• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Counterfeit Parts, Supply Chain Management, and Purchasing System Adequacy

E-mail Print PDF

This is one of those articles where we say, "Told you so!" and "You should have listened" and suchlike and so forth. We almost didn't write it because of all the smugness in the air over at the vast cavernous spaces that are the Apogee Consulting, Inc., conference rooms. The smugness is so thick it might as well be the souplike fog of Victorian London; you know what we're saying? But then we thought, "Who's gonna know? It's not like these rants get much notice … so let's go for it!" And thus here we are with yet another polemic railing about secure supply chains and avoidance of counterfeit parts.

You may recall the prior discussion of same, right here, in which we tsk'd-tsk'd at our negligent readership, who had been hearing from Apogee Consulting, Inc. since April 2010 that it was time to jump aboard the "secure supply chain" bandwagon, and to circle those bandwagons to protect program supply chains from "the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system."

We wrote "Contractors who have already created secure supply chain management systems, including not only policies and procedures, but also actual practices, will have an undeniable competitive advantage in evaluations where supply chain risk is a factor. Those who have not, will not. If you have been a long time reader, you have had more than three years to prepare for this day. Not that you took advantage of that advance notice, mind you. But the opportunity was there…."

Thus, while our November 2013 article pointed to the competitive advantage of a secure supply chain, now-six months later-we point to potential unallowable costs and a disapproved/inadequate Contractor Purchasing System as the price to be paid for failing to secure one's supply chain when required to do so. What happened? Well, the DFARS was revised via Final Rule that implemented aspects of the FY 2012 and FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The DFARS revision establishes criteria for a system to "detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts." It also establishes that those criteria will be evaluated as part of the Contractor Purchasing System Review CPSR). It established applicability and flow-down requirements. It is, in a nutshell, a very big deal.

First, the rule applies to CAS-covered prime contractors in which the applicable DFARS clauses are incorporated into their contracts. It does not apply to small business prime contractors, since those contractors are exempt from CAS. However, when a small business is a subcontractor to a prime that is subject to the new rules, then that small business subcontractor is also subject to the requirements and system criteria. According to the promulgating comments: "Suppliers, including small entities, will need to be able to trace the source of the electronic parts they are supplying to the original source if they are not the original manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer."

So yeah, you small businesses may need to think about your supply chains as well. Our advice? Think hard.

With that out of the way, let's dig into the meat, shall we?

Counterfeit electronic part means an unlawful or unauthorized reproduction, substitution, or alteration that has been knowingly mismarked, misidentified, or otherwise misrepresented to be an authentic, unmodified electronic part from the original manufacturer, or a source with the express written authority of the original manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer. Unlawful or unauthorized substitution includes used electronic parts represented as new, or the false identification of grade, serial number, lot number, date code, or performance characteristics.

Electronic part means an integrated circuit, a discrete electronic component (including, but not limited to, a transistor, capacitor, resistor, or diode), or a circuit assembly (section 818(f)(2) of Pub. L. 112-81). The term ''electronic part'' includes any embedded software or firmware.

Obsolete electronic part means an electronic part that is no longer in production by the original manufacturer or an aftermarket manufacturer that has been provided express written authorization from the current design activity or original manufacturer.

Suspect counterfeit electronic part means an electronic part for which credible evidence (including, but not limited to, visual inspection or testing) provides reasonable doubt that the electronic part is authentic.

More stuff from DFARS (Subpart 246.870, to be specific):

Contractors that are subject to the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and that supply electronic parts or products that include electronic parts and their subcontractors that supply electronic parts or products that include electronic parts, are required to establish and maintain an acceptable counterfeit electronic part detection and avoidance system. Failure to do so may result in disapproval of the purchasing system by the contracting officer and/or withholding of payments (see 252.244-7001, Contractor Purchasing System Administration).

Did you see that part above, the sentence we emphasized with italics? Did you see what happens to your Purchasing System if the DCMA reviewers don't think your Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System is up to snuff? Yeah, go read that paragraph again, why don't you?

