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Apogee Consulting Inc

Government Establishes Position on CAS 412 Requests for Equitable Adjustment

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If you’ve been reading this blog for any length of time, you more than likely have read an article or two on CAS 412. CAS 412 is one of those Cost Accounting Standards that only a very few (possibly psychologically unwell) individuals enjoy delving into. And the truth is, you really don’t need to understand the intricacies of CAS 412 unless you have a defined benefit pension plan. Those many upon many contractors who have defined contribution pension plans instead of defined benefit plans really can afford to stay the heck away from CAS 412, and thus maintain lower blood pressure readings and perhaps a healthier psyche.

For those who enjoy staring into the abyss, we want to recap some of our articles on the topic, in order to establish a historical context.

In May, 2010, we wrote this article, in which we discussed the Pension Protection Act (PPA) and how that public law led to “CAS harmonization”—especially the revisions to CAS 412 and 413. Three years ago, we wrote—

The Standards dealing with defined-benefit pension plans are about to be revised, and contractors will have to change their cost accounting practices in order to comply with the revised CAS requirements.  The changes will lead to an increase in measured pension costs.  A ‘SWAG’ by a DCMA pension expert estimated a 60% increase in pension costs!  Because the cost accounting practice changes are required by the revised Standards, contractors are entitled to an equitable adjustment to contract prices.  They are going to be hitting up their customers for the increased costs.  … The DOD has known about this upcoming day of reckoning for quite some time, and has taken actions that would prevent contractors (and their government customers) from doing anything about it until the CAS Board finishes its rulemaking work.  Yes, you heard that correctly.  The Pentagon has actively prevented DOD programs from creating reserves that would cover the upcoming cost impacts.  … As a result of DOD’s willful blindness, someday soon there is going to be a reckoning, as CAS-covered contractors with defined benefit pension plans notify contracting officers of the contract price increases stemming from the new CAS rules.  DOD has no budget for the price increases and any attempt at proactive planning was effectively halted by the DPAP memo noted above.  Won’t Congress dearly love the upcoming surprises coming its way!

In March, 2012, we wrote an update article, in which we discussed reactions to the news about the costs of contractor pension plans, in which several ostensibly knowledgeable entities and individuals feigned surprise and shock over the additional pension costs stemming from the CAS 412 changes that “harmonized” CAS with the PPA.

About a month later, we discussed a Memo issued by the Honorable Shay Assad, DOD Director of Pricing. That was an important Memo for two classes of contractors: (1) those that had defined benefit pension plans whose cost measurement had been impacted by the CAS 412 and 413 revisions, and who would be submitting Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REAs) associated with their cost increases; and (2) those that had defined benefit plans whose cost measurement had been impacted by the CAS 412 and 413 revisions, but who would not be permitted to submit REAs associated with their cost increases.

Okay, with that background, you are now ready for the latest discussion point: a new Memo issued by Shay Assad, entitled “Guidance on the Cost Accounting Standards Board Equitable Adjustment Process Related to Cost Accounting Standards, December 27, 2011, ‘Final Rule to Harmonize CAS 412 and 413 with the Pension Protection Act of 2006.’”

Whew. With a title like that, you know it’s got to be good!

Notably, the latest Assad Memo states—

Contracting parties have been developing, submitting, reviewing, and negotiating cost impacts since the establishment of the CAS. For these reasons, this well-defined process will serve well in this instant case. However, it must be recognized that the actual impact of CAS Pension Harmonization on affected contracts can be significant even with relatively minor increases/decreases in the interest rate used to compute the minimum actuarial liability and minimum normal cost. Accordingly, included in the attachment [to the Memo] is guidance to ensure that the adjustment to affected contracts is equitable for both contracting parties. This would include an annual assessment and potential adjustment to the negotiated cost impact based upon looking back and comparing the impact between the forecasted and actual interest rates.

Also notably, the Memo states that the contractors who submit REAs will not be entitled to profit/fee on those REAs.

The second point is annoying but perhaps relatively minor. The first point, quoted at length above, is significant and, in our view, inapposite. So we’ll rail a bit on the first point.

