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Conclusions from the Annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System

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Conclusions
The Hon. Frank Kendall (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) recently issued the second annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, focusing on data for Government Fiscal Years 1984 through 2013. Here’s your link.

The 126 page-long report is simply chock-full of data. Graphs and regression analyses and charts and lots and lots of information. But we want to ignore the data (which you are perfectly welcome to read for yourself) and focus on the conclusions that we noted as we skimmed through the report.

  • The percentage of obligated dollars awarded through competition has actually decreased since 2010. This is a counter-intuitive result, given the emphasis placed on competitive awards via Mr. Assad’s direction as well as the Better Buying Power initiative. The high-water mark was achieved in GFY 2008 and it’s fallen ever since. In 2008 about 64% of all obligations were awarded via competition; in 2010 that value was 62.5% and in 2013 the value was 57%, which was the lowest percentage on the chart. The Service with the lowest percentage of competitively awarded obligations was the Air Force, at 41% (which was actually higher than its goal of 38%), but the Navy/Marine Corps were right there at 41% as well (which was lower than their combined goal of 47%).

  • Acquisition of vehicles had the lowest rate of competition (16%) and weapons/ammo were not much better (22%). Everything else was higher, much higher.

  • Contractor profits/fees did not correlate with performance. That is to say, final contract margin/markup “was not predicted by cost, price, or schedule performance.”

  • There was no correlation between cost/schedule performance and contract type. That is to say, whether the contract was Firm, Fixed-Price or Cost-Reimbursable did not control how well the contractor performed. This is a significant finding that we will discuss below.

  • Fixed-price contracts exhibit lower cost growth because they are used primarily in lower-risk situations—not because they inherently lead to lower cost growth.

  • Fixed-price contracts are only fixed if the contractual work content and deliverables are fixed; they can be (and often are) modified to handle realized risks, leading to cost growth.

  • When cost control is predetermined and formulaically incentivized in the contract, vendors respond. The key is predictable incentives, not fixed pricing.

  • Competition leads to better contract outcomes. That is to say, cost and price growth are statistically lower on competed contracts.

The most interesting finding in the report was the commentary on contract type. We have discussed contract type before. We were pleased to see that our assertions were confirmed by the report—i.e., that a FFP contract placed before requirements are fixed is no better than placing a cost-type contract, at least in terms of cost or schedule control. It’s a notion we wish would become more popular.

It was also interesting to see that competition—long the hallmark of public contract policy—was confirmed as leading to better acquisition outcomes. The report doesn’t say why that would be the case, but we assume (without evidentiary support) that the efforts involved in responding to a well-written RFP and it going through the detailed planning associated with preparing a good cost, technical and/or management proposal establish a solid foundation for program execution, once the contract is awarded.

At the end of the day, what strikes us is the rigor of the analyses. Apparently after decades of collection, there is sufficient contractual data for the statisticians to dig into, and so we are finally seeing some “common wisdom” myths being busted while others are confirmed. We don’t pretend to know who will use the information, or if the conclusions will actually affect public policy, but knowledge is generally held to be a good thing. And so this report would seem to be a good thing as well.

 

DOD Inspector General Tells DCMA To Make it Harder to Settle Litigation with Contractors

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DOD_IG_HotlineWhen we wrote about the UTC/Pratt & Whitney litigation that addressed (among other issues) the definition of "cost" for the purpose of CAS compliance and government contract cost accounting, we thought we were writing about relatively ancient history. After all, the Federal Circuit decision we vivisected was issued in 2003-more than a decade ago. Many folks had forgotten all about it.

So why was the final settlement between Pratt & Whitney and the U.S. Government the subject of a May, 2014, Department of Defense Inspector General Hotline Investigation Report?

But before we answer that question, remember that we are on record as asserting that contract-related litigation is on the rise, that apparently the DCMA has forgotten the FAR 33.204 statement that "The Government's policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer's level;" and as a result, the lawyers are very busy indeed. See, for example, this two-part article from August, 2012, in which we opined-

COs don't resolve complex issues any more. They don't negotiate DCAA audit findings (such as cost disallowances or CAS noncompliances). They don't look to 'split the baby' because getting an assured half a loaf now is no longer better than litigating for an entire loaf (plus interest), even when the probability of getting that entire loaf in a judicial award approaches zero.

