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Apogee Consulting Inc

A-12 Nightmare Finally Over

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A-12
The A-12 is the poster child for a failed defense program.

Don’t take our word for it. Read this article written by Herb Fenster, Esq. and published in 1999 in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings. It’s called: “The A-12 Legacy: It Wasn’t an Airplane—It Was a Trainwreck.” It’s really a very important set of observations regarding how the Navy put General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas into the firm, fixed-price, mess they found themselves in, and the implications of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s program Termination for Default, which lasted through multiple rounds of litigation starting in roughly 1992 and lasting through until very recently. Even the Supreme Court of the United States weighed-in on the never-ending litigation circus.

Mr. Fenster summed up the situation in a footnote, as follows—

Eleanor Spector was DoD's most knowledgeable procurement executive. She had the additional advantage of having spent several years at NavAir. She later revealed what knowledgeable procurement people all know: A program such as this to produce a new highly sophisticated aircraft, incorporating unproven technologies to accomplish unproven mission objectives presented huge risks. She also had the advantage of having been advised of these risks by Brigadier General Keith Glenn, U.S. Air Force, who had been the B-2 program director and was then functioning as the special access programs director for DoD. He had told her, in unequivocal terms, that the program was far too risky for fixed-price contracting.

In another article published in Air Force Magazine just after the program was terminated, author David Montgomery wrote—

The Secretary's summary execution of the A-12 abruptly ended the saga of a plane that, six months earlier, enjoyed broad congressional support and appeared problem-free. The stealthy, carrier-based attack plane had been naval aviation's top priority since 1984. What caused it to nosedive from preeminence to oblivion?

Investigators and officials place the blame on four factors: 
  • Overly protective Navy officials, who didn't want to endanger the plane by pointing out problems. A Pentagon analyst first detected a possible cost overrun two years ago, but the Navy program manager continued to describe the A-12 as being on track until after a major Pentagon review last year.
  • A ‘don't-rock-the-boat’ segment of the Pentagon bureaucracy, which was aware of the problems but apparently reluctant to buck its superiors to press its case. In one incident, a report noting A-12 problems was tucked away and forgotten.
  • Overly optimistic A-12 contractors, who miscalculated the extent of the technical difficulties in producing such a plane and shielded the problems from the government. An inquiry by Navy Deputy General Counsel Chester Paul Beach found that General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas discovered "increasing cost and schedule variances" but did not alert the Navy in a timely fashion.
  • Excessive secrecy, which blanketed the project and prevented examinations that might have brought problems to light. Officials assigned to Secretaries Cheney and Garrett were kept away, standard reporting procedures were abandoned, and information was transmitted verbally rather than in writing.

One important outcome of the A-12 debacle was a critical look at the Earned Value reporting metrics used by the program, which eventually led to a reinvention of EVMS in the early 2000’s. Another important outcome was the recognition that use of cost-based progress payments didn’t reward contractors for making progress; instead, they rewarded contractors for spending money. That recognition led to the creation of Performance-Based Payments in the late 1990’s, which are still considered to be the Federal government’s “preferred” contract financing option, despite Shay Assad’s direction to walk away from their use.

But although there were some positive outcomes, they did not outshine the problems with the program and its termination, much like a silver lining fails to outshine the dark clouds accumulated over 23 years of constant litigation.

The parties finally reached a settlement a week ago, as reported by Reuters. At one point, the government wanted the contractors to repay about $1.5 Billion each, and the contractors wanted to keep their progress payments plus get another $1 Billion plus interest.

Reuters reported that the contractors will not have to repay their progress payments, but the government will not have to pay anything more. In addition, “the Navy will receive three EA-18G electronic attack aircraft from Boeing, and a $200 million credit from General Dynamics toward its work on a new DDG-1000 destroyer.”

So that’s it then.

Our long national nightmare is over.

The multitude of attorneys involved in the legal battles can get back to other clients.

And the Navy will make do with its F-35 variant.

 

 

The Importance of the Limitation of Funds Clause

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As consultants to a diverse group of government contractors, we frequently find ourselves in the position of having to explain requirements associated with various solicitation provisions and contract clauses. Our readers know, of course, that there is a host of provisions and clauses with which to comply, each with individual requirements. Some of them are fairly well known and most everybody has a fair idea of their basic compliance requirements; but others are less well understood and tend to fall towards the bottom of the compliance checklist.

The Limitation of Cost (LoC) and Limitation of Funds (LoF) clauses are two of the latter set. They’re insidious little clauses, because they seem so straight-forward and yet shift risk in subtle and far-reaching ways. A write-up of the clauses from the law firm of Watkins Meegan is entitled, “Two FAR Clauses that Are Sometimes Overlooked,” and, indeed, the clauses are often overlooked or ignored.

Let’s be clear: Contractors ignore the LoC/LoF clause requirements at their own peril.

