DCAA Looks to Speed Audits by Reducing Reviews
 It’s generally accepted throughout the defense industrial base that DCAA takes too long to issue its audit reports. For example, we’ve reported that DCAA now takes (on average) nearly four years to issue a single “incurred cost” audit report covering a single contractor’s fiscal year. No contractor thinks that’s an acceptable cycle time standard. But that’s not the only metric: there are other examples to discuss, and we’ve devoted several articles to DCAA’s drop-off in productivity—including its challenges in issuing business system follow-up audit reports in a timely fashion.
Interestingly, many in government service (notably those civilians employed by the Defense Contract Management Agency) agree with industry on this point—marking one of the few points of agreement between the Defense Department and its contractors in these adversarial days. Both parties agree that DCAA takes too long to issue its reports, and many (including GAO and the DOD Inspector General) assert that what reports DCAA does manage to squeeze out are of dubious quality and usefulness to contracting officers and buying commands.
Opinions vary as to the root causes of DCAA’s general inability to issue GAGAS-compliant audit reports in a reasonable timeframe. Certainly, many argued that it was DCAA’s focus on cycle time reduction that led to the well-known audit quality failures publicized by the GAO and legislators in the 2008/2009 timeframe. Thus, less focus on the time it takes to generate audit reports and more focus on the quality of those reports would seem to be a good thing. Unfortunately, recent government reports indicate that the quality of DCAA’s audit reports (at least in terms of ability to comply with GAGAS) has not noticeably improved. So DCAA’s management reforms have led to a situation where the only thing that’s changed is that the agency produces fewer and fewer reports.
For its part, DCAA senior management has a tendency to blame contractors for the delays in issuing audit reports. Contractors are not responsive and do not produce supporting documentation timely, so goes the refrain. Contractors do not provide real-time access to accounting systems. Contractors do not provide adequate proposals that comply with the requirements of FAR Table 15-2. Contractors do not provide adequate “incurred cost submissions” that comply with the requirements of FAR clause 52.216-7. Contractors do not provide access to personnel, or to attorney-client privileged information, or to internal audit reports. Liaison personnel don’t facilitate audits; instead, they impede them. The list of alleged contractor failures goes on and on. But in the meantime audit reports don’t get issued.
It’s become apparent that one of the causes for DCAA’s inability to issue timely reports is the multiple layers of management reviews associated with each audit. From Supervisory Auditor review to Technical Specialist review, and from FAO Manager review to Independent Reference Reviewer review, DCAA has redesigned its entire management focus to deploy multiple reviews, designed to ensure that its audits are GAGAS-compliant in all respects. And that new approach has delayed audit report issuance, often for months and sometimes for years.
It’s not like DCAA management hasn’t realized the problem. They obviously realize they’ve created a monster. And they’ve tried to reduce the number of reviews. For example, we reported back in April, 2013, that DCAA had implemented a new Instruction (DCAAI 7642.2) designed to give discretion to the auditor to determine what additional reviews might be necessary (based on risk) and to specify reviews associated with individual audits (activity codes). Unfortunately (as we told readers) DCAA chose not to publish that Instruction, so contractors have no idea what reviews they should expect and thus cannot make an informed estimate regarding the duration of those reviews.
More recently, DCAA issued new guidance (MRD 13-PPS-024(R)) designed to “reduce the number of required reviews” and give the FAO managers more discretion in determining if additional reviews are needed. According to the MRD, “required reviewers include the Supervisory Auditor, FAO Manager and, if applicable, the RAM and/or Independent Reference Reviewer (IRR).” Optional reviewers include FAO Technical Specialists and Regional Technical Programs. DCAAI 7642.2 was modified once again to document the reduced number of management reviews.
The impetus for the changes was said to be “recent town halls and other input venues” that aired “concerns from the field” that the multiple layers of review were not enhancing quality. Instead they were simply slowing down the audit completion process.
Or perhaps, DCAA management may have read our many blog articles complaining about the same thing? (Doubtful.)
