, it was incumbent on the government to issue a new and reasonable completion date before terminating the contract for default.

But that was not the end of the story.

ESCI then filed another appeal at the ASBCA, asking for payment of the progress payment request that was rejected by the Contracting Officer. Remember, that payment request (in the amount of $138,506) was originally submitted in June, 1997. Judge Freeman wrote--

Fourteen years later, ESCI submitted to the contracting officer a payment request with an invoice dated 29 November 2011 for the original amount of Invoice No. 7 ($138,506.50) plus $433,381.33 for interest on that original amount from 1 January 1997 through 31 December 2011.

That, good friends, is chutzpah.

The problem with ESCI’s cunning plan was that it had failed to submit a certified claim to the Contracting Officer, and had failed to obtain a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision, before filing its appeal at the ASBCA. In essence, ESCI had nothing from which to appeal, since the CO had never issued a COFD on a certified claim. (We’ve discussed this point before, many times, notably right here.) We are reluctantly forced to conclude that ESCI failed to read our blog articles.

ESCI’s appeal of nothing was denied without prejudice “for lack of jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the door was left open for ESCI to file a certified claim to the CO, receive a COFD, and reinstate its appeal. At which point, the government is free to argue that the CDA Statute of Limitations operates to separately deny the ASBCA jurisdiction.

But that’s not the end of the story.

ESCI filed another appeal, this time asking for attorney fees in accordance with the Equal Access to Justice Act. Its appeal was denied because the Judge found that the government’s position was substantially justified.

But that’s not the end of the story.

The ASBCA heard another appeal in this case, this time one brought by the Department of the Navy). Apparently, the government did appeal the ASBCA decision, but subsequently the Department of Justice attorneys agreed to dismiss the government’s appeal before it was heard. This did not sit well with the Department of the Navy attorneys. As Judge Freeman wrote—

Dissatisfied with the Department of Justice's agreement to the dismissal of its appeal in the Federal Circuit, the contracting agency (Department of the Navy) returned to this Board on 28 September 2012 with a ‘Motion for Relief from Judgment’ pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)and 60(b)(6).

The Navy’s Motion pled for the Judge to consider ESCI’s conduct during the course of the proceedings, which allegedly included:

… violating the Prompt Payment Act (PPA), submitting false certifications and false claims to the Government, and making repeated slanderous and offensive accusations, and threats directed at the Board, Government counsel, and other Government officials and trial witnesses …

The Judge told the Navy to man-up and suck it up, writing—

All of the grounds for relief in the government's motion are matters that could have been presented in a timely motion for reconsideration, or on appeal to the Federal Circuit. The government's present motion does not assert any newly-discovered, outcome-determinative facts leading up to the termination, and we otherwise find no extraordinary or exceptional circumstances pertinent to the merits of the case that, in the nature of an FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion, would justify vacating the decision. The government's Motion for Relief from Judgment is nothing more than an untimely motion for reconsideration, or attempt to argue its now dismissed appeal to the Federal Circuit.

Does that end the story of ESCI and its $500,000 UST contract? Only time will tell ….

Getting back to the original article topic, we trust the ESCI story shows both the complexity of the T4D process and how a contractor might assert defenses to a T4D that it might receive. Note that ESCI’s Contracting Officer issued both “cure notices” and “show cause” notices prior to terminating the contract. Those are mandatory steps.

But the fact that multiple notices were issued actually worked against the Government in this instance, as did the reasonableness of the CO and the attempts to work out a resolution with the contractor. The fact that no revised completion date was put into the contract operated to waive the Government’s rights with respect to the original completion date. The ESCI story points to the fact that the Government must walk the T4D process exactly, with no missteps along the way. Otherwise, the contractor may successfully get its T4D converted into a T4C.

“Diamond Dave” from Denver told us that he likes the shorter, pithier, blog articles on this site. This has not been one of them. Sorry about that, “Diamond Dave.” But we trust “Black Hawk Dawn” got what she asked for.

 

New Rules on Compensation Allowability Add Complexity, Decrease Recovery

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On June 26, 2013, the Federal Acquisition Regulation Cost Principle on the allowability of compensation costs (31.205-6) was revised. It was revised via an interim rule. Concurrently, the FAR Council also published a proposed rule that would revise it even more. And what’s worse, the Cost Principle revision in the interim rule is to be applied retroactively to costs incurred (or allocated) to contracts awarded in CY 2012—and the revision was published literally less than a week before contractors’ CY 2012 annual proposals to establish final billing rates were due. And what’s even worse than that is that the proposed rule would also apply retroactively as well—but to a different time period.