Okay, so the next step is to understand the criteria that determine whether your CEPDAS is up to snuff, or not. Here are the DFARS criteria associated with an adequate system:

A counterfeit electronic part detection and avoidance system shall include risk-based policies and procedures that address, at a minimum, the following areas (see 252.246-7007, Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System):

(1) The training of personnel.

(2) The inspection and testing of electronic parts, including criteria for acceptance and rejection.

(3) Processes to abolish counterfeit parts proliferation.

(4) Processes for maintaining electronic part traceability.

(5) Use of suppliers that are the original manufacturer, sources with the express written authority of the original manufacturer or current design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer or suppliers that obtain parts exclusively from one or more of these sources.

(6) The reporting and quarantining of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts.

(7) Methodologies to identify suspect counterfeit electronic parts and to rapidly determine if a suspect counterfeit electronic part is, in fact, counterfeit.

(8) Design, operation, and maintenance of systems to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts.

(9) Flow down of counterfeit detection and avoidance requirements.

(10) Process for keeping continually informed of current counterfeiting information and trends.

(11) Process for screening the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) reports and other credible sources of counterfeiting information.

(12) Control of obsolete electronic parts.

Piece of cake, right? No problemo!

So now you know how to establish an adequate CEPDAS and get it through a CPSR review. You might think you're home free. But wait a second; there's a bit more over in the DFARS Supplement Cost Principles. We now have a new Supplemental Cost Principle (231.205-71, entitled "Cost of remedy for use or inclusion of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts." That new Cost Principle states:

The costs of counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts are unallowable, unless-

(1) The contractor has an operational system to detect and avoid counterfeit parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts that has been reviewed and approved by DoD pursuant to 244.303;

(2) The counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts are Government-furnished property as defined in FAR 45.101; and

(3) The contractor provides timely (i.e., within 60 days after the contractor becomes aware) notice to the Government.

So not only is your Purchasing System at risk; not only do you face potential payment withholds; but you also face potential cost disallowance for what might otherwise be perfectly allowable direct and/or indirect costs. You best get on this right away.

Don't take our word for it. Here's a client advisory from the deeply knowledgeable attorneys over at McKenna Long & Aldridge. The advisory concludes with the following advice: "Contractors should immediately begin the process of comparing their existing systems to the counterfeit part detection and avoidance requirements to ensure that they are in compliance with these new requirements."

Yeah, what they said.

 

DCAA's Year in Review, 2013 Edition

E-mail Print PDF

DCAA recently published another Year in Review for its workforce, this time focusing on GFY 2013 accomplishments. Bill Keating discussed it at the recent Executive Seminar on DCAA Audits (hosted by BDO and the Public Contracting Institute. I (Nick Sanders) was an invited speaker and I suppose I should translate my semi ex tempore remarks into something coherent at a future point in time. Anyway Bill did an excellent job of pointing out concerns with the metrics reported by DCAA without actually criticizing anything. It was a very good job of dancing that fine line between shrilly criticizing and calmly accepting; a line that I have a very hard time finding most of the time.

I don't really want to get into it here. I mean, I take issue with DCAA's metrics and have done so many times here on the blog. But I don't want to go into the usual blathering about inflated taxpayer savings and embarrassing QC sustention rates once again. It's just not that interesting to me anymore. I've spoken out (and written out) and my positions are a matter of public record; just check out the blog articles. What more can I say? It's not like anything ever changes over at Fort Belvoir. DCAA, as a bureaucratic organization, continues to play its bureaucratic organizational games and accountability is rarely evident. I don't feel like once again pointing out the abnormal organizational psychology issues evidenced by policy and behavior. The lack of organizational change and a seeming intractable desire to prepare working paper after working paper, regardless of any value to the acquisition process, is too depressing to contemplate, let alone write about.

Moreover, the fact of the matter is that the Year in Review publication is first and foremost an internal publication meant for the DCAA workforce. It's intentionally biased toward positive aspects and that's as it should be. I would no more expect an unbiased, objective, internally focused publication than I would expect an unbiased, objective, annual report from a publicly traded company. So I'm not going to say mean things about the content.

