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Apogee Consulting Inc

Contract Financing Failure

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The_Silent_Auditor
The mission of the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DOD IG) is "to provide independent, relevant, and timely oversight of the Department of Defense that supports the warfighter, promotes accountability, integrity and efficiency, advises the secretary of defense and Congress, and informs the public." Audit reports and testimony issued from the DOD IG generally fall in line with its mission. However, every once in a while we scratch our head(s) in puzzlement and wonder what in the name of accountability the DOD IG was thinking.

This is one of those times.

Recently the DOD IG issued an audit report criticizing financial management of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. We think it missed the mark and failed to promote accountability, integrity and efficiency. We think it failed to advise the Secretary of Defense and Congress regarding significant issues. We think it failed to inform the public regarding significant procurement policy shortfalls.

As you may be able to ascertain, we don't think very highly of that particular DOD IG audit report.

First, let's remind readers that we have expressed concerns with the management of the GCV program before. We've gone on record as expressing skepticism that any contractor could meet the Army's expressed requirements in the timeframe it wanted them met, for the budget it said it had to spend. Despite our concerns, in August, 2011, the Army awarded two early GCV technology development contracts. BAE Systems Land & Armaments division received $450 Million and General Dynamics Land Systems received $440 Million. The contracts called for each contractor to deliver a design for consideration by August, 2013. A prototype development contract was expected to follow. The GCV prototype was to be delivered by 2014.

In January, 2013, the technology development contract performance period was extended by six months. The Army decided it would award an Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract to only one of the two competing contractor teams, though it is not clear if the downselect decision would be made solely on the design or whether the two teams would each produce a prototype to give the Army something tangible to evaluate.

Now, nearly three years after initial contract award, the program is essentially dead. The Secretary of Defense publicly announced termination of the program in February, 2014; but the truth is that the program continues today, though it has been "downgraded to a study project."

What happened? The Defense News reported-

BAE Systems and General Dynamics have been given hundreds of millions of dollars by the Army since 2011 to develop technologies for the GCV program, even though the Congressional Budget Office has argued against building the platform due to its ballooning weight, armor and projected sustainment requirements. In an April report, the agency estimated that the Army would have to spend $29 billion between 2014 and 2030 to purchase 1,748 GCVs.

Obviously, sequestration and other budget constraints were going to negatively impact the Army's ability to fork over a couple of billion dollars per fiscal year. (Actually, it would be more than that if you make a reasonable estimate of probable cost growth.) Plus, if you do the math you get a fairly high cost per vehicle (something in the neighborhood of $16.6 million per). That's seems rather pricey when you consider that the world's most effective anti-armor missile (the Javelin) can be had for a $125,000 command and control unit plus $40,000 per missile. All other factors being ignored, putting $16 Million at risk from a $165K missile would not seem to be on the right side of the economic equation.

Thus, the GCV program was essentially doomed before it got started.

With the foregoing as background we can put the DOD IG audit report in its proper context. In the proper context, the audit report becomes a stellar example of the maxim that an auditor is one who enters the battlefield after the battle has already been fought and proceeds to efficiently bayonet the wounded.

The DOD IG showed up at end of the program's life to audit the Army's financial management of the program. If the IG's input was really going to affect the program's financial management of the program, wouldn't we (as taxpayers) have wanted the IG auditors to show up at the program's inception? At this point, the audit report is essentially moot and simply criticizes those who are probably searching for new jobs at this point in time.

But the timing of the report is not our real concern. It's not like government audit reports spit out from an assembly line in a week or two. The timing of this report is nothing more than a cavil. No. Our real concerns (and criticisms) of this particular IG audit report lie elsewhere.

Let's start here. Readers should be clear that when the DOD IG says it audited the Army's financial management of the program, it did not, in fact, audit the Army's financial management of the program. The DOD IG did not audit whether the Army's program requirements were reasonably achievable, or whether the required technology was sufficiently mature, or whether the program schedule was achievable for the appropriated budgets. Nope. The DOD IG didn't look at any of those attributes, though we believe most people would agree with us that those aspects might reasonably be considered to be important signposts of the financial health (or lack thereof) of a Major Defense Acquisition Program.