The purpose of a cost impact analysis is to establish the cost impact on affected CAS-covered contracts, so that the contracting parties can negotiate a contract modification that acknowledges that cost impact. (Normally, the cost impact is supposed to be a price impact, but see the second point noted above.) The point is, it’s a single negotiation, informed by the cost impact analysis. That impact analysis is really a proposal and it’s audited, more often than not, by the DCAA—just as if it were a cost proposal for new contract work. The parties then sit down and negotiate how the price of one, or more than one, contract will be affected. (See FAR 30.6 and the CAS clause 52.230-6.)

Nowhere does the CAS or FAR anticipate that the negotiation will become an annual affair, with the contract cost impact and resulting modification being adjusted again and again, based on changes to forecasted interest rates. That’s just something created out of whole cloth in order to keep the cost impact to a minimum; it comes from the same place as the notion that a contractor shouldn’t get the profit it would have originally negotiated, had Mr. Assad not forbidden the contracting parties to consider the impact of PPA in their price negotiations.

So in our view it’s kind of an inappropriate approach to negotiating cost impacts. In fact, in our experience, it would take far longer than one year for DCAA to conduct an audit of the interest rates and for DCMA to negotiate contract modifications. Thus, in addition to our philosophical objections, we believe it’s simply unworkable in practice.

Now before you get all worked up, we also consulted other practitioners at affected contractors, at least one of whom attended in person an industry meeting with Mr. Assad to discuss this new guidance Memo. The other folks told us, “it could have been worse.” In other words, they think they can live with it.

And unless you, too, are a fully CAS-covered contractor with a defined benefit pension plan, then it’s their opinion that matters and not yours. And likely not ours, either.

 

Breaking Down the Silos

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We all know that the organizational “silos” undercut both efficiency and effectiveness. The silos—and the myopic self-interest such entities promote—act to sub-optimize decision-making time after time after time. It’s no longer about the larger organizational mission, and it becomes (at some level) about the mission of the smaller entity. Individuals in the smaller entity think primarily of their own interests, and not the interests of the larger organization. And so the larger strategic objectives suffer because poor decisions are made. Strategic objectives are not attained because the organization, as a whole, is not internally aligned. In at least some respects, the organization may actually be working at cross-purposes.

We all know this to be true. We’ve all experienced this situation. It’s likely the most common work environment in mid-size and larger organizations. Indeed, finding a large organization that was not divided into “silos” would be a rare and pleasant surprise.

Yet despite our best efforts to “smash the silos” (as one consultancy puts it), the “rice bowls” and “fiefdoms” and similar organizational entities seem to persist.

Perhaps it’s just human nature.

Perhaps we should expect ambitious folks to “build their empires” and defend their ‘turf’ from those who would seek to integrate (or annex, if you prefer) disparate organizational entities into one. Perhaps we should simply accept the fact that Type A individuals will put their own self-interest ahead of the interests of the entire organization.

Still ….

It’s tough to be an effective consultant when the hiring organization cannot operate effectively, because of competing organizational silos.

You hire PwC or KPMG or Deloitte or EY, or Accenture or FTI, and you are paying top-dollar for expertise and experience—both of which inform strategic and tactical recommendations. If you hire Apogee Consulting, Inc., you pay significantly less, but you are still paying for the same thing. The same concept holds true for any consultant or professional you may hire—including attorneys.

If you decide to hire outside advisors, you pretty much know you are going to be paying some significant dollars.

So why would you let your ability to implement those expensive recommendations be undercut by your own organization?

Of course you wouldn’t do that in a rational work environment; but, as we’ve already noted, irrational structures and self-dealing individuals persist, despite management’s efforts to eradicate them. (And that assumes management knows about them; they are often hidden from sight in backoffice eddies.)

Too often—far too often—we’ve experienced bizarre and irrational organizational behavior that undercut the strategy and tactics for dealing with Government compliance issues. Big companies, mid-size companies, even small companies: all exhibit a tendency to let competition between internal organizational entities stop effective implementation of the recommended courses of action. And this has been true even after top leadership has agreed to implement the recommendations.

In 1999, a multi-billion dollar corporation paid a consultancy about $500,000 for an in-depth analysis of its contracting and billing functions. The analysis took about six weeks and involved a joint effort with internal counsel and other employees, who were seconded to the analysis team to make sure the consultants got it right. The corporation needed to get it right, because the Department of Justice was already involved. For that $500,000 investment, plus the additional investment of internal time and resources, the corporation received 18 very detailed recommendations. The consultancy was thanked for its efforts; the bills were paid. And then … the corporation actually implemented only one of the 18 recommendations. The other 17 recommendations were ignored.