What’s a good contractor to do?

Let’s first discuss the interim rule, which is complicated enough all by itself. The rule became effective on June 26, 2013—literally four calendar days before contractors with a 12/31/2012 fiscal year-end would have been required to finalize and submit their annual proposals to establish final billing rates (aka, “incurred cost submissions”). Does the interim rule apply to costs incurred in those contractors’ fiscal 2012? Yes, it does. Perhaps. It applies to some contracts, but not to others.

Did we mention this rule was complex?

Let’s clarify the rule’s requirements:

  • For DOD, NASA and Coast Guard contracts awarded after December 31, 2011, the current executive compensation cap is to be applied to all contractor employees, not just the Top Five most highly compensated executives at each segment.

  • For contracts awarded by other Executive Branch agencies, the current executive compensation cap is to be applied only to the Top Five most highly compensated executives at each segment.

  • The Allowable Cost and Payment Clause (52.216-7) has been modified and now provides a link to a good history of the compensation benchmark. Here is that link.

The timing of the publication was unfortunate, to say the least. We would assert that there would be no way that a contractor of more than medium size could actually implement the rule in the timeframe provided. And notice that the rule was retroactive, applying to contract costs incurred prior to its publication.

The interim rule, as published, requires contractors with contracts from multiple agencies to establish at least three sets of indirect cost rates to be applied to their 2012 contract costs. The first set is for contracts awarded prior to 12/31/2011. The new rule does not apply to those contracts, regardless of awarding agency. The second set is for DOD/NASA/Coast Guard contracts awarded after 12/31/2011, to which the compensation ceiling is to be applied to labor costs directly charged to those contracts. (There is some question in our minds as to whether the ceiling should be—or could be—applied to indirect labor that is allocated to such contracts, especially G&A labor.) The third set of rates is for contracts awarded after 12/31/2011 by Executive Branch agencies other than DOD, NASA, or the Coast Guard. Those rates will default back to the old rule.

And contractors needed to figure this out in four calendar days, most of which were weekend days.

In reality, we suspect most contractors will ignore the new rule’s 2012 application requirements and apply it to their FY 2013 costs. They will argue—with much support and legal precedent—that the rule is retroactive as written, and that the only cost allowability rules with which they need to comply are the ones that were in effect at the time the contract was executed. We suspect they’ll point out that an attempt to retroactively enforce cost allowability rules is, technically, a breach of contract.

The FAR Councils acknowledged as much, writing—

There are challenges with respect to the retroactive application of section 803 (i.e., to the application of section 803 to contracts awarded before the enactment of section 803). The implementation of section 803 is similar to the implementation of section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Pub. L. 105-85, November 18, 1997), which imposed a cap on Government contractor's allowable costs of “senior executive” compensation. Section 808, like section 803, retroactively applied to contracts that already existed on the date of its enactment; both statutes contain text which applied the statute to contracts awarded before, on, or after the date of enactment of the underlying act. In litigation on the application of section 808 to contracts awarded before the date of the enactment of the statute, the courts held that section 808 breached contracts awarded before the statutory date of enactment (General Dynamics Corp. v. U.S., 47 Fed. Cl. 514 (2000); and ATK Launch Systems, Inc., ASBCA 55395, 2009-1 BCA ¶ 34118 (2009)).

We further suspect that, regardless of the merits of that line of argument, DCAA won’t buy it. The audit agency’s reaction may take the form of a rejection (inadequacy) or it may take the form of additional questioned costs. Consequently, contractors need to prepare for DCAA’s reaction and plan their next steps.

Now, on to the proposed rule.

The proposed rule addresses the retroactive application of the compensation caps to DOD/NASA/Coast Guard contracts awarded before December 31, 2011. Labor costs incurred after January 1, 2012 on those contracts would be subject to the compensation ceiling. Thus, the retroactive implementation of the compensation ceiling would be extended back even further than the interim rule would have it be.

We don’t know what Congress was thinking. But you can tell the FAR Councils what you think about either the interim or the proposed rule by submitting your comments. Details regarding how to submit comments on each of the rules can be found in the Federal Register notices—links above.

 

 

Getting from Defective Pricing to False Claims

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Disgruntled_Employees
This is one of those articles that requires us to let readers know that we are not—repeat: NOT—lawyers or attorneys or barristers or solicitors or legal advocates of any sort, and that we really have little business opining on legal matters.

