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Apogee Consulting Inc

ASBCA Takes Hard Line on J.F. Taylor’s Request for Attorney Fees

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Bad_Judges
The original J.F. Taylor decision was a resounding victory for contractors who think DCAA has overreached in its attempts to find a basis for questioning compensation costs. We wrote about the decision right here. Judge Shackleford found that the unrebutted evidence showed that DCAA’s methodology for establishing the reasonableness of executive compensation was “fatally flawed statistically” and “significantly overstated and speculative.”

Good stuff, and a great win for contractors everywhere (though DCAA has, to all appearances, ignored that ASBCA decision and continues to question exec comp costs using the same flawed methodology).

But then J.F. Taylor submitted an application for nearly $200,000 in attorney fees it had incurred appealing the matter, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Judge Shackleford denied the request, finding that the government’s position was “substantially justified” because it was based on published regulation (citing R&B Bewachungsgesellschaft mbH, ASBCA No. 42221, 93-3 BCA If 26,010, aff'd on recon., 94-1 BCA 126,315). As Judge Shackleford wrote, “… the method used by the government to evaluate the reasonableness of executive compensation had been used over a long period of time and this methodology was part of the DCAA contract audit manual.” In other words, Judge Shackleford conflated the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM)—which is an internal document published by and for DCAA auditors without public input and without the force of regulation—with published regulations such as the FAR. Even the non-lawyers here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. thought that was an error of law that demanded a Motion for Reconsideration.

J.F Taylor’s attorneys thought so too, and filed that Motion. In a recent decision, Judge Shackleford denied it as well.

Judge Shackleford’s decision was based on the fact that the government’s position was supported by legal precedent—namely, the Techplan decision. Even though the original decision found that DCAA “generally followed” the Techplan approach to evaluating exec comp, the Judge also found that J.F. Taylor’s expert statistician challenged “Step 6” of the Techplan analysis, and that challenge was unrebutted. Therefore, the Judge opined that—

That [failure to rebut] may have been a tactical error in defending the claim, but not one fatal to substantial justification of the position it took relying on Techplan as precedent. … [while] reliance on the DCAA manual and long standing practice alone might not justify an otherwise unreasonable position, but those factors combined with the fact that the methodology in the manual was based upon legal precedent (Techplan) justified the government's position.

Having so found, Judge Shackelford then indulged in a bit of what attorneys might call obiter dicta, opining that—

While one could quibble over the status of the DCAA manual and the established practice by DCAA in approaching executive compensation cases, the fact remains that the Techplan decision was established law that the government relied upon and that the DCAA manual was based upon; and, on that basis, we do not modify our decision that the government's position was substantially justified.

So okay, then. Unlike our prior article where we thought Judge Shackleford’s elevation of the DCAA CAM to regulatory status was a travesty and judicial error of epic proportions, we’re not going to go there again. You win some; you lose some. J.F Taylor won its case in main and avoiding paying some $500,000. The fact that it had to spend $200,000 to do so is an unfortunate reality of litigation.

We are not going to get all worked up regarding how the Judge changed the basis of his original finding, so as to continue to find that the government’s position was “substantially justified.” We’re not going to get all worked up about how he elided J.F. Taylor’s attorneys’ arguments about the purpose of the EAJA. DCAA and DCMA got away with another one, apparently.

It happens.

In order for the contracting community to roll back the tide of unreasonable DCAA findings and unsupported Contracting Officer decisions, individual contractors, such as J.F. Taylor, need to stand up and say, “enough is enough.” Those courageous contractors need to spend the funds litigating, even with little likelihood that they will have their attorney fees reimbursed. Only in such a manner can the rule of law prevail over the petty bureaucrats and their flawed administrative policies.

 

 

NASA Proposes to Adopt DFARS Proposal Adequacy Checklist

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We were dumbstruck to learn that the USPS OIG thought that the DFARS Estimating System adequacy criteria were “best practices” for designing an adequate estimating system. We were croggled to learn that DOE had decided to adopt the DFARS Business System compliance regime. We continue to believe that the DFARS business system adequacy criteria might be fine for a contracting environment that is willing to pay a nearly 20 percent price premium for such niceties, but that the criteria make little or no sense outside of such an environment.