Well, according to that recent DOD IG report, DCMA shouldn't really ever try to settle complex issues unless that settlement adheres to strict FAR and CAS rules. Any negotiated settlement that contemplates accepting less than the full amounts allegedly due the Government will be second-guessed and criticized. And that criticism may come from an unlikely source.

Let's start with a chronology of events, courtesy of Appendix B of the DOD IG report.

The issue began in 1991, when "DCAA reported that Pratt had not complied with CAS 410, 418, and 420 when accounting for the cost of material obtained through the use of collaboration agreements." In December, 1996, DCMA agreed with the DCAA assertion and issued a $260 Million demand for payment associated with the CAS noncompliances. In July, 2001, Pratt appealed to the ASBCA. As we know from the prior blog article on the case, the ASBCA found in Pratt's favor. The Government appealed to the Federal Circuit and, in January, 2003, Judge Dyk (writing for the Court) vacated the ASBCA decision and remanded the case back to the ASBCA to determine damages.

And that's where we lost interest; honestly, we thought it was routine from there. But apparently we were wrong. One of the items we missed was Footnote 19 in the Appellate decision. It stated:

To the extent that Pratt may argue that some portion of the revenue shares represented payments for items other than parts, Pratt may provide that evidence on remand. The burden is upon Pratt, however, to show that the revenue share payments included payments beyond that for the collaboration parts.

That innocuous footnote turned out to be important in the later chronology of events, which continued to unfold as follows:

In November, 2003, "DCMA issued an updated demand to Pratt in the amount of $754.7 Million," based on DCAA's "Rough Order of Magnitude" calculation "produced as a nonaudit service." (Readers may recall we have discussed DCAA's issuance of ROMs before.)

Throughout 2004, DCMA leadership and Pratt discussed the matter and attempted to resolve it through negotiation. In December, 2004, Pratt offered to pay $125 Million and DCMA countered with a settlement offer of $605 Million. Pratt rejected the DCMA counteroffer.

Discussions continued and in March, 2005, "DCAA Northeastern Regional Director e-mailed the DCAA Director a briefing sheet that identified a range of settlement positions calculated by DCAA as a nonaudit service." In particular, DCAA asserted that "$200 million was a reasonable recovery considering Pratt's explanation that some portion of the revenue shares represented payments for items other than parts."

In April, 2005, Pratt upped its offer to $175 Million. Internal DCAA briefings stated that "$334 million is a reasonable estimate of the cost impact (based on estimate of cost to Pratt to manufacture)" and "$234 million is a reasonable settlement, recognizing certain litigative risks associated with this issue." However, the DCMA Senior Trial Attorney disagreed with that assessment, asserting that a recovery between $417 and $814 million was expected if the litigation proceeded to conclusion; settlement was expected to be at $420 Million with a minimum of $375 million.

By June, 2005, the Government team "had splintered" with each part of the team expecting a different recovery value. But while the various parties had their own notions of how much the Government had been damaged, the DCMA Divisional Administrative Contracting Officer (DACO) still had to hammer out a prospective agreement on how the CAS noncompliances would be resolved and how Pratt would be permitted to do its cost accounting. The DACO proposed letting Pratt use an estimate of the cost of manufacturing its parts in-house in lieu of obtaining the parts (at cost) from the suppliers, in order to calculate its indirect cost allocation bases. The Senior Trial Attorney stated that proposed go-forward methodology could not be supported by him.

Negotiations continued through 2006. Importantly, while discussions continued, personnel were transferred and promoted. Notably, an employee of Sikorsky Aircraft (another UTC subsidiary) became a member of the DCMA leadership team at Pratt & Whitney. DCMA decided to continue settlement discussions without the participation of the DCMA Senior Trial Attorney.