Whether the FAO teams will avail themselves of their enhanced discretion to reduce audit report reviews remains to be seen. Accordingly, whether the changes to DCAAI 7642.2 will result in faster issuance of audit reports also remains to be seen.
In the meantime, we are hearing continued reports that DCAA has given up performance of Disclosure Statement adequacy reviews and turned that responsibility over to DCMA. We are hearing reports that DCMA is hiring DCAA auditors as “cost monitors” and “pricing analysts”—and gearing up to evaluate contractor proposals without the benefit of a DCAA audit report. We are hearing that DCMA is preparing to handle business system reviews, and we’ve already reported that DCAA has announced DCMA is going to be negotiating Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs) without waiting for a DCAA audit. In other words, DCAA is working hard to take itself out of the defense acquisition system.
The recent attempts to streamline audit report reviews may be a case of “too little, too late.”
It’s Official! Shay Assad Makes Cost of Ineligible Dependents Expressly Unallowable
 Of all the things to worry about right now—from the impacts of budget sequestration to DCAA’s backlog of (at last count) 26,000 unaudited contractor final billing rate proposals, and from systemic corruption of government employees in multiple service branches to systemic contractor fraud in preferred socioeconomic contracting categories, and from GAO reports that DCMA has been mismanaged to GAO reports that DOD doesn’t even know the training status of its acquisition workforce—the Director, Defense Pricing, has chosen to focus on an issue that he has admitted has already been “largely corrected” by the defense industry.
We are talking about the additional healthcare premium costs associated with ineligible dependents.
We’ve discussed this particular issue before. Nothing gets us as upset as the building of a political mountain from what has been proven to be a cost accounting molehill. You can search this site using the keyword “dependent” and get links to seven (7) blog articles focusing on this particular issue, plus links to three others in which the issue is at least mentioned. It’s safe to say this is one of those buttons that, when pushed, sets us off.
Boom!
Today we report that the Honorable Mr. Shay Assad, Director, Defense Pricing, has gotten his wish, and that the DFARS Cost Principle at 231.205-6(m)(1) has been revised to make it super-duper clear that—
Fringe benefit costs that are contrary to law, employer-employee agreement, or an established policy of the contractor are unallowable.
Publication of the final rule marks the end of an eighteen-month effort by Mr. Assad and his associates to penalize contractors for inadvertent inclusion of such costs into their indirect cost rates. We told you it was coming.
In fact, we also told you that the DFARS rule change was going to be implemented, regardless of any public comment to the contrary. Indeed, that’s pretty much what happened. A look at the promulgating comments, including responses to public input, indicated that public comments were disposed of with the usual cavalier disdain.
Comment: One respondent asserted that industry-wide ineligible dependent costs are immaterial, and thus have no impact on contract billing or pricing. The respondent suggested that DoD should review the DCAA findings in its policy memo 09-PSP-016(R), dated August 4, 2009, before proceeding with further rulemaking. Response: Research indicates the rate of ineligible dependent claims can represent as much as 3 percent or more of total healthcare costs. The overall cost for ineligible dependent claims, which are often fraudulent, can be significant for large contractors that spend millions of dollars for dependent healthcare. …
We ask: where is that research? Why has it not been published? Also, if such ineligible dependent claims are indeed fraudulent, then the victims of the fraud are the contractors themselves, and not the Department of Defense—since most large defense contractors are self-insured to a very large extent.
Comment: One respondent asserted that the treatment of ineligible fringe benefit costs as expressly unallowable does not comport with Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 405 and its preambles. In the preamble of the original publication of CAS 405, the CAS Board explained its use of the term “expressly” in the definition of “expressly unallowable cost” as“. . . that which is in direct and unmistakable terms.” The respondent believed that “fringe benefit costs . . . contrary to law, employer-employee agreement, or an established policy of the contractor” are not direct and unmistakable costs. Response: The rule makes fringe benefit costs expressly unallowable when such costs are contrary to law, employer-employee agreement, or an established policy of the contractor. The Director of Defense Pricing Policy determined these conditions are direct and unmistakable.
We ask where the DAR Council and Mr. Assad in particular were granted the authority to interpret the Cost Accounting Standards? We were under the impression that such interpretations were reserved by statute to the CAS Board.