But the metrics in the DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress and the more recent DCAA Annual Report to Congress are fair game, I think. I spent too much time compiling numbers from each report going back to 2006. It's hard to do much in the way of in-depth analysis, because what's being reported is not always consistent. For example, in the 2009b report to Congress, DCAA/DOD IG reported "assignments completed" instead of audit reports issued, because (as was explained in the footnotes) not every audit assignment concludes with issuance of an audit report. But in the next Report (2010a), DCAA/DOD IG was back reporting audit reports issued (and then noting assignments completed in the footnotes). Also, there are some interesting games being played with "questioned costs" versus "funds that can be put to better use." It was not until recently that DCAA started claiming questioned costs in audits of contractors' proposals; historically those values had been reported as "funds that can be put to better use". Finally, there is some discrepancy between Audit Work Years and Auditor Staffing. So it's tough to do a lot of trend analysis.

Instead, let me report some facts for your amusement.

  • In 2010 and 2011, about one-third of DCAA assignments were completed without issuance of a formal audit report. In 2012 about 40% of all assignments were completed without issuance of an audit report. In 2013, the number had risen to 54%. By 2013, almost 6 out of 10 DCAA assignments were reported as being complete without the issuance of a formal audit report. We've commented on the growing phenomenon several times on the site. Suffice to say, it's hard to get gigged for GAGAS failures when an audit report never gets issued.

  • Much has been written, here and elsewhere, about the dramatic drop in DCAA audit productivity. Because of the reporting legerdemain between audit reports issued and audit assignments completed (as noted above) it's tough to make rigorous and rigorously fair conclusions. But the amount of dollars "examined" (i.e., audited) has not noticeably been monkeyed with. Accordingly, we can say with confidence that while 2013 audit staffing is almost exactly 10% higher than 2006 audit staffing, the 2013 dollars examined are just about 50% lower than 2006 values. (In 2006 DCAA examined $310,591,800; in 2013 DCAA examined $163,075,100.)

  • In 2006, DCAA issued 2,413 CAS-related audit reports, in which $89.2 Million was questioned. In 2013, DCAA issued 725 CAS-related audit reports, in which $157.4 Million was questioned. At first blush, it seems DCAA was more efficient or maybe more productive in 2006; or perhaps DCAA was more rigorous in 2013. But it's not necessarily the quantity of audit reports issued that tells the story, nor it is necessarily the amount of costs questioned. Consider: In 2006, DCAA questioned about 40% of all dollars examined in CAS-related audits. In 2013, DCAA questioned about 44% of all dollars examined in CAS-related audits. Obviously, then, the dollar value of each individual CAS-related assignment in 2013 was much greater than in 2006.

  • In 2006, DCAA issued 485 post-award ("defective pricing") audits, in which $92.7 Million was questioned. In 2013, DCAA issued 31 post-award audits, in which $115.9 Million was questioned. Since DCAA does not report post-award dollars examined, we cannot comment further.

Make of the foregoing what you will.

 

Musings About DCAA, Part 2 of 2

E-mail Print PDF

Mercy_Killing
In the previous article we mused on the panoply of issues confronting the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which range from an agency-wide lack of productivity to a pervasive lack of audit quality in the few reports that do manage to slip past multiple levels of review. We discussed how DCAA's systemic GAGAS compliance failures, originally alleged in 2008, 2009, and 2010, continue to haunt the audit agency today. We discussed how DOD has permitted (or perhaps directed?) DCAA to shift the audit workload onto the backs of others, most notably DCMA Contracting Officers and their staffs. The first example of this trend was the decision to have DCAA stop performing "field pricing assistance" on certain contractor proposals, so that the audit agency could focus on more important audits. The Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) questioned that decision and reported it had not led to the performance improvements originally contemplated by the decision-makers.

That decision, which was an intentional effort to reduce DCAA auditor workload by increasing DCMA Contracting Officer workload, was the first step down the road, but it was by no means the last. Other management decisions have continued that trend.

One of those other decisions was the 2010 "contractor recovery initiative" in which DCAA and DCMA teamed-up to disposition some 400 "reportable audits" and roughly 300 DCAA Form 1's that had been awaiting Contracting Officer disposition. We didn't think too much of that initiative at the time and opined as follows:

If you look closely at the resolution process, and the roles and responsibilities, you'll see that DCMA has all the actions. Moreover, you'll see that DCMA has to make its dispositions 'in consideration of the DCAA audit report'-which seems very much like direction to the ACOs to 'accept the DCAA audit report as if it had merit'. Well, after nearly three years of GAO and DOD IG criticism of the quality of DCAA audit reports, we don't expect that guidance to result in many fair, reasonable and/or correct ACO decisions.