In April, 2006, the parties were close (Pratt offered $270M and the Government wanted $291M). Finally, the Government accepted Pratt's offer of $283 Million on April 29, 2006, which settled the matter for the CAS noncompliances between 1984 and 2004, and established that Pratt could use a collaboration part cost estimate for its indirect cost calculations, which was termed by DOD IG "a noncompliant practice." Regardless of whether the cost accounting practice was compliant with CAS, the parties agreed that Pratt could use it.

At that point, things seemed to be (finally) wrapped-up.

Then somebody called the DOD IG Hotline and made two allegations:

  1. There was pressure from the highest levels of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to settle this litigation for an amount that-was agreeable to the contractor rather than an amount that was fair to the taxpayer.

  1. The litigation of Pratt's cost accounting for engine parts on commercial engine collaboration programs from 1984 through 2004 was settled for an amount about $500 million less than an amount consistent with Government procurement regulations, including the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).

The DOD IG found no evidence to support the first allegation. There was no evidence of undue pressure to settle at an amount favorable to the contractor.

However, with respect to the second allegation, the DOD IG found that the cognizant DCMA Contract Management Office (CMO) had "failed to protect the Government's interest" when "determining a reasonable basis for the $283 million settlement amount." The DOD IG found that-

It was the trial attorney's litigation position that all the revenue share payments should be deemed the cost of collaboration parts unless shown to be otherwise by Pratt. The decision by DCMA management to reach a negotiated settlement instead of pursuing a court decision on the amount of damages owed by Pratt to the U.S. Government left the DACO and her team with data insufficient to support a negotiated settlement position that was consistent with FAR and CAS.

(Proving once again that one key purpose of an IG audit is to enter the battlefield after the fight and bayonet the wounded.)

The DOD IG report went on to discuss a fairly recent DCMA creation, the use of Boards of Review to review proposed Contracting Officers' negotiations. The DOD IG asserted that, if the Board of Review DCMA Instruction had been in place at the time of the settlement, then "the Board would have disagreed with the basis of the DACO's prenegotiation position." Regardless, the DOD IG noted that the current Boards of Review "would not have ensured that the DACO and her team had data sufficient to support a negotiated settlement position that was consistent with FAR and CAS." Accordingly, the DOD IG recommended establishing a new Review Board policy "that requires a management official oversee an evaluation determining the extent to which data obtained from the trial attorney supporting litigation is sufficient to support and justify a settlement negotiated consistent with the [FAR}."

The DCMA Director "partially concurred" with the above. One action taken was to update and reissue DCMA-GC Operating Instruction 2 ("Resolution of Intra-General Counsel Differences"). The Boards of Review Instruction 134 would also be revised to (among other things) ensure that a GS-1102-15 Supervisory Team Leader review and approve all Contracting Officers' litigation settlement actions. As for the rest of the DOD IG's recommendations, the DCMA Director found them to be no longer necessary, given the recent reorganization and creation of the CACO/DACO group at the DCMA Cost and Pricing Center.

The DOD IG report also had a third finding. It found that "DCAA assistance had negatively impacted the settlement amount." According to the DOD IG, DCAA's analysis that $234 Million would be a reasonable settlement amount "resulted in a substantial reduction in the settlement expectation anticipated by DCMA" and "inappropriately provided advance on litigative risk." The DCAA Director did not concur with that DOD IG finding.

At the end of a 23-year odyssey involving complex CAS and GAAP interpretations, a favorable ASBCA decision and an unfavorable Federal Circuit decision, we remain convinced that too many individuals within the U.S. Government want to ignore the official policy to engage in negotiation in lieu of litigation. We remain convinced that the authority given to Contracting Officers is being eroded, and that the Warrant (or Certificate of Appointment) held by Contracting Officers is worth less and less each day. As a result, we expect it will become harder and harder to resolve such issues, even when entitlement has been decided and what's being negotiated is simply quantum.