Yeah. Like that ever stops us.

We are curious about the latest fad in Federal legal jurisprudence, wherein an allegation that a contract has been defectively priced in violation of the Truth-in-Negotiations-Act (TINA) somehow leads to allegations that the False Claims Act (FCA) has been violated. We are interested in how a TINA violation that has the stated legal remedy of a unilateral contract price reduction plus interest on any overpayments that may have resulted leads to a situation in which every invoice submitted for payment in connection with that defectively priced contract has become a false claim, subjecting the contractor to up to $11,000 per invoice, plus up to treble damages, plus interest.

Recently, CyTerra Corporation settled a False Claim Act suit for $1.9 million—a relatively minor penalty as such things go. But the FCA suit derived from a defective pricing situation. As the Department of Justice press release stated—

In 2003, the Department of the Army awarded CyTerra a contract for the production and delivery of AN/PSS-14 hand-held mine detection units.  The contract was modified several times to provide for the production and delivery of additional mine detection units.  The government contended that, in connection with the negotiations concerning three of these contract modifications, CyTerra knowingly failed to provide the Army with the most recent cost or pricing data on the number of labor hours needed to produce a mine detector.  Under the Truth in Negotiations Act, CyTerra was required to provide cost or pricing data that was ‘accurate, complete and current.’  The government alleged that if the Army had received such information, it would have negotiated a lower price.

So how was that a FCA action instead of a TINA action? We have no idea.

In our recent article on SAIC, we noted that SAIC’s FCA settlement looked very much like a defective pricing issue. We wrote—

The fact of the matter is that this is not the first time that government attorneys have linked defectively priced contracts to the False Claims Act. In our experience, the contractor’s intent is one of the key factors in the government’s decision to move beyond TINA and into FCA territory.

But as we ponder the CyTerra and SAIC settlements, we aren’t so sure that intent is the factor that swings the litigation from TINA to FCA. One thing that both matters have in common is that they both originated as qui tam suits filed by relators under the FCA. In other words, the matters started out as FCA suits that were predicated on defective pricing allegations. It’s not that the Federal government prosecutors decided that the cases warranted the heavy bludgeon of FCA; instead, the cases started there because that’s the nature of the original suits filed by the “private attorneys general”—i.e., the whistleblowers.

Now we have a new rule: If the Federal government detects the defective pricing, then it’s a TINA matter. But if the relator detects the defective pricing, then it’s a FCA matter.

Which is inconsistent and, on its face, somewhat inequitable. But that’s the way we’re seeing it these days.

The upshot of our new rule is that, if you are a contractor, you would much rather have DCAA conduct a post-award audit of your contract that results in allegations of defective pricing under TINA, as opposed to having your disgruntled ex-employee file suit under the False Claims Act. The TINA remedies are so much less painful than the FCA remedies.

So what are the chances that DCAA will be conducting a post-award audit of your contract in the near future?

Not good.

According to the latest DOD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report to Congress, DCAA issued a grand total of eight (8) post-award audit reports in the six month period between October 1, 2012 and March 31, 2013.

Eight.

Across the entire agency.

Over a six-month period.

Questioning a grand total of $4.1 million.

As you can see, you are much more likely to have your disgruntled ex-employee claim the mantle of private attorney general and file a qui tam suit under the FCA than you are to have a by-the-book DCAA auditor assert you defectively priced your contract. Which is not great news if you want to minimize your legal settlement payments.

Think about the probabilities the next time you submit your TINA-certified proposal to the Federal government.

 

Protecting the Government’s Interests

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We have written quite a bit about the Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations (CDA SoL). We’ve written quite a bit because it’s an area where the law is evolving, and because it involves a nice intersection between contract administration and contract cost accounting.

And because it involves DCMA and DCAA.

And you know how much we love to write about Department of Defense oversight agencies.

Anyway, we were discussing issues associated with the CDA SoL with a group of knowledgeable practitioners, and the topic came up about the door swinging both ways. This means that the same Statute of Limitations that prevents the Government bringing an untimely claim against the contractor also means that the contractor cannot bring an untimely claim against the Government. There was much discussion about what to do if one’s final billing rates were significantly in excess of one’s provisional billing rates, and DCAA hadn’t yet gotten around to auditing the proposal to establish final billing rates, and it was nearing the six-year SoL.

What to do indeed.

First of all, we’ve written about this before. We are certain that we’ve addressed this and told our readers that if they let the CDA SoL pass without asserting their claim(s), then they are in a very untenable negotiating position. So this topic is not particularly new news to us or our readers. We confess we got a little bored with the discussion, and our mind wandered a bit.