We didn't remark much on it at the time, but in retrospect CRI was blazing a trail for future DCMA/DCAA/contractor interaction in aspects beyond merely shifting workload to DCMA. Not only did it mark the diminution of "independent business judgment" of the warranted Contracting Officer in the face of a DCAA audit finding, but it also marked the first real use by DCAA of non-GAGAS memoranda and ROMs to quantify the auditors' so-called findings. The reverberations of that particular sea change still echo today.

We were not the only ones to note the sea change. In another article we quoted respected attorney John Pachter (of the firm Smith, Pachter, McWhorter), who opined (in an article published by the ABA's Public Contract Law Journal)-

Contracting Officers must confront the notion, expressed in various ways, that auditors' advice is presumptively correct. Rather than being allowed to rely on the advice of auditors and then make a considered decision as the FAR contemplates, Contracting Officers now have the burden of justifying their decisions when they differ from those of auditors.

[Emphasis added.]

The trend continued with the publication in late May 2011 of the FAR revisions ostensibly designed to improve the contract close-out process. Instead, DCAA drove significant changes to the Allowable Cost and Payment contract clause (52.216-7) that required contractors to use the 15 "Incurred Cost Electronically" Schedules developed by DCAA, regardless of whether or not those Schedules actually had anything to do with calculating final billing rates or claiming allowable incurred costs.

This was perhaps the biggest workload shift ever seen to date, and it shifted the workload from those doing the auditing to the contractors being audited.

Readers, some of those now-mandatory Schedules were previously DCAA audit working papers. Some of the Schedules now prepared by contractors where internal DCAA schedules that used to be prepared by auditors.

For example, Schedule I ("Schedule of cumulative direct and indirect costs claimed and billed by contract and subcontract") is used by DCAA in the preparation of the Cumulative Allowable Cost Worksheet (CACWS). It creation of Schedule I has nothing to do with claimed costs nor does it have anything to do with calculating indirect cost rates. If it weren't for the necessity of preparing a CACWS, it would not need to be done. Historically it was an internal DCAA working paper that was a data source of the CACWS. After the 2001 FAR changes it became a mandatory Schedule that contractors needed to prepare and submit in the exact required format mandated by DCAA, a format that was designed to provide data into the CACWS. Similarly, Schedule J is simply a listing of awarded subcontracts so that DCAA can request assist audits. Schedule O simply identifies contracts that might be closed-out, if DCAA could ever get around to finishing the 10100 audit. Those three Schedules add zero value to the contractor but DCAA demands the contractor prepare them.

If the contractor declines to take on the auditors' workload, then its proposal to establish final billing rates is determined to be inadequate for audit by DCAA (even though the FAR expressly reserves the right to determine adequacy to the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer) and the contractor has no right of appeal. Actually, the consequences for a refusal to do the auditors' work are worse than a simple finding of "inadequate for audit."

If DCAA judges that the contractor cannot remedy the alleged deficiencies in its final billing rate proposal within 30 days then it will send the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer a memo recommending decrements to the proposed direct and indirect costs. What happens after that is solely the responsibility of the ACO, since (as we told readers) DCAA will close out its audit assignment and drop the proposal from its backlog. In other words, DCAA will wash its hands of the matter and negotiating final billing rates will then become DCMA's problem.

Moreover, if DCAA judges that a contractor cannot (or is unwilling to) submit an "adequate" final billing rate proposal (as defined by DCAA), then the auditors have the option of issuing a deficiency report and recommending that the contractor's accounting system be determined to be inadequate for cost-reimbursement contracting. Not only would that determination lead to a massive erosion of competitive position, but it might well lead to an imposition of payment withholds under the DFARS Business System administration regime. The person who makes the final call and prepares the Board of Review package is the ACO and (once again) not the DCAA auditor making the finding. (Naturally, if the finding is not sustained by the Contracting Officer or the Board of Review, then there are no consequences for the DCAA auditor or his/her supervisory auditor or his/her Branch Manager. Nobody ever puts a letter of reprimand in their personnel files for issuing bogus findings that waste the time of the DCMA Contracting Officers and/or the DCMA Review Boards. That's a feedback loop that does not seem to exist. So much for accountability; but perhaps we digress.)