Please notice, readers, the elephant in the room, the one issue not addressed by the DOD IG report: the accuracy of the original $754.7 Million ROM created by DCAA and initially used to establish the Government's estimate of damages. Somehow, between November, 2003, and April, 2005, that ROM estimate was more than halved and became $334 Million. What happened to that number over eighteen months? We will never know because the DOD IG chose not to evaluate the DCAA methodology used to determine the initial ROM value.

We remain convinced that using DCAA as a stalking horse, and having auditors calculate ROMs without implementing rigorous oversight designed to ensure the accuracy of the ROM values, is a bad idea. In this particular instance, it may have been an inaccurate ROM value that led to the protracted litigation, the difficult negotiations, and the subsequent DOD IG Hotline complaint. We hope DCAA auditors will think twice or three times before throwing out ROMs they know to be suspect; and we hope DCMA Contracting Officers will think twice before accepting DCAA ROMs at face value.

And we hope DCMA Boards of Review will take into consideration DCAA's methodology used to calculate ROMs before rejecting a Contracting Officer's use of independent business judgment to resolve complex disputes.

Oh, one final comment:

Remember that DCMA/Pratt settlement agreement? The one that permitted Pratt to use an estimate of collaborator part costs (based on what it would have cost the company to manufacture the parts in-house)? The one that was going to settle the dispute prospectively?


About that.

On September 22, 2011, DCAA reported that the ongoing Pratt cost accounting practice "may be resulting in an estimated cost impact of $15.2 million" with respect to one year (FY 2009). A week later, DCMA issued a "notice of potential noncompliance with CAS 418" to Pratt. Pratt's response pointed out that the issue was more than six years old (hello Statute of Limitations!) and, in any case, the cost impact was immaterial in amount. DCMA has taken no action since then … subjecting the individuals involved to yet another round of DOD IG criticism.

And so it goes ….

 

Counterfeit Parts: Turning the Dial to Eleven

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Nigel Tufnel : The numbers all go to eleven. Look, right across the board, eleven, eleven, eleven and...

Marty DiBergi : Oh, I see. And most amps go up to ten?

Nigel Tufnel : Exactly.

Marty DiBergi : Does that mean it's louder? Is it any louder?

Nigel Tufnel : Well, it's one louder, isn't it? It's not ten. You see, most blokes, you know, will be playing at ten. You're on ten here, all the way up, all the way up, all the way up, you're on ten on your guitar. Where can you go from there? Where?

Marty DiBergi : I don't know.

Nigel Tufnel : Nowhere. Exactly. What we do is, if we need that extra push over the cliff, you know what we do?

Marty DiBergi : Put it up to eleven.

Nigel Tufnel : Eleven. Exactly. One louder.

Marty DiBergi : Why don't you make ten a little louder, make that the top number and make that a little louder?

Nigel Tufnel : [pauses] These go to eleven.

The Government Contracts Attorneys at McKenna, Long & Aldridge summarized the situation with simple elegance. They wrote: "Contractors still assessing compliance with the DOD counterfeit electronic parts rule could soon be faced with another counterfeit parts obligation."

You remember the DOD Counterfeit Electronic Parts rule, don't you?

It was issued after the DOD Interim Rule covering "supply chain risk." You know: that rule where contractors with secure supply chain systems would be subject to a statute-approved competitive advantage over those who did not. From our perspective, that rule was the carrot designed to entice contractors into moving into secure supply chains and product pedigree analysis.

Then DOD took the next step. It added requirements for a system to identify counterfeit electronic parts. DOD baked the new CEP requirements into the Purchasing System adequacy criteria and threatened to disapprove a contractor's purchasing system that failed to adequately address the new requirements. As we all know, a system disapproval in the DOD (or DOE) environment would lead to payment withholds that would impact cash flow. And DOD also said that the cost of rework or remedying inclusion of counterfeit electronic parts was likely to be unallowable, except in very specific circumstances. Those actions seemed like the sticks to us, designed to beat contractors who were not motivated by the carrot described above.

We figured that if the carrot didn't work, then sticks certainly would.

We figured the rulemakers had done their job and contractors would be moving in the desired direction.