When the DOD IG says it audited the Army's financial management of the GCV program, what it means is that it audited the administration of progress payments by DOD officials, so as to determine whether those officials "authorized and administered progress payments in accordance with selected Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) [requirements] and [the requirements of] DOD policies."

Yep, that's it. That was the entire audit objective.

You've got a billion taxpayer dollars being spent, and your entire audit focus is on whether or not the program's progress payments were being "appropriately authorized and administered"? Seriously?

No, this was not a joke. The DOD IG was completely serious.

In fairness, we have to report that the DOD IG audit objective actually grew during performance (much like we suspect the GCV program requirements grew during design and development). As the DOD IG audit report stated-

Our initial announced objective was to determine whether DoD officials authorized and administered progress payments in DoD contracts in accordance with selected Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and DoD policies. During the course of the audit, we found significant issues related to the authorization of contract financing for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) development contracts. As a result, we modified the audit objective to determine whether DoD officials complied with selected FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Subpart (DFARS) clauses for progress payments awarded for the GCV Technology Development Phase.

So the DOD IG added compliance with DFARS clauses to the audit scope, based on findings during audit procedures.

Now readers can see the vastness and pertinence of the DOD IG audit scope. It not only encompassed compliance with FAR requirements and DOD policy requirements, but it also included compliance with DFARS requirements as well! (Note: You must read the foregoing sentence in a biting, sarcastic, tone of voice.)

Seriously. That was the scope of the DOD IG audit.

Now before we get into the "meat" of the audit report, we should remind readers that administration of contracting financing payments is not the DOD's strong suit. Those pesky Performance Based Payments (PBPs) always seem to trip up Contracting Officers. As we told our readers during the last go-round (in April, 2013)-

DOD has been using PBPs for contractor financing since 2000. DOD IG has been criticizing DOD's administration of PBPs for just about that same length of time. While some of the details have changed, in a larger sense none of the 2013 criticisms are new; they are essentially the same criticisms asserted in 2001 and 2003. Pentagon policy-makers continue to largely concur with the IG's audit findings, and continue to commit to enhanced/revised policy guidance and enhanced/revised detailed user's guidance, and to enhanced/revised training for DCMA personnel involved in the administration of PBPs. Not too much has changed over the past decade.

So let us offer this prediction.

Sometime in the next decade, the DOD IG will conduct an 'audit' of DOD's administration of PBPs on its fixed-priced contracts. That audit will find many failures. It will recommend enhanced policy guidance. It will recommend more detailed direction. It will recommend enhanced training. And the Pentagon policy-makers will concur, and agree to implement the recommendations.

And that cycle will continue. Forever.

Well, it took less than a year for the DOD IG to issue another report finding fault with DOD's administration of contract financing payments on fixed-priced contracts. You may be as unsurprised as we were to see that additional internal guidance and additional training were found among the IG's recommended corrective actions. You may be as unsurprised as we were to see that DOD policy makers concurred with the findings and agreed to implement the recommended corrective actions.

But if that was all to tell you, we wouldn't have bothered.

What makes this audit report more interesting than the usual run-of-the-mill criticisms of those who do by those who do not, was (1) the IG was auditing the use of "customary" progress payments based on contractor costs incurred, and (2) the IG found that US Army Procurement Contracting Officers (PCOs) were inappropriately mixed "customary" and "unusual" contract financing methods on the GCV contracts.

That's kind of new.

By way of background, contract financing payments are permitted in certain circumstances and are intended to assist contractors with cash flow needs when their contract delivery dates are far in the future. Customary progress payments mean that a contractor can submit payment requests equal to a percentage of costs it incurs-generally, large contractors can receive reimbursement equal to 80 percent of their costs. On the other hand, PBPs are not tied to incurred costs; instead, they are tied to significant program events that measure technical progress. If a contract uses PBPs, the contractor can (in theory) receive financing of up to 90 percent of contract price (assuming program milestones are achieved).

So which is better?

