Technology Evolving Too Fast for DOD?
 In September, 2013, the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Port Hueneme, California, issued an RFQ for “180 PowerXpress PPC8A Power PC-based 6U VME embedded computing boards, made by GE Intelligent Platforms in Huntsville, Ala.” The boards were introduced nine years ago and were designed into several Naval surface warship weapon systems—systems whose design configuration has been frozen. In other words, NSWC cannot make design changes to those systems, even the minimal design changes to substitute more recent products that have the same form, fit, and function. As the folks at Military & Aerospace Electronics pointed out, the original manufacturer (GE) does not carry the boards in stock anymore, preferring to use more recently manufactured boards in current designs.
So when NSWC (and other repair depots) runs out of their stock of nearly decade-old PC boards, they have a problem. The problem is called “technological obsolescence” and it’s a byproduct of moving away from the good ol’ days of MILSPEC and, instead, focusing on using Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) parts in military designs.
John Keller, Editor-in-Chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics, wrote up a recent op-ed piece on the pervasive problem. He wrote—
What military program managers and the defense industry face today is a broadly installed base of COTS electronics with capabilities and supportability that is going obsolete rapidly, and with diminishing prospects for being brought back up to date because of crushing military budget cuts. … Military budget cuts are delaying or eliminating scheduled rounds of component upgrades for military systems. Those COTS components that were supposed to be switched out ever five years or so are staying in the field longer than ever. Sometimes only portions of fleets are being upgraded, leaving others to make-do with what they have for indefinite periods. The results are predictable -- obsolete parts and a complicated logistics chain are exactly what we're seeing today as the military adjusts to a rapid downturn in spending. We have electronic components that are going obsolete quickly, with only spotty long-term support. Obsolete COTS technology can be far more problematic than obsolete mil-spec technology.
We visited the DOD DMEA (Defense Microelectronics Activity) website and learned a little bit about the official view of the problem. The DMEA folks wrote—
The primary cause of obsolescence is commercial profit motive: when an item is no longer economical to produce, manufacturers stop producing it. The U.S. Department of Defense also contributes to the problem with its long design-to-acquisition lead times which bring about support requirements for military systems that generally extend from 25 to 30 years, as opposed to the 4-to-7-year support cycle expected for many commercial electronics systems.
Basically, by the time the DOD gets its major weapon systems into production, the original design is already replete with obsolete parts, built by sources who are preparing to end their production and long-term support. Historically the DOD has solved this problem by making large purchases—“life-time buys”—or guaranteeing the manufacturer a certain quantity of purchases, so that a sufficient flow of parts will be there for the weapon system’s life cycle. That ability has been impacted by sequestration and looming budget cuts.
Use of COTS parts has, generally, been viewed as a no-brainer. Why spend time and money designing some MILSPEC part that that is already being produced by private industry? This is especially true when that private industry-designed part is of a more current design, with better operating features. But we are now seeing the other shoe drop, where DOD’s inability to innovate and match the private industry product development cycle is leaving the logistics, repair and maintenance functions with a big headache, as they struggle to source technologically obsolete parts called for by their “frozen” designs.
Here’s a tip.
You want to get rich? Find out what COTS parts are designed into the F-35 and stockpile them. In a couple of years, DOD is going to be asking you for those parts, and you’ll be able to name your price.
Just sayin’….
It’s Past Time for You to Secure Your Supply Chain
It has been awhile since we wrote about the importance of supply chain management. If you are a long-time reader (and, if so, thank you for that!) you know that, from time to time, we rant about the topic and implore you to do something.
Yeah, like that ever works.
If, for example, you had taken our advice posted in April, 2010, you might have started thinking about counterfeit parts and securing your supply chain, with the stated goal of a “product pedigree … through creating an unbreakable chain of custody from first source through the various manufacturing and fabrication and assembly and finishing steps.” A few months later we told readers that effective management of their supply chain was the single most important driver of operational success. We also told readers about DOD positioning to “reward contractors for successful supply chain management.” We have pointed out both the carrot and the stick, and too few of our readers gave a fig newton. It wasn’t their issue.
More recently, we noted Section 818 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and told readers that DCMA was considering “eliminating the ‘Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS)’ business system, and replacing it with a business system focused on detection and prevention of counterfeit parts (the “secure supply chain” system).”
Thus, nobody should be surprised to learn that the DAR Council recently issued an interim rule to implement Section 806 of the 2013 NDAA, which allows DOD customers to “consider the impact of supply chain risk” in evaluating proposals for certain types of national security system contract awards. According to the interim rule, the phrase “supply chain risk” is defined as “the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.”
Contractors who have already created secure supply chain management systems, including not only policies and procedures, but also actual practices, will have an undeniable competitive advantage in evaluations where supply chain risk is a factor. Those who have not, will not.
If you have been a long time reader, you have had more than three years to prepare for this day. Not that you took advantage of that advance notice, mind you. But the opportunity was there….
In related news, a final DFARS rule was published on the same day as the “supply chain risk” rule that requires “defense contractors to incorporate established information security standards on their unclassified networks and to report cyber-intrusion incidents that result in the loss of unclassified controlled technical information from these networks.”