And now the FAR Council has turned the dial to eleven.

We're talking about FAR Case 2013-002, "Expanded Reporting of Nonconforming Items." Here's a link to the proposed rule, which would revise the FAR (not just the DFARS) to require all government contractors to report not only counterfeit electronic parts, but also counterfeit parts of all types.

If adopted as proposed, the FAR rule will impose two fundamental requirements on government contactors:

  1. Ensure that vendors or suppliers of raw or processed materials, parts, components, subassemblies, and finished assemblies have an acceptable quality control system and that quality escapes from these vendors and suppliers are not incorporated into the contractor's final product; and

  1. Screen reports in the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) to avoid the use and delivery of items that are counterfeit or suspect counterfeit items or that contain a major or critical nonconformance.

Contractors will be responsible for submitting a written report (a) to the Contracting Officer within 30 days, and (b) to the GIDEP within 60 days, when the contractor becomes aware of a counterfeit (or potentially counterfeit) part or if a quality escape deemed to be a critical or major nonconformance impacted a common item or more than one customer.

Clear?

Let's quote some proposed FAR definitions:

Common item means an item that has multiple applications versus a single or peculiar application. Common items include, for example, raw or processed materials, parts, components, subassemblies, and finished assemblies that are commonly available products (such as nondevelopmental items, off-the-shelf items, National Stock Number items, or commercial catalog items).

Counterfeit item means an unlawful or unauthorized reproduction, substitution, or alteration that has been knowingly mismarked, misidentified, or otherwise misrepresented to be an authentic, unmodified item from the original manufacturer, or a source with the express written authority of the original manufacturer or design activity, including an authorized aftermarket manufacturer. Unlawful or unauthorized substitution includes used items represented as new, or the false identification of grade, serial number, lot number, date code, or performance characteristics.

Critical nonconformance means a nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or services; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission.

Design activity means an organization, Government or contractor, that has responsibility for the design and configuration of an item, including the preparation or maintenance of design documents. Design activity could be the original organization, or an organization to which design responsibility has been transferred.

Major nonconformance means a nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result in failure of the supplies or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose.

Quality escape means a situation in which a supplier's internal quality control system fails to identify and contain a nonconforming condition.

Suspect counterfeit item means an item for which credible evidence (including but not limited to, visual inspection or testing) provides reasonable doubt that the item is authentic.

The proposed rule would apply to primes and to subcontractors, to simplified acquisitions and to negotiated acquisitions, and to acquisitions of commercial items.

Interestingly, the new requirements are not being driven by Congress. That is to say, Congress did not direct the FAR Council to take the far-reaching rule-making actions that have been proposed.

Readers may recall our analysis of the FY 2012 NDAA, in which we noted Section 818, which required DOD to enhance its processes for detecting and avoiding counterfeit electronic parts. Let's let the FAR Council describe how they implemented that piece of statutory direction, courtesy of the Background section of the proposed rule. They wrote-

While section 818 applied only to DoD, only to electronic products, and only to contractors covered by the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), the FAR Council concluded that the principles expressed in section 818 should be applied beyond DoD, should not be limited to electronic products, and should not be limited to CAS-covered contractors. Similarly, although OFPP Policy Letter 91-3 requires agencies to report to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP), the FAR Council determined that reporting would be much more timely and effective if contractors were to make the reports directly to GIDEP.

So there you have it. A new, potentially far-reaching, proposed rule driven not by statute but, instead, by the FAR Council's view of the seriousness of the threat.

But we're not done yet.

Perhaps the FAR Council is not wrong in its assessment of the situation.