Well, to those who remember the A-12 fiasco, PBPs are significantly better than cost-based progress payments. The A-12 nightmare taught us that progress payments do not pay contractors for making progress; instead, they pay contractors for spending (taxpayer) money. A contractor can be dead in the water (in terms of program execution) and still get 80% or so of the cost it incurs on the program. In contrast, a contractor needs to complete its program event milestones in order to be able to submit PBP requests. So if you want to tie payments to execution, you go with PBPs every single time.

But if you are a government bureaucrat you don't really care for PBPs. Use of PBPs does not require an "approved" accounting system. PBPs are not subject to the kind of GAGAS-compliant audit that certain government auditors like to perform. Use of PBPs is not well understood by the government contracting officers who have to administer them. Proper use of PBPs requires an investment of time and effort by those who have little of either, in return for downstream cost savings by other functions. PBP event milestones are "yes/no" questions that can only be answered by technical folks, which leaves certain government auditors with idle time on their hands. Plus, it's undeniable that contractors have used the government's wide-spread ignorance of PBPs to their advantage by "gaming" event milestone values so as to accelerate their cash flow.

Consequently (and despite the official FAR policy that PBPs are the "preferred" contract financing method), the DOD announced in 2011 that it was going to go back to the tried-and-true customary contract financing method of cost-based progress payments. As we reported at the time, the Honorable Shay Assad, who was at that time Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) wrote a memo that reinstituted the old policy, based primarily on the assertion that contractors had accelerated their cash flow by use of PBPs without providing the Pentagon with adequate consideration for having done so. (We have to admit he was probably correct in his assertion, even though we thought (and still think) he was engaging in a bit of overreaction.)

We wrote at the time-

So nice job, Mr. Assad. You managed to reverse one of the more important innovations of Clinton-era acquisition reform. You've opened the door for contractors to increase their offer prices at a time when the DOD (and indeed the entire Federal government) is focused on lowering those very prices. And you've managed to recreate the environment that led to one of the worst DOD weapon system 'train wrecks' in history.

(Reading that quote two years later, we suspect we were engaging in a fair bit of overreaction ourselves.)

Which brings us back to the GCV program and the DOD IG audit of its use of cost-based "customary" progress payments.

According to the IG audit report, the two contractors quickly found that submitting progress payment requests based on 80 percent of costs incurred (as adjusted in accordance with the progress payments contract clause) led to a negative cash-flow situation. Which is exactly what one should expect, right? If you are only getting reimbursed for about 80 percent of the costs you're incurring, that obviously means you have a negative cash flow of at least 20 cents on the dollar. Nobody should have been surprised about that situation, especially the two GCV contractors. That didn't stop the contractors from complaining to the PCO, however. The IG noted with approval that the assigned PCOs rejected the contractors' requests to modify their contract financing arrangements so as to augment their cash flows.

But just a few months later, one PCO executed a bilateral modification to one of the contractors (GDLS)

… that authorized the current customary progress payments be supplemented with additional financing payments for the successful completion of the Systems Functional Review, the Preliminary Design Review, and the end of the period of performance. The Systems Functional Review and Preliminary Design Review were included in the original GDLS contract under the Contract Data Requirements List, which was a 'not separately priced' contract line item. The modification stated that its purpose was to establish 'a change to the current contract financing arrangement' and also included a payment plan for event completion to incorporate the terms and conditions of the additional financing payments.

Thus, by mixing use of cost-based progress payments with use of PBPs on the same contract, the PCO was in violation of FAR requirements. Just as importantly (as the IG pointed out), the modification was "not in line with … the April 5, 2012, memorandum [from the PCO] that stated [those particular] performance events did not represent value or benefit to the Government." Finally, the IG noted that the PCO failed to obtain "adequate consideration" from the implementation of PBPs, as directed by the 2011 Shay Assad Memo we discussed above.

The DOD IG audit report devotes some verbiage to the discussion of the PCO's failure to document why GDLS needed the contract financing and how consideration should have been calculated. We were interested to note that the IG stated that DPAP guidance required the PCO to calculate consideration "at no less than a 2 percent interest rate," and criticized the PCO for using the current Treasury Rate instead. The PCO's argument that "the Government received additional work concurrent with the change in financing, and the additional work approximated the value of the consideration that he calculated," was received with some skepticism by the IG auditors.