What works for DOD should not be expected to work for civilian agencies—and there is considerable room for debate as to whether the Business System compliance regime actually works well for DOD. As we recently reported, the DOD Inspector General has expressed concerns with the ability of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditors to conduct business system related audits in a timely fashion. Further, there is some question in our minds as to whether the adequacy criteria associated with Purchasing System adequately address taxpayer interests.

And now NASA has proposed to adopt the DFARS Proposal Adequacy checklist.

Why?

According to NASA rulemakers—

This proposed rule supports the NASA Assistant Administrator for Procurement's “Reducing Transaction Costs in NASA Procurements” initiative by incorporating the requirement for a proposal adequacy checklist into the NFS at 1815.408-70(c), and associated solicitation provision at NFS 1852.215-85, to ensure offerors take responsibility for submitting thorough, accurate, and complete proposals.

Yeah, sure it will. Forcing bidders to complete an onerous checklist is sure to reduce the overhead costs of those same contractors. Oh, wait! NASA doesn’t really care about the overhead costs of its contractors. Instead, NASA cares about “streamlining” its source selections so as to reduce “lead time.” Don’t believe us? Check this out.

Implementation of the DFARS Proposal Adequacy checklist will do neither.

NASA already has jumped on the DOD/DCAA bandwagon with respect to “risk-based” audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (aka “incurred cost audits”). (See this memo.) And now the nation’s space agency wants to keep the momentum going by taking on the DOD/DCAA Proposal Adequacy checklist.

What do these two things—DFARS Proposal Adequacy checklist and acceptance of DCAA’s new approach to not auditing contractors’ claimed costs—have in common?

You guessed it: DCAA is what they have in common.

While DCMA is moving away from use of DCAA wherever it can, NASA seems to be cuddling closer and closer. Apparently NASA is so tied into use of DCAA that it is eager to adopt any initiative that DCAA proposes, regardless of whether the evidence supports a linkage between initiative and desired results. Pretty weird for a science-based agency, huh?

If you are a NASA contractor and want to submit comments regarding the proposed adoption of the DFARS Proposal Adequacy checklist, the link to the proposed rule (above) will tell you how to do so.

 

Purchasing System Controls

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Data_Mining
Contractors that generate more than $25 million in sales to the Federal government via cost-type contracts or sole-source fixed-price contracts (including modifications thereto) are eligible to receive a visit from DCMA functional specialists who will perform a Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR). The objective of a CPSR is “to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness with which the contractor spends Government funds and complies with Government policy when subcontracting.” (Ref. FAR Subpart 44.3.) Special CPSR focus areas include—

(a) The results of market research accomplished;

(b) The degree of price competition obtained;

(c) Pricing policies and techniques, including methods of obtaining certified cost or pricing data, and data other than certified cost or pricing data;

(d) Methods of evaluating subcontractor responsibility, including the contractor’s use of the System for Award Management Exclusions (see 9.404) and, if the contractor has subcontracts with parties on the Exclusions list, the documentation, systems, and procedures the contractor has established to protect the Government’s interests (see 9.405-2);

(e) Treatment accorded affiliates and other concerns having close working arrangements with the contractor;

(f) Policies and procedures pertaining to small business concerns, including small disadvantaged, women-owned, veteran-owned, HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns;

(g) Planning, award, and postaward management of major subcontract programs;

(h) Compliance with Cost Accounting Standards in awarding subcontracts;

(i) Appropriateness of types of contracts used (see 16.103); and

(j) Management control systems, including internal audit procedures, to administer progress payments to subcontractors.

Astute readers looking at the CPSR focus areas above might notice a curious omission. It’s difficult to discern where the DCMA functional specialists would evaluate a contractor’s internal controls that would mitigate risks of corruption. For example, where is the evaluation of the contractor’s controls that act to prevent receipt of bribes and kickbacks by personnel involved in purchasing?

That’s where DCAA comes into the picture. DCAA auditors can perform additional testing of the contractor’s internal controls related to its purchasing system—at least in theory. In fact, the DCAA has prepared an internal control matrix that can be a useful tool for contractors seeking to assess their purchasing system internal controls. In theory, DCAA can either perform its audit procedures as part of the CPSR team, or on its own (based on its perception of risk).