You have been warned.
|
Assad Sets Record Straight Regarding DOD Acquisition “Myths”
We have, from time to time, had differences of opinion with statements and actions made by the Honorable Shay Assad, DOD Director of Pricing.
Mr. Assad has parlayed his former position as Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) into key role that is essentially whatever he wants it to be, from leading fact-finding and negotiations on Major Defense Acquisition Programs to setting contract management policy, and from establishing the Department’s position on how CAS 412 equitable adjustments will be negotiated to defending DCAA’s new, risk-based, approach to determining where the auditors will conduct audits.
Years ago, during the days of the allegedly independent Commission on Wartime Contracting, Mr. Assad successfully positioned himself as the mediator between DCMA and DCAA, and thus ascended over the Directors of those other DOD agencies. We have no problem with that. Our problems have all involved his policy positions and the direction he’s given to those other DOD agencies.
Recently, Federal Times carried a story in which Mr. Assad dispelled certain “myths” about the DOD acquisition workforce. Apparently, he made his remarks in public, at a recent National Contract Management Association (NCMA) symposium. We weren’t there, but we assume the Federal Times reporter (Andy Medici) got the gist of Mr. Assad’s myth-busting.
The first “myth” Mr. Assad “sought to dispel” was the notion that the DOD contracting workforce was untrained and unprepared to award contracts and administer those contracts after award. Not true, according to Mr. Assad. In fact, he asserted that “Our workforce today is healthier and stronger than it has been in the last 10 years or so.”
He also noted that any reports that the acquisition workforce is shrinking are wrong. In fact (according to Mr. Assad), that workforce has grown by roughly 24,000 over the past five years. He also noted that more than one-third of the DCMA contracting officers have industry and/or business experience, thus dispelling the myth that today’s contracting officers are inexperienced.
Thus, according to Mr. Assad, the current state of the DOD acquisition workforce is just fine.
But to keep improving things, Mr. Assad noted that DOD contracting folks will receive “better curricula and more funding” for training.
Well, there you go.
We don’t relish being in constant opposition to Mr. Assad; that’s not what we’re about here. But still …
This website has posted articles that both summarized, and linked to, official GAO reports which indicated that Mr. Assad’s view of the DOD acquisition workforce is optimistic. Do a keyword search on “GAO” or “DOD IG” or “DCMA” and see what you get. We believe there’s sufficient evidence, from official sources, to lead one to the conclusion that there are significant DCMA workforce concerns that need to be addressed. We sincerely hope that Mr. Williams’ successor will make addressing those concerns his or her number one priority.
But it would seem to be difficult to prioritize issues when one is in denial that they even exist. If the doctor doesn’t establish a medical baseline based on correct measurements, one suspects it would be difficult for the doctor to correctly diagnose, and treat, the patient. Similarly, if a senior DOD acquisition leader is operating from an inaccurate assessment of the current state of the acquisition workforce, one suspects that senior acquisition leader might not make the best decisions that would fix the problems reported by official government sources.
DCAA Finds New Ways to Reduce its Audit Backlog
 In September, 2012, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) announced a fundamental change to its approach to auditing contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost submissions”). We discussed the new, “risk-based,” approach in some detail.
A fundamental aspect of the new approach was the bucketing of contractors’’ proposals into either “low risk” or “high risk” categories. In order to be classified as a “low risk” proposal, several criteria must have been met. For example, DCAA must have performed at least one full-scope incurred cost audit on the contractor in the past. The contractor must have no inadequate business systems with deficiencies that might have a “significant impact” on the contractor’s ability to calculate an adequate proposal. And—perhaps most importantly—the previous DCAA audit must not have questioned a significant amount of claimed costs.
The September, 2012, DCAA audit guidance included a table that defined “significant exception dollars” in terms of strata based on the contractor’s proposed “auditable dollar value” (ADV). For example, if the contractor’s proposed ADV was between $15 and $50 Million, total questioned costs needed to have been less than $55,000. Anything more and the contractor’s current final billing rate proposal could not be classified as being “low risk”. For a proposal with an ADV between $50 to $250 Million, total questioned costs needed to have been less than $100,000. (Proposals with an ADV greater than $250 Million could never be classified as being low risk.)
The beauty of falling into the “low risk” bucket is that it greatly decreased your chance of DCAA actually performing an audit of your claimed costs. Again, the probability associated with a contractor’s proposal being audited was based on ADV strata. For example, if you were found to be low-risk, and your proposed ADV was between $50 and $100 Million, then there was only a 10% chance your proposal would be audited. Conversely, there was a 90% chance your proposal would never be audited and you would be able to finalize billing rates that were equal to your proposed final billing rates. DCAA would simply send a Memo to the cognizant ACO, and that would end the audit agency’s involvement in the process.
We know several, smaller, contractors who’ve already experienced that happy result. They’ve finalized rates and never had to go through an audit. Lucky them.