The two clauses go together because they basically have the same set of requirements. The LoF clause (52.230-21) pertains to cost-type contracts that are incrementally funded, and the LoC clause (52.230-20) pertains to cost-type contracts that have been fully funded. Essentially, the clauses act to limit contractors’ ability to seek reimbursement for otherwise allowable costs they’ve incurred on their cost-type contracts.

It seems counter-intuitive that contractors would be limited in the amount of costs they could recover from their government customers. After all, doesn’t the fact that the contract is a “cost-type” mean that all allowable costs will be reimbursed? It’s the fixed-price contract types that have ceilings on contractor costs. Cost-type contracts are supposed to be low risk because they don’t have any such ceilings. The contractor incurs costs and, if they’re allowable, then the government reimburses them. How can cost-type contracts have cost limits?

We’ve heard that position being espoused many times over the years, and it’s wrong. The LoC/LoF clauses are what make that position wrong. The two clauses establish limits on recoverable costs incurred on cost-type contracts. It’s more than that, actually. The clauses require advance notification of expenditures before they reach certain prescribed limits. If the contractor fails to comply—and comply exactly—with the clause requirements, then the government has the right to refuse to pay allowable costs incurred for the contract if they exceed the specified ceiling. By failing to comply with the LoC/LoF clause requirements, the contractor has essentially converted its cost-type contract into a firm, fixed-price contract. That’s really not a good thing.

We’ve noted it in this blog when contractors run afoul of the clause requirements. For example, in this story we wrote about a hapless contractor that “had failed to comply with the administrative requirements of the Limitation of Cost clause and thus no increase to the contract value would be forthcoming,” but we’ve never really focused on the matter. We remedy that oversight today.

We’re going to assume that you, the reader, are going to mosey over to a FAR site and check out the exact wording of the clauses. We’re going to assume that you are going to actually read your contracts and make sure you understand what your contract clauses require of you. Thus, we are not going to recapitulate the standard FAR clause language here. It’s your responsibility to figure out what you need to do, not ours.

Unless you want to hire us. In which case, let us know how we can assist you!

Instead of reciting the clause language, we are going to focus on a recent decision over at the Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in which Boeing learned the hard way about the requirements associated with the LoF clause. Note: this is Boeing we’re talking about—one of the largest defense contractors in the USA. So if Boeing hasn’t figured out the clause requirements with respect to all of its defense programs, you may rest assured that the answer is far from obvious. Here is an opportunity to learn along with Boeing, and for a very small fraction of the company’s cost.

Let us set the stage for you.

Boeing had a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) engineering services contract, awarded by the US Air Force. The contract was a Task Order type, meaning that the government would issue orders for certain amounts of services from time to time. Crucially, the contract was “incrementally funded”—meaning that the government would dole out certain amounts of funding from time to time. The contract period of performance encompassed one base year and nine (9) option years.

One Task (Contract Mod 112) was an engineering assignment for Boeing to design, develop, fabricate, install, test and FAA certify a Global Air Traffic Management System for 3 KC-10 aircraft. (That Task was called "the KC-10 GATM assignment".) The specified total estimated cost-plus-award-fee for the assignment was $79,250,000. The specified completion date for the assignment was 30 April 2003. Contract Mod 112 also increased the obligated (allotted) funds in the contract Schedule to a total amount of $133,123,763.97.

The thing about cost-type contracts is that they don’t always go as planned. If the parties could foresee every eventuality, they likely would not use a cost-type contract format. The KC-10 GATM assignment did not seem to go as planned. On 7 January 2002, bilateral Mod 179 increased the total estimated cost-plus-award-fee of the KC-10 GATM assignment to $97,477,602.00 and extended the period of performance to 31 March 2004. On 11 August 2003, Boeing reported to the government that the GATM assignment would not be completed until 31 March 2005 (a two-year delay) and that it was willing to enter into "a Cost Share Arrangement” so as to complete the Task.

A month later (10 September 2003), Boeing and the government “agreed in principle” that the KC-10 GATM assignment would be continued on a cost-reimbursable basis "upon agreement of a new EAC [estimate at completion] and schedule between Boeing and the Government". On 24 September 2003, Boeing provided the government with a schedule showing completion of the assignment on 30 September 2005 (note another six month delay) and an estimated cost at completion of $154.7 million (a cost-growth of roughly $57 million against the original budget of $97.5 million).

As you might suspect, the Air Force customer was not thrilled with the state of affairs. Indeed, although the customer provided some additional funding, it was not as much as Boeing forecasted it would need. On 15 October 2003, Modification 220 increased the total estimated cost-plus-award-fee for the KC-10 GATM assignment to “only” $107,309,826 and extended its performance time to 31 March 2005. A couple of more Mods increased the available funding to $121,603,858—still significantly below the amount Boeing had told the Air Force it would need. Apparently, that was as much funding as the Air Force was willing to provide to Boeing.

After roughly three months of negotiation, on 10 March 2004, the Contracting Officer issued a Stop-Work Order to Boeing. A couple of weeks later, he issued a Termination for Convenience Notice, terminating the KC-10 GATM assignment.