We say “in theory,” of course, because DCAA doesn’t, as a rule, actually perform audits of contractors’ purchasing system internal controls in the current environment. Reviews of contractors’ business systems are not the highest priority for the Pentagon’s audit agency at the moment. Such audits have fallen to the bottom of the in-box in the same way that post-award “defective pricing” reviews have slipped in priority, and in the same way that Disclosure Statement adequacy reviews have slipped in priority. (That’s not to say that no such reviews are being performed; but it’s fairly clear that the number of such reviews has dropped precipitously, such that there is a very low probability that your company will experience one in the near future.)

The Department of Defense has thus effectively ceded purchasing system internal control testing to the contractors. It is up to the contractors to both establish their internal control systems and to test them for efficacy. And in times of budgetary pressure, should we be surprised if contractors decide that they have more important investments for their overhead dollars? Should we be surprised if contractors decide to cut back, or to forego altogether, the kind of internal reviews and testing procedures that would tend to ferret out employee wrongdoing—such as those that would detect corruption by personnel involved in purchasing?

The thoughts above may provide some context for a recent news story, reporting that a former Boeing “procurement officer” and three vendors were indicted by a Federal grand jury for mail and wire fraud “stemming from a bribery and kickback scheme involving Boeing military aircraft parts.” According to the news report—

Boeing Procurement Officer Deon Anderson allegedly provided J.L. Manufacturing, a Washington-based aerospace job machine shop, non-public competitor bid information and historical price information in connection with multiple Boeing military aircraft part purchase order requests. That information was used in bids submitted by J.L. Manufacturing to Boeing for approximately nine different Boeing parts requests - of those nine, J.L. Manufacturing was awarded seven, totaling more than $2 million. In exchange for the information, J.L. Manufacturing's Robert Diaz and Jeffrey Lavelle made cash payments to Anderson in St. Louis and California.

In addition, the indictment states that another Boeing sub-contractor, William Boozer, the owner and operator of Globe Dynamics, asked Anderson to provide non-public competitor bid information and price information in exchange for cash payments. Anderson gave Boozer information for bids on behalf of Globe Dynamics for approximately 16 different Boeing requests. Of the 16 bids, Globe Dynamics was awarded seven purchase orders to supply U.S. military aircraft parts to Boeing - totaling more than $1.5 million.

Boeing is reportedly cooperating with the prosecutors, as well it should. We’d like to think it was Boeing’s vigilance that detected the alleged wrongdoing, but we have our cynical doubts. Consequently, it behooves Boeing to cooperate fully, lest allegations of lax oversight and lack of controls lead it to an unwanted membership in the five percent withhold club.

The thing is, it shouldn’t have been that difficult to detect the alleged corrupt arrangement. While it may be possible that a single bidder might win seven of 16 competitions, having another vendor win seven of nine competitions should have raised some eyebrows. That kind of win ratio might well be considered to be a risk indicator for corruption within the purchasing function. It would seem fairly easy to mine procurement system data for such anomalies. (And again, for all we know, that’s exactly what Boeing did.)

Given the Government’s seeming retreat with respect to testing contractor purchasing system anti-corruption controls, it’s more important than ever for contractors to implement data mining and other, relatively inexpensive, techniques that act to detect employee wrongdoing. If nothing else, such controls will tend to keep embarrassingly news reports to a minimum.

 

The Timeliness of Follow-up Audits

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DCAA_logo
The Government contracting community was uneasy when DOD proposed to revise the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in 2011 to adopt a new approach to surveilling and evaluating contractors’ internal control systems. We shared the general apprehension. In fact, we wrote articles and even submitted comments to the DAR Council, in the hope that the members might reconsider the proposed approach.

Yeah, like that was ever going to happen.

And so the final rule was issued and now several Defense contractors have joined the 5 percent “withhold club”—which may be an amusing turn of phrase, since DOD now uses the threat of payment withholds as a club to beat contractors into agreeing with audit report findings (no matter how flawed) or to beat price concessions out of them when negotiations become rocky. And it’s no longer just Defense contractors who will be feeling the pain associated with the “business systems” oversight regime. As we told our readers, the Department of Energy has decided to adopt the DOD oversight approach. And thus, soon the lives of the DOE contractors—but not the M&O contractors, who were exempted from DOE’s new rules—will be filled with joy and rainbows. (Please read that previous sentence in a sarcastic tone of voice.)