Why? Why would a corporation facing significant sanctions make those investments and then not make the necessary changes to create the “return on investment” that they had told themselves they wanted?

Many of those other 17 recommendations involved making changes to the ways in which aspects of the corporation operated. They threatened fiefdoms and rice bowls and turf. From one perspective, it was easier to ignore them than to think about work flow and reorganizations and employee transfers. From another perspective, it was easier to ignore them than to expend the political capital necessary to make the changes.

Regardless of the reason, the corporation’s shareholders spent half a million dollars, and received very little return on their investment.

And this is but one of the many examples we could write about.

We could write about the multi-billion defense contractor that paid $500,000 for a new approach to risk management, one that would be designed to reduce line stoppages that stemmed from vendor delivery delays. They got what they paid for, only to see the innovative approach killed by “sector management” because it was that entity who “owned” risk management, organizationally speaking. Innovation threatened their monopolistic position. And so the contractor paid its bills and got nothing in return.

We could write about the mid-size E&C contractor who let its corporate accounting function hold-off the hiring of external consultants to perform an independent analysis of its indirect cost allocation structure (since there was no reason to change what had been successfully working for so long). Yeah, that worked for them—right up to the time DCAA pulled the accounting system adequacy because the company couldn’t document, trace, or support its indirect cost allocations.

So here’s the thing: we consultants do not like to see our time and efforts wasted by your organizational inefficiencies. Despite the popular stereotype, most every consultant we know gets great satisfaction from seeing their recommendations successfully implemented and seeing your problems resolved. We do not simply want to take your money: we very much want to help you solve your problems and improve your operations. Our success is measured by your success, not by the bills you pay.

When you pay our bills but don’t take our recommendations, when your problems go unresolved because you don’t take our advice, then that disappoints us more than you can imagine.

And when you listen to us and agree to implement the actions that we both agree are the right actions to take, and then you don’t implement the actions because your internal organizational “silos” are not aligned and, indeed, engaged in active warfare with the goal of scuttling the organization’s strategic objectives because they threaten somebody’s little fiefdom … well, that upsets us more than you can possibly imagine.

***

Why did we write this blog article? Why did this topic come to the forefront of our consciousness today?

Oh, no particular reason.

Why do you ask?

 

Hiatus Coming

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Don’t panic but we’re not going to be posting many blog articles on this website for a while.

Why?

Well, relocation, for one reason.

Apogee Consulting, Inc. is moving its physical location from Orange County, CA to North Dallas, Texas.

Moving takes some effort and thus, we will have little time for article writing over the next few weeks.

So please do not give up on us! We’ll be back in August with more articles.

In the meantime, Nick Sanders, Principal Consultant, will be co-Chair at the upcoming DCAA Audit & Compliance Bootcamp in San Diego, CA.

Come to San Diego in late July!

Introduce yourself to Nick: he’ll buy you a drink, we promise.

We’ll be back as soon as we can ….

 

Update on Apogee Consulting, Inc.

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Flying on a plane between Texas and California, it seems an appropriate time to give a 38,000 foot perspective on where Apogee Consulting, Inc. is going.

The consulting continues, though at lower levels than we’ve previously experienced. We thank our clients for their continued use of our services, and for their referrals. We will continue to provide consulting services to those who request them, though we will do so from Texas instead of California.

The website continues, though quite honestly we’re a bit concerned about the lack of use of some of our features. For instance, though we get anywhere from 600 to 1,000 visits a week, almost nobody cares to leave comments or reactions to our blog articles. It was some of our regular visitors who requested those features, and we spent time and money to create the functionality. If they’re not going to be used, we’ll probably kill them come January.

The fate of the comments/reactions functionality is in your hands, gentle readers.

The other feature that’s not being used is that of our accumulated knowledge resources. You can find things there that are tough to find anywhere else. Yet, despite what we think is much value, almost nobody is using them. Thus: we probably won’t be adding many new resources to our repository. As we look to streamline the future site, we’ll evaluate such features based on usage/popularity.

We will be resuming blogging soon but, consistent with the state of flux involved in relocating halfway across the country, readers should not expect daily updates. Right now, once or twice a week seems to be the right level—unless something really frosts us and demands a screed of outrage.

So what will we be doing with all our free time?