(Familiarity with the T4C process is going to be assumed. If you feel as if you need some background reading, try this piece.)

In response to the T4C Notice, Boeing terminated its subcontract with Honeywell. A few months later, Honeywell submitted its Termination Settlement Proposal (TSP) and asked Boeing for $22,100,059. Boeing looked at that request and then notified its Termination Contracting Officer (TCO) that it would need as much as $154 million to pay off various supplier claims and settle its own situation. (Funny how that amount was really, really, close to the $154.7 million it had told it customer it would need to finish the assignment.) The TCO replied to Boeing’s notification as follows—

It is rare that the TCO requests additional funds to be added to the terminated cost type contracts. There are, at times, the PCO may have reason(s) to add additional funds to the terminated cost type contracts. However, the Government, usually, will stand by the ‘Limitation of Funds’ clause. Per your funding status, we only have $4,719,870.15 remaining in the contract.

Apparently in denial over its financial situation, Boeing came back with another request for more funds, to which the TCO replied—

I have discussed with you before in that this contract is a cost type contract, and the ‘Limitation of Funds’ clause does apply; therefore, no additional funds will be requested. The amount remaining in the contract is it. As discussed earlier, if for some reason the PCO wants to obligate more funds to the contract, he can do so.

Boeing continued to act as if it were ignorant of its precarious financial position, going so far as to submit a “Settlement ROM Proposal” in which it asked for $37.1 million in additional funds. The government did not deign to reply to that request.

Meanwhile, Boeing and Honeywell settled for $10.8 million (roughly 50 cents on the dollar). The Honeywell settlement figure was included in Boeing’s certified TSP, which was audited by DCAA. DCAA “questioned all but $182,185 of the $10.8 million settlement,” and the TCO refused to approve it. On 3 August 2010, the TCO issued a final decision denying ratification of all but $280,294 of the $10,800,000 Honeywell settlement agreement. The final decision was based “primarily on cost allowance [allowability?] and cost allocation grounds, but also invoked the LoF clause as a bar to recovery of any amount that would exceed the funds allotted to the KC-10 GATM assignment.”

Boeing appealed that TCO final decision to the ASBCA.

Judge Freeman first found that the LoF clause applied to the total contract funding and not to the funding of individual Task Orders. This is an important finding because it contradicts other decisions in which each Task Order was found to be a separate contract. (See, for example, this article.) However, Judge Freeman reasoned that the government intended the LoF clause to apply to the entire contract as a whole because there was another contract clause (H-841) that also covered funding allocated to individual Task assignments, and he need to interpret the contract has a whole, giving meaning to all clauses. Readers interested in that aspect of the decision are invited to go read it (page 8).

However, the rest of the decision did not go Boeing’s way.

Judge Freeman found that the Government never promised to increase contract funds to the level sought by Boeing. Importantly, the Judge found that there had been no agreement on the EAC or the performance schedule. Furthermore, the Judge didn’t agree with Boeing’s argument that, by terminating the contract when it was in an overrun condition, the Government waived the LoF requirements. He wrote—

Boeing had notice that the government considered the LOF clause to be applicable to the termination settlements eight months before it concluded the Honeywell settlement agreement. Boeing also knew, or is chargeable with knowing, the terms of the LOF clause, the amount of the allotted funding in the contract and the amount of its incurred costs in performing the contract. Subparagraphs (f) and (h) of the LOF clause expressly provided that Boeing was not obligated to incur, and the government was not obligated to reimburse, any costs of performing the contract, including termination activities, that would exceed the allotted funding in the contract. If Boeing did incur termination costs in excess of the allotted funding, it was a volunteer and did so for its own account.

In other words, Boeing should have included potential subcontract termination liability in its “incurred” costs when reporting pursuant to its LoF clause requirements. When that calculated number approached the funding amount provided by its USAF customer, it should have stopped work. Because Boeing exhausted the funding before subcontractor termination settlement liability was incurred, it was not able to have its subcontractor settlements reimbursed, even though it had received a Termination for Convenience.

This is a great lesson on how the two little understood clauses (Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds) turn out to be critically important when a contractor wants the government customer to fund an overrun on a cost-type contract.

Do not ignore the Loc/LoF clause requirements.

 

ASBCA Muddies Statute of Limitations Issue

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Paul Pompeo, of Arnold Porter & Porter, did a great presentation late last year on the status of the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) Statute of Limitations (SoL) issue. Unfortunately, we don’t have it to share with you. So we have to muddle through without benefit of legal counsel.

And make no mistake: we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. are not attorneys and you should not rely on any of our layperson legal analyses to guide you. Instead, you should seek counsel from knowledgeable and experienced government contract attorneys, such as Mr. Pompeo.

So with that caveat out of the way, let’s look at a recent decision by Judge Freeman at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in the matter of Fluor Corporation v. United States Government.

We don’t get it.