Comment: One respondent asserted that the rule is unnecessary since the FAR cost principles already protect the Government. Contractors are currently required to exclude fringe benefit costs that do not meet the requirements for reasonableness per FAR 31.201-3. Response: The results of the DCAA audits have made it clear that coverage is not sufficiently clear. …
As we have pointed out on this website, the problem with the DCAA audits is that they misinterpreted the regulations. The regulations were clear; DCAA couldn’t read them. Neither could DCMA Leadership at Fort Lee. Neither could Mr. Assad. So obviously the correct fix is to revise the regulations to comport with DCAA’s flawed interpretation.
The individuals involved in this rule-making are clearly among those who believe that when reality differs from one’s personal point of view, then reality should change. Unfortunately for many of us, those individuals have the power to warp reality, at least in this particular area.
The only thing that changed between the proposed and the final rule was the elimination of the language that would have made estimating such costs expressly unallowable and subject to penalty. Even the DAR Council realized that language was impossible to enforce, since penalties only apply to costs claimed in contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates, which are based on actual, incurred, costs and not estimated costs. Nothing else changed.
So here’s the thing. What do you do if you are a defense contractor, subject to the DFARS Cost Principles in addition to the already-onerous FAR Cost Principles? Do you implement expensive testing to make sure your employees don’t include, intentionally or inadvertently, their ineligible dependents in their healthcare coverage?
Well, yes. You should do that. You should make sure that only eligible employee dependents are being covered by your healthcare plans. There are a number of ways to do that, and you should figure out which method results in the best return for your investment.
One other thing you can and should do is change your policies. You should clarify coverage of employee dependents in your policies. For example, you might expressly grant your employees a one-year grace period in which to identify and remove otherwise ineligible dependents from their requested coverage. You might tie coverage to the Affordable Care Act’s requirements (i.e., cover dependents until age 26). In other words, since the allowability of dependent costs is tied to your policies, you should look at those policies and make dependent coverage as broad as possible. In that way, you will be reducing the risk that an auditor will allege you have expressly unallowable dependent costs in your healthcare premium costs.
You need to take this seriously, because those inside-The-Beltway Senior Executives with the power to make your life difficult have decided to take it seriously. DCAA auditors will be looking, and DCMA Contracting Officers will be eager to uphold audit findings, so as to show those Senior Executives how eager they are to do their bidding.
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Far-Ranging Navy Fraud “Rocking the Pentagon”
 Have you been following this one?
Let’s start with the report that John Beliveau II, a Senior Investigator with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), will plead guilty in Federal Court “to bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery.” Allegedly, the bribery charges relate to “accepting prostitution services and expensive trips in exchange for providing information and advice to an Asian defense contractor at the center of a multimillion-dollar fraud probe.”
What would Leroy Jethro Gibbs say about that?
Beliveau is reported to be “one of three Navy officials who have been arrested” and the first to cop a guilty plea. (The other two, Navy Commanders each, have pleaded not guilty.) Two employees of GDMA (including its President, Leonard Francis, and Mr. Francis’ cousin) have been arrested, and have also pleaded not guilty. Allegedly, NCIS Senior Investigator Beliveau provided advice and assistance to Mr. Francis as the probe progressed.
What probe? What’s the story here?
The case reportedly involves Glenn Defense Marine Asia, Ltd. (GDMA) and allegations of bribery to Navy personnel “in return for confidential information” that may have included shipping routes and schedules. According to the news story (link above)—
The accusations signal serious national security breaches and corruption and have set off high-level meetings at the Pentagon with the threat that more people, including those of higher ranks, could be swept up as the investigation continues. Other unnamed Navy personnel are mentioned in court documents as getting gifts from Mr. Francis, who is known in military circles as "Fat Leonard" because of his wide girth. … Prosecutors say Mr. Francis bribed Navy commanders to give him confidential ship route information or even move Navy vessels like chess pieces, diverting aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships to Asian ports with lax oversight, where GDMA could inflate costs and invent tariffs by using phony port authorities. In exchange, Mr. Francis lined up prostitutes, luxury hotel stays and tickets to shows for the Navy officials, including a Lady Gaga concert in Thailand, according to the complaint. The company bilked the Navy out of $10 million in just one year in Thailand alone, U.S. Attorney Laura Duffy [alleged]. [GDMA] serviced Navy ships in the Pacific for 25 years. [Its] contracts have now been suspended.