A similar situation was reported with respect to the BAE contract. The second GCV program PCO followed the GDLS PCO in issuing contract modifications that enabled use of PBPs while concurrently continuing use of cost-based progress payments.

Had the "proper" interest rate been used by the two PCOs, then (according to the IG) the government would have received $1.3 million in consideration from the two contractors.

The DOD IG audit report described the ignorance of the DOD personnel involved in the foregoing decisions in some detail. Let's quote a bit-

The PCOs either did not understand the proper use and approval of contract financing, or disregarded key FAR contract financing guidance. Specifically, both PCOs stated they did not consider the additional financing payments to be unusual contract financing payments. Instead, all internal ACC-Warren documents called the extra events PBPs and the modifications referred to the revisions as additional financing, the PCOs stated that they never intended the events to be additional financing. The PCOs stated the events were actually contract deliverables with a discrete price. The PCOs believed they only erred by using the financing and PBP wording choices. Therefore, the PCOs stated they did not obtain the approval for unusual financing required by FAR 32.114 and DFARS PGI 232.501-2 because they did not believe they were providing unusual financing. They could not explain why they used the financing and PBP wording originally, and then later determined it was in error. However, based on the evidence the ACC-Warren PCOs provided, including comparison of the original contract terms to the modification, the modifications on the two contracts most closely exhibited payments for specific performance events, as opposed to distinct deliverables; and therefore, the payments represented PBPs.

The DOD IG audit report contained several recommendations for fixing the various problems it noted. However, the current Director of DPAP pointed the finger for implementing some of those recommendations at Mr. Assad (currently Director of DOD Pricing), because it is Mr. Assad (and not Mr. Ginman) who "is responsible for overseeing the complete renovation of DoD's pricing capability." In other words, the office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy declines to take responsibility for at least some aspects of defense procurement and acquisition policy.

We are reminded of that bit in the classic movie, "Office Space," where the two external efficiency consultants ask that one poor employee "so what would you say you do here?" That being said, we have no doubts whatsoever that the assignments and workload are clearly delineated between Mr. Ginman's and Mr. Assad's organizations.

But if the DOD IG audit report in question is simply a bit more of the same-albeit with a twist involving cost-based progress payments instead of the traditional PBP target-then why did we devote so much typing time to this particular article? Why do we criticize the DOD OIG so harshly for taking time and attention to a mooted matter than really did little more than point to widespread training problems within the DOD acquisition team?

Well, here's the thing.

We think the DOD IG audit report was so focused on slapping these two PCOs (and their management) on the wrists for helping the contractor that they missed the root cause of the problem. What's the root cause?

Fixed-priced development contracting.

Four-and-a-half years ago, we warned our readers about the perils of fixed-priced development contracting. We had lots to say, including quoting from FAR Part 35 regarding the official regulatory preference for cost-reimbursement development contracting.

In that same article we discussed the four elements that one policy wonk asserted would need to be aligned in order for fixed-priced development contracting to work. Those four elements were:

  • Stable, detailed, and technically sophisticated customer requirements definition

  • Clear understanding of those requirements by the contractor(s)

  • Savvy and skilled contract negotiating by the Government

  • A willingness to adjust requirements to meet the fixed price, if necessary

We wonder how the GCV technology program addressed those four elements. We wonder whether the decision to give the two contractors additional cash flow was driven by a tacit acknowledgement that the contracting parties never should have been involved in fixed-priced development contracting in the first place.

We wonder, but we'll never know the answers. We'll never know the answers to those questions because the DOD IG chose to focus on minutiae instead of things that would actually lead to better outcomes for future DOD programs. The DOD OIG missed its opportunity to create an audit report that tackled fundamental issues, and to make value-added recommendations. Instead the DOD OIG settled for more of the same: more contract financing violations, more recommendations about policy guidance and training. And so the DOD leadership that decided a fixed-priced was the right way to go for the GCV development program was let off the hook, and no doubt they were happy to agree to the same type of recommendations the DOD OIG has been making for more than a decade (without a noticeable improvement in results).