We’ve written extensively on the CDA SoL topic. As we’ve noted more than once, this is an area of the law that’s “evolving” (as they say), and each decision adds a bit to what we think we know about it. That evolution is not necessarily a linear progression: there are setbacks and victories, and great leaps forward and small steps backward. The two contract disputes fora (the ASBCA and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, or CFC), don’t always agree with each other. Importantly, Judges are not required to treat each other’s decision as precedent-setting; they can ignore decisions with which they disagree. Accordingly, it’s very tough to determine any “bright line” with respect to when the CDA SoL jurisdictional timeclock begins to run—though everybody’s crystal clear that the timeclock runs out exactly six years after it starts.

Let’s recap a bit to illustrate what we mean.

  • In January, 2012, we wrote that the ASBCA had thrown-out a 2010 government claim against Boeing alleging increased costs related to changes in cost accounting practice because the government knew, or should have known, by 2003 (at the latest) that it had been harmed. It was in 2003 that the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) issued a letter to Boeing finding that Boeing owed the government money and offered to negotiate a settlement. Unfortunately, Judge Melnick did not determine exactly when the CDA SoL timeclock actually started (i.e., did it start when Boeing submitted a revised CASB Disclosure Statement, or when it submitted its cost impact showing increased costs to CAS-covered government contracts, or when DCAA issued its audit report identifying $7.4 million of increased costs? Each of those events happened prior to 2003.). He simply concluded that the government claim was time-barred.

  • In April, 2012, we wrote that the CFC had thrown-out a 2008 government claim against Raytheon related to a 1999 Advance Agreement in which Raytheon had already paid the government $4.75 million, in 2003. Judge Hodges concluded that the government had all the information it needed to file a claim nine years before it actually filed it. Thus, the government claim was time-barred. Importantly, Judge Hodges rejected the government’s argument that the “continuing claims doctrine” meant that each new year’s claimed cost represented a new start to the CDA SoL, finding that each year’s claimed cost was based on the original 1999 Advance Agreement.

  • In June, 2012, we wrote that the ASBCA had accepted a government claim against Lockheed Martin related to alleged noncompliances with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), even though the DCAA had issued an audit report determining the CAS noncompliance in 2002, the DACO had issued a Final Determination that Lockheed Martin was in noncompliance in 2008, and the DACO had issued a Final Decision/Demand for Payment in 2010 (i.e., eight years after DCAA had reported the CAS noncompliance). Judge Delman wrote that, although DCAA had identified “inappropriate charges” in 2002, “DCAA did not identify any overbillings or increased costs paid by the government resulting from the alleged inappropriate charges.” Because DCAA had never identified overbillings or increased costs paid, the CDA SoL did not start to run. We didn’t think very highly of that decision.

  • In July, 2012, we wrote about two decisions at the CFC (Sikorsky and a motion for reconsideration on the Raytheon decision), in which it was made clear that the CDA SoL timeclock does not pause or stop simply because the government is going through its administrative procedures. The timeclock continues to run.

  • In January, 2013, we wrote about two more Raytheon decisions at the ASBCA, in which Judge Delman found (with respect to allegations of unallowable costs) that the CDA SoL timeclock starts running when the contractor submits its annual proposal to establish final billing rates (aka, “the incurred cost submission”). The government has six years from that date to assert any claims that the contractor included allegedly unallowable costs in its rate calculations. Importantly, Judge Delman treated each separate contractor proposal as a separate start to the CDA SoL timeclock, such that even though claims against a stream of costs (such as depreciation) might be time-barred with respect to incurred cost submissions aged more than six years, claims against that same cost stream would not be time-barred with respect to incurred cost submissions aged less than six years. We thought Judge Delman was focused on factual knowledge of events rather than the events themselves, and offered some criticism on those grounds.

  • In March, 2013, we wrote about yet another Raytheon decision at the ASBCA, in which Judge Melnick found that “The events fixing liability should have been known when they occurred unless then can be reasonably found to have been either concealed or ‘inherently unknowable’ at that time.” As you might guess, the government’s claim against Raytheon (related to a noncompliance with CAS) was thrown-out as being time-barred. This is an important decision because Judge Melnick took pains to distinguish the facts before him from those presented in Judge Delman’s Lockheed Martin decision. Here’s a link to our article in case you want to check-out the quotes we pasted from the decision.

  • In April, 2013, we wrote about Judge Lettow’s decision at the CFC in the matter of the Sikorsky CAS noncompliance, in which Sikorsky won on the merits but lost its motion to have the entire claim thrown out as being time-barred. We criticized that aspect of the decision, but obviously Sikorsky was thrilled.

  • In June, 2013, we wrote about several new Raytheon appeals at the ASBCA, in which it won several motions for summary judgment and lost another motion—all related to the CDA SoL. Judge Grant tied the start of the CDA SoL timeclock to submission of the contractor’s cost impact analysis. Absent that analysis, Judge Grant found the government lacked sufficient information to know it had been harmed. But once that analysis had been submitted, the CDA SoL timeclock started to run.