Well, for starters we have a few eBooks to get written. We’ll start with something on Leadership that’s never been published anywhere, and then we’ll do at least one compilation of well-received blog articles from this site. The compilations will be for sale – for cheap! – on Amazon. We’ll announce them here. Look for them before too long.

We are also thinking about bigger fish, such as a book on the Cost Accounting Standards that does more than simply rehash the rules and regulations. It seems past time for such a book to be written, and we think we have the chops to see it through. Only time (and a willing publisher!) will tell.

So that’s the 38,000 foot perspective on 2013 and beyond.

Thanks for your support.

 

Termination for Default

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It’s a drastic, final, solution—and a decision that the government should never make lightly. We’re talking about a default termination (T4D).

We’re talking about T4D because our long-time supporter “Black Hawk Dawn” asked us to.

There’s so much to write about T4Ds we hardly know where to start. It’s a complex subject with myriad facets. Perhaps most importantly, the government typically needs to follow an exact series of steps in is process and, for each of those steps, the contractor may have one or more defenses available to it. Often, the contractor is able to convince a court that its T4D was inappropriate, and have its T4D converted into a Termination for Convenience (T4C), which is obviously a much more beneficial outcome.

You want to know how complex the T4D process is? Google “A-12 Termination”. There has been roughly 20 years of litigation associated with that particular T4D—including a SCOTUS decision in 2011. Reportedly, both sides spent a combined $500 million on attorneys’ fees during that 20 year period.

The T4D process is so complex that the DOD has a published a 2007 guide—weighing-in at 109 pages in length—to assist Contracting Officers in properly terminating a contract for default.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) discusses T4D at Subpart 49.4. Here’s a link for your reading pleasure. If you read it, you’ll see that a T4D is what happens when a contractor fails to perform its contractual duties. In theory, the T4D remedy is available to any Contracting Officer whose contractor fails to perform any contractual duties, including compliance with those “incorporated by reference” Section I clauses that nobody ever reads. But of course the reality is that T4D is a drastic action that is normally reserved for the most egregious performance failures, such as when a contractor walks off the job or gives the CO an ultimatum involving delivery.

For example, should a contractor tell the CO that it’s not going to deliver any goods unless the contract is modified in its favor, it should expect the T4D process to start.

We found a semi-interesting ASBCA case that illustrates some of the complexities associated with a T4D—it’s the September, 2011, decision in the matter of Environmental Safety Consultants, Inc. (ESCI).

The first thing we noted was that ESCI was represented by its President and not a Beltway attorney. We’ve found that to be a warning indicator in other decisions. (We wrote about our thoughts on the matter right here.)

Here’s the story:

ESCI received a contract in November, 1995, “to remove old and install new underground and above ground fuel storage tanks at 35 building sites on the Naval Weapons Station (NWS), Yorktown, Virginia.” Apparently the contract was firm, fixed-price in the amount of $561,764.25 and permitted submission of Progress Payments. The contract also specified that Liquidated Damages could be assessed at the rate of $500 per each day delivery was delayed. In December, 1995, the government told ESCI that it could proceed with the work. In February, 1996, the government told ESCI that 14 of the 35 tanks were ready and available to be removed.

You might think that, upon winning a contract and being told that you had authorization to proceed with work, you would, uh, actually start work. You might think that, upon being told several weeks later that 14/35 of your workload was awaiting your contractually agreed-upon action, you would, uh, actually start work. Well, if you were ESCI, then you’d be wrong.

ESCI took a different tack. ESCI decided to wait until early April, 1996, to mobilize at the site. ESCI didn’t start doing any work until three weeks later, as April came to a close. Consequently, as of June 30, 1996, “after three months of work and less than two months before the specified contract completion date then in effect (26 August 1996), ESCI had completed only 20 percent of the contract work.”

Now, let’s be honest about this. We’ve all been there—right? We’ve all delayed and procrastinated and waited until the last minute before putting distractions away and getting down to business. Hell, we remember in college, waiting until the midnight before the paper was due before getting out the typewriter and starting to put words on paper. (This was in ancient times before the advent of PCs, obviously.)

The point is: it didn’t matter when ESCI started. What mattered was when ESCI finished. So long as it finished within its contractually agreed-upon due date, all would be well.

And then came the fuel oil spill.

It was alleged that the spill stemmed from ESCI’s failure to properly secure the tank in the excavation, and the Judge found that to be the case.