On June 13, 2014, the Department of Justice announced that-

The former president of a Burlington, N.J.,-based defense contracting business was arrested and charged today … Richard Melton, 44, of Moorestown, N.J., was charged by complaint with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud for receiving $3 million from 2008 to 2009 as a result of allegedly fraudulent contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

Melton owned and operated Partz Network from April 2003 to December 2009. Partz Network contracted with the government to supply the DoD with parts on small-dollar contracts. The majority of the contracts were for replacement parts for military rolling stock: trucks, trailers, and engineering equipment. The majority of Partz Network's DoD contracts required that the items provided be manufactured by DoD-recognized qualified manufacturers. Melton and his conspirators allegedly lied on Partz Network's bids for DoD contracts, stating that they would be providing the "exact product" sought by the DoD, meaning that the product was manufactured by a DoD-recognized qualified manufacturer. In fact, Partz Network was allegedly providing parts made by unapproved, and oftentimes unknown, sources.

In 2007, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), a DoD contracting agency, became aware of reports of nonconforming parts being received from Partz Network. As a result, DLA required Partz Network to provide "traceability documents" to confirm that the items it was supplying were actually being manufactured by DoD recognized qualified manufacturers. Partz Network provided traceability documents and invoices to DLA regarding items provided under the DoD contracts. When DLA researched the traceability documents supplied by Partz Network, DLA learned that the documents were either altered or completely fictitious. …

The items ultimately provided by Partz Network were not the exact products required under the contract because the items were not manufactured by a qualified manufacturer. In fact, on Nov. 10, 2007, five days prior to Partz Network submitting its bid for the contract, Melton sent an e-mail to a Partz Network employee with a link to the DoD RFQ that stated the following: "Bid these (1400) HMMWW oil pans at $53.85 and I will have them made overseas by [a company located in the People's Republic of China] or another overseas firm, 200-day lead time." Based on Partz Network documents related to that contract, Partz Network purchased the oil pans that were provided to the DoD from a company located in India in January 2008. …

The wire fraud conspiracy count with which Melton is charged carries a maximum potential penalty of 20 years in prison and a fine of $250,000, or twice the gain or loss from the offense.

So as long as the U.S. Government perceives the threat of non-conforming and/or counterfeit parts to be a serious threat, they would seem to be justified in requiring contractors to take measures to detect and deter their occurrence. The fact that it's going to impose new requirements (with additional costs) on contractors probably did not weigh heavily in the FAR Council deliberations. Perhaps with final implementation of this rule, there will be sufficient carrots and sticks available to reign in this practice.

On the other hand, when the U.S. Government keeps awarding contracts to the low-price bidder without regard to how those low prices were derived ( e.g., outsourcing manufacturing to the People's Republic of China), it creates an incentive for contractors to keep breaking the rules. Note that the proposed rule would apply to both simplified acquisitions (Part 13) and commercial acquisitions (Part 12) as well as to negotiated acquisitions (Part 15). Price analysis is a significant aspect of Part 12 and Part 13 source selection decisions. It would not be uncommon for price to be the sole deciding factor between what seems to be otherwise responsible competing sources.

Moreover, it seems unrealistic to expect contractors to be motivated by regulatory carrots and sticks, when a threat of 20 years in Federal prison doesn't seem to affect behavior. The same people who would seek to defraud the Federal government prior to the implementation of this proposed rule would seem to still seek to defraud the Federal government, though of course there would be more certifications to falsify and more required reports to ignore. The same people who would ignore the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act and the False Statements Act would not seem to be deterred by this new set of contractual requirements.

Consequently, one possible outcome of this proposed rule would be to increase the costs associated with the "good guys"-the compliant contractors who will do their best to meet their obligations … while having no cost impact on the "bad guys" (those who intend to provide counterfeit or nonconforming parts regardless of the consequences). If this is the outcome, then the price disparity between the good guys and the bad guys is going to increase, leading to more awards to the bad guys.

Will this be the outcome? Only time will tell.

 

The Ability to Accurately Input IR&D Information

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Recently DCAA issued audit guidance designed to assist its auditors with the requirement that certain "major" DOD contractors must input IR&D information into the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).

Readers may remember we addressed the new requirement when it was promulgated. We wrote: "In sum, the new rule establishes two requirements: (1) reporting to DTIC, and (2) review of the information reporting by DCAA and the cognizant DOD ACO to determine which IR&D projects are 'of potential interest' to the Pentagon. Failure to meet the first requirement will lead to disallowed IR&D associated with specific, individual, IR&D projects."