And speaking of DOD leadership, it seems funny how the same bureaucrats who ignored FAR Part 32's official regulatory preference for the use of PBPs instead of cost-based progress payments are seemingly the same ones who also ignored FAR Part 35's official regulatory preference for cost-reimbursement development contracting. Are they in fact the same individuals? We don't know because, once again, the DOD IG auditors chose to ignore (or at least not pursue) that particular issue.

Choosing to focus on the administration of contract financing payments instead of whether the parties should have been in a fixed-priced development contract was clearly the easier path, the one with fewer political pitfalls for all involved. But by making the choice it made, we believe the IG auditors missed a significant opportunity to promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency. We believe the IG auditors missed a significant opportunity to inform the Secretary of Defense and Congress, and to inform the public about the perils of fixed-priced development contracting.

Not the DOD OIG's best choice, in our view.

 

Whistle-Blower Protections

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It should not need to be said that you do not retaliate against whistle-blowers.

You do not retaliate against whistle-blowers.

You do not take any action against an employee who calls the company hotline, or who calls the Inspector General, or who files a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act against your company.

You just don't.

And now the DOD has made it official, adopting as a final rule DFARS Case 2013-D010 on February 28, 2014. The final rule adopted, with minor changes, the interim rule adopted at the direction of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 112-239). The final rule modified DFARS 203.903 to state the following policy of the Department of Defense-

(1) Prohibition. 10 U.S.C. 2409 prohibits contractors and subcontractors from discharging, demoting, or otherwise discriminating against an employee as a reprisal for disclosing, to any of the entities listed at paragraph (2) of this section, information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a DoD contract, a gross waste of DoD funds, an abuse of authority relating to a DoD contract, a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a DoD contract (including the competition for or negotiation of a contract), or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Such reprisal is prohibited even if it is undertaken at the request of an executive branch official, unless the request takes the form of a non-discretionary directive and is within the authority of the executive branch official making the request.

(2) Classified information. As provided in section 827(h) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, nothing in this subpart provides any rights to disclose classified information not otherwise provided by law.

So now it's official.

But that's not all. Did you know that if you are a DOD contractor, you must educate your employees regarding their whistle-blower rights? Did you know you must provide them with their rights-in writing? Did you know that requirement is a "mandatory flow-down" to all your subcontractors?

Yeah, you might want to check out DFARS contract clause 252.203-7002 ("Requirement to Inform Employees of Whistleblower Rights," Sept. 2013). That clause states-

(a) The Contractor shall inform its employees in writing, in the predominant native language of the workforce, of contractor employee whistleblower rights and protections under 10 U.S.C. 2409, as described in subpart 203.9 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.

(b) The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause, including this paragraph (b), in all subcontracts.

So now you know.

 

Checklists and Regulations, Oh My!

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So we noticed that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently announced it has adopted the now-ubiquitous "Proposal Adequacy Checklist" under the guise of "reducing transaction costs in NASA procurements."

How lovely for the space agency that once led the vanguard with respect to technical innovation and derring-do, an agency that is now pretty much known as much for bureaucratic bungling as its technical successes (which largely derive from the dreams of crazy young scientists who succeed in spite of the constraints placed upon them by the bureaucrats). NASA's strategic mission has evolved from its October, 1958, founding focus on exoatmospheric space flight to … what? (Nobody knows for sure.) Since the agency has insufficient funding and few champions in Congress and no national mandate for its mission, it has cannily chosen to emulate the most efficient of all Executive Branch Departments: the Department of Defense.

They say imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.

NASA has adopted the Proposal Adequacy Checklist in spite of public input that opined-

… the proposed rule passed the administrative burden and shifted the associated costs directly onto the contractor which was inappropriate. Respondent suggested, as an alternative, that solicitations require standardized table of contents with a proposal.