And then came the second fuel oil spill, two weeks later.

The Judge found that the second spill was caused by ESCI’s failure to “properly shore the tank during excavation.”

At this point, the government customer began to get concerned. As the Judge wrote—

By letter dated 24 July 1996 and at a meeting on 30 July 1996, the government expressed its concerns to ESCI about its performance of the contract to date. These concerns included among others, the lack of an effective quality control (QC) program with no full-time QC manager on-site and non-compliance with the contract requirements for: (i) marking utilities; (ii) providing shoring and site safety plans; (iii) notification to the contracting officer 48 hours before beginning excavation; (iv) barricades for open excavations; (v) protection of government utilities; (vi) repair of utilities damaged in the course of the work; (vii) timely submission of daily production and QC reports; (viii) timely submission of weekly payrolls for labor standards enforcement; and (ix) secondary containment piping material, sump and depth of underground installation.

The government began to issue “contract non-compliance notices” to ESCI. Meanwhile, ESCI kept submitted requests for Progress Payments. As the Judge wrote—

On 21 August 1996, five days before the contract completion date specified in Modification No. POOOOl, ESCI submitted its progress payment Invoice No.3 indicating that as of 21 August 1996, performance of the contract was 34.9 percent complete. The government estimate of the percentage of completion on that date was 30.4 percent.

The government paid the request and ESCI kept working on the site, long after the contractually specified due date had passed. It was not until 18 September that the CO issued a “cure notice” which is a mandatory step in the T4C process. For its part, ESCI responded to the cure notice by proposing to hire a subcontractor to complete the remaining work. On October 4, the CO sent a letter to ESCI stating that the government was “considering default termination” and “offered ESCI the opportunity to show that its failure to perform ‘arose from causes beyond your control and without fault or negligence on your part.’”

In October and November, ESCI’s subcontractor(s) continued to perform work at the site, with the government’s knowledge and approval. One of those subcontractors was Rickmond Environmental. The record supports the assessment that Rickmond performed well and that the government was satisfied with how things were going.

In May 1997, ESCI’s payment bond surety notified the government that it was paying claims for four ESCI subcontractors. A month later, “Rickmond left the site and did not return to work thereafter.” At that point, ESCI owed Rickmond $114,000 on unpaid invoices.

At that point, ESCI submitted progress payment request No. 7, showing that 78.7 percent of the contractually agreed-upon work had been completed. It was now 10 months after then contractually agreed-upon performance completion date. But this time, the CO refused to pay the request, citing ESCI’s unpaid subcontractors.

On September 30, 1997, thirteen months after the original completion date, the CO gave ESCI another 30 days to get its act together “or termination for default proceedings will be initiated.”

On January 6, 1998, ESCI received another cure notice.

On January 22, 1998, the CO offered ESCI an opportunity to “show cause” why its contract “should not be terminated for default.” ESCI replied, stating that the failure to complete the contract “was caused by government changes and delays and by the government's wrongful withholding of payment of ESCI's progress payment Invoice No.7.”

On March 20, 1998—

ESCI submitted a letter to the contracting officer stating among other things that ‘ESCI is owed approximately $257,833.25 for work completed, plus interest as of June 30, 1997.’ This letter also referred to its plan for having the work completed by a subcontractor or subcontractors other than Rickmond.

On April 10, 1998, the CO replied to ESCI’s letter, disputing its assertions. On May 8, 1998, the government issued its third show-cause letter to ESCI. (Actually, we think it was the second show-cause, but it might have been the third cure notice.) ESCI replied to that letter, proposing to increase the contract price by $128,000 so that a subcontractor could complete the work.

On June 12, 1998, the CO terminated ESCI’s contract for default, roughly 21 months after the original contract completion date had passed.

Guess what? The ASBCA Judge found that the government had not complied with the T4D processes, and thus ESCI’s T4D would be converted to a T4C.

What?

We mean, if ever a contract should have been T4D’d it would appear to have been this one. Nearly two years after the contractual completion date, the work still had not been completed. How could ESCI have escaped its T4D fate?

Well, let’s see how the Judge parsed the situation.

