DOE Contractors Must Comply with Business System Administration Regime
 Last August we reported that the Department of Energy had decided to implement the DFARS Business System administration regime for its contractors. We were interested to note that DOE Management and Operations (M&O) contractors were exempted from that decision. We also noted that DOE had decided to implement only five of the six DFARS business systems, leaving MMAS on the cutting room floor (so to speak).
On February 12, 2013, the DOE issued further implementation guidance via Acquisition Letters (ALs).
Link to DOE Policy Flash 2014-17 which summarized the changes from the prior Business System ALs.
Link to DOE AL which describes how DOE will implement the Business Systems administration regime.
As is usually the case with DOE, policy makers provided background and context, as well as direction, to their acquisition teams. (We wish DOD would take a similar approach.) When perusing the AL we noted several points we would like to bring to readers’ attention.
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DOE contractors that don’t have approved accounting and purchasing systems are going to have a tough time being determined to be “responsible” contractors, as that term is defined at FAR 9.1. The AL states, “The contracting officer shall ensure that the offeror/contractor has an approved accounting system and purchasing system for use under the contract.” Contractors that have unassessed accounting systems will be evaluated via the SF 1408 Pre-award Survey. Contractors that have disapproved or inadequate systems are going to be in trouble.
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DOE contracting officers are directed to obtain business system information from contractors “not later than 60 days after contract award.” Contractors must submit “written documentation that each business system meets the system criteria required in each clause”.
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DOE provided guidance to its contracting officers addressing negotiation objectives when a contractor has a disapproved accounting system. Options include: (1) give the contractor time to correct identified deficiencies, (2) use another contract type, (3) reduce profit/fee, or (4) including a contractor “reopener” clause.
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Similar guidance was provided to address negotiation objectives when a contractor’s purchasing system has been disapproved.
Importantly, DOE has different criteria than DOD regarding which contracts are subject to the Business Systems administration regime. DOD implements the rules only on CAS-covered contracts. All other contracts are exempt from payment withholds arising from disapproved or inadequate business systems. DOD implements the rules on CAS-covered contracts plus “fixed-priced contracts awarded to large businesses on the basis of adequate price competition” regardless of whether cost or pricing data was submitted.
In summary, DOE has adopted a similar, yet subtly different, approach to contractor business system administration.
Meanwhile, how’s DOD doing with its approach to contactor business system administration?
At the end of January, Bloomberg reported that payment withholds were in place at several of the largest defense contractors, including Northrop Grumman ($1.4 million), Boeing ($5.2 million), and BAE Systems ($19 million). In addition, Bloomberg reported that DCMA was planning to start withholding payments from Honeywell and General Atomics.
Readers will perhaps recall our story that DCMA had finally approved Lockheed Martin’s EVMS business system at its Fort Worth facility, freeing up roughly $222 million in previously withheld payments. The Bloomberg article reported that $46.4 million in payment withholds (related to an unidentified deficient business system) had also been freed up at Lockheed’s “space unit”. Interestingly, DCMA is not letting Lockheed Martin recoup the payment withholds in one lump sum (as we would have guessed), but instead, “Lockheed has received some of the payments, and the rest will be released in future billings.” Why? We have no idea.
So if you are a DOE contractor looking to assess risk associated with the new business system administration regime, you have only to look at those large DOD contractors. Based on their experiences, you may just want to take this whole thing seriously.
If you are a DOE contractor new to the business system administration regime, you will want to start by mapping your current practices to the official adequacy criteria. You will want to remediate any gaps. You will want to document the compliant state through policies, procedures and desk instructions. You will want to prepare boilerplate language for your future DOE proposals. You will want to develop walk-through presentations to support future business system audits/reviews. If you don’t currently have assessed or approved accounting or purchasing systems, you will want to focus on those two systems first.