The NASA rule-makers reviewed that comment, mulled it over, discussed it amongst themselves in a frank and thoughtful exchange of views, and responded as follows-

This rule does not impose additional requirements over what is already required under the conditions when certified cost or pricing data is required. This provision is a single uniform tool that is applicable across NASA to promote consistency in compliance with FAR Table 15-2.

Well, there you go. The rule does not impose any additional requirements. So shut up and follow it.

Which begs the question, of course, as to why the heck a rule-any rule-which "does not impose additional requirements," would even be necessary. One might reasonably think that a rule which does not impose additional requirements would not be necessary in the first place, and would be seen as a complete waste of the rule-makers' time. Promulgating a rule that does not add any additional requirements would seem to be the equivalent of gilding a lily, or shipping coals to Newcastle, or extolling the virtues of ice to Eskimos.

But of course the truth is the rule does impose additional requirements: it just imposes them on contractors and not on Federal officials. It requires contractors submitting certain proposals to NASA to fill out an onerous checklist that adds no value to anybody. At best, the Proposal Adequacy Checklist creates the illusion of the imposition of quality, because anybody can fill out that checklist and say anything, while in reality their proposals may still omit lots of required cost or pricing information. The simple truth is that a completed Proposal Adequacy Checklist is no guarantee of the underlying quality of the proposal accompanying it.

It's the Potemkin Village of proposal quality control.

Yet NASA thinks requiring such an illusion is going to somehow reduce agency costs associated with evaluating proposals. Does anybody reading this blog expect that to be the outcome?

And despite protestations to the contrary, NASA is adopting a Checklist that's also demonstrably redundant and unnecessarily burdensome. The DAR Council admitted as much when it recently revised the Proposal Adequacy Checklist "to remove a redundant item." Here's what the rule-makers said about their regulatory action-

Item 19 [of the Checklist] required price analysis for all commercial items offered that are not available to the general public. Through further research and discussion, DOD has determined that item 19 … is duplicative in nature. DoD has concluded that items proposed with a commercial basis under subcontracts in the proposal require price analysis by the offeror. Furthermore, DoD has also concluded that question 14 under the Material and Service section and question 17 under the Subcontracts section on the Proposal Adequacy Checklist currently address the requirement for price analysis of the proposed commercial item that is produced or performed by others.

Thus, after "research and discussion" the rule-makers finally concluded what the public told them nearly a year ago: the rule was hastily written and poorly thought-out. It imposed additional requirements of little or no value, and was going to lead to increased costs on the contractor side without any cost reductions on the Government side.

Accordingly, it's more than a little ironic that those Pentagon paper-pushers who ignored public input and essentially adopted DCAA's policy position(s) lock, stock and barrel have now requested public input into their review of "requirements which impact the efficiency of the acquisition process." This initiative is so important to DOD that it just published a Federal Register Notice to extend the public input period from 30 days to 70 days. While the DPAP folks point to statute as the basis for rules that impede efficiency, we ourselves would point to DPAP, DCAA and the DAR Council as significant contributors to the current moribund state of defense acquisition.

Hey, we're just sayin'.

And we're just sayin' that the asinine Proposal Adequacy Checklist is a great example of the imposition of illusory controls that add no value, and simply act to give DCAA a reason not to provide Contracting Officers with "field pricing assistance". And we're just sayin' that the FAR Case 2008-020, implemented in FAC 2005-52 is another great example of the imposition of burdensome rules that limited Contracting Officers' ability to close-out contracts rather than speed contract close-outs (which was the guise under which the rule was originally perpetrated).

What the two rules have in common is they act to shift DCAA's audit burden to contractors. They both give DCAA a checklist which guides auditors into concluding that the proposals are adequate for audit, or not. And if the auditors conclude that the proposal they are looking at is not adequate (as defined by the checklist rather than the exercise of professional judgment), then those auditors have a wonderful regulatory-based excuse for not auditing it.

This is the paragon of procurement efficiency that NASA has chosen to emulate.

Great job, NASA! We're sure that your auditors (which tend to be DCAA auditors, naturally) will be thrilled that they have another checklist to use.

The next step, of course, is for NASA to announce a thorough review of all regulatory requirements that drive up costs and impede efficiency. Unless they decide to wait for DOD to complete its review, which they can they adopt wholesale without any critical analysis whatsoever.