The Judge found that the government had waived its right to enforce the contract’s completion date by its actions. As the Judge wrote—

… the subsequent actions of the parties starting with the instruction in the second paragraph of the contracting officer's 30 June 1997 notice of rejection of Invoice No.7 and extending over the next 11 months clearly indicated that the 30 June 1997 completion date in Modification No. P00006 was not of the essence of the contract … The repeated incantation of reservation of rights language in some of the government letters, followed by no action to terminate and further suggestions for compromise, further weakened any validity to the 30 June 1997 completion date. After eleven months of this dalliance, it was incumbent on the government to issue a new and reasonable completion date before terminating the contract for default.

But that was not the end of the story.

ESCI then filed another appeal at the ASBCA, asking for payment of the progress payment request that was rejected by the Contracting Officer. Remember, that payment request (in the amount of $138,506) was originally submitted in June, 1997. Judge Freeman wrote--

Fourteen years later, ESCI submitted to the contracting officer a payment request with an invoice dated 29 November 2011 for the original amount of Invoice No. 7 ($138,506.50) plus $433,381.33 for interest on that original amount from 1 January 1997 through 31 December 2011.

That, good friends, is chutzpah.

The problem with ESCI’s cunning plan was that it had failed to submit a certified claim to the Contracting Officer, and had failed to obtain a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision, before filing its appeal at the ASBCA. In essence, ESCI had nothing from which to appeal, since the CO had never issued a COFD on a certified claim. (We’ve discussed this point before, many times, notably right here.) We are reluctantly forced to conclude that ESCI failed to read our blog articles.

ESCI’s appeal of nothing was denied without prejudice “for lack of jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the door was left open for ESCI to file a certified claim to the CO, receive a COFD, and reinstate its appeal. At which point, the government is free to argue that the CDA Statute of Limitations operates to separately deny the ASBCA jurisdiction.

But that’s not the end of the story.

ESCI filed another appeal, this time asking for attorney fees in accordance with the Equal Access to Justice Act. Its appeal was denied because the Judge found that the government’s position was substantially justified.

But that’s not the end of the story.

The ASBCA heard another appeal in this case, this time one brought by the Department of the Navy). Apparently, the government did appeal the ASBCA decision, but subsequently the Department of Justice attorneys agreed to dismiss the government’s appeal before it was heard. This did not sit well with the Department of the Navy attorneys. As Judge Freeman wrote—

Dissatisfied with the Department of Justice's agreement to the dismissal of its appeal in the Federal Circuit, the contracting agency (Department of the Navy) returned to this Board on 28 September 2012 with a ‘Motion for Relief from Judgment’ pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)and 60(b)(6).

The Navy’s Motion pled for the Judge to consider ESCI’s conduct during the course of the proceedings, which allegedly included:

… violating the Prompt Payment Act (PPA), submitting false certifications and false claims to the Government, and making repeated slanderous and offensive accusations, and threats directed at the Board, Government counsel, and other Government officials and trial witnesses …

The Judge told the Navy to man-up and suck it up, writing—

All of the grounds for relief in the government's motion are matters that could have been presented in a timely motion for reconsideration, or on appeal to the Federal Circuit. The government's present motion does not assert any newly-discovered, outcome-determinative facts leading up to the termination, and we otherwise find no extraordinary or exceptional circumstances pertinent to the merits of the case that, in the nature of an FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion, would justify vacating the decision. The government's Motion for Relief from Judgment is nothing more than an untimely motion for reconsideration, or attempt to argue its now dismissed appeal to the Federal Circuit.

Does that end the story of ESCI and its $500,000 UST contract? Only time will tell ….

Getting back to the original article topic, we trust the ESCI story shows both the complexity of the T4D process and how a contractor might assert defenses to a T4D that it might receive. Note that ESCI’s Contracting Officer issued both “cure notices” and “show cause” notices prior to terminating the contract. Those are mandatory steps.

But the fact that multiple notices were issued actually worked against the Government in this instance, as did the reasonableness of the CO and the attempts to work out a resolution with the contractor. The fact that no revised completion date was put into the contract operated to waive the Government’s rights with respect to the original completion date. The ESCI story points to the fact that the Government must walk the T4D process exactly, with no missteps along the way. Otherwise, the contractor may successfully get its T4D converted into a T4C.

“Diamond Dave” from Denver told us that he likes the shorter, pithier, blog articles on this site. This has not been one of them. Sorry about that, “Diamond Dave.” But we trust “Black Hawk Dawn” got what she asked for.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.