The reason for the change in audit approach, as our readers know all too well, is that DCAA wasn’t getting its job done. The backlog of unaudited contractor final billing rate proposals was growing and growing and growing, and so was the backlog of physically completed contracts awaiting closeout. DCAA’s implementation of audit milestone tracking and “streamlined” report reviews have not noticeably reduced the time it takes the agency to perform an ICS audit, which (at last report) was roughly four years per contractor proposal. Instead of reducing audit backlog through implementation of efficiency initiatives, DCAA reported that its backlog of ICS proposals actually increased over the past Government Fiscal Year.
While DCAA has kept to its key talking point that all will be well by the end of GFY 2016, the agency’s Director has also quietly admitted that DCAA ““has frozen hiring and will lose about 5 percent of its workforce, or 250 employees, this year.” That situation is not going to help DCAA catch up any time soon.
DOD’s answer to the intractable problem of the growing backlog of final billing rate proposals to be audited? Stop auditing so many submissions.
The not-so-hidden flaw in this cunning plan, as we told our readers in our original article discussing the new approach (first link above), was that the number of “low risk” submissions that met the criteria was going to be much lower than DOD leadership thought. We wrote—
… we think the number of contractor final indirect billing rate proposals that will actually be classified as ‘low risk’ is likely to be relatively low. The criteria DCAA has established for assessing a submission as ‘low risk’ are actually going to be tough for many companies to meet. For example, former DCAA Director Stephenson once testified that as many as two-thirds of contractor business systems were inadequate. If that testimony was accurate, then none of those contractors will have their final billing rate proposals assessed as being ‘low risk’ by DCAA. Thus, we expect that many contractors will see their submissions targeted for audit, regardless of the size of their ADV.
And we were right about that, as Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported. We discussed that GAO report right here. Among our discussion points, we noted that GAO had found that DCAA’s initial assessment of contractor proposals had resulted in more than half the submissions being classified as high-risk, meaning that a full scope audit would be required. In contrast to reality, DCAA’s initial planning has assumed that only about 20 percent of submissions would be found to be high risk. And this was in relation to contractor proposals with ADVs of less than $15 million.
What went wrong? GAO reported that the problem was that too many of the contractors submitting final billing rate proposals had no incurred cost history—and thus (pursuant to its own risk criteria), DCAA could not find those proposals to be low-risk.
Not to be stopped by this unfortunate reality, DCAA has recently revamped its risk criteria so that more contractor proposals can be passed with minimal or no audit testing being performed. In the words of the new DCAA audit guidance—
Policy performed an analysis of audits completed in FY 2013 to determine if our incurred cost sampling process is working in the most efficient manner to apply our limited audit resources to the audit areas with the highest risk. … Based on this analysis, we found that there was room for improvement. Therefore, adjustments were made to the questioned cost thresholds and the sampling percentages. In addition, feedback from the field indicated that the current risk determination criteria requires revision to better allow auditors to use their professional judgment when determining if an adequate incurred cost proposal is high risk or low risk. Therefore, the risk determination criteria was modified, and the tools were updated to make it less of a checklist and more of a tool to assist the auditor in documenting the judgments they made in arriving at their final determination of high or low risk.
First, let us write (again) that we are in favor of more auditor professional judgment and discretion, and anything that introduces flexibility into the system is just fine by us. (Assuming of course that the auditors have appropriate experience and training so as to properly apply that professional judgment.)
Second, we don’t really care about the new criteria. We don’t really care that the “exception dollar” thresholds were raised so that more proposals can be found to be “low-risk”. That’s nice for DCAA. We don’t expect that very many contractors will be affected by the changes.
Third, it appears that DCAA may have backed off from the requirement that a previous full-scope ICS audit was required to be conducted before a contractor’s proposal could be determined to be “low-risk”. We may be reading between the lines a little bit, but we noticed that the revised audit guidance discusses “previous experience” with the contractor and does not expressly call out a full-scope ICS audit requirement. For example, the guidance says (for proposals with ADVs between $5 Million and $250 Million)—
For all proposals with $5 million - $250 million in ADV, consider the following significant risk criteria:
- Known significant fraud referral (Form 2000) applicable to the proposal fiscal year or the period in which the proposal was prepared
- Pre-award accounting system performed that resulted in an opinion of ‘unacceptable,’ or there are reported business system deficiencies relevant to the incurred cost year under audit
- No previous experience with the contractor such as voucher processing, forward pricing proposal, pre-award accounting system, etc.
- Specific relevant risk with the contractor that has material impact to the incurred cost proposal being assessed (i.e., significant CO/Auditor identified risk)
So it seems to us that DCAA has found a way to remove the key impediment to “risking-away” its backlog of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates. Instead of requiring a previous ICS audit, it now requires “previous experience” and has empowered the auditors to use their professional judgment to find that experience is relevant to the risk assessment.
If true, we expect that DCAA will be able to report good news to Congress in its next report. It will have significantly reduced its backlog of roughly 26,000 contractor final billing rate proposals awaiting audit. It will have accomplished this feat not be streamlining its procedures or redefining “GAGAS-compliant” audits. Instead, it will have reduced its backlog by finding innovative ways to classify proposals as being “low-risk” and, thus, avoiding the need to audit them.
|