While others discussed what might be done as they approached their particular SoL deadlines, we started wondering about a slightly different topic.

We wondered how one might avoid getting into this predicament in the first place.

Our first thought was that one should never have provisional billing rates that are significantly lower than one’s proposed final billing rates.

As we’ve discussed before, the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause (52.216-7) states (at 52.216-7(e) Billing Rates) that provisional billing rates “shall be the anticipated final rates.” (Emphasis added.) If, during the course of contract performance, either contracting party believes that the provisional billing rates will be materially different from the final billing rates for the cost accounting period, then either party may request that the provisional billing rates be “prospectively or retroactively revised by mutual agreement … to prevent a substantial overpayment or underpayment.”

So if the parties are complying with the requirements of the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause, then the difference between provisional and final billing rates should be de minimis.

That’s the theory, anyway. We’re quite certain that practice does not match theory in this area. The primary reason for the deviation between theory and practice is that many Contracting Officers apply decrement factors to contractor’s proposed provisional billing rates in order to “protect the Government’s interests.” As a result of the desire to protect the Government’s interests, contractors are only approved to bill at provisional rates that are lower than the estimated final billing rates. The size of the decrements seems to depend on the individual Contracting Officer; some contractors have rather small decrements and others have rather larger decrements. The immediate impact is to reduce contractors’ cash flows, which is annoying, no doubt. But since the provisional billing rates should be synced up to final billing rates over time, the cash flow impact primarily manifests during the current performance year and, accordingly, is perceived as a temporary phenomenon and not something to get overly worked-up about.

There are two opportunities to sync up provisional and final billing rates. The first opportunity is at year-end, when the books close and indirect cost pools and allocation bases are known with some certainty. The other opportunity is when the proposal to establish final billing rates is submitted to the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer. In that regard, FAR 42.704(e) states—

When the contractor provides to the cognizant contracting officer the certified final indirect cost rate proposal in accordance with 42.705-1(b) or 42.705-2(b), the contractor and the Government may mutually agree to revise billing rates to reflect the proposed indirect cost rates, as approved by the Government to reflect historically disallowed amounts from prior years’ audits, until the proposal has been audited and settled.

And of course, the provisional billing rates may be adjusted at any other time, so as to prevent a substantial overpayment or underpayment.

The express goal of the process is to have the provisional billing rates be as close as possible to the final billing rates that will, eventually, be negotiated and settled by the ACO and the contractor. So if the process is being followed by the contracting parties, then why should a contractor have a significant difference between its provisional and final billing rates, such that it would be compelled to file a “protective claim” with the ACO as the six-year CDA SoL approaches?

The answer would appear to be that either (a) too many Contracting Officers are not adjusting provisional billing rates to better reflect estimated final billing rates, or (b) too many contractors are failing to request adjustments to their provisional billing rates, so as to avoid a significant difference. In the latter case, shame on those contractors. In the former case, shame on those Contracting Officers.

The fact of the matter is that provisional billing rates should closely approximate final billing rates. Imposition of a large decrement factor on a contractor risks the government being unaware of a contract’s true costs, and receiving a large “surprise” when the final billing rates are negotiated. (We note for the record that too-low provisional billing rates do not relieve a contractor from having to comply with the Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds clause requirements.) Moreover, from the contractor’s perspective, having provisional billing rates closely approximate final billing rates means that the settlement of final rates will not have a significant impact on cash flow.

Contracting Officers who seek to “protect the Government’s interests” by imposing large decrements that reduce contractors’ provisional billing rates do themselves no favors. Unless those decrements are justified by historically experienced unallowable costs at the contractor, we think there’s a strong argument that those Contracting Officers are violating the express requirements of the 52.216-7 Allowable Cost and Payment Clause. (Remember that the clause states that provisional billing rates “shall be” the anticipated final billing rates. “Shall be” is an imperative direction that the Contracting Officer cannot ignore—see FAR 2.1, Definitions.)

Contractors who let themselves be put at a financial disadvantage by those Contracting Officers do themselves no favor either. Not only have they agreed (if only tacitly) to reduced cash flow, they’ve also let themselves be tied to the Government’s timeline for auditing, negotiating, and settling billing rates. As we all know, that process can take many years.

And for those contractors, as they approach the CDA SoL deadline, they must pay for their past decision(s) by submitting a claim for the money they’ve left on the table, lest they lose their right to assert that claim in the future.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.