 

DOD Embraces the "IT Box" Concept to Speed IT-Related Acquisitions

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We recently wrote an article exploring whether technology has been evolving too quickly for the Department of Defense to keep up. We wrote, "DOD's inability to innovate and match the private industry product development cycle is leaving the logistics, repair and maintenance functions with a big headache, as they struggle to source technologically obsolete parts called for by their 'frozen' designs."

If the problem of parts obsolescence is a "headache" for acquisition of major weapon systems, how much worse must the problem be for acquisition of Information Technology programs?

It's a problem we all feel. By the time we've got our hands on the latest and greatest smart phone or tablet (or phablet), it's already passé. We spend top dollar for the best and the coolest technology, but our friends always seem to have tech that's newer or better-and always cooler. How much worse must it be for the Pentagon, whose acquisition system is notoriously slow, and where workflow flows like molasses at the North Pole?

When you combine DOD acquisition processes with the acquisition of information technology, how can the result be anything other than completely ridiculous?

Recognizing the problem, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (the Hon. Katrina McFarland) told Senators at a hearing of the Senate's Armed Services Committee (Subcommittee for Readiness and Management Support) that the DOD "is working to speed up the route to acquiring new [Information Technology] systems by increasing collaboration and improving processes."

ASD(A) McFarland testified that the Pentagon is making several improvements in the way it acquires IT-related systems, in order to speed things up and avoid acquiring obsolete technology. Among them-

  • Adoption of interim guidance to adopt "modular, open system methodology" with an emphasis on "design for change".

  • Creation of the Cyber Investment Management Board, to unite "IT policy and operational requirements by identifying gaps in resources and in capabilities."

  • Development of a cybersecurity guidebook for Pentagon program managers "to assist them in understanding what cybersecurity activities are necessary at each point in the acquisition life cycle."

  • Using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to support "training of IT acquisitions personnel through the Defense Acquisition University."

In addition to the foregoing, the DOD is also adopting the "IT box" concept, which was described as "a significant change" to the IT acquisition process. According to Ms. McFarland's testimony, "The IT box gives organizations the ability to acquire technology that improves on already-approved technology, as long as the changes don't exceed certain parameters." In other words, instead of "freezing" a design based on specified technology, the "IT box" concept allows end-users to upgrade the initial requirements to adopt advances that took place after the requirements were definitized-so long as those upgrades fall within "certain parameters" that were not specified.

It is to be hoped that DOD's adoption of the foregoing improvements will indeed improve acquisition of information technology and IT systems. However, we have our doubts.

In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act (Section 804) required DOD to "develop and implement a new acquisition process for information technology systems." Further, Section 804 directed the Secretary of Defense to base that "new acquisition process" on "the recommendations in chapter 6 of the March 2009 report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Information Technology." Section 804 listed several attributes the new acquisition process was to embrace, including (but not limited to) incorporating "a modular, open-systems approach."

The 2010 NDAA was signed into law on October 28, 2009.

In other words, the Pentagon has had more than four years to take action, action that was directed by Congress and approved by the Commander-in-Chief (when he signed the bill into law). DOD has had more than four years to improve its acquisition of information technology and IT-related systems. It has taken DOD more than four years to develop the acquisition process innovations described earlier in this article.

More than four years.

In contrast, it took the Toyota Motor Company only two years to develop, produce, and start to sell its Prius automobile. Toyota was able to go from a blank sheet of paper to selling production vehicles in less than half the time it took Pentagon acquisition officials to implement recommendations from the Defense Science Board, recommendations that they had statutory authority to implement.

Why did it take the Pentagon so long? Good question. But perhaps a better question is why did the Pentagon need Congress to tell them to go do it?

Remember, the Defense Science Board (DSB) came up with the basic recommendations even before Congress got involved. The DSB recognized the problem, studied it, and made recommendations. Those recommendations didn't go to Congress-they went to the Secretary of Defense.