Today we want to discuss the Fluor case at the ASBCA and Judge Freeman’s opinion regarding Fluor’s motion to dismiss the government’s claim for increased costs related to an alleged CAS noncompliance because it was time-barred by the CDA SoL. Judge Freeman didn’t agree and found an interesting approach to the issue.

Looking at the recaps above, you might think to yourself that the issue should have been relatively straightforward. When did the government know of the alleged non-compliance and when did it know it had been damaged through identification of increased costs or overbillings? Those events should have (we believe) started the CDA SoL timeclock running, so that if the government’s claim (made by Contracting Officer Final Decision) was issued more than six years after those events, then the government would be SOL (pun intended) and its claim would be determined to be a nullity.

Not so fast, according to Judge Freeman.

Fluor’s cost accounting practices related to allocation of its “Burden and Benefits” (“B&B”) pool to its salary costs had been in place and disclosed to government oversight officials as early as January, 2001. Fluor’s salary costs included project assignment allowances, foreign service incentives and foreign hardship allowances (among other salary costs). In August, 2004, DCAA provided Fluor with a preliminary audit finding that its hazard pay and foreign assignment salary uplifts were too high and therefore unreasonable in amount. In February, 2006, another DCAA audit found that Fluor’s cost allocation methodology was compliant with FAR and CAS 418. In December, 2005, another DCAA audit report focused on B&B allocation methodology concluded that Fluor was in compliance with the requirements of CAS 403 (after a preliminary report prepared in September, 2005, found it was not in compliance).

Regardless of the foregoing, in September, 2007, DCAA issued yet another audit report stating that Fluor’s B&B cost allocation methodology was noncompliant with the requirements of CAS 403. In November, 2010 (more than three years later), the cognizant ACO issued a final determination that Fluor was noncompliant with CAS 403 because “the B&B allocation base was not representative of the factors on which total B&B pool payments were based.” In November, 2011, the ACO issued a Final Decision and asserted a claim against Fluor for $63.4 Million related to alleged increased costs on Fluor’s CAS-covered contracts for the period 2004 through 2010.

Simply looking at the facts, it seems quite clear that in 2007 the government objected to a practice that it had already stated was compliant in 2006, a practice that had been in place, unchanged, since at least 2001, a practice that had been the subject of multiple government audits. It seems quite clear that the government knew, or should have known, as early as 2004 that Fluor’s allocation methodology included “uplifts” which may have distorted the pool allocations. Thus, it seems quite clear that the government’s claim should have been dismissed as being time-barred.

But no. Judge Freeman found that “the government did not and could not know at that time, much less submit a CDA claim for, the increased costs … until that work was performed, billed and paid.” (Emphasis added.)

Judge Freeman found that—

The government’s 17 November 2011 claim was a continuing claim inherently susceptible to being broken down into a series of independent distinct events each having its own associated damages—namely, each payment by the government to Fluor for a CAS non-compliant billing on a government contract.

But all was not lost for Fluor. The part of the government’s claim relating to payments made on or before September, 2005 (the date on which DCAA concluded, on a preliminary basis, that Fluor was in non-compliance with the requirements of CAS 403) accrued on that date for purposes of the CDA SoL, so any claims asserted against Fluor for those pre-September 2005 payments after September 2011 were time-barred. (Remember, the ACO issued the CoFD in November, 2011.) As for the rest of the government’s claim, the CDA SoL timeclock started to run “on the date [Fluor’s invoices] were paid.” Thus, any payments made to Fluor before 17 November 2005 were thrown-out.

Now we don’t know what to make of this muddle. It occurs to us that there were a couple of approaches Judge Freeman might have used. First, he could have looked to the contractor’s cost impact analysis as the date the government knew it had been harmed. Unfortunately, Fluor refused to provide a cost impact analysis, perhaps under the theory that it doesn’t make much sense for to give the government any ammunition it is going to use to shoot at you.

Another approach would be to say that the government knew of Fluor’s practices as early as 2001, so what the heck? Or perhaps that the government knew in 2004 that Fluor included in its cost allocation base the very components that formed the basis for the eventual CAS noncompliance. In either scenario the entire government claim would be time-barred.

Another approach would be to say that any costs estimated, accumulated, or billed in a manner noncompliant with applicable CAS requirements were unallowable costs (see FAR 31.201-2) and therefore, like all unallowable costs, the CDA SoL timeclock started running when Fluor included them in a proposal to establish final billing rates. In that scenario, incurred cost submissions dated earlier than November, 2005 would be thrown-out, but submissions after than date would be susceptible to a trial on the merits.

But we really don’t like Judge Freeman’s approach, which focused on individual contract billings. We get that such an approach might actually help Fluor, since generally invoices are paid before submission of a final billing rate proposal (i.e., invoices related to 2012 costs have been paid before the contractor submits its 2012 final billing rate proposal in June, 2013). But we think such an approach flies in the face of the CAS noncompliance regime, codified in the FAR CAS Administration clause (52.230-6). As we read that clause, it seems that the impact of any CAS noncompliance must be estimated, and that estimate is used as the basis for negotiating contract price adjustments. Judge Freeman’s approach seems to ignore that statutorily-required approach in favor of an invoice by invoice analysis that is going to be hugely time-consuming for both parties.