The Washington Post characterized this as “the biggest fraud case in years for the Navy” and notes that seven Naval officials (including two Admirals) have been suspended to date.
In addition to uncovering a surprisingly large number of allegedly corrupt Naval officers, WaPo also reported that “the investigation has pinpointed systematic weaknesses in the Navy’s worldwide contracting bureaucracy.” It reported—
According to affidavits filed by agents from the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Francis and other executives from Glenn Defense Marine cheated the system with ease by forging hundreds of invoices, price quotes and other documents to overcharge for fuel, food and port services. The firm made little effort to conceal the fraudulent nature of the paperwork, repeatedly submitting the same false forms for reimbursement, the affidavits show. Navy contracting officials in Singapore and Japan rubber-stamped many of the claims, even though a cursory check could have exposed the scam, according to the agents’ statements. … To win a bigger share of the Navy’s business, Glenn Defense Marine submitted bids that were sometimes so low that competitors formally complained there was no way it could cover its costs, let alone turn a profit, a review of contracting records shows. In an attempt to minimize expenses, the Navy negotiated fixed prices for many port services in advance. While Glenn Defense Marine was stuck with its low bid for those fixed services, the contracts contained major loopholes that the company was able to exploit, according to prosecutors. Under certain conditions, Glenn Defense Marine could charge higher prices for fuel, ‘incidental services’ and port tariffs, or fees charged by local port officials. To do so, the company was required to submit paperwork justifying the added expenses, such as quotes from multiple subcontractors or invoices from port officials. In case after case, however, federal investigators found that Glenn Defense Marine simply made up those bills and bids.
As a result of the investigation, arrests, and other associated allegations of systemic fraud and abuse, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus ordered a complete review of how husbanding and port service contracts are handled. According to the Stars and Stripes—
In a Dec. 5 memo, Mabus instructed Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition Sean Stackley to review “all acquisition strategies” worldwide and determine whether proper procedures are being followed. He also told the Navy auditor general to audit the contracts to improve internal controls. Husbanding and port service contracts assist Navy ships and sailors when they pull into a foreign port and include everything from goods and services such as fuel or docking, to water and sanitation. Mabus’ memo is in addition to guidance laid out in September after investigations by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and audits by the Naval Audit Service raised concerns.
As we reported recently, the Honorable Shay Assad, DOD Director of Pricing, recently wrapped-up a multi-year campaign against those contractors who included the premiums of ineligible dependents in their medical insurance costs billed to the Dept. of Defense. The DAR Council wrote that it thought as much as three percent of all dependents might be ineligible, and called inclusion of such costs in contractors’ indirect rates a matter of fraud.
It’s perhaps a cheap shot, but let’s take it anyway: While DOD Leadership was focused on solving a problem that had already been “largely corrected” (in Mr. Assad’s words), they have ignored a massive, obvious, systemic, criminal activity that was allegedly occurring right under their noses, during their watch. Why was Mr. Assad’s organization not evaluating the pricing of Naval husbanding and port service contracts?
Why did it take—quite literally—years for the alleged perpetrators of this scheme to be brought to justice? Perhaps one of the reasons it took so long is that the people who should have been looking inward at the military service anti-corruption controls and evaluating the relationship between price and quality for the Navy were focused elsewhere, such as on beating up contractors for the relatively trivial amount of healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents.
Why did the Directorate of Pricing not care about prices paid by the Navy for its port service contracts? Of, if they in fact did care, why did they not care enough to identify pricing anomalies that, in the words of WaPo, where “obvious”?