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We would very much like to think the foregoing will inspire contractors to get serious about their business systems. Unfortunately, experience has taught us to be more cynical. Too many contractors are going to defer investing in their business systems until the very last minute—i.e., just before their covered proposal is due to be submitted. Trust us, at that point it’s really too late. The DOE guidance makes it clear that deficient accounting or purchasing systems are going to put you at a competitive disadvantage, and may end up costing you the win.
Still other contractors are going to ignore the business systems clauses in their contracts. Those contractors will be surprised when the auditors and/or reviewers show up, and they’ll be even more surprised when their system deficiencies lead to payment withholds. They will convene tiger teams and executive steering committees, and bring in platoons of expensive outside consultants, and they’ll scramble in a “Chinese fire drill” until, sooner or later, the payment withholds will go away. And then they’ll congratulate themselves and award bonuses to the same people who ignored the issue until it was too late.
Don’t be those contractors.
If you have business system clauses in your existing contracts, or if you think you will be bidding on contracts subject to the business system administration regime, then now is the time to get started. Don’t put it off for another day.
Is it the Navy or the Entire Department of Defense?
You know, or ought to know, that one of our favorite themes here at the Apogee Consulting, Inc. blog is that government contractors are no more corrupt than any other business sector. Despite conventional wisdom, we assert that government contractors are no more corrupt than government employees, or military service people.
It takes two to tango, folks. Where you find contractor corruption, chances are there’s corruption on the other side of the negotiating table as well.
In point of fact, any time you have a large population of individuals, you are going to see a rough bell curve of behavior, with ethically challenged people found outside the mean—and corrupt actors found out beyond the six sigma point. Yet despite piles of evidence to the contrary, auditors and investigators and politicians love to pick on the instances of government contractor wrongdoing, and seemingly ignore the instances of wrongdoing made by civil servants and military service people.
The seeming blindness extends to deployment of internal controls as well. Ask any public accountant about Sarbanes-Oxley controls or Dodd-Frank or the importance of business ethics and “tone at the top” and no doubt you’ll get an earful. But ask any Inspector General or DCAA auditor about those topics, and you’ll get a discussion about contractors’ controls, and damn little about controls in place in the Federal government or in the military services. That’s not to say those controls don’t exist; of course they do—and there are people who think about them and work on them. But we assert that the focus of the Federal government’s efforts to implement controls and evaluate their efficacy is outward facing and not internal facing. We assert the focus is aimed at contractors and not at employees of the Federal government.
But maybe that seeming blindness is clearing a little bit.
Recently, stories have emerged that Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel is “deeply troubled” by the multitude of military scandals that have made the news in recent months. For example, this article at Defense News reported that Hagel thinks “there may be a ‘systemic’ ethics crisis inside the military.” The article reported—
The sweeping concerns voiced by [the Pentagon spokesperson] come amid recent reports of service members and some high-ranking officers accused of cheating, fraud, drug use, alcohol abuse, gambling and sexual misconduct. Hagel appears to be expanding his concerns beyond the recent problems inside the Air Force’s nuclear missile community. Missileers have been accused of cheating on tests, using drugs, and failing to properly maintain the nation’s arsenal of 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles. … The Navy on Feb. 4 acknowledged a cheating scandal at its Nuclear Propulsion School in South Carolina, which so far has implicated at least 30 senior enlisted instructors accused of sharing answer sheets to nuclear qualification tests. Seemingly unrelated, the Army recently revealed that about 1,200 soldiers — including 200 officers — are implicated in a long-running scheme by National Guard recruiters to fraudulently collect nearly $100 million in recruiting incentive payments.
With respect to that last sentence, readers may recall that we reported on it right here. We stated—
So, what do we think about this latest evidence of corrupt behavior in our nation’s armed forces? Well, what we think is that the Army should have done what almost every savvy corporation does, when recruiting referral bonuses are being offered. It should have made the new recruit identify any individual who made the referral, or else check a box on a form that said ‘nobody referred me.’ That would have been a simple, inexpensive, effective control that would have acted to make this kind of ‘wide-ranging’ conspiracy a whole lot harder to execute.