Yet, as we look back on the original concerns and comments submitted by so many (including us), we are struck by their relevance. For example, we took the DAR Council to task because we thought the proposed rules would be “unworkable” since DCMA and DCAA would lack resources to support the new requirements. In particular, we thought DCAA’s role in the follow-up process (to confirm contractors had implemented the required system corrective actions) was going to be problematic. We told the DAR Council—

At its current workload, DCAA already takes years to resolve follow-up business systems audits. The author has personally been witness to follow-up audits that lay fallow for two or more years, because DCAA’s auditors constantly are reassigned to meet the needs of ‘demand audits’ and other internal priorities. Let us reiterate: DCAA cannot support timely audits of contractor business systems, issue its audit reports in a timely manner, and provide timely reviews of contractor corrective actions. It’s simply impossible and no platitudes from DCAA or the DAR Council will make it possible.

[Emphasis in original. Link to comments provided above.]

And now the Department of Defense Inspector General has told Patrick Fitzgerald, Director of DCAA, much the same thing. In a recent audit report, the DOD IG told DCAA its business system follow-up audits were not being performed timely.

The DOD IG was investigating a hotline allegation that DCAA auditors had negligently, in non-compliance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), issued an audit report concluding that a contractor in the Northeast had corrected previous findings of system deficiencies in that contractor’s Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS), which is one of the six “business systems.” In September, 2005, DCAA issued an audit report finding 30 individual deficiencies in the MMAS. In January, 2007, DCAA initiated a follow-up audit to evaluate whether or not the contractor had corrected those 30 deficiencies. DCAA issued its audit report in September, 2008, finding that the contractor had corrected 28 of the 30 deficiencies.

Note it took DCAA a full 18 months to start the follow-up audit, and another 21 months to issue it—meaning the ACO received the follow-up report more than three years after hearing about the contractor’s system deficiencies. In fairness, we also have to note that this all took place years before the promulgation of the revised DFARS rules. But similar anecdotal evidence of DCAA’s inability to issue timely audit reports abounded at the time—and informed the comments submitted to the DAR Council. Since then—as we’ve reported—the delays have gotten worse, not better. For example, the IG reported that the DCAA Field Audit Office (FAO) “initiated a second follow-up audit” to evaluate the two remaining deficiencies in August, 2011—nearly three years after the first follow-up audit report was issued. And according to the IG, that second follow-up audit was “still ongoing” two years after it started.

And therein we find the crux of this article.

We are much less concerned that the IG substantiated the original hotline allegation that the DCAA auditor (since retired) had concluded 28 of the 30 deficiencies had been remediated “without obtaining adequate evidence” and thus “the Government does not have a reasonable basis for relying on the accuracy of material costs charged by the DoD contractor.” Whatever. We all know that DCAA obtaining adequate evidence to support its audit findings is, by far, the exception and not the rule. The IG’s finding is but one of a host of similar findings they could make, if only they looked for them.

The big deal—and this is something that the DOD IG keyed on as well—is the untimeliness of the DCAA follow-up audits. The IG wrote—

In March 2010, the contracting officer requested that the DCAA FAO perform a second follow-up audit to review the contractor’s efforts to eliminate the two outstanding deficiencies and provide the results of the review by May 2010. Yet, more than 3 years later, the FAO has still not completed the second follow-up audit. The FAO told us that the completion of the audit was delayed because of other priority work. It is unreasonable for the FAO to take more than 3 years to complete a limited follow-up audit of two deficiencies.

In addition to be unreasonable, the DOD IG also found that the situation was noncompliant with the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM). It wrote: “According to the [CAM], the auditor should place a high priority on conducting follow-up audits of previously reported business system deficiencies….” More importantly, the IG wrote—

The failure of DCAA to conduct a timely follow-up audit compromises the contracting officer’s responsibility in determining the adequacy of the MMAS, implementing withholdings in accordance with DFARS 252.242.7005, and reducing or eliminating withholdings to reflect the contractor’s progress in correcting deficiencies. Contracting officers might not withhold payments if DCAA does not uphold its responsibility to conduct timely follow-up audits of contractor corrective actions.

To address this concern, the IG recommended that DCAA should “assess the timeliness of follow-up audits on an agency-wide basis and make appropriate improvements in related quality assurance procedures.”