One is left with the impression that the Pentagon does not think much of DSB recommendations, since it does not seem to want to implement them unless directed to do so by Congress. And even then, it takes half a decade to get around to doing so. What's up with that?

The Defense Science Board has been advising Secretaries of Defense since 1956. Maybe it's time to do away with it, since the people being advised don't think very highly of its recommendations.

Actually, that's probably not the right answer to the problem of bureaucratic inertia. We suggest a better answer might be to hold Pentagon officials accountable for dispositioning recommendations received by the DSB. Make the bureaucrats publicly declare what they think of those recommendations. If they decline to implement a DSB recommendation, make them publicly declare what's wrong with it. If they like a recommendation, then make them publicly commit to an implementation date-and hold them accountable for meeting that commitment date.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon policy-makers will continue to inch along their infinite loop of incremental acquisition process improvements, funded by taxpayers and overseen by gullible members of Congress.

 

Face Palm Level Contractor Fraud

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Face_Palm
Sometimes we come across stories of contractor fraud that make us realize why so many government auditors are so skeptical about government contractor costs, and why so many "gadfly" NFPs are so skeptical about the integrity of government contractors, and why so many politicians are so willing to assist in efforts to combat government contract fraud through passing legislation.

This is one of those times.

For Pete's sake.

How in the world does a contractor get into such a predicament? How in the world do so many employees fail to blow the whistle on such an egregious fraud? The amount of collusion here is truly staggering. How convenient that the fall guy is dead and can't tell his side of the story….

Care to learn more?

Today's story comes courtesy of the DOD Inspector General, who posted this press release from the U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of California. It concerns the travails of Vector Planning & Services, Inc. ("Vector"), who had reached a deal with the US Attorney in which it admitted to "criminally defrauding the Defense Department … resulting in losses … of over $3.6 million." Vector settled its issues for $6.5 million.

The details of the fraud are … staggering. Truly, words fail us. So we'll quote from the press release.

… Under a cost-reimbursement contract, a contractor is entitled to reimbursement for both its direct allowable costs … and a prorated portion of its indirect allowable costs … Because indirect costs must be pro-rated across multiple contracts, they cannot be precisely determined until the end of the fiscal year. Accordingly, under a cost-reimbursement contract, a contractor initially submits claims for indirect costs based on 'provisional' or estimated rates, and later submits its actual indirect costs to the government for review, reconciliation, and approval. This later submission, known as an 'Incurred Cost Submission' or 'Incurred Cost Proposal,' reflects what the contractor certifies were its actual allowable costs for the prior fiscal year.

In this case, Vector admits that after claiming and being paid for direct costs in connection with other, firm-fixed-price and time-and-materials contracts, Vector systematically reclassified these same costs in its accounting system to make it appear as if the costs were indirect costs that were incurred in connection with its cost-reimbursement contracts, thereby inflating its indirect cost rates. These inflated rates were then used by Vector to justify the rates claimed in its Incurred Cost Proposals submitted to the Navy. The effect of these fraudulent submissions was, in essence, to pay Vector twice for the same expenses, amounting to 'double dipping' or 'double billing' at government expense. Vector admits to submitting these false Incurred Cost Proposals for costs incurred in 2005 through 2009, with a total loss to the Defense Department of $3,672,756. As described in Vector's agreement, Vector made these false submissions in 2010, 2011, and 2012.

When faced with a Defense Department audit in late 2011, Vector falsified its electronic accounting entries, and prepared and backdated fake invoices in order to support those falsified accounting entries.

Not only did Vector reclassify direct costs to indirect costs in order to fraudulently increase actual indirect costs to better align with provisional indirect costs, company employees also decided it was a great idea to prepare fake invoices in order to support the validity of its reclassified costs.

Face palm.

We would like to go on record as saying--if in fact it needs to be stated--that we would never, ever, advise our clientele to emulate Vector. Indeed, we have discussed (in some detail) issues associated with adjusting provisional billing rates during contract performance. Any government contractor that contemplates such a weapons-grade stupid strategy to calculating indirect cost rates and/or supporting DCAA audits had better not call this consulting firm.

We couldn't take the gig anyway. We'd be too busy face-palming.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.