Thus, we are on record (once again) as saying that the fixes to these corruption problems are simple, in the sense that every large corporation in America has similar issues and has deployed controls to detect and/or deter corrupt behavior. Do those controls always work? Of course not. But the corporations don’t pretend the problem doesn’t exist, and they work to combat it. Here’s yet another example of how the DOD is years behind the private sector, where inexpensive and straightforward anti-corruption controls are being implemented and evaluated for efficacy every single day.
In a tradition that goes back at least to World War I, it’s once again time for the DOD to borrow practices from the private sector.
And speaking of borrowing from the private sector, we were bemused to see a report over at The New York Times, which dealt with yet another Navy scandal. The possible scandal involves Inchcape Shipping Services, a Dubai-based Navy contractor. According to a qui tam suit, “employees asserted that Inchcape had received discounts from subcontractors and then pocketed the difference instead of refunding it to the Navy.”
That suit, filed in 2010, led to Inchcape being suspended and at least one subpoena being issued. In 2011, Inchcape turned over billing records from as far back as 2002 to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). In 2012, Inchcape was ordered “to give investigators a copy of an internal company audit from 2008 into some of the questionable billings.”
Isn’t it interesting that Inchcape, a company Headquartered in the UAE, would have performed its own audits, and would have retained them? But perhaps we digress….
What did NCIS and other DOD investigators/auditors do with the treasure trove of information provided by Inchcape. Well, apparently not very much. The NYT reported that Inchcape challenged its suspension in December, 2013, and that Judge Merow at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims was considering ordering that it be lifted, because (according to Judge Merow) “it did not appear that the Navy’s suspension office had ‘conducted any meaningful investigation’ of other documents ‘despite having had time to do so.’”
As our readers know all too well, that’s par for the course.
So what did the Navy do? According to the NYT—
Faced with the possibility that the judge might dismiss the suspension, records show, the Navy agreed to lift it in exchange for promises from the company to follow federal rules, refund overcharges, and hire independent monitors and auditors. … the company has agreed to pay for an independent audit that could help the Justice Department determine how much it may have overcharged the government.
Let’s repeat that: “…the company has agreed to pay for an independent audit that could help the Justice Department determine how much it may have overcharged the government.”
Apparently giving up on waiting for NCIS to complete its investigation, the DOJ told the contractor to hire a private audit firm to conduct the government’s investigation.
That’s … unusual, to say the least.
And others apparently think so as well. The NYT reported—
Contracting experts said it was unusual for the government to turn to an outside auditor in this type of case, and some questioned whether an independent firm could do as thorough a job. … ‘To wait for the Navy to do a serious audit is like waiting for Godot,’ said Charles Tiefer, a professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former member of the federal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Considering that the Navy has sat on its hands for years, getting an accounting from a private firm is a sign of desperation.’
“A sign of desperation”?!?
One might reasonably think that the DOJ or the Navy might turn to DCAA to perform the kind of audit that would identify overbillings. Indeed, they may have done so, only to run up against the fact that DCAA cannot perform timely audits either.
Giving up on the accounting and audit resources of the Federal government, in a “sign of desperation,” the parties have agreed to hire a private sector auditor and (presumably) to rely on its findings.
So this is what it’s come down to … this is the state of affairs in which both contractors and government stakeholders find themselves. The accounting and audit resources of the Department of Defense are worthless to evaluate whether or not a contractor overbilled the DOD.
How sad. We sincerely mean that. How sad.
At a time when DOD leadership is—finally!—waking to the realization that it may have internal control weaknesses that would be unacceptable in a public company, at a time when the Pentagon’s control environment and tone at the top are being questioned by many, at a time when the expertise of the nation’s premier audit agency is needed the most … DCAA is missing in action.
How sad.
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Do You Use SAP? Do You Use the GPD Function? Then DCAA Is On To You!
There are a number of accounting software packages available to government contractors. Generally, we don’t care which one our clients use.