There's more to discuss.

There are some tasks that DCMA has taken from DCAA for itself, apparently because DCAA cannot or will not issue a timely audit report that would actually be of value to a Contracting Officer. The most apparent of these is the review of a contractor's CASB Disclosure Statement for adequacy. This review used to be DCAA's bread and butter; now, it's a review performed by the DCMA Contracting Officer and staff. Similarly, DCMA now issues Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs) without waiting 90 or 120 or 180 days for an official DCAA audit report that will express an opinion on the mathematical accuracy of the contractor's estimate of direct and indirect costs it will record over the next year or two or five. (Let's be clear. DCAA has little if any ability to actually express a supported conclusion on the contractor's forecast of sales and cost of sales and SG&A costs, which is fundamentally a crystal ball-based educated guess as to what the future holds. Guess what? DCAA's guess about the contractor's future is going to be significantly less educated than the contractor's guess. But that disparity doesn't keep DCAA from "questioning" forecasted costs and then reporting those questioned costs as some kind of taxpayer savings that justifies next year's operating budget. Oops! Perhaps we digressed once again. Let's wrap this up, shall we?)

At this point we've discussed how DCAA has shifted its former workload over to DCMA, and how DCAA has shifted its former workload onto the contractors. (Did we mention how much pressure is on contractors these days to lower their indirect expenses? It's tough to do that when you're taking on additional workload.) And we've discussed how DCMA has voluntarily taken on some of the former DCAA workload, in what seems to be an effort to move the ball forward despite DCAA's inability to play in the game.

The last item we will discuss is going to be how the Department of Defense is preparing to shift a huge piece of DCAA's workload over to the contractors. It's called DFARS Case 2012-D042. Now we confess we haven't seen the proposed DFARS revision. According to the open DFARS Open Cases Report (dated 4/26/2014) the rule is at OIRA for review. (OIRA = Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, for those who don't follow Federal rulemaking.) The Open Cases Report simply says of the proposed DFARS revision: "Revises business systems clauses to include contractor reporting and documentation requirements regarding contractor compliance with DFARS business systems criteria." Now, that sounds rather benign (unless you know the propensity for the rulemakers to hide their true intentions behind benign-sounding phrases). But according to Adam Eastridge, writing in the March 2014 edition of West's Government Contract Costs, Pricing & Accounting Report, hidden within that proposed rule will be a key policy shift that increases contractor workload. Mr. Eastridge wrote-

The proposed DFARS rule … clearly has the potential to create additional inefficiencies in both the Government and the contracting industry. The proposed rule would require contractors to pay CPA firms to audit and opine on their business systems. … [Under the proposed rule] DCAA will no longer be responsible for auditing business systems … DCMA may view the proposed rule as beneficial because it transfers the responsibility for business system audits away from DCAA. Excluding DCAA from the process to allow quicker and timely decisions is clearly DCMA's preference, as illustrated in the recent DCMA FPRP guidance.

[Emphasis in original.]

Again, we have not seen the DFARS revisions (because they haven't been published yet), but Mr. Eastridge clearly has seen a draft. If his summary of the proposed change is accurate, then DOD will once again be shifting the workload from its own staff to the staffs of its contractors. But of course the contractors will not have to hire any new personnel; they will simply hire outside CPA firms to do the work. Sure it will cost money, but it's free money because it's not coming out of DOD's budget. Where is that money coming from? Contractors' prices, is where.

Consequently, it's likely that contractors are going to be required to spend more of their limited indirect funds to pay for external CPAs to review their business systems, a review that will be mandated by DOD and paid for through increased prices for goods and services.

This is but the latest example of how DCAA has reduced its workload. But remember, readers, this workload shift has been happening at the same time as DCAA has been adding additional staff. DCAA has been reducing the workload of its auditors and asking them to do less, while at the same time hiring more staff.