Judge Freeman appeared to have embraced the “continuing claims” doctrine, while other Judges seem to have found it to be not very helpful. It’s unclear to us how this will impact disputes involving “stream-of-cost” issues such as depreciation.

All in all, we’re confused. And we bet others are, as well. We continue to look for the various contract disputes fora—and their Judges—to give the parties a bright line test that can be used to resolve issues and avoid litigation.

As far as we can tell, this ain’t it.

 

Confusion Concerning Allowable Compensation

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The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (also known as Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations) establishes the general rules for cost allowability—i.e., the rules regarding which costs the government will pay for and under what circumstances it will pay for those costs. Now that’s not the only thing the FAR establishes, not by a long shot. But it’s the part we are going to discuss today.

We say the FAR “establishes the general rules for cost allowability” because the FAR has supplementary regulations that may apply, depending on which Department or Agency of the Executive Branch you are dealing with. For example, the Department of Defense has its own “Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement” (aka, “DFARS”). Digging deeper, there may be additional rules and regulations established by local commands. For example, there’s a FAR Supplement for the U.S. Army. And there’s another one for the U.S. Air Force. Et cetera. You get the picture.

So the FAR is not the be-all-and-end-all in the discussion of cost allowability. But it is the start of the discussion.

The FAR establishes cost allowability rules in Part 31 (“Contract Cost Principles and Procedures”). Subpart 31.2 (“Contracts with Commercial Organizations”) discusses cost principles and procedures that are to be followed by for-profit entities that do business (or want to do business) with the Federal government. Subpart 31.2 can, somewhat simplistically, be broken down into two pieces: nine “general principles” (called by the late Mel Rishe “the cornerstone principles”), and principles governing “selected costs”. There are 52 selected cost principles (though several are “reserved” and Not Applicable to contractors). So for-profit contractors need to be aware of about 55 individual rules governing cost allowability.

(Note: We are of course eliding any discussion of the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) found in Part 30 or contract financing/billing rules found in Part 32.)

Looking at the roughly 55 individual cost allowability rules, there is one rule that stands out among all the others, because of its complexity and sheer length and breadth of coverage. We’re talking about the Cost Principle found at 31.205-6, Compensation for Personal Services. Actually, there are (at least) 17 separate rules found within that single Cost Principle, ranging from 31.205-6(a) (“general rules”) to 31.205-6(q) (“allowability of employee stock ownership plans”). It covers such wide-ranging compensation topics as back pay, severance pay, pension costs, bonuses and other incentive compensation, postretirement benefits, fringe benefits, etc. It’s a bear.

It’s an intentially complex Cost Principle for a variety of reasons, likely the foremost of which is the notion that the biggest driver of contractors’ costs is their labor costs. (Actually, with advances in factory automation, telecommunications/information technology, and process streamlining, we’re not sure that’s a valid assumption any longer. But we digress.) In addition, it’s undeniable that contractors have, in the past, “gamed” compensation costs to their benefit. For example, waiting until just before the books close at year-end in order to see how room there is in the estimated indirect rates for incentive compensation, and then awarding incentive compensation based on that amount of “room” is one way contractors have gamed their compensation costs—to their benefit and presumably to the detriment of their government customers, who may have ended-up paying less had a different methodology been used. As the government (and Congress) became aware of the compensation “games,” the rules evolved in order to close the regulatory loopholes that permitted them. Thus, here we are today, with a bear of a Cost Principle with which to comply.

Another important factor to consider is the impact of Federal government employees, the buyers and program managers, and quality assurance specialists, and cost monitors, and auditors, and pricing analysts, and logisticians, and all the folks who belong to the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). Not to engage in union-bashing (because we support the right of employees to organize and engage in collective bargaining), but it’s a fact that AFGE has, for years, waged a war against a perceived inequality between private sector compensation and benefits, and the compensation and benefits offered to Federal employees. In fact, as recently as its official 2013 “Issue Papers,” AFGE called for “capping taxpayer subsidies for contractors at $200,000 per annum” and devoted several pages of single-spaced arguments to supporting its position. The attacks by AFGE and others on contractor compensation have resulted in complex and somewhat arbitrary compensation “ceilings” that limit the amount of allowable employee compensation that can be priced and billed to the Federal government.

We have written several articles on the perceived inequality between civil servant pay and private sector pay. We finally concluded that there is insufficient information to reach a conclusion—and that there were too many contradictory studies for anybody to reach a conclusion. (Here’s a link to that article.) We have also attacked the notion that the compensation paid to contractor executives (who may be helming companies in which Federal revenue is but a pittance of total corporate sales) is a valid target for rule-makers. We opined that it would have long-term repercussions on the quality of the defense industrial base. We argued setting compensation allowability ceilings too low (e.g, at $200K or $230K) would be a bad idea.