Readers may find it interesting that the DOD IG thought the DCAA Director’s comments to that recommendation were “non-responsive”. The IG wrote—

The Director, DCAA, agreed ‘in principle.’ DCAA recognizes that it can improve the timeliness of business system follow-up audits agency-wide. However, the Director stated that the requirements for DCAA services far exceed the available staffing and management must make decisions on which priority assignments take precedence. In addition, the Director does not believe ‘a detailed assessment of the timeliness of business systems follow-up reviews is a good use of DCAA’s limited resources.’

The DOD IG thought the Director, DCAA, could do better. The audit report stated—

We disagree that assessing timeliness is not a good use of DCAA’s limited resources. An assessment could identify opportunities, best practices, and lessons learned for improving timeliness

When DCAA reports that a major DoD contractor’s business system contains significant deficiencies as defined in DFARS 252.242-7005, DCAA asserts that the deficiencies materially affect the ability of DoD officials to rely on information produced by the system. If the contracting officer agrees with DCAA, the contracting officer must withhold payments until the contractor eliminates the deficiency. Therefore, DCAA plays a critical role in providing the contracting officer with timely information on the status of contractor corrective actions. If DCAA commits resources for conducting a full business system audit and reporting on significant business system deficiencies, then DCAA should place a high priority on performing a limited and timely follow-up of those deficiencies.

Although DCAA policy allows for the reporting of significant business system deficiencies in other audits, this does not address the need for performing timely follow-up audits of the deficiencies (including those identified in other audits).

Yeah.

We told the DAR Council this was going to be an issue under the new DFARS business systems rules. We were not alone in sounding that particular alarm. And the DAR Council ignored all those warnings, for which we believe its members ought to be ashamed.

As for DCAA’s part, we suspect that business system reviews and follow-up audits are going to come back into vogue sometime in the future. This audit report may help in that regard. In addition, the movement of CASB Disclosure Statement adequacy reviews from DCAA to DCMA should help as well—as will the dropping of DCAA from its formerly key role in the Forward Pricing Rate Proposal analysis process.

In other words, DCMA seems to be more than a little tired of receiving audit reports too late to be helpful and which are of dubious quality in any case. Consequently, they are carving DCAA out of their contract administration processes wherever possible. Sooner or later, DCAA will find itself with lots of time on its hands. Perhaps they’ll use that time to perform some business system reviews and follow-up audits.

What else are they going to do?

 

Giving Auditors Real Time Access

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Venus_on_the_Halfshell
For several years DCAA leadership has grumbled about contractors’ failure to give them online and real time access to accounting data. For example, in its GFY 2012 Report to Congress, DCAA stated—

Read-only access to the contractor’s books and records would greatly assist DCAA to effectively plan and perform all of the audit effort at a contractor location. This is especially important at contractors with highly complex Enterprise Application Integrations environments and Enterprise Resource Planning systems.

Contractors are increasingly generating and storing accounting data and records in a digital environment. Whether it’s an Electronic Timecard System, an Electronic Management Records system storing invoices/vouchers, or an automated General Ledger journal entry posting and reconciliation of accounting records within an enterprise accounting system, original accounting source data and records have become increasingly developed and available solely within electronic environments and formats. DCAA has always maintained that direct access to contractor original accounting ‘books of entry’ or source records, whether manually or electronically generated, is authorized under FAR 52.215-2 Audit and Records—Negotiation. Nonetheless, many contractors have denied DCAA the read-only access to their electronic accounting systems data. Accessing these source records is necessary for DCAA to efficiently perform its audit mission and support the Contracting Officer.

Specificity of the authority for direct and online access to contractor’s data would improve both the audit and DCAA’s ability to support the Contracting Officer. For example, direct, read-only online access would allow DCAA to respond more quickly to contracting officers because we could obtain the necessary data directly rather than having to repeatedly request the data from a contractor representative. Furthermore, the access would decrease the amount of costs and personnel resources needed by contractors to support audit requests for data. In addition, online access would advance DCAA audit efforts by allowing real time contract cost monitoring and continuous risk analysis, including the use of advanced data analytics. DCAA is continuing to determine what specific legislative proposal is necessary to ensure that DCAA has appropriate access to a contractor’s online data.

Permit us to respectfully disagree with the foregoing. We disagree with both the premise and conclusions put forth in the official report from DCAA to the U.S. Congress.