We’ve noticed that smaller entities tend to use the entry-level packages, which is of course just fine. As entities grow and become more sophisticated, so does their accounting software. Companies move from Quickbooks to CostPoint or to Jamis or whatever. That’s the normal evolution of things.
And when companies grow larger, then tend to embrace “enterprise-wide” systems such as Oracle, Peoplesoft, or SAP. Those systems tend to be complex and require quite a bit of budget to implement and maintain. Accordingly, they tend to be used only by the largest and most complex of government contractors.
This article is written for those large contractors that use SAP. Actually it’s written for that small group of large contractors that use the “Grouping, Pegging and Distribution” (GPD) function of SAP.
You may be in for a rough ride from your DCAA auditors.
We know this because we just read the audit guidance covering SAP GPD.
The GPD function of SAP “is an automated inventory process where parts and their associated costs move between contracts.” As we understand it, GPD “pegs” material parts and other inventory to contracts based on scheduling need loaded into the MRP system. Should the project schedule need dates change, the parts/inventory might be “repegged” to another project with an earlier need date. What’s relevant here is that material costs move along with the parts, so today’s project’s material cost need not be tomorrow’s project’s material cost.
DCAA may have a problem with that feature.
According to the audit guidance, potential audit concerns may include—
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Material Title Passed to Government – When material title passes to the Government, the contracting officer must approve transfer of material between contracts; however, GPD automatically reassigns material and costs between contracts without the required authorizations.
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Audit Trail – Due to the continual cost shifting of the GPD processes, there is a limited audit trail that allows for tracing costs from the contractor’s book and records to supporting documents (i.e., purchase requests, invoices, and receiving reports).
Importantly, the audit guidance implies that these issues may impact the adequacy of a contractor’s Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS). Astute readers may recall that the MMAS is one of the six DFARS Business Systems. Consequently, any finding that a contractor’s MMAS has Significant Deficiencies may lead to payment withholds.
The good news, of course, is that DCAA has de-emphasized performance of Business System reviews so that it can focus on catching up on its ginormous backlog of incurred cost audits. Thus, it’s likely that by the time DCAA gets around to auditing your SAP GPD system as part of a MMAS review, you will have implemented a new MRP system that the audit agency has never heard of.
But if you are one of the small group of unlucky contractors that has SAP GPD functionality and a MMAS Business System and an active DCAA Field Audit Office, then we suggest you might want to be a tad concerned about this audit guidance.
And Speaking of Terminations
Recently we had occasion to comment on the end of the 23 year-long termination of the Navy’s A-12 stealth fighter program. Now we’ve come across another termination that seems worthy of comment. It’s the VH-71 Presidential Helicopter program, known as the “Kestral.”
The development contract was awarded by the US Navy to Lockheed Martin and Augusta Westland in 2004. As Flight Global reported in 2009—
The aircraft was marketed as a relatively simple adaptation of the successful EH101 helicopter. However, new requirements imposed on the programme after contract award forced the USN to launch a major re-design. The delays and cost overruns plaguing the VH-71 Kestral have become a rallying cry for reforming the DOD acquisition system.
Sound familiar?
Defense Industry Daily reported—
… the total amount paid to Lockheed over the entire contract ends up costing the taxpayer about $2.2 billion. The biggest reason for all that waste is a President’s own office that couldn’t stop adding requirements, but enforcing Navy certification requirements on a helicopter designed to commercial aviation standards wasn’t helpful, either.
Inside Defense reported that the final Termination Settlement payment was $91.1 million. That final payment included “$38.5 million for completed work and $51.6 million in termination fees.” According to the same source, “that brings the termination total to about $203 million.” Thus, it seems that the termination settlement expenses were roughly nine percent of ITD program costs.
Remember that longish article we wrote about Boeing and its inability to get the government to reimburse it for its settlement expenses, because Boeing had exceeded the Limitation of Funds ceiling? Well, when you are tracking your costs for compliance with the LoC/LoF clauses, we suggest you add another eight to ten percent on top of those costs, to cover your termination settlement expenses.
Just a thought ….
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