But our opinions and arguments didn’t really stop Congress from passing Section 803 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), or Section 864 of the 2013 NDAA. Nor did it stop the FAR Councils from issuing an extremely complex and problematic interim rule in June, 2013, revising 31.205-6(p) employee compensation limits. We wrote about that piece of nefarious mischief right here.

Which brings us, by perhaps roundabout means, to the topic of this article: what the heck has Congress done to contractor compensation ceilings this year? Depending on what bill you read (either the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 or the 2014 NDAA), you get a different compensation cost allowability answer. In the Budget Act, allowable contractor compensation was capped at $487,000. In the 2014 NDAA, allowable contractor compensation was capped at $625,000. How is a contractor supposed to know what the official limit is? The attorneys argue that the ceiling imposed by the bill signed last governs, but we’re talking about a 24 hour timing difference. Does that really make a difference? Well, according to all the inside-The Beltway attorneys, yes. It does. Thus, according to pieces from Jenner & Block and Crowell & Moring, contractors should be working with the lower of the two compensation ceilings.

In fact, the world-class government contracts attorneys at Crowell & Moring prepared a really handy summary of the various compensation ceilings with which Federal contractors must comply. Here’s a link to that essential summary. It illustrates just how complex and confusing the contractor compensation situation has become. The Crowell & Moring attorneys describe the situation as “confusing, inconsistent, and in some cases unenforceable.”

But remember, dear readers, that contractors must comply with the Cost Principles in effect at the time their contract is awarded. If the FAR Councils revise the Compensation Cost Principles after contract award, perhaps in response to legislation such as the Bipartisan Budget Act or the NDAA, then the changes do not apply to that contract. (Yeah, some of the Compensation Cost Principle changes attempt to apply the changes retroactively. Thus: the comment about unenforceability.) Any attempt to apply post-award cost allowability requirements to an awarded contract should at least result in an equitable adjustment to the contract price. Failure to provide that adjustment may be deemed to be a contract breach. If you have a Federal customer attempting to apply post-award allowability requirements to your awarded contract, you probably want to consult a knowledgeable and experienced attorney, just like the ones at Jenner & Block or Crowell & Moring.

 

New DCAA Audit Guidance on Consultant Costs Emphasizes Substance over Form

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Consultants
As long-time readers know, we tend to be quick to criticize DCAA audit guidance. In our experience DCAA auditors would like to “do the right thing” in terms of audit procedures and findings, but find themselves constrained by guidance in their Contract Audit Manual (CAM), guidance in recently issued Memoranda for Regional Directors (MRDs), and by undocumented decisions made by Regional leadership (as well as by Fort Belvoir leaders). Thus, we tend to criticize the guidance as opposed to the auditors.

As we’ve written in several blog articles over the years, our belief is that well-trained, experienced, auditors generally have the judgment and discretion to reach their own conclusions, without the multiple layers of management review heaped upon them. Yes, we can argue as to whether your individual DCAA auditor meets the generally-accepted professional standard of “well-trained [and] experienced” but that’s as much a matter of luck as anything. The acumen of an individual in any large group is going to be subject to the bell curve—and there are roughly 5,000 DCAA auditors. Of course your mileage may vary from the expected mean.

Which is why we focus on audit guidance. If the audit guidance is good, the average DCAA auditor ought to be able to execute against it and reach reasonable, supportable, conclusions. If the audit guidance is bad, then even the best auditor is going to be challenged in executing against it, and in reaching reasonable, supportable, conclusions.

Over the past four years, we haven’t had many nice things to say about DCAA audit guidance. (You may have noticed that.) We believe our criticisms have been reasonable. Not everybody agrees with us or thinks we have been reasonable in our negative assessments. In our defense, when we see good guidance, we also point that out to our readership—as we have a couple of times in the past few months.

Today we have another piece of good audit guidance to bring to your attention.

It concerns how DCAA auditors should determine the allowability of the cost of outside consultants used by contractors.

We’ve written about the use of consultants before and we summarized applicable regulatory requirements in that article, as well as discussing some other compliance challenges in that area.

The allowability of consultants’ costs has long been an area of contention between DCAA and contractors. In fact, consultant costs are often considered to be “low-hanging fruit” with respect to generating questioned costs—and we all know how giddy it makes Fort Belvoir to report “taxpayer savings” from such questioned costs to Congress every year. (Never mind the fact that the majority of those “questioned costs” are never sustained by a Contracting Officer, and often lead to protracted litigation that significantly costs those same taxpayers.)

(Rumor around the watercooler is that DCAA Director Fitzgerald has established an expected target of 6% CQ for each ICS audit. We have not verified that rumor. But we digress.)

In any case, DCAA recently updated applicable audit guidance via MRD 13-PAC-026(R), issued December 19, 2013. Generally speaking, we like what we read. The guidance tells auditors to focus on substance, not form, and to use professional judgment to determine the allowability of consulting costs. That sounds promising, doesn’t it?