We’ve written about the “Price Fighters” and suggested they were focused on fighting the wrong enemy. The story of GDMA confirms what we have asserted in that article (and others). The DOD Leadership is focused on beating up its industrial base, because it simply cannot face the fact that its own house is in slip-shod repair and in desperate need of attention. It’s clear that the Department of Defense needs a thorough house-cleaning, from top to bottom.
OFPP Issues FY 2012 Executive Compensation Benchmark/Ceiling
Section 39 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act requires the OFPP to issue, annually, an executive compensation “benchmark” amount that establishes an allowability ceiling on compensation of contractor executives. The benchmark amount is set at the median (50th percentile) amount of compensation over a recent 12-month period for the five most highly compensated employees in management positions at each home office and each segment of all publicly-owned companies with annual sales over $50 million, and the determination is based on analysis of data made available by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As defined by the Cost Principles at FAR 31.205-6(p), executive compensation means the total amount of wages, salaries, bonuses, restricted stock, deferred and performance incentive compensation, and other compensation for the year, whether paid, earned, or otherwise accruing, as recorded in the contractor's cost accounting records for the year. For government contractors, executive compensation in excess of the annual OFPP benchmark/ceiling amount is unallowable. Period.
We have previously noted that Section 803 of the FY 2012 NDAA extended the executive compensation cap beyond the “top 5” most highly compensated executives in each segment, to apply to all contractor employees. Further, we have also reported a proposed rule change to the FAR Cost Principle on Compensation that would implement that statutory direction. It was problematic in several respects, as we noted.
The FY 2011 ceiling amount of executive compensation was $763,209.
The FY 2012 ceiling amount is $952,308.
The Federal Register notice provided ample evidence that the OFPP disagrees with the statutory formula it is required to follow. In a Memorandum published along with the new ceiling amount, OFPP Administrator Joseph Jordan opined—
When the cap was raised to $693,951 for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the President called on Congress to repeal the current statutory formula and replace it with a lower, more sensible limit that is on par with what the Government pays its own executives and employees. Over the last several years, the Administration has strongly reiterated the need for reforms to the current statutory framework and Congress has considered several proposals to reform the compensation cap. To date, however, Congress has not revised the cap amount or the formula for adjusting the cap. Instead, Congress made only a modest change that expanded application of the statutory cap on defense contracts from the contractor’s senior executives to all of its employees (section 803 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013, Pub. L. 112–81, December 31, 2011). This expansion of the applicability of the cap to all contractor employees did not cover contracts with the civilian agencies, so the cap for those contracts remains applicable only to certain contractor senior executives, which is defined as the five most highly compensated employees in management positions at each home office and each segment of the contractor.
OFPP Administrator Jordan then availed himself of the opportunity to ask Congress, again, via the Federal Register (as opposed to, you know, sending a letter) to lower the statutory formula to match the President’s annual salary (current $400,000).
We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. believe that OFFPP Administrator Jordan has not gone far enough. Not only should Congress cap the allowability of contractor salaries at $400,000, it should also cap the tax deductibility of all compensation, received by any individual in America, at that same that limit. Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie should have their actor compensation limits set at $400,000, with respect to tax deductible film production expenses. Larry Ellison should have his Oracle salary limited to $400,000, with respect to Oracle’s corporate tax deductions. Nobody on Wall Street should be allowed to treat compensation in excess of $400,000 as a tax deductible expense.
Basically, if you are going to interfere in the free market, why not go all the way and just implement top-down, centralized, compensation limits (with respect to tax deductibility, of course). It should be obvious that nobody adds any more value to the American economy than the President of the United States of America. So let’s take that notion and enforce it across the board! After all, nobody is limiting the amount of compensation that may be paid; the only limits would be on the tax deductibility of that compensation.
And let’s see how all those corporate and Wall Street contributors to Congressional campaigns react to that initiative, shall we?
Getting back to contractor compensation allowability, we note (for the record) that once again the OFPP is late issuing its benchmark ceiling. Most contractors have already submitted their FY 2012 proposals and retroactively implementing the new amount would be expensive.
Perhaps OFPP Administrator Jordan would be better served ranting less about the law he and his staff are required to follow, and working harder to ensure that they follow the law within a reasonable timeframe?
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