Yes, you read that correctly. DCAA is working hard to do less with more, with the official blessing of Pentagon leadership.

Given the foregoing, we have to ask whether DOD and the taxpayers need DCAA anymore. What is the purpose of an ever-growing audit agency that no longer performs a significant piece of the workload for which it was responsible only a few short years ago? What is the purpose of an audit agency when its own customers prefer to do the work themselves or to push it to others? What is the purpose of an audit agency when its reports lack meaningful value in the eye of its customers?

If DCAA were a commercial audit firm-the kind of audit firm that DOD wants to now audit contractor business systems-then it would be going out of business. Instead, DCAA keeps on hiring. For what purpose? We don't know.

We are reminded of Norm Augustine's musing on the ever-expending role of the auditor. He wrote:

Auditors, reviewers, inspectors, and other forms of overseers perform a truly important role, but that role can be beneficial only when applied constructively and with considerable moderation. The prevailing trend would suggest the existence of an explosion in the overseer business, with an ominous threat approaching that there will soon be no one left for the auditors to audit. When this day of an infinite watcher-to-worker ratio arrives, it will presumably be necessary to focus audits on the mistakes which would have been made had in fact there been anyone doing anything.

[Emphasis in original.]

This blog has existed for more than five years now. In that time we've discussed many different topics. But no topic has been more prevalent, or more popular, than the discussions about DCAA and its evolving role in the defense acquisition process. This website has documented the fall of DCAA and we think that fall will continue. We don't know what DCAA is going to do with its ever-growing audit staff but, obviously, it will not be performing many audits or Disclosure Statement reviews or contractor business system reviews in the future.

We don't relish the following statement, because we personally know many DCAA auditors and (for the most part) we like and respect those we work with. But the truth is that the DOD audit agency is working hard to put itself out of business and we think it's time to let that happen.

It's time to put DCAA out of business completely.

 

It's Not Called "TINA" Anymore

E-mail Print PDF

Change_for_the_Sake_of_Change
One of the problems with growing old is that the youngsters keep changing things. Stuff we thought we knew cold is suddenly called something different, confusing us and requiring us to unlearn certain things only to relearn those same things again under a brand new name. It's the Circle of Life, or something.

First GAAP was recodified and renamed, and is now known as the FASB Auditing Standards Codification (ASC). Nothing substantive actually changed; but all the names of all the GAAP pronouncements and suchlike changed. Suddenly it was like speaking a new language.

Similarly, the FAR was just revised (via final rule) to implement the Positive Law Codification of Title 41 and recodification of Title 40 of the United States Code. Nothing substantive actually changed; but all the names of all the "popular names of the Acts" and citations changed. It's like speaking a new language.

The following table, cribbed from the Federal Register notice (link above) will help explain what we mean.

Historical Title of Act

New Title to be Used

Anti-Kickback Act

Kickbacks

Brooks Architect-Engineer Act

Selection of Architects and Engineers

Buy American Act

Buy American

Contract Disputes Act of 1978

Contract Disputes

Davis-Bacon Act

Wage Rate Requirements (Construction)

Drug-Free Workplace Act

Drug-Free Workplace

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Title III

Procurement

Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act

Committee for Purchase from People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled

Miller Act

Bonds

Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act

Office of Federal Procurement Policy

Procurement Integrity Act

Restrictions on Obtaining and Disclosing Certain Information

Service Contract Act of 1965

Service Contract Labor Standards

Truth in Negotiations Act

Truthful Cost or Pricing Data

Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act

Contracts for Material, Supplies, Articles, and Equipment Exceeding $15,000

We are going to have a hard time getting used to the new terminology. For example, the Truth in Negotiations Act has been TINA to us since we started in this crazy business, long ago. Calling TINA "Truthful Cost or Pricing Data" (TCoPD) is not going to be easy.