The first thing we noticed about the guidance is that it is “effective immediately for all new and in-process assignments.” That means that it applies to any 10100 (ICS) audit of your annual proposal to establish final billing rates, even if that audit has been exited. So long as the audit has not been issued, it is subject to the guidance—which could give you an opportunity to get some of the questioned costs associated with outside consultants reversed! (Not likely, but still ….)

Second, the guidance stated—

… we want to ensure that when testing a transaction for allowability, we apply the appropriate audit criteria (i.e., FAR Cost Principle) based on the nature of the claimed cost and not the account in which the contractor recorded the cost. In some instances, costs recorded as consultants may represent purchased labor, and audit teams should evaluate these costs using appropriate audit criteria.

In our experience, it’s been tough to convince DCAA auditors that a vendor is not a consultant, especially when the associated cost has been misrecorded into the wrong General Ledger account. The foregoing should be helpful in that area, especially when you use the following—

Audit teams must first determine whether the underlying nature of the claimed cost represents professional and consultant services before applying the documentation requirement in FAR 31.205-33(f). … The audit team’s assessment of the underlying nature of the claimed costs determines whether FAR 31.205-33 is applicable and not the contractor’s accounting classification. For instance, contractors may record expenses for purchased labor (e.g., janitorial, clerical, security) in a “Consultant” or “Professional Services” account; this does not make these costs subject to the requirements of FAR 31.205-33. Likewise, costs recorded in other accounts may be professional and consultant service costs and the auditor should evaluate the costs using the criteria of FAR 31.205-33.

Accordingly, it couldn’t be clearer that the first step in evaluating the allowability of consultant costs is to conclude that the costs are, in fact, consultant costs. And it is the underlying nature of the activity, and not the contractor’s cost account description, that drives that determination. Only after the auditor concludes (with appropriate evidence) that the cost is related to a “professional and consultant services” (as that term is defined in the FAR Cost Principle) should the auditor then go on to evaluate the allowability of that cost using the three-pronged test of 31.205-33. If the auditor concludes that the cost is not related to “professional and consultant services” then the three-pronged test cannot be used to determine cost allowability—though of course there are lots and lots of other Cost Principles in FAR 31.2 that might be used.

The audit guidance also contained helpful clarifications regarding that three-pronged test. It described the three prongs as follows—

… it is important for the audit team to understand that the evidence required from the contractor is essentially the following:
• An agreement that explains what the consultant will be doing for the contractor;
• A copy of the bill for the actual services rendered, including sufficient evidence as to the time expended and nature of the services provided to determine what was done in exchange for the payment requested, and that the terms of the agreement were met. This documentation does not need to be included on the actual invoice and can be supported by other evidence provided by the contractor;

• Explanation of what the consultant accomplished for the fees paid–this could be information on the invoice, a drawing, a power point presentation, or some other evidence of the service provided.

Helpfully, the audit guidance stated—

It is important to clarify that the audit team is looking for evidence to satisfy these three areas and not a specific set of documents. Therefore, auditor judgment will be the determining factor on the type and sufficiency of evidence required to satisfy these requirements. … The contractor may provide evidence created when the contractor incurred the cost as well as evidence from a later period. … As an example of evidence from a later period, the contractor may facilitate a meeting between the consultant and the audit team to obtain documentation (oral/written) from the consultant regarding what effort they performed (i.e., third party confirmation). The audit team should consider the evidence provided by the consultant, along with other evidence obtained, to determine if the total evidence gathered is sufficient to satisfy the documentation requirements

One of the most difficult areas (in terms of audit support) is to meet the third prong of the three-prong test—i.e., to provide a work product or other evidence of work performed. Given DCAA’s recent tendency to delay performing audits for years (or even a decade in some extreme cases), it’s usually a challenge to come up with the work product. Given that you may be looking for support for consulting expenses some four or five years after incurrence, it’s challenge enough to figure out who to talk to regarding what the consultant did, let alone to hope that same person retained evidence of work performed. Thus, it’s very important to review the MRD language regarding work product, since it is more flexible that previous audit guidance has been. The new guidance stated—

The purpose of the work product requirement is for the contractor to be able to demonstrate what work the consultant actually performed (in contrast to what work is planned to be performed). Although a work product usually satisfies this requirement, other evidence also may suffice. Therefore, if the audit team has sufficient evidence demonstrating the nature and scope of the consultant work actually performed, the contractor has met the FAR 31.205-33(f)(3) requirements even if the actual work product (e.g., an attorney’s advice to the contractor) is not provided. The audit team should not insist on a work product if other evidence provided is sufficient to determine the nature and scope of the actual work performed by the consultant.

While we are not in 100% agreement with every aspect of the audit guidance (e.g., we disagree that attorney-client privilege does not act to protect the contractor from disclosure of materials to auditors), we generally think this is a very positive piece of audit guidance. Now it’s up to our readers to educate their DCAA auditors on the newly relaxed—and reasonable—requirements it contains.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.