The new DCAA audit guidance adds some detail to our summary. It states-

Contractors subject to the regulation must:

  • input project information to the DTIC database no later than three months after the end of the contractor fiscal year (CFY) in which the contractor initially incurs the associated IR&D;
  • annually update information in the database for ongoing projects (no later than three months after the end of the CFY in which the associated IR&D cost is incurred); and
  • update the database when the contractor considers the project completed.

Importantly, the DCAA audit guidance does not focus on the absolute accuracy of the data being input into DTIC; instead, it emphasizes the impact associated with the simple failure to input any information. With respect to audits of Forward Pricing Rates, the audit team may reduce or eliminate forecasted IR&D expenditures "based on the contractor's ability to appropriately complete the requirements to input data into the DTIC system." With respect to adequacy reviews of a contractor's Accounting System, "Audit teams should consider whether the contractor's failure to have adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with the regulation results in an accounting system deficiency."

Based on the foregoing, an inability to timely input the required information could have far-reaching and unpleasant ramifications. Accordingly, defense contractors subject to the DTIC reporting requirement should assign responsibility for the input and also design a compliance check to ensure the information was submitted on time.

Of course, the DCAA audit guidance reminded auditors that a failure to comply with the DTIC reporting requirements could and should lead to questioned (and ultimately disallowed costs). The audit guidance stated-

If the contractor fails to input the IR&D information into the DTIC database, the costs are expressly unallowable; audit teams should question the costs and recommend application of penalties. If the team identifies significant expressly unallowable costs, consider reporting a noncompliance with CAS 405, Accounting for unallowable costs.

We have already seen both DCAA and DCMA probing the DTIC input. Frankly, it should not be a big deal to support an audit RFI for those contractors subject to the rule. This is only going to be a big deal if somebody doesn't input the information when required to do so. But contractors required to input IR&D information, who do not or cannot timely fulfill their responsibility, may be in for a very rough ride indeed.

 

T&M Contracts Get Riskier

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RisksTime and Material (T&M) contracts have always been the least preferred contract type, whether you are a Government customer or contractor.

From a Governmental viewpoint, a T&M contract does not require performance; it requires delivery of hours. The contractor delivers the hours and it gets paid at the specified contractual rates, regardless of whether or not those hours actually lead to the desired program outcome. In addition, there are cost-reimbursement aspects (on the "M" side) which means audits and negotiated final rates … which means it's going to take quite some time to actually close-out that contract after performance.

From a Government contractor perspective, a T&M contract requires juggling a number of variables to ensure a profit is generated. Employee salaries need to be estimated in advance, as do indirect rates. If somebody gets an unexpected raise, or if the indirect rates unexpectedly jump, then there is going to be immediate profit degradation. In addition, the T&M Payment clause (52.232-7) imposes a number of relatively onerous compliance requirements and the Allowable Cost & Payment clause (52.216-7) also imposes a number of definitely onerous compliance requirements. And the fact that actual allowable indirect cost rates are allocated to the "M" side means audits and auditors and protracted final rate negotiations … which means it's going to take quite some time to actually final-bill and close-out that contract after performance.

The profit negotiations on T&M contracts are difficult. Officially the contractor should not bill profit/fee on the "M" side of its contract. Officially subcontractor hourly billing rates (which include billing rates for other affiliated divisions of the contractor) do not bear any prime contractor profit. But of course the contractor expects to be paid a reasonable profit, not only on its own contract hours, but also on the hours billed by its subcontractors. Given that the only way to bill profit on those other hours (and materials and travel and Other Direct Costs) is to bake them into the contractor's hourly billing rates, what seems like a reasonable bottom-line profit percentage to the contractor seems egregiously rapacious to the Government Contracting Officer trying to negotiate a price.

For the foregoing (and other) reasons, neither contractors nor their Government customers should desire to enter into a T&M contract.