And we're not the only ones who feel this way. Several commenters providing input to the rulemaking expressed their concerns with the changes to nomenclature. The rulemakers responded that they were simply revising the FAR to cite to the current statutory titles. When one commenter opined that making changes to the FAR with respect to the Davis-Bacon Act while the Department of Labor had not made similar changes would result in confusion among practitioners, the rulemakers disagreed and offered the following rationale-

The codifications of Title 40 and Title 41 have removed all references to the popular names of the statutes codified therein. There are also conforming changes to other titles of the United States Code, to likewise remove the use of the popular names throughout the United States Code. When the Councils decided that the change was necessary for conformity to the United States Code, the 2005 case was reviewed and conforming changes to the statutory titles in Title 40 were included in this case. Future changes to these sections of the United States Code will no longer be in terms of the old statutes, but in terms of the new codification. Therefore, the old popular names will gradually have little meaning to the newer workforce.

[Emphasis added.]

So apparently it's a new world folks, and old fogies such as Apogee Consulting, Inc. had better get out of the way to make room for the newer folks who aren't weighed-down by the anchors of the "old popular names" of public laws.

The problem with that logic is that there are any number of textbooks and articles and commentary that refer to the statutes by their old popular names and not by the newer, hipper, names used by the younger workforce. Since there were no substantive changes made, we don't really see all those textbooks and articles and commentaries being rewritten simply to change the statutory name from (say) the old fogey name of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act to the newer, hipper, more trendy name of "Contracts for Material, Supplies, Articles, and Equipment Exceeding $15,000," or changing the gray-haired geezer name of the Truth in Negotiations Act to the young hipster name of "Truthful Cost or Pricing Data".

Until the old fogies die off (or retire) some translations will need to be made.

Live long and prosper, readers.

 

Musings About DCAA, Part 1 of 2

E-mail Print PDF

If a reader were to look back over the more than 700 articles on this blog, that reader might notice several common themes. Recurring points scattered throughout multiple articles include topics such as:

  • The critical importance of effective supply chain management and the pressing need to secure the program supply chain.

  • The forward march of technology, including discussions about evidence which shows the private sector is (once again) driving technological innovation and that the government is (once again) being left behind.

  • Today's version of "acquisition reform" and discussions about the swinging pendulum that contrasts the defense acquisition environment of the mid-1990's with the current acquisition environment-including the rise of adversarial relationships between government customer and government contractor, and the rise in litigation in areas that used to be handled through administrative procedures.

  • The importance of investing in internal controls, as evidenced by a large number of articles recounting fraud allegations within the community of government contractors as well as within the civil service and (unfortunately) within the ranks of the military service as well.

  • Exploration of the arcane areas of Federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), including discussions of legal cases that impact government contract cost accounting (from a layperson's view).

  • Analyses of certain less understood or inherently opaque aspects of government contracting.

  • Discussions of leadership, workforce management, and innovative approaches to "human resources".

  • Topics related to program management, including predictions about government budgetary constraints and their impacts on poorly performing programs.

  • Discussions about contract administration/management, including discussions of the still recent DFARS "business system" administration regime.

Perhaps that reader might conclude that the interests (dare we say expertise?) of Apogee Consulting, Inc., are fairly eclectic, even though our overarching focus has been consistently aimed at the subject of government contracting. We like to believe that "big picture" view is one of our strengths, even though others might think we should pick a topic and stick with it.

But that's not really our style.

We have never had an explicit agenda or list of topics to discuss; instead, we have written about what interested us and what caught our eyes in the news. We have written about many things and we have tried to draw inferences from what we saw and heard-all with the intent of documenting the crazy world of government contracting as we have experienced it. Sometimes our articles resonate with those of you who come to visit and other times things we care about passionately seem to hang in the lower rungs of the hit count. Which is fine, because popularity has never been the goal, even though this site has become more popular than we could ever have hoped for.

We write about many things within the broad rubric of government contracting and government contract cost accounting, but perhaps the most conspicuous theme has been our many discussions of the foibles of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).

As this blog came into being, DCAA was in the process of being tortured by everybody from GAO to the DOD Inspector to Congress over flagrant audit quality failures. It was the most serious crises faced by the audit agency since its founding in 1965. This blog has documented the subsequent de-evolution of DCAA from its former glory as the Federal government's premier audit agency into a troubled (and arguably mismanaged) agency with systemic problems including a dramatic decrease in productivity, continued audit quality failures, and bureaucratic maneuvering that has tried to paint a thin veneer of top-down forced GAGAS compliance in an vain attempt to cover the rusted hulk of antiquated audit procedures, the systemic inability to exercise professional judgment during audit performance, and an anxious (perhaps neurotic) preoccupation with working papers instead of transaction testing.