We disagree with the foundational premise that the contract clause 52.215-2 grants to DCAA auditors the right to access contractors’ electronic systems—including systems on which accounting data are stored—at their discretion and without limit. Indeed, a review of the clause language indicates that DCAA does have broad access, but certainly not unfettered access. For example, the clause grants DCAA access to the contractor’s physical plant—but only the parts of the plant “engaged in performing the contract” and only at “reasonable times.” Consequently, it seems unlikely that a court would interpret that clause as granting DCAA open access, 24 hours per day, seven days per week, into a contractor’s accounting system, to include those aspects of the accounting system unrelated to government contract costs.

Moreover, we disagree with the notion that online access to contractors’ accounting systems would permit DCAA auditors to “respond more quickly” or increase efficiency. We disagree with the implicit accusation that contractor audit liaison personnel are unresponsive to DCAA audit requests (“repeatedly request the data”). And we certainly disagree with the conclusion that, if DCAA had unfettered online real time access to contractors’ accounting systems, then those contractors could lay off their audit liaison personnel (“decrease the amount of costs and personnel resources needed by contractors to support audit requests”). We disagree with essentially every single word written by DCAA leadership to Congress.

We disagree because our experience has proven otherwise.

Now, we need to be careful here, because of client confidentiality. But following are some general statements based on our first-hand experience.

  • Modern ERP accounting systems are expensive, complex, and difficult to learn. In order to learn the contractor’s individual, customized, implementation of Oracle Financials, PeopleSoft, SAP R/3 or whatever, employees often have to take multiple classes spanning many hours if not weeks of training. These multi-segment systems don’t come out of a box; nor are they birthed, like the goddess Venus, fully formed and riding in a seashell. So who’s going to train the DCAA auditors in the nuances of the contractor’s ERP? The contractor? Don’t be ridiculous. Show us that requirement in a contract clause; we are confident you will not be able to do so. (Truth be told we know of at least one contractor who’s spent tens of thousands of dollars training DCAA auditors in accessing its ERP system. The problem is that the auditor staff doesn’t stay the same, auditors forget how the system works because they only access it every so often, etc. Thus, the contractor spends more money every year retraining DCAA auditors.)

  • Modern ERP accounting systems have rigorous security features, including individual roles, rotating passwords, and automatic account disablement based on too many login errors or a failure to access the system within a given time period. For example, if a registered user doesn’t access the system at least once every six or eight weeks, then the account is disabled. Thus, if an auditor doesn’t access the system every so often, then the account may be disabled and the auditor will be prevented from accessing the system thereafter, until the account is reset. In order to get the account reset, the auditor will have to call the contractor’s IT Security function. How will the auditor get the name/number of the right person to call? Don’t say the auditor should call the contractor’s audit liaison personnel, because they were laid off when DCAA was given their system access. The fact of the matter is that where DCAA auditors have been given access to contractors’ ERP systems, the contractor will subsequently spend a not-insignificant amount of time maintaining that access on behalf of the auditors. In other words, giving DCAA auditors access to the accounting system costs more money, not less.

  • When DCAA auditors have been given access to contractors’ accounting systems, a new problem emerges. Suddenly, the auditors’ system reports don’t tie to the contractor’s reports, and now it is the contractor’s job to reconcile the two versions of the report. In other words, now the contractor has to diagnose the errors made by the auditor in running the report. So instead of giving DCAA access leading to a reduction in contractor audit support personnel, the reverse is actually true—the contractor has to add personnel who can review DCAA’s methodology and explain where the errors were introduced. (Yes. This presupposes the errors were on DCAA’s side. That’s not always the case; but it is the case in about 90% of the discrepancies we’ve seen.) Further, notice who is now performing the analyses and reconciliations: it is no longer the auditor and is now the auditee. Ironic, no?

DCAA leadership would like Congress and others to believe that DCAA’s inability to access contractors’ accounting systems in real time is a significant impediment that delays audits. That assertion is demonstrably wrong. Experience has shown that, the more access auditors are given, the more problems are created, the more work is generated for contractor support personnel, and the longer the audits take. Experience has shown that the most efficient way for DCAA auditors to get the accounting information they need for their audits is to simply and clearly request it from the contractor’s personnel who are trained in the system and know how to extract it.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.