That warning doesn't keep far too many T&M contracts from being awarded each day. The Government keeps issuing 'em and contractors keep signing up for 'em, even though both parties know going in that there are going to be difficulties and risks, and at the end of the period of performance somebody is likely to be upset.

And the risk/reward equation of T&M contracts just skewed once again, as DCAA issued new audit guidance on May 22, 2014. The audit guidance reminds auditors of old 2007 guidance (issued in conjunction with the revision of the 52.232.7 T&M Payment clause) that said-

Labor hours incurred to perform tasks for which labor qualifications were specified in the contract will not be paid to the extent the work is performed by employees that do not meet the qualifications specified in the contract, unless specifically authorized by the Contracting Officer.

The audit guidance recognizes that each hourly labor category not only has a fixed billing rate, but also has a definition as to which contractor (or subcontractor) employees are allowed to bill at that particular rate. (We should note that is yet another variable the contractor needs to manage: making sure that its mapping of employees to labor categories/hourly billing rates complies with contractual definitions.)

The DCAA audit guidance tells auditors that a contractor's failure to properly map its employees to the contract-defined labor categories/hourly billing rates is not just an opportunity to question costs. It is also an opportunity to question the adequacy of a contractor's accounting system. The audit guidance states-

If the audit team determines that the contractor has a material amount of T&M billings that include hours that do not meet the labor qualifications specified in the contract, a significant deficiency related to DFARS 252.242-7006(c)(12) should be reported. The contractor has failed to establish adequate internal controls to exclude from costs charged to Government contracts, amounts that are not allowable in terms of contract provisions in the FAR 52.232-7 T&M Payment Clause. An adequate accounting system would include procedures for a contractor to ensure that they get the Contracting Officer's specific authorization prior to the delivery and billing of hours that do not meet the qualifications specified in the contract.

Consequently, a T&M contract not only includes most of the "normal" risks associated with government contracting plus unique profit risks plus unique personnel risks, it now also includes the risk that if you get anything wrong and DCAA notices your mistake, you may have to deal with a "deficiency report" and a recommendation that your accounting system be deemed to be inadequate for cost-reimbursement and/or T&M contracting.

But readers may notice something in the new DCAA audit guidance: it isn't new. It's essentially a rehash of the 2007 audit guidance plus a bolt-on paragraph related to the DFARS Business Systems administration/compliance regime. So why did DCAA issue it?

Well, we don't know the answer to that question. But we did notice a May 19, 2014 article in the Washington Post that reported on the findings of a DOD Inspector General audit report. The DOD IG report was FOIA'd by POGO (the Project on Government Oversight) and would not otherwise have been published had POGO not FOIA'd the DOD IG.

The not-for-publication DOD IG audit report found that from October 2007 through March 2013 Northrop Grumman "did not properly charge labor rates" for a counter-narcoterrorism contract. WaPo reported that "the Army agency in charge of the contract did not ensure that the people performing the work had the necessary qualifications. The agency also did not review invoices for millions of dollars of overtime."

Moreover (according to WaPo)-

… the IG found $21.7 million in 'potentially excessive payments' for overtime, including one employee who billed $176,900 for 1,208 hours in a 12-day period. That caught investigators' attention, since the employee was billing for more than 100 hours a day. The IG found that out of the charges submitted over nearly six years for 460 DynCorp employees working for Northrop Grumman, 360 did not meet the specified labor requirements, leading to $91.4 million in questionable costs. In one case, a program manager who billed 5,729 hours over a year and a half, totaling $1.2 million, did not have a bachelor's degree, which was a requirement of the position. Another employee billed 16,270 hours' worth $2 million over five years but was qualified for only 161 hours of the work.

Is there a connection between the May 19, 2014 Washington Post story about mismatches between contractor employee qualifications and contract-defined labor categories with individually specified hourly billing rates, and the May 22, 2014 reminder to DCAA auditors to check for matches between contractor employee qualifications and contract-defined labor categories with individually specified hourly billing rates?

We don't know but, if there is no official connection, then it's surely a strange coincidence, is it not?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.