Point of fact: The last external peer review of DCAA audit quality was performed in 2006 by the DOD Inspector General, and the DOD IG's 2007 opinion of "adequate" (with recommended corrective actions) was withdrawn in August, 2009. Since August 26, 2009, DCAA has not had an opinion on its quality control system covering its audits and attestation engagements as required by GAGAS 3.59b. GAGAS 3.50b and 3.55 require audit organizations performing audits or attestation engagements in compliance with GAGAS to have an external peer review at least once every 3 years. Based on GAGAS criteria, DCAA should have obtained a peer review on its work performed in FY 2009. It has not done so.

DCAA told the Audit Committee of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) that a peer review would be performed in GFY 2013 and would cover reports issued in GFY 2012. GFY 2013 ended on September 30, 2013 with no external peer report being issued. We do not know the status of the external peer review (except that it's already more than six months late), but we do know that until that peer review report is issued, DCAA cannot claim to be issuing GAGAS-compliant attestation reports, since it is not compliant with the GAGAS requirements noted above.

Here is a link to DCAA's own admission of the situation in which it finds itself. Naturally, there is no mention of the agency-wide GAGAS failure. (See our comment on "thin veneer" above.)

DCAA is so anxious about the next round of audit quality assessments that it seems to have started issuing memos instead of audit reports. We assume the strategic driver behind this sea change is the belief is that the external reviewers will not include the memos in the universe of audit activity subject to testing for GAGAS compliance, if and when that external quality review is ever performed.

But this article is not about the lack of DCAA audit quality; not really. Instead, we want to point out a trend that others have noticed but which has not really been highlighted before. We want to talk about DCAA's deliberate and intentional efforts to push audit work off the backs of its staff and onto the backs of others.

The trend first started in September, 2010, when the DOD changed its approach to requesting "field pricing assistance" (reviews of contractors' proposed costs) from DCAA. Note this change did not spring from the mind of the Secretary of Defense or the USD (AT&L); no, the change was requested by DCAA and "approved" by the then Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP)-even though DPAP was not in DCAA's chain of command. (DPAP sets policy for DCMA Contracting Officers; but we've noted a recent trend wherein DPAP has been setting audit policy for DCAA as well. What gives? But we digress.) The change in approach meant that the expected dollar value of the contract award and the anticipated contract type determined whether or not DCAA would perform an audit of bidders' proposals. With few exceptions, DCAA would only audits proposals for firm, fixed-price contracts if the award value were expected to be more than $10 million, and it would only audit proposals for cost-reimbursement contracts if the award value were expected to be more than $100 million. For other (smaller, assumed-to-be-less-risky) proposals, the DCMA contracting officer and staff would be on their own.

As we reported roughly two years later, that new approach concerned the DOD Office of the Inspector General, which reported that the change in audit approach did not reduce DCAA audit hours as much as initially predicted, did not help DCAA reprioritize the workload as much as initially promised and, as a result, the new approach actually led to a reduction in taxpayer savings.

The DOD IG reported the impetus for change in the field pricing assistance policy was driven by DCAA's lack of audit resources. It was a deliberate attempt to "reduce the number of audits DCAA was performing" so that the audit agency could focus on its "most important work," which included "large dollar value contractor proposals, incurred cost audits relating to the backlog of DoD contracts awaiting final close-out, and defective pricing audits." Well, our readers know how well that cunning plan has worked out for DCAA.

It was the DOD IG that first brought to the public's attention the DOD strategy of shifting audit workload from DCAA to DCMA. The IG report questioned the decision "to direct Department and taxpayer resources to DCMA to perform a job DCMA was not prepared to perform when DCAA had the existing infrastructure in place to get the job the done." And we've been watching that trend accelerate ever since.

NEXT: The trend continues and accelerates and leads to an unexpected sharp turn, right in the hearts of smaller DOD contractors.

